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Abstract 
The present research focuses on analysing the judicial uncertainty in the 
implementation, interpretation and application of the ICC Statute both in 
international and national arenas. In this context examined are the parameters 
of state sovereignty as the main source of theoretical as well as practical 
contemporary debate on the relationship between lex specialis character of 
ICC norms and domestic legal regimes. Varying and frequently inconsistent 
degrees of international and national compliance with international criminal 
law due to the multiplicity of legal regimes are scrutinised by analysing the 
relationship between national and ICC measures with regard to aspects of pre- 
trial proceedings, such as surrender of accused persons and transfer of criminal 
proceedings, rights of suspects and defendants as well as some aspects of 
sentencing in so far as they affect the prima facie jurisdiction. 
One of the main objectives of the ICC Treaty is to advance the unification of 
international criminal law. Whilst it may be contended that this body of law is 
acquiring a great degree of specificity and uniformity in content through the 
Statute, both its development and importantly its scope are fundamentally 
reliant on interpretation and application at national level; it is here that 
international criminal law is fragmented. Consequently, its understanding and 
enforcement are inconsistent. 
The ICC Statute presents issues that are the result of the fusion of common and 
civil law traditions as well as a blend of diverse criminal laws within each one 
of those systems. Distinguishing between Anglo-American and Continental 
European criminal procedures has become increasingly complex and 
transgressed. Such blend of legal traditions, whilst it must ensure that justice is 
rendered with equality, fairness and effectiveness, generates nevertheless ever- 
increasing lack of legal orientation. The aim of this pastiche is therefore to 
establish an international, uniform standard across contemporary justice 
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systems. However, the application of the ICC provisions will depend on 
particular method of implementation of the Rome Treaty into domestic law, 
local political situation, the nature of a conflict (armed conflict is where most 
of the ICC crimes are likely to occur), any peace process involving regional 
amnesties and pardons and domestic policies and rules on sentencing. 
The general perception of the ICC and the law it represents is that of a 
powerful, centralised regime. Contrary to this belief, a proposition is made 
here for a less hierarchical international criminal justice that is fundamentally 
reliant upon national courts and law enforcement agencies. Such a proposition 
emphasises the need for the ICC involvement at a local level. In this context, 
the thesis sets out to clarify the ICC law and related Statute enforcement 
issues. 
The law stated is correct as of 15 th February 2006. 
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Introduction 
The present study focuses on analysing the judicial uncertainty in 
implementation, interpretation and application of international criminal law as 
codified by the ICC Treaty. I begin my examination by assessing the scope of 
state sovereignty as the main source of theoretical as well as Practical 
contemporary debate on the duties to comply in good faith with the ICC Treaty 
as well as to respect fundamental pre-trial procedural rights of suspects and 
accused persons. By establishing the sui generis normative nature of the Court, 
under scrutiny here is the relationship between national and international 
courts in particular with a view of determining the varying degrees of 
observance of pre-trial procedural laws. The aim of my work is to evaluate the 
contemporary literature on the ICC, which purports a uniform, even universal 
normative ICC system, therefore a supranational standard of international 
criminal justice. In this context I aim to provide an insight into both monist 
and dualist legal reasoning in defining the hierarchical relationship between 
international and national law against claims that such relationship is well 
defined and rigid'. 
The parameters of legal structures within which perpetrators of most serious 
international crimes are surrendered to the International Criminal Court and 
the legal frameworks within which the rights of such individuals are best 
protected are not sufficiently precise in international law. The ICC Statute 
tentatively attempts to reconcile the fragmented approach to international and 
national enforcement schemes. The study tests the supposition which 
visualises the ICC Statute as one of the most important tools in the 
harmonisation process between civil and common law traditions, the 
adversarial and inquisitorial criminal justice orders. The supposition is founded 
on the fact that the ratification and correct implementation of the Rome Treaty 
has led to adequate legislative and policy amendments in the domestic legal 
orders of numerous States Parties. Moreover, the validation of the International 
'E. g., Broornhall B., "International Justice and the International Criminal 
Court: Between 
Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (oxford Monographs in International Law)" 
(2004). 
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Criminal Court's surrender and deferral mechanisms is analysed here against 
the ICC Statute's procedural safeguards vis-a-vis national ones. These two 
aspects of the ICC regime produce a lack of clarity and uniformity of legal 
standards. Furthermore, the present research questions claims of universality 
of international criminal law and certain human rights; it investigates causes 
and effects of the fragmentation and regionalism of these bodies of law. 
The Court's jurisdiction may not be triggered automatically nor be imposed on 
States by virtue of accession to the Statute alone. From this perspective, the 
International Criminal Court has features of an arbitration tribunal, operating 
only according to contingent political will. Chapter I presents the overall 
context of the thesis and qualifies the assertion of a fragmented application of 
the ICC Statute which is analysed both through the scrutiny of the text of the 
Statute, therefore its lacunae, and by the investigation of the outcomes of the 
multiplicity of implementation methods which result in and reflect the above 
said fragmentation. Rights of States vis-a-vis the ICC within the scope of 
complementarity are also examined here. Chapters 2 and 3 aim at providing 
examples, therefore substantiating the premises of Chapter I in particular with 
a view to revealing how the non-uniformity of the application of the ICC law 
affects the rights of the accused persons in pre-trial proceedings. Here, mostly 
the judicial sovereignty of States is examined in light of diverging ICC Statute 
implementation models, the survival of traditional extradition defences such as 
ne bis in idem in the ICC surrender regime, the right of States to prioritise 
domestic prosecutions or competing jurisdictional requests, the survival of 
amnesties and the right of States to enter into treaties which effectively defeat 
the object and purpose of the Rome Treaty. Chapter 4 specifically questions 
the position and therefore the validity of Article 98 (2) immunity agreements 
in the context of the sui generis nature of the ICC. The examination of the 
immunity agreements serves to further establish the inequalities in the 
application and interpretation of the ICC Statute. The thesis studies the ICC 
system in a wider, nation-orientated context in order to outline the issues 
inherent in validating the ICC regime as a centralized accountability 
mechanism and proposes the decentralization of the same; as such it may 
develop into an effective apparatus for assisting nations in advancing the rule 
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of law, emancipating it to international standards. In consideration of the fact 
that the jurisprudence of the Court has not evolved significantly since the 
undertaking of the present study, certain aspects of the thesis are necessarily 
speculative but they seek to define criteria against which the assessment of the 
ICC is to be based. The objective of Chapters 1 and 4 is to scrutinise the ICC 
as a part of wider, complex legal and political environment where interests of 
States, individuals and victims compete. Chapters 2 and 3 on the one hand are 
concerned with revealing how the consequences of the binary and 
jurisdictionally imbalanced ICC legal regime reflect on substantial law such as 
the rights of suspects and accused persons. Rights granted by the ICC Statute 
as well as those of States within the realm of the surrender model are examined 
here. Whereas the ICC Treaty arguably erodes national judicial sovereignty by 
imposing international duties and rights more directly to the citizens of nations 
in their individual capacity, rather then governments, varying implementation 
methods will define, broaden or limit the scope and legitimacy of the ICC 
surrender model. This is illustrated for instance, from observing the extent to 
which traditional extradition defences have survived the ICC surrender model 
as well as the existence and enforcement of regional amnesties. In turn, this is 
strongly indicative not only of the binary nature of the interpretation and 
application of the ICC Statute, but also of the subsequent disparity in 
availability of remedies to suspects and accused persons whose rights have 
been infringed. 
Problems of ICC Treaty interpretation go beyond the mere Treaty language; 
notwithstanding the principle of pacta sunt servanda (i. e. treaties are binding 
on the Parties and must be performed in good faith) these lie in the 
contradiction between the legal principle through which it is possible to arrive 
at an interpretation and reconciliation with constitutionalism. In fact, 
international treaties may be considered to be contracts, legislation and even 
constitutions. One of the main characteristics of the parliamentary model, such 
as the British model, is its non-recognition of any so-called 'higher law' that 
could interrupt the validity of an Act of Parliament. Pursuant to the 
parliamentary model, even if a court finds legislation defeating the object and 
purpose of the ICC Statute or even being in clear violation of it, such finding 
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will not affect the validity or the enforcement of those provisions. Generally, 
in the parliamentary model courts do not examine whether legislation is or is 
not compatible with rules of international law as an Act of Parliament cannot 
be ultra vires, beyond Parliament's jurisdiction. From this perspective 
immunity agreements, or ICC Article 98 (2) agreements, cannot be deemed 
void ab inition, or be construed as being incompatible with the Rome Statute. 
In the constitutional model on the other hand, a parliament cannot be 
4sovereign' because its legislation must be compatible with the 'higher law'. 
Importantly, this model affords greater flexibility as far as judicial bodies and 
not parliaments assess the compatibility of national law with international 
norms. If a court reaches the conclusion that a national norm is incompatible 
with the international one, it will not apply that norm. 
Developing themes around state culpability pursuant to the Rome Treaty 
becomes challenging as the actual impact of the association between Security 
Council action and the operation of the Court is political in nature and 
consequently, highly ambiguous. From this perspective, it becomes hard to 
persuade a country to become a party to the ICC Statute, a Statute that may 
apply to all States except to the permanent members of the Security Council. 
Consequently, complementarity, or primacy of national judicial authority, 
must be respected unreservedly. An examination of the Security Council 
referral of the situation in Sudan shows how in practice complementarity is 
bypassed. Obviously, the persistent weakness and obstruction of the rule of 
law in certain parts of the world demand continuous international attention and 
monitoring. However, whereas the failings of the rule of law through its 
obstruction may be restored through ICC intervention or interference, the 
weaknesses of the rule of law, which is entrenched in a political dimension and 
therefore a result of it, should only be adequately dealt with by the Security 
Council and not through ICC action. 
The ICC Statute surrender model introduces independent rights for the 
individual as a subject of a transfer order prior to or after actual surrender. 
The 
enforcement measures endorsed by the ICC are not as coercive 
in nature as 
those of the ICTY/ICTR, but instead encompass a greater margin of 
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appreciation for human rights. Human rights discussed here relate to those 
relevant both to pre-trial and, to a lesser extent, trial proceedings as individuals 
should have the right to be tried within a jurisdiction that affords them 
optimum procedural safeguards. In order to establish the legitimacy of the ICC 
surrender model, which is different in nature and scope with those of the ICTY 
and ICTR, compliance with transfer orders of the ICC demands full and 
unreserved observance and enforcement of fundamental rights. Some of the 
rights concern the prohibition of prolonged arbitrary detention, rights to a fair 
trial, to proportionate sentencing, as well as the general interests of the accused 
persons and interests of criminal justice in acceptance of illegally obtained 
persons and/or evidence. Legal scrutiny is a fundamental component in 
legitimising the work of the ICC, although the Court's relationship with the 
Security Council questions the adequacy of the Statute's review mechanism. In 
this theoretical context, the legal status of the ICC is evaluated and the relevant 
treaty regulatory frameworks analysed. 
The experience of the ICTY underscores great obstacles of investigating 
crimes from The Hague. Notwithstanding the ICC Prosecutor's partial powers 
to conduct investigations on a territory of a State, the geographical distance 
between the ICC investigative teams and witnesses will render the assessing of 
what is relevant material, evidence or testimony especially difficult. 
Moreover, the elementary importance of interpreting is often neglected; under 
international jurisdiction, witness statements will be recorded in English, only 
to be translated into French or other relevant languages, by different persons 
each time and therefore increasing the gap between the initial witness 
2 testimony and the final product 
The authority of international criminal law may only benefit from a 
synchronized approach to the nature and extent of applications for judicial 
reviews at a national level. Such trans-national convergence represents a 
unique opportunity to legitimise a uniform and long lasting authority, therefore 
application of international criminal law as codified by the Rome Treaty. The 
2 Pantz S., "From Bosnia to Kosovo and to Bosnia Again" Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2004) p-459. 
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institutional need for independent judicial review by national organs in 
executing surrender orders is necessary in facilitating transfer to the detriment 
of upholding the Court's unsatisfactory review process. Such conclusion seems 
in line with the principles of complementarity. Consequently, and in the 
interests of consistently promoting advanced domestic application of 
international law, national prosecutions for international crimes will enjoy 
greater integrity and legitimacy. As the following chapters propose, national 
investigations and prosecutions, albeit more infrequent than international ones 
and less compliant with higher standards of international criminal justice, are 
crucial in developing themes around individual and state culpabilities. In turn, 
the effects of this serve a twofold purpose. The first one is to rebuild, with 
international monitoring and assistance, national accountability or judicial 
institutions that, with a long lasting effect, promote deterrence. The present 
thesis questions in several parts the boundaries of the ICC Statute premise that 
common bonds unite all people and that their cultures are pieced in a shared 
heritage. Such presumption neglects to respect the nature of divergences 
among nations created through collateralism; such disregard as a result, 
neglects the need to find the root causes to conflicts or obstructions of law in 
general and ultimately provide adequate remedies. The root causes are 
customarily political and socio-economic 'emergencies'. As such, they 
frequently invite a 'pragmatism' that departs from principled respect of human 
rights and international criminal law. From this viewpoint, complementarity is 
a reflection and encouragement of operational collateralism that, in practice, 
diminishes the uniformity of the ICC law both in interpretation and 
application. This collateralism would appear to be justified for instance, by the 
exclusion of universal jurisdiction in the Rome Statute, its non-express 
prohibition of amnesties and pardons for perpetrators of the most heinous 
crimes of human kind and the extensive number of Article 98 (2) 
immunity 
agreements. The marginal treatment of these 'obstructions' to the effective 
enforcement of the ICC Statute necessitates the Court's constant 
involvement 
in national proceedings through training and monitoring which should, over 
time, result in institutional manipulation, through which the process of 
harmonisation of international criminal substantive and procedural 
law may be 
facilitated and advanced. What is needed therefore is the ongoing 
development 
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of the law of the ICC Statute. That this is conceivable and achievable in 
practice is determinable through the experience of mixed tribunals for 
example. 
The study aims at contributing to the scholarship in the field of international 
criminal law and is a comprehensive legislative review; it offers a pragmatic 
way of looking at and utilising the ICC mechanisms. The ob ect of the present 
study is also to structure these concepts into a more comprehensive system of 
surrender and deferral that sees the emancipation of municipal international 
criminal law. Instrumental in the vision of synchronizing the practices of 
States in successfully executing the ICC Statute is a decentralized operability 
of the Court. The study is an important and timely endeavour to underline the 
uncertainty of the ICC Statute both in terms of its hierarchy in contemporary 
international criminal law both with regard to States and the Security Council 
and treaty law and with particular reference to substantive elements affecting 
the transfer of criminal proceedings and surrender of accused persons 3. By 
outlining the vagueness and ambiguities in the enforcement of the ICC 
provisions in this context, the study furthermore emphasises the need to 
'nationalise' the ICC Statute through international participation and 
monitoring. 
Methodology 
The present thesis scrutinises in the first place substantive elements of the ICC 
Statute with respect to pre-trial proceedings, notably the transfer of criminal 
proceedings and surrender of accused persons. It then compares these with 
national relevant provisions in order to determine how, in a jurisdictional 
claim, the rights of individuals may be best protected. The thesis describes and 
3 In view of the fact for instance that "the ICC penalty regime reveals lack of substance and 
the underdeveloped and conflicting penaljustifications and the irrationality ofpraxis" in 
Henham R., "Some issues for sentencing in the International Criminal Court", International 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 52, p. 82. 
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assesses the nature of the relationship between the Court and States Parties 
within the realms of international treaty law with the aim of illustrating 
varying and frequently inconsistent degrees of international and national 
compliance with international criminal law as stipulated by the ICC Statute, 
due to the multiplicity of legal regimes. It is argued in fact that the ICC Statute 
reflects a sui generis legal regime. From this theoretical perspective, the 
research progresses towards analysing the judicial uncertainty in 
implementing, interpreting and applying international criminal law and 
relevant human rights instruments 4. Through the examination of the full extent 
of the principle of complementarity and immunity agreements, I examine the 
scope of state sovereignty as the main source of theoretical as well as practical 
debate on parameters of duties imposed on States to enforce the Rome Treaty. 
Through the evaluation of the case law emanating from other international 
criminal courts, tribunals and panels, human rights courts as well as local 
courts, the thesis aims to reveal the impact such jurisdictional contests have on 
the rights of individuals and the effects of further advancement of international 
criminal law through res judicata. This evaluation also purports to indicate the 
effects of the imbalance of power between the Court and States Parties, 
illustrated for instance through the decisions of the Security Council on the 
future uniformity and potential universality of the ICC Statute. The aim of the 
present investigation is to validate the ICC legal system and subsequently learn 
whether a global, uniform standard of international criminal justice is 
attainable. By depicting the hierarchical relationship between international and 
national legal frameworks in international criminal law a conclusion is reached 
that uniformity of the ICC law is, at the present time, hindered by collaretalism 
and regionalism derived from and maintained by political economies which are 
not, per se, the subject of analysis in the thesis. 
Planning and designing the research project consisted of three main phases. 
The first one consisted of conceptualisation and preliminary consultations. In 
this phase the research strategy was planned and developed and the 
4 E. g., Shany Y., "The Competing Jurisdictions ofInternational Criminal Courts and 
Tribunals", 2003, questioning the consistency of decisions rendered by different court s and 
tribunals pertaining to similar legal questions but arising out of different disputes, at 79. 
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international bibliography on the ICC and relevant legislations revised and 
updated. A strategy was developed according to (a) the purpose and nature of 
the research project; (b) personal existing knowledge of the subject and (c) 
deadline for completion. In the second phase data was collected, translated 
where appropriate, selected, filtered and categorised; in the final, third stage, 
descriptions and analysis were conducted and conclusions drawn. These steps 
were not entirely linear for it was necessary to repeat certain steps or approach 
them from a different perspective as the understanding of legal issues grew. 
Developing the thesis, thereby identifying arguments, entailed first of all 
acquainting myself with both primary and secondary sources on the topic. The 
initial thinking time was crucial in locating determinative facts and legal 
issues. Once identified, they were given priority at the beginning of the 
research process. The original research plan was periodically revised in 
response to feedback from the research results and/or new developing factors. 
Comparative methodology was designated for the purposes of the research and 
is validated here as being a method of legal science that plays a crucial role in 
the interpretation of legal norms pertaining to various legal systems. However, 
similarities and differences between the laws of two or more countries are not 
the subject of comparison. Rather, the reference to a large number of countries 
(States Parties) is to be understood collectively as one variable of the 
comparison, the other being the ICC legal framework. The aim of the present 
study is not to compare one or more States per se, but instead only one aspect 
of the variable represented by the ICC States Parties and to a lesser extent 
States Non-Parties. A further comparative study is conducted between the 
jurisprudence concerning relevant legal factors of the recent ad hoc tribunals 
(ICTY/ICTR), international panels, mixed tribunals as well as the European 
Court of Human Rights judgments and the ICC Statute. The latter form of 
comparison had the objective of estimating the effectiveness of the ICC 
decision-making structure as well as determining the impact of ICC res 
judicata on national proceedings. The large number of countries described and 
referred to is intended to provide a comprehensive picture of degrees of (non) 
uniformity and moderate success of the ICC Statute within the realms of local 
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jurisprudence. The particular selection of the countries under scrutiny seeks to 
inquire the process by which both common and civil law traditions as well as 
certain political socio/economic and cultural ideologies advance, alter or 
otherwise shape ICC law. The systematic examination, both doctrinally and 
empirically of the methods of implementation and interpretation of the ICC 
Statute across State Parties purports to investigate to what extent common 
interests of international criminal justice survive the local legal and political 
reasoning. The designation of the comparative method provided ample latitude 
in enabling a study of legal systems, in a collective sense, on a large scale, 
which was necessary to achieve representation amongst the States Parties. 
Importantly, the comparative method enabled the identification as to the forms 
of comparable legal components across jurisdictions as well as revealed shared 
practices by highlighting the dynamics of process in the application of the ICC 
Statute. 
Systematic comparisons were used to establish correlations and ultimately 
causal connections and supposed 'laws' on one hand and on the other to 
rigorously test propositions of universality and uniformity in application of the 
ICC Statute as well as to assess the value and reach of the measures of 
compellability against unwilling, unable, uncooperative, malevolent or 
isolationist States. 
The data derived through the comparative method consisted of both primary 
and secondary sources. Secondary sources were largely employed during the 
initial research phase in order to detect primary sources around which 
arguments were later developed. Initially, secondary materials such as leading 
existing literature on the ICC and international criminal law in general, 
attributable predominantly to judges, lawyers, other practitioners and legal 
scholars had been reviewed and examined. This process revealed that such 
literature places the ICC as "the central pillar in the world community for 
upholding fundamental dictates of humanity"5. The majority of scholarly 
5 Cassese A., "From Nuremberg to Rome: International Military Tribunals to the International 
Criminal Courf ' in I The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary 
18 (Cassese A. et al eds, 2002). 
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writings on the ICC also envisage the ICC at the heart of "global efforts to 
develop and eqforce human rights and humanitarian law"6 . It anticipates that 
the Court is to "clarify existing ambiguities in the law" and to set "highest 
international standards"7 of due process as well as "advance international 
5,8 criminal law ... thus contribute to the globalisation of criminal justice . 
Moreover, the Court's supporters believe that the ICC will put an end to 
impunity for grave human rights violations and act as a deterrent for war 
crimes around the world9. The thesis does not dispute the undeniable need for 
a homogeneous standard of accountability on a global plane for the most 
serious of international crimes. It does however challenge the universality 
assertion and by going beyond leading writings on the subject it suggests that 
consistency and uniformity are hampered by various factors such as judicial 
sovereignty, the varying implementation methods which frequently strive to 
accommodate constitutional and parliamentary models, and the right of States 
to enter into treaties that defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Treaty. By 
examining the legal principles which govern transfer of criminal proceedings 
and surrender of accused persons, the thesis furthermore assesses the limits of 
the principally common law approach to serious international crimes and its 
compatibility with other judicial traditions and conditions across the globe. 
Predominantly, the leading existing literature is ICC-centred and assumes its 
legal framework as the principal and optimal mechanism for international 
criminal law enforcement and accountability by endorsing the highest 
standards of international criminal justice. This is reflected in assertions such 
as that the establishment of the Court represents a promise of "universal 
justice"10. Contemporary literature also advances the progression of the monist 
doctrine of international treaty law, which presupposes the supremacy of 
6 Bassiouni M. C., "The Time Has Comefor an International Criminal Court" I IND. INT'L 
& COMP. REV. I (199 1); Sadat L. N. and Cardens S. R., "The New International Criminal 
Court: An Uneasy Revolution" 88 GEO. L. J. 381 (2000). 
7 For example, Pejic J., "Creating a Permanent International Court: The Obstacles to 
Independence and Effectiveness", 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. (1998), pp. 291,294. 
8 Treiffter 0., "Domesticos de ratificacion e implementacion" in La Nueva Justicia Penal 
Supranacional: Desarrollos Post-Roma 13,44,45 (Kai Ambos ed. 2002). 
9 Politi M., in "The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to 
Impunity", (Politi M. and Nesi G. eds 2001), 8-15. 
10 U. N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, Press release, Statement of Secretary General Kofi 
Annan before the International Bar Association in New York (June 12,1997), U. N. Doc. 
SG/SM/6257 (1997). 
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international law "giving little weight to the proper or applicable law notions 
based on the doctrine of autonomy of the will of the parties"' 1. Essays on the 
general scope and effectiveness of the ICC Statute are typically confined to 
comparisons with other international criminal courts and tribunals, with the 
intention of examining legal constructs of the Statute with a view of studying 
proceedings to be conducted before the Court 12 . In contrast, the present study 
is nation-orientated and it recommends that a long term, uniform and 
consistent criterion of international criminal justice may only be aimed at 
national enhancement and advancement of international criminal legal 
doctrines and standards. The assumed universality 13 , whilst in the interest of 
the international community, is at the present unattainable and largely 
dismissed. The thesis therefore stresses the need for the nationalisation of 
international law. Instrumental in this vision is the dissemination of the highest 
standards of international justice through an ICC involvement at a local level, 
which in turn shall lead to gradual, local institutional reform 14 . In this way 
precision of international criminal law and consistency in the employment of 
the ICC Statute would be achievable with the aim of warranting greater 
protection of individual rights during pre-trial proceedings. This conclusion 
was arrived at through the employment and rigorous study of (primary) 
qualitative sources. These consisted of the travaux preparatoire of the Rome 
Treaty, the study of which was aimed at disclosing the legal reasoning, 
opinions, intentions and reservations of all the States participating at the 1998 
Rome Conference. This in turn led to the close following up of national 
developments concerning the ratification of the ICC Statute as well as 
11 Maniruzzman A. F. M., "State Contracts in Contemporary International Law: Monist 
Versus Dualist Controversies", European Journal of International Law, Vol. 12, No. 2 (200 1), 
pp. 309-329. 
12 See e. g. Schabas W. A., "An Introduction to the International Criminal Courr' 
(2004); 
Safferling C., "Towards an International Criminal Procedure" (2003), p. 1: "The Rome Statute 
provides a workable ftam ework and basis to befilled in and built on 
by legislative acts, for 
example the Rules of Procedure and Evidence orjudicial acts, that is case-law ...... 
13 Reydams L., "Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives" 
(2003), p. 40: "The unilateral limited universality principle also raises the question of 
compatibility with the International Criminal Court ... Asfirst conceived, 
this notion of the 
universality principle was a substitutefor a non-existing international criminal court, an 
idealistic solution to the incomplete structure of the international 
legal order. Now that the 
ICC is established, it would seem illogical to hold on to it and attribute similar 
if not broader, 
powers to a single State than to a treaty-based Court". 
14 See e. g., Romano C. P. R. et al (eds. ), "Internationalized 
Criminal Court: Sierral Leone, East 
Timor, Kosovo and Cambodia" (2004). 
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introduction and/or amendments of other relevant legislation and constitutions. 
The information gathered derived primarily from actual legislative acts and 
bills, minutes of parliamentary debates, which provided an in-depth insight 
into the factual intentions and importance behind the laws. Both legislations 
and their travaux preparatoire were obtained in their original form and where 
possible, in the English language. I have personally translated numerous 
original texts and my fluency in relevant languages (Italian, Spanish and 
Serbo-Croat) afforded higIn standards of accuracy. 
Several semi-structured interviews were also conducted during the course of 
the second phase of research with practitioners, academics, politicians and 
expert witnesses. Interviews were normally based on a standard set of open- 
ended questions formulated and guided to a certain extent by interpretations of 
questions asked, local protocol and such topics which those interviewed 
considered important to an understanding of the subject matter in question. 
Although the information gathered represents a primary, independent, original 
source of information, it embodied a collection of diverging judgments on 
different issues and could not be employed to advance generalised and 
representative argumentation. In consideration of reliability and validity 
concerns of primary, qualitative sources, which are normally confined to the 
study of small components, the information gained through interviews was 
instead utilised to provide focus to the research and crucially, to locate other 
primary, sometimes obscure, materials such as for example the original texts 
of U. S. immunity agreements. 
For the purpose of obtaining greater objectiveness and consistency, amply 
employed were secondary qualitative and quantitative sources which included 
government reports, leading texts, case law, statutes, judicial and other 
relevant journals and reviews. Correctly assessing secondary sources was of 
crucial importance in consideration of four important factors: (1) authenticity 
referring to the question of how genuine a document is. Wherever possible, 
every effort had been made to cross-reference secondary materials by 
identifying the original source; (2) credibility, the issue relating to the amount 
of distortion in a document concerning either accuracy or sincerity. For 
16 
instance, it was always necessary to bear in mind that any report will reflect a 
view of those responsible for producing it and it was therefore essential to 
conceptualise the information gathered; (3) representativeness as the natural 
consequence of the previous criteria and (4) the intended meaning which again 
involved cross-referencing information in order to objectively interpret the 
information and accordingly attribute to it the appropriate weight. Systematic 
and rigorous evaluation of qualitative and quantitative secondary sources led to 
the conception of primary data. 
17 
Chapter 1 
ICC Treaty, Implementation Methods and Implementation Effects 
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1.1 Introduction 
One of the main objectives of the Rome Treaty is to advance the unification of 
international criminal law. Whilst it may be argued that this body of law is 
becoming more specific and uniform in content, its development remains 
reliant on interpretation and application at national level where it remains 
fragmented. Consequently, its understanding and enforcement are inconsistent. 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute presents issues that are a result 
of the fusion of common and civil law traditions as well as the blend of diverse 
criminal laws within each one of those systems. Distinguishing between 
Anglo-American and Continental European criminal procedures has become 
increasingly complex and transgressed. Such blend of legal traditions, whilst it 
may ensure that justice is rendered equally, fairly and effectively, generates 
nevertheless ever-increasing lack of legal orientation. The aim of this pastiche 
is also to establish an international and uniform standard across contemporary 
justice systems. Whereas the application of international criminal law in the 
International Criminal Court will be, or will attempt to be, as consistent as 
possible, the application of the same provisions will vary across the globe. The 
application of ICC procedures will depend for example on a particular method 
of implementation of the Rome Treaty into domestic law, domestic politics, 
the nature of a conflict, any peace process involving regional amnesties and 
pardons, and domestic rules on sentencing. Various states still feel that the way 
in which the ICC will define, develop and apply international criminal 
law is 
still unpredictable. The ICC will have to take account, to a great degree, of the 
law as stated by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Decisions 
and judgments rendered by these tribunals, when 
looked at closely, are not 
infrequently applied on case-by-case basis, and are at times overruled; 
therefore, some areas of law have not been conclusively or satisfactorily 
established. Other states, most notably the 
United States, feel that a transitional 
period is important to evaluate the performance of 
the Court before deferring 
to it any of the sovereign judicial powers. 
As to the principle of 
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complementarity, states have not understood it unvaryingly. Some countries 
feel that under this principle, they have retained their sovereignty whereas 
others have explicitly declared, even in their amended constitutions, that 
international law and international obligations and duties emanating from the 
ICC Statute', take precedence over national laws and limit consequently, their 
jurisdictional sovereignty. Important here will be the discussion on what status 
the ICC provisions have on a domestic level and how will this status influence 
the application of international criminal law. With regard to the proposition 
that the ICC may bind third states, we shall also discuss the relevance of the 
law of treaties. Moreover, mention will be made of the law on subsequent 
treaties, namely bilateral (or Article 98) immunity agreements. Such 
agreements seem to be in contradiction with the Rome Treaty and therefore in 
contradiction with a state's international obligations to perform the Treaty. 
Also, the general perception of the ICC is that of a centralized and uniform 
regime. Contrary to that belief, a proposition is made here for a less 
hierarchical international criminal justice system that is fundamentally reliant 
upon national governments and national courts in prosecuting the core crimes. 
It emphasises the need for ICC involvement at the national level. A key 
strategy in this vision is the participation of the ICC in the work of national 
courts and regional mixed tribunals. 
1.2 General overview of the ICC system 
The proposition that the enforcement of international criminal law under the 
ICC Statute is fragmented as its understanding and application will depend on 
national political, legal, social traditions is based on the premise that the ICC 
lacks 'political capital 2 to achieve its proposed goals. At the time of 
implementing the Rome Treaty, Norway for example stated that it was 'fiully 
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), UN. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9. 
2 Iontcheva J., "Nationalizing International Criminal Law" 2004, Conference Paper, 18 th 
International Conference of the International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law, 
Montreal, Canada, p. 3. 
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aware that the Court's actual efficiency and effect in practice will depend on 
the adherence of the various states to the Statute and on their political will to 
53 support the Court' . Similarly, Brazil stated: "the success of the ICC depends 
upon the continuing support it receives ftom its States parties and ftom 
international community as a whole"4 . In Africa. ) where the ICC Prosecutor 
officially initiated criminal investigations into the situations in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and northern Uganda, II of the 26 African states that are 
parties to the ICC had not made any payment toward their assessed share of 
the ICC's budget for 2002,2003 and 2004 5. Some of these states could clear 
their arrears for all three years with a single payment of less than 3,000 Euros. 
Illustrative of the qualified support for the ICC6 is also the general lack of 
support from the United States that has led to substantial limitations on the 
Court's powerS7 , and numerous compromises and restrictions in the 
final 
wording of the ICC Statute. Pinpointing lacunae in the ICC system relates here 
mainly to: 
8 
a) Non-surrender agreements/Art. 98 (2) agreements . As of 13 July 2004, 
of 139 signatories to the Rome Treaty, of which 98 States Parties, 92 bilateral 
agreements have been entered into9. Thirty-eight ICC States Parties have 
signed and/or ratified these agreementslo. The Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
3 Transcript of the debate in the Plenary of the Storting (The Norwegian Parliament) on 27 
January 2000 (unofficial translation) provided by the Council of Europe, "The Implicationsfor 
Council of Europe Member States of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court- 
Norway", 18 October 200 1, Consult/ICC (2001) 42, p. 4. 
4 Statement by Ms Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Mission of Brazil to the United Nations, Security 
Council Public Meeting "on the proposed renewal of the provisions of Security Council 
resolution 1422 (2002), 12 June 2003. 
5 Speech of Stompor J., "Africa, Human Rights, and International Criminal Court. - A 21" 
Century Testing Groung", American Branch of the International Law Association, 16 October 
2004. 
6 The Rome Statute of the ICC was adopted by a vote of 120-to-7, with twenty-one countries 
abstaining, see Sadat and Carden, "The New International Criminal Court. - An Uneasy 
Revolution", 88 Georgetown Law Journal (2000) at 384. 
7 See Goldsmith J., "The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court", 70 University of 
Chicago Law Review 89 (2003), pp. 89-104. 
8 immunity Agreements will be fully examined in Chapter 4. 
9 Press Statement by Boucher R., U. S. State Department, upon Eritrea's signing of the Article 
98 Agreement, 13 July 2004, at http: //www. state. p-ov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/34347. htm 
10 These are: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia FRY, Romania, TaJikistan, 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, 
Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, 
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noted in fact that his government saw "no prohibition within the Rome Statute 
itself to the adoption qf certain types of bilateral agreements under Article 98 
(2) 
b) Amnesties and pardons 12 . State Parties have undoubtedly conferred 
some of their penal powers to the ICC but they have also refused to 'relinquish 
sovereign prerogatives in administering criminal justice 113 . Importantly, the 
Statute lacks provisions on amnesties, pardons, parole, and sentence 
14 commutations . During the Rome Conference in fact, many delegations 
maintained that "the Statute should not permit the Court to intercede in the 
administrative (parole) or political decision-making process (pardons, 
amnesties) of a State 1515 . Recently, the Chief of Cabinet and Head of the 
Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division 16 , ICC Office of the 
Prosecutor, responded to a request to assess the ICC practicality of an amnesty 
which was promised to rebels in Uganda, by stating that "in the case of 
Uganda, as with the Democratic Republic of Congo, we have to look at the 
peace process and make sure that our investigations are not an obstacle to 
these peace settlements" 17 . Furthermore, it had been perceived that conferring 
jurisdiction to the ICC could undermine essential national and transnational 
efforts, and actually obstruct the effective fight against these crimes 18 . The 
problem is not prosecution, but rather investigation. These crimes require "an 
ongoing law enforcement effort against criminal organisations andpatterns of 
Dominica, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor, Fiji, Mongolia, 
Marshall Islands, Nauru. 
11 Mr Cowen, Irish Parliamentary Debates, Written Answers on International Criminal Court, 
03 December 2002, Vol. 558, p. 1058, para. 220. 
12 For a full discussion see Chapter 2. 
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. P cit, lontcheva, note 2, p. 9. 
14 Ibid. 
15 El Zeidy M. M., "The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery To Implement 
International Criminal Law", 23 Michigan Journal of International Law (2002), p. 94 1. 
16 MS Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi at the Third Session of the Consultative Assembly of 
Parliamentarians for the International Criminal Court and the Rule of Law, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 06 December 2004, at http: //www. pp-action. org/prog inte past. asp? id=170 
17 Ibid. 
" Statement of Hon. Scheffer D. J., Ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues, Hearing 
Before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
United States Senate, One Hundred Fifth Congress, Second Session, "Is a UN. International 
Criminal Court in the US National Interest? " (July 23,1998) p. 14, at 
htlp: //www. amicc. org/docs/SlOC7 23 98. pd . 
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crime with police and intelligence resources. The Court will not be equipped 
effectively to investigate and prosecute these types of crimes" 19. Moreover, the 
ICC has been criticised for underestimating and '! fundamentally confusing"20 
the importance and proper roles of " olitical and economic power, diplomatic p 
efforts, military forces and legal procedures... The ICCs advocates make a 
fundamental error by trying to transform matters of power and force into 
matters of law"). 
C) No inclusion of universal jurisdiction in the Statute. As it is evident 
throughout the ICC drafting process, many countries expressed an unequivocal 
preference for domestic prosecutions. The Rome Conference does in fact 
reflect the careful and reserved approach to the admissibility of cases and 
limits of ICC jurisdiction 21 . This resulted in the exclusion of universal 
jurisdiction under the Statute, which means that the Court would, in theory, not 
be able to prosecute criminals who only temporarily find themselves on the 
territory of a State Party. This ICC jurisdictional limitation is founded too in 
general treaty law. All existing international courts have jurisdiction only over 
states that are parties to a particular treaty providing for their jurisdiction 22 . 
Treaties establishing international courts, except those created by the UN 
Security Council acting under UN Chapter VII (such as ICTY and ICTR), 
afford states parties discretion over the powers that the courts will have in 
relation to jurisdiction and remedies 23 . For example, 
ICJ jurisdiction depends 
on the consent of states that are parties to the dispute. Such state consent to ICJ 
jurisdiction may be given in advance either through a compromisory clause 
contained in a treaty providing that some or all categories of disputes arising 
under that treaty will be submitted to the ICJ or through a declaration under the 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid, Statement of Hon. Bolton J., p. 27. 
21 See International Criminal Court (ICC-OTP), "The Principle of Complementarity in 
Practice" (2003), p. 7, available at http: //www. icc- 
cpi. int/libraLy/orp, ans/otp/complementarity. pdf 
22 See United Nations "Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States" 
(1992), p. 70. 
23 See e. g. 1945 Statute of International Court of Justice (ICJ) Art. 34 (1), the International 
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (Annex VI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea 1982) Statute Art. 20 (1) and the WTO 1994 (Art. 2(l)) dispute settlement system. 
These instruments also provide considerable flexibility regarding exemptions 
from 
compulsory settlement system. 
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ICJ Statute's 'optional clause' 24 which stipulates that a state agrees to accept 
ICFs jurisdiction for some or all categories of future disputes. State practice in 
the use of the optional clause shows that the 'state' is still largely in control 
with regard to making advanced jurisdictional grantS25. 
Reflecting the U. S. position, it has been noted that: 
"The jurisdiction of the Court (1CQ over nationals of non-parties is not 
simply a question of erga omnes obligations allegedly binding upon the 
international community as a whole. It also involves the institutional question 
of the obligatory submission without consent to a specific international forum 
of the prosecution of the alleged violation of such obligations. Indeed this is 
26 not in accordance with international treaty law" 
As reflected in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaties 
cannot bind non-parties 27 . Some commentators contend however that the 
objection that the ICC Treaty's conferral of jurisdiction over Non-Party 
nationals violates the law of treaties can only be valid if the Treaty provisions 
are the exclusive basis of that ICC jurisdiction. For example, if the jurisdiction 
to be exercised by the ICC is the pre-existing jurisdiction of States Parties 
which they have delegated to the Court, then potentially the ICC's jurisdiction 
is derived from sources outside the ICC Treaty which, far from binding Non- 
Parties, are merely agreements among the States Parties regarding the manner 
in which they will exercise their jurisdiction through the delegation of 
territorial and universal jurisdiction 28 
24 ICj Statute, Article 36 (2). 
25Less than a third of the members of the United Nations currently have in force declarations 
under the optional clause and many of those states have made reservations that substantially 
limit the effect of their declarations, see Merrills J. G., "International Dispute Settlement" 
(1998) p. 123. 
26 Malanczuk P., "The International Criminal Court and Landmines: What Are the 
Consequences ofLeaving the US Behind', European Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, 
No. 1 (2000), p. 8 1; See also Committee on Human Rights Law and Practice, "Report on the 
Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences", prepared by 
Kamminga M., International Law Association, Report of the 68th Conference, Taipei, Taiwan, 
1998. 
27 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969,1155 U. N. T. S. 331,8 I. L. M. 679, Arts. 34- 
38. 
28 For a full discussion see Chapter I 
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In 1998, at the Preparatory Committee, Germany introduced a proposal that 
29 would have granted the Court universal jurisdiction over all core crimes . This 
would have given the ICC the authority to prosecute a crime without securing 
the consent of any State. This proposal was rejected, as it was perceived that 
universal jurisdiction would stretch existing interpretations of international law 
too far and would be politically unacceptable to key StateS30. South Korea 
proposed the most accepted solution that would have required the consent of 
any of these States: (1) the State of nationality of the accused; (2) the State on 
whose territory the crime was committed; (3) the State of nationality of the 
victim; (4) or the State with custody over the accused 31 . 
The Vienna Convention is a general framework in place to resolve any 
difficulties presented by the relationship between national and ICC (special) 
laws but it had been observed that Convention provisions are 'residual' in 
32 nature and can be superseded by an agreement . 
The ICC Statute provides that 
disputes relating to the interpretation or application of the Statute may be 
referred to the jCj33 whereas disputes relating to the competence of the ICC 
will be settled by the ICC itself34. 
Strong arguments have been put forward that potential exercise of jurisdiction 
over nationals of Non-Party States is a contravention of international law and 
threatens the legitimacy of the ICC. Consent of the State of nationality of the 
accused is mandatory, according to this line of argument, if the ICC is to 
exercise jurisdiction. Exercise of such jurisdiction undermines State 
sovereignty and is therefore contrary to the principle of complementarity. The 
United States in particular, maintained that such interpretation of ICC 
jurisdictional powers violates the principle of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec 
29 See U. N. Doc. A/AC. 249/1998/DP. 2. 
30 Ibid. 
31 See Art. 8, Draft ICC Statute, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/C. I/L. 6 (08 June 1998). 
32 International Law Commission (ILC), "Fragmentation of international law: difficulties 
arisingfrom the diversification and expansion of international law", Chapter X, Report of the 
ILC on the work of its 56 th Session, 283 oth Meeting, A/CN. 4/L. 663/Rev. 1,09 August 2004, 
p. 293, para. 330. On application of successive treaties relating to the same subject matter see 
Chapter on Bilateral Immunity Agreements. 
33 ICC Statute Art. 119 (2). 
34 This reflects the position of the majority of States at the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries at the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
Rome, 15 June- 17 July 1998. See for example Colombia's proposal, at the 4thplenary meeting, 
16 June 1998, p. 84, para. 25, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/SR. 4. 
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prosunt, by which a treaty may not create obligations or rights for a state non 
party to a treaty without that state's consent. 
Numerous States favoured universal jurisdiction for the ICC. During the ICC 
negotiations, Belgium for example stated that since it adopted in 1993 
legislation providing for universal jurisdiction, it would be difficult for it to 
accept an international court without such universal jurisdiction 35 . At the same 
time it concluded that Non-Party States have to declare that they accept the 
Court's jurisdiction in order to be bound by the same obligations on 
cooperation as States parties 36 . Slovakia also reiterated that if the crime 
occurred in a State Non-Party, criminal prosecution would be possible only 
with the consent of the State 37. In recent years few local courts have attempted 
to exercise universal jurisdiction either through the doctrine of erga omnes or 
through applying domestic laws retroactively. For example, the Dutch 
Supreme Court ruled in 2001 that the limitations imposed by its Wartime 
Offences Act in cases where the Netherlands is not involved in an armed 
conflict do not apply to the repression of violations of the laws and customs of 
war 38 . 
However, the exercise of such jurisdiction is sporadic, non-uniform, and 
generally requires a strong territorial link. In Senegal for instance, the highest 
court upheld the decision barring criminal proceedings against the accused, a 
former President of Chad, who was charged with complicity in crimes of 
torture. The Court ruled that Senegalese courts lacked jurisdiction to prosecute 
and try aliens present on the territory of Senega139 . 
Another example 
illustrating the necessary territorial link to the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
is a decision of a Spanish court not to exercise that jurisdiction with respect to 
acts of genocide committed in Guatemala. A magistrate had accepted 
jurisdiction on the basis of a national law which provides for universal 
35 See Rome Conference, 6 th plenary meeting, 17 June 1998, p. 97, para. 4. 
36 Ibid, para. 3. 
37 Mr Valo (Slovakia), Rome Conference, 5 th plenary meeting, 17 June 1998, 
A/CONF. 183/SR. 5, p. 91, para. 4. 
38 Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), II November 1997-This decision is the fourth in a series 
relating to the same case (Arnhem District Court, 21 February 1996; Supreme Court, 22 
October 1996; and Arnhem Court of Appeal, 19 March 1997). 
39Hissein Habre, Case No. 14,20 March 200 1, Cour de Cassation. The decision was also based 
on absence of any legislative measure establishing such jurisdiction over torture related 
offences, as required by Art. 5(2) of the 1984 Convention against Torture. 
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jurisdiction over acts of genocide 40 - The Spanish Court noted that Article 6 of 
the 1948 Genocide Convention provided that criminal jurisdiction over 
genocide is to be exercised by the states on whose territory genocide was 
committed or by an international court. It was of the view that Art. 6 of the 
Convention did not prevent other states to exercise jurisdiction over genocide 
committed abroad but it had the effect of giving precedence to the territorial 
state 41 . The Court made a comparison with the ICC principle of 
complementarity; given that the unwillingness of Guatemala's authorities to 
prosecute had not been demonstrated, and that there was no legal impediment 
to such prosecution under Guatemalan law, the Court concluded that there was 
no need for a Spanish court to exercise universal jurisdiction 42 . 
The idea of delegated universal jurisdiction (which was hoped for by many but 
rejected by the majority and therefore not included in the ICC TreatY43 ) as a 
basis for ICC jurisdiction over Non-Parties does not account for ICC 
jurisdiction over a number of crimes under its Statute, crimes that are not 
however subject to universal jurisdiction 44 . For example, some violations of 
Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva ConventionS45 are not subject to universal 
jurisdiction under customary law 46 and thus the delegated universal 
jurisdiction theory of ICC jurisdiction over Non-Parties would not account for 
jurisdiction over some of the crimes within the ICC Statute. Here is an 
example. Recently, in a case before the Special Court for Sierra Leone it was 
ruled that the recruitment of child soldiers is a crime and a violation of 
international law 47 
. The Defence argued here that the Special Court had no 
jurisdiction to try the accused for crimes relating to the recruitment of child 
40 Art. 23 of the Ley Organica 6/1985. 
41 Decision of the Audencia National (Sala de lo Penal), 13 December 2000. 
42 For a different position see e. g. Swiss Military Court of Cassation, 27 April 2001, Arrets du 
Tribunal militaire de cassation 2001/2002, Office de I'Auditeur en chef, Vol. 12,3enne 
fascicule, pp. 1-3 1, no. 2 1. 
43 Op cit, note 34, Germany Proposal, p. 83, para. 2 1. 
44 Morris M., "High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-party States", 64 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 1 (200 1), p-28 
45 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) 08 June 1977, U. N. T. S. 3. 
46 For example, conscription of child soldiers, prohibited under Protocol I is placed within the 
urisdiction of the ICC but is not a crime customarily subject to universal jurisdiction. 
7 Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Appeals Chamber 
"Decision on preliminary motion based on lack ofjurisdiction (child recruitment)", Case No. 
SCSL-2003-14-AR-72(E), 31 May 2004. 
27 
soldiers under the age of 15 recruited "into armedforces or groups or using 
them to participate actively in hostilities', 48 due to the fact that this crime was 
not part of the customary international law at the time relevant to the 
indictment. The Defence also argued that although the ICC Statute 
criminalizes the recruitment of child soldiers, it does not codify customary 
international law. During ICC negotiations, States had different views as to 
whether this is the case. For example, Sudan's understanding was that the 
Court would consolidate customary norms 49 whereas India declared that the 
function of the Rome Conference was to establish an institution, not to develop 
and codify substantive international law 50 . The Prosecution on the other hand 
argued that the crime of recruiting child soldiers was part of international 
customary law. It argued that international criminal liability for this crime 
resulted from various factors accumulated over time, and that unlike a national 
legal system, international law is without a Parliament with legislative power, 
and therefore there cannot be a statute that declares certain activity as criminal 
under customary international law. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Robertson 
traced the preparatory work leading to the adoption of the Special Court 
Statute and argued that the state of law at the relevant time (1996) in respect of 
child enlistment was unclear to the UN Secretary-General himsele'. 
Importantly, he also pointed that because there was no evidence of national 
prosecutions of such crimes, it is difficult to find evidence of explicit state 
practice in criminalizing the crime. According to him therefore, the crime was 
52 not part of customary law 
Furthermore, many States also consider that customary law may not become 
part of their legal systems without the involvement of the parliament, which 
should codify it into national law. During the Rome Conference for example, 
48 Special Court for Sierra Leone Statute, Art. 4 (c). 
49 Mr Yassin (Sudan), Rome Conference, 7" plenary meeting, 18 June 1998, 
A/CONF. 183/SR. 7, p. 105, para. 3. 
50 Op cit, note 34, Mr Lahiri (India), p. 86, para. 52. 
51 See Summary of Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child 
Recruitment), Prosecution v Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-14-AR72(E), 31 May 
2004, p. 2, para12. 
52 Op cit, note, 47, para. 22. 
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Andorra stated it was deeply concerned about acts that affected children 53. It is 
worth mentioning however, as an example, that the Canadian Crimes Against 
Humanity and War Crimes Act 2000 provides that "For greater certainty, 
crimes described in Articles 6 and 7 andParagraph 2 ofArticle 8 of the Rome 
Statute are, as of July 17,1998, crimes according to customary international 
law. This does not limit or prejudice in any way the application of existing or 
developing rules of international law" 54 . Words 'for greater certainty' appear 
to imply an artificial codification of customary international law that 
represents a purposive adoption of the ICC Statute rather than uniform state 
practice. 
d) Reservations. The ICC Treaty does not permit any type of 
reservationS55 . Although, in theory at least, treaty law recognises the right to a 
reservation as a means of respecting the autonomy of the reserving state, it is a 
rule of international law 56 , and the ICC Statute confirms it, that a State may not 
invoke the provisions of its internal law as a justification for its failure to 
perform treaty obligations 57 . The 
interests of contracting parties and that of the 
international community must be considered. Upon ratification of the ICC 
Treaty, the Eastern Republic of Uruguay made an interpretative declaration to 
which most ICC States objected as it effectively amounted to a reservation 58 . 
Uruguay declared that, "As a State party to the Rome Statute, the Eastern 
Republic of Uruguay shall ensure its application to the full extent of the 
powers of the State insofar as it is competent in that respect and in strict 
accordance with the Constitutional provisions of the Republic"59 . In response 
53 See statement by Mr Minoves Triquell, Rome Conference, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/13 
(Vol. 11), p. 81, para. 2. 
54 Article 4 (4). 
55 CC Statute Art. 120. 
56 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 27. 
57 See General Assembly, International Law Commission, "Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of itsfifty-fourth session (2002)" 14 January 2003, A/CN. 4/529, p. 15, 
para. 5 1. 
8 I See e. g. General Assembly, International Law Commission, 55 
th Session, 27 May 2003, 
A/CN. 4/535, "Eight report on reservation to treaties" by Pellet A., Special Rapporteur. 
59 See declaration made upon ratification on 28 June 2002 (ICC implementing law, Ley No. 
17.510,27 June 2002) available at http: //www. un. org/law/icc/statute/romefra. htm , at 14; See 
also Uruguayan General Assembly debate "Se establecen procedimientos para la oplicacion 
en el ambito interno del Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal Internacional", 
17/01/03, at 
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to this declaration various States made objections. Germany for example, 
responded by declaring: 
"Germany considers that the Interpretative Declaration with regard to the 
compatibility of the rules of the Statute with the provisions of the Constitution 
of Uruguay is in fact a reservation 60 that seeks to limit the scope of the Statute 
on a unilateral basis... Germany therefore objects to the... 'declaration' made 
by the Eastern Republic of Uruguay. This objection does not preclude entry 
into force of the Statute between the Republic of Germany and Eastern 
ý61 Republic of Uruguay' 
Other countries have explicitly declared that the ICC Statute should be 
interpreted in light of the Charter of the United Nations and the general 
principles and rules of international law and international humanitarian law 62 
Although the ICC Statute does not permit reservations, Article 124 allows 
States to opt out of the Court's jurisdiction for seven years for crimes of war. 
So far, France and Colombia have made declarations under Article 124. Upon 
ratification, France stated: "The French Republic declares that it does not 
accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes 
referred to in article 8 when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its 
nationals or on its territory', 63 . Naturally however, a significant number of 
States declared that the principle of non-retroactivity of the jurisdiction of the 
Court, pursuant to JCC Articles II and 24, shall not invalidate the well 
established principle that no war crime shall be barred from prosecution due to 
ft: //www. presidencia.. RLib. uy/proyectos/2003011701. hti-n ; Diario de Sesiones de la Camara 
de Representantes, Cuarto Periodo Ordinarion de la XLV Legislatura, 29a Sesion, 02 July 
2003, the Chamber of Represetnatives states its aim to "ratify the will of the Chamber of 
Representatives to defend the sovereign exercise of crim in al jurisdiction, and the principle of 
jurisdictional complementarity of the International Criminal Court as established in the Rome 
Statute, in order to prosecute crimes ofgenocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
crimes of aggression", translation of communiqud available at 
htU2: //www. pizaction. org/uploadedfiles/urup, uay-Micheliniý/ý20communiqueý/ý20 english_. pdf 
Uruguay adopted the ICC implementing law, Ley No. 17.510,27 June 2002. Although the 
Constitution remains of a higher rank to which all other laws are subject, Uruguay stated that 
this will not in any way, constitute a reservation to any of the provisions of that international 
instrument. 
60 Op cit, note 57, p. 20, para. 81. 
61 At http: //www. un. ora/law/icc/statute/romefra. htm p. 15. 
62 See Egypt declaration No. 2 upon signature at http: //www. un. oriz/law/icc/statute/romefra. htm 
p. 8. 
63 Declaration No. 7 (111) at http: //www. un. orý,,, /Iaw/icc/statLIte/romefra. htm p. 10. 
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the statute of limitations and no war criminal shall escape justice or escape 
prosecution in other jurisdictions 64 . The justification for ex post facto creation 
of war crimes may be found in Article 15 (1) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights which states that "nothing ... shallprejudice the trial 
and punishment of any person for any act or omission which at the time when 
it was committed was criminal according to the general principles of law 
recognised by the community of nations"65 . However, most constitutional 
orders prohibit the retroactive application of the law even if it relates to the 
commission of serious crimes such as toiture 66 . At the time of ratification 
67 
1 
France made a reservation to ICC Article 124 which excludes prosecutions of 
French citizens for war crimes from the ICC's jurisdiction for seven years 68 . 
Throughout the ICC negotiations, France supported the automatic jurisdiction 
of the Court for core crimes except war crimes since such crimes, as defined in 
the 1907 Hague Conventions, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 
69 Additional Protocols, might be isolated acts . Similarities may be drawn here 
with the European Convention on Human Rights which has not been adopted 
universally and consistently. In the United Kingdom the Convention had been 
implemented by the Human Rights Act 1998. The Convention has been largely 
understood to represent a three-tier hierarchy 70 of rights which determine the 
64See e. g. Egypt Declaration No. 5 upon signature at 
hqp: //www. un. orWIaw/icc/statute/romefra. htin p. 9. Onjus cogens see also Haas and Priebke 
Cases, Italian Military Court of Appeal, Supreme Court of Cassation, 07 March 1998/16 
November 1998. 
65 See e. g. Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth of Australia and Another (1991), 172 
Commonwealth Law Reports 50 1, F. C. 91/026: "The wrongful nature of the conduct ought to 
have been apparent to those who engaged in it (war crimes) even if, because of the 
circumstances in which the conduct took place, there was no offence against domestic law", 
per Justice Dawson, p. 643. 
66 See e. g. The Decision of the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), Criminal Chamber, 
Judgment of 18 September 200 1, No. 00749/01 (CW2323) where the Court found that the 
Dutch Act implementing the Convention against Torture was not applicable to the facts in the 
case (Bouterse's acts in 1982), since Art. 16 of the Dutch Constitution prohibits retroactive 
application of the law. See also the Cavallo Case, Juez Sexto de Distrito de Procesos Penales 
Federales en el Distrito Federal, Extradicion de Miguel Angel Cavallo, Expediente de 
Extradicion 5/2000,11.06.2001. 
67 Enacted Cooperation Legislation: LOI no 2002-268 (26-02-02) relative a la cooperation 
avec la Cour penale internationale (I). 
68 See country progress by the Coalition for the International Criminal Court 
(CISS), France, at 
http: Hwww. iccnow-org/countryinfo/europc. is/france. htmI 
69 Op cit, note 3 5, Mr Vedrine (France) p. 10 1, para. 77. 
70 Black-Branch J. L., "The Derogation of Rights under the UK Human Rights Act: 
Diminishing International Standards? " 22 Statute Law Review 1 (200 1), p. 7 1. 
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strength of a given right and the degree to which it is guaranteed and upheld 71 . 
It has also been widely accepted that this hierarchy would prevail under the 
Human Rights Act, whereby depending on the position of a right the 
Government "may impair its integrity, or courts may limit its scope based on 
special pressing needs of the day. In other words, the position of a right in this 
hierarchy ivill determine its effectiveness"72 . Absent from this Act is the 
derogation clause under Article 15 of the Convention and present are sections 
14 and 15 which allow for designated derogations and reservations to be 
placed on any right or freedom; these rights are not only derogable, but the set 
of reasons for derogating have also been removed opening it up potentially to 
any political reason. It follows that "we have moved into a new era whereby 
formalized rights have been accorded to the citizen under domestic legislation 
on the one hand, but their realization is now subject to political scrutiny, on 
the other"73 . Moreover, the effectiveness of rights depends on two variables: 
(a) whether a government can derogate from its responsibility in the first 
instance and (b) the degree to which the right in question may be qualified. 
Derogation is defined as "the partial repeal or abolishing of a law, as by a 
,, 74 subsequent act which limits the scope or impairs its utility andforce . In 
signing the First ProtoCO175 of the European Convention, the United Kingdom 
issued the following reservation: "the principle affirmed in the second sentence 
ofArticle 2 is accepted ... only in so 
far as it is compatible with the provision of 
efficient instruction and training, and the avoidance of unreasonable public 
expenditure', 76 - This 
is just an example of the political power accorded to 
77 states to derogate from their responsibilities 
71 Ibid. 
72 id. 
73 Id. , p. 72. 74 Black's Law Dictionary (199 1). On subsequent treaties, see Chapter 4. 
75 Protocol I- Enforcement of certain Rights and Freedoms not included in Section I of the 
Convention. 
76 Human Rights Act 1998, Schd. 3. 
77 See e. g. Brogan and Others v United Kingdom (Ser. A, No. 
145-B; App. Nos. 11209/84; 
11234/84; 11266/84; 11386/85) (1989) 11 ECHR 117,29 November 1988. 
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e) Sentencing. Under closer examination, the ICC penalty regime reveals 
lack of substance and 'the underdeveloped and conflicting penal justifications 
and the irrationality of praxis'78 . The ICC Statute is in effect silent on the 
79 purposes and principles that govern the rules on sentencing . This is the end 
result of substantive debate on the matter at the 1998 Rome Conference, which 
focused instead on capital punishment 80 . This 'omission' 
81 significantly 
destabilizes the impact of ICC sentencing law and it inevitably leads to 
application of inconsistencies among States Parties as sentencing is based and 
justified on different national objectives and beliefs. Sentencing methods serve 
a major role in promoting deterrence, retribution or reconciliation. For 
example, one of the principal aims of the ICTY was to deter future violations 
of international criminal law. The Trial Chamber of the ICTY had in fact 
discussed the objectives of deterrence in the context of the United Nations 
Security Council's overriding concern to maintain peace and security in the 
former Yugoslavia 82 . The Tribunal drew a clear distinction between 'general 
prevention (or deterrence), reprobation, retribution as well as collective 
reconciliation 83 , suggesting that these purposes should provide guidance in 
determining the appropriate punishment for a crime against humanity, yet no 
attempt was made to define these purposes, or explore their meaning 84 The 
ICTY gave equal weight to retribution and deterrence, but went on to suggest 
that incapacitation of the dangerous and rehabilitation were also desirable 
obj ectives 85 but no consideration was given to defining these objectives in the 
context of 'demandsfor collective retribution personified by state interests and 
the adopted common law tradition which favours the individualisation of 
78 Henham R., "Some issuesfor sentencing in the International Criminal Court", International 
Comparative Law Quarterly 52 (2003), p. 82. 
79 Only the ICTR Statute includes a reference to the need to contribute to 'national 
reconciliation'. This commitment comprised in the Preamble of the Statute and is arguably 
therefore of limited legal authority. 
80 Schabas W. A., "An Introduction to the International Criminal Court" (200 1), p. 140. 
81 See Hall C., "The Fifth Session on the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of 
the International Criminal Court" 1998,92 American Journal of International Law, p. 33 1. 
82 See Prosecutor v Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment (29 November 
1996). 
81 Ibid, para58. 
84 Op cit, Henham, note 78, p. 87- 
81 Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-S, Sentencing Judgment (14 July 1997) para. 61. 
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sentences 86 . The relevant provisions of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes seem to 
be limited to imprisonment as there is nothing to suggest the application of the 
death penalty, as well as corporal punishment, imprisonment by hard labour 
and fines or national commutation of sentences. In determining these, the 
judges of the ad hoc Tribunals are called to consider the intent of the Security 
Council, relying upon preparatory documents such as the Secretary General's 
report, statements submitted to the Security Council by Member States, as well 
as the statements of the permanent representatives during the meetings of the 
Security Council87. Moreover, the ICTY Statute provides that the Tribunal 
"shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the 
88 
courts of the former Yugoslavia" 
This ICC Statute permits the Court to impose two types of penalties: 
imprisonment for a specified term or life imprisonment (Article 77). After 
debate over whether minimum and maximum limits should be set on the terms 
of imprisonment, eventually, Article 77 only contains a 30year maximum. Life 
imprisonment was opposed by a number of countries, particularly Latin 
American ones, whose constitutions prohibit this penalty as a violation of 
human rights, being cruel, inhumane, and inconsistent with the aims of 
rehabilitation. A provision for a mandatory review of penalties, when the 
person has "served two thirds of the sentence or 25 years in the case of life 
imprisonment" (Article I 10) was added to mitigate some of the concerns about 
life imprisonment. The Court may also order fines and forfeitures. The Statute 
recognizes that these penalties would be in addition to imprisonment. 
There were divergent and strong views on whether the death penalty should 
be 
explicitly included as a penalty, with Trinidad and Tobago, 
Arab states, 
Nigeria, and Rwanda being in favour of its inclusion. Not only did these 
States 
feel that the core crimes should be punished by the maximum penalty, 
but they 
feared that the prohibition of the death penalty in the Statute would 
impact on 
their domestic laws. The United States, supported by Japan, made an 
intervention that the principle of complementarity would nevertheless permit 
86 Op cit, Henham, note 78, p. 88. 
87 Schabas W. A., "Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach" 7 Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 2 (1997), p. 445. 
88 ICTY Statute Article 24 (1). 
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countries to apply capital punishment to punish the core crimes. Subsequently, 
the exclusion of the death penalty in the Statute warranted a provision titled 
"Non-prejudice to national application of penalties and national law', 89 which 
was offered as a compromise to those States pushing for the inclusion of the 
death penalty; it reads that "nothing in this part of the statute affects the 
application bY States Qfpenalties prescribed by their national law". 
The principal aim of ICC sentencing practice will aim at ensuring that there is 
no justification for serious violations of international criminal law. Whilst 
pursuing this goal, a balance should be reached between proportional ity9o and 
culpability which means that consistency demands similar crimes to be dealt 
with by equal punishment and furthermore that the penalty imposed be 
91 
proportionate to the wrongdoing 
The possibility of unjust and disproportionate sentences is addressed only in 
Part 8 (Appeal and revision) of the ICC Statute which specifies that "a 
sentence may be appealed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, by the Prosecutor or the convicted person on the ground of 
disproportion between the crime and the sentence"92 . 
Failure to deal adequately with consistency and disproportionality issues, 
significantly undermines the capacity of the ICC to deliver a sentencing 
practice and correspond with contemporary due process concepts and 
instruments promoting access to justice and fair trial, such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights 93 . 
Inconsistencies that are likely to emerge from the application of ICC law will 
inevitably become apparent as depending on how the ICC Treaty is being 
implemented into national law, as well as on whether national laws provide for 
amnesties and pardons, two defendants accused of the same crime may be 
subject to two different sentences. One defendant may earn a life term 
89 ICC Statute Art. 80. 
90 ICC Statute Art-81 (2) (a) provides that "a sentence may be appealed... on the ground of 
disproportion between the crime and the sentence". 
91 See Prosecutor v Todorovic, Case No. IT-95-99/1-S, Sentencing Judgment (31 July 2001), 
para. 3 0. 
92 ICC Article 81 (2) (a). 
93 Op cit, Henham, note 78, p, 95- 
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sentence, while the other might walk free under a national amnesty provision. 
However, the ICTY confirmed in the Celebici case the importance of the 
principle applied, that 'gravity is determined in personam and is not one of 
universal effect' 94 . As an author explains: "the potential for the systematic 
di,. ýIiniclion qf sentencing practice in the ICC is significantly enhanced by the 
absence of' n iechai 7 isms designed to secure consistency. Inevitably, this will 
hivite comparison, adoption or expansion of existing paradigms drawn from 
either state or interstate jurisdictions"95 . In 
fact, neither the ICC Statute nor 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide for techniques of securing 
96 consistency . ICC Article 76 (1) by providing that "the Trial Chamber shall 
consider the appropriate sentence to be imposed and shall take into account 
the evidence presented and submissions made during the trial that are relevant 
to the sentence" positively encourages97 an unreasonable amount of discretion, 
98 without taking into consideration primary rationales for sentencing . As with 
the ad hoc tribunals,, this primary sentencing purpose is deterrence99. However, 
the ICC's effective contribution to deterrence is, as already pointed out, largely 
overstatedloo. In Portugal, strong opposition was expressed against the ICC 
sentencing regime. Dr Marques Mendez, President of the Foreign Affairs 
Commission, maintained a persuasive position against "demagogic tendencies 
aimed at imposing imprisonment-sentences that would go against the principle 
of humanity and frustrate the principle of rehabilitation and social re- 
94 See the ICTY Appeal Chamber in the Celebici Case, Sentencing Judgment (09 October 
2001), para. 30. 
95 Op cit, Hen-ham, note 78, p. 96. 
96 See also Council of Europe's 1993 recommendations on consistency in sentencing, 
Recommendation No. R (92) 17. 
97 Op cit, Henham, note 78, p. 96. 
98 The consequences are further exemplified by ICC Article 77 (1) which indicates 
imprisonment as the preferred sanction for any crimes under Article 5 (genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and the crimes of aggression) with fines and forfeitures regarded 
as additional under Article 5(2). 
99 See e. g. Prosecution v Jelisic G., Case No. IT-95-10-4, Judgment (05 July 2001) where the 
accused, a war criminal was sentenced by the Tribunal to 40 years of imprisonment and 
transferred to Italy to serve the sentence. However, since Italian law envisages a maximum 
sentence of 30 years, an Italian court reduced the sentence by 10 years. See e. g. Nanetti M., 
"La Casssazione riduce lapena di 10 anni aJelisic, il boiaserbo", 11 Messaggero, 03 
February 2003. 
100 In justifying the US opposition to the Court it had also been said that "all available 
historical evidence demonstrates that the Court and the prosecutor will not achieve their 
central goal, the deterrence of heinous crimes, 
because they do not and should not have 
sufficient authority in the real world', op cit, note 18, Statement of Hon. Bolton J., p. 
26. 
36 
integration oj'convicted persons" 101 . 
In Kosovo, the 2004 Law on Execution of 
Penal Sanctions 102 provides that "The execution ofpenal sanctions shall aim at 
the reintegration of the convicted person into society and prepare him or her 
to conduct his or her life in a socially responsible way, without committing 
103 criminal offences" 
The ICC Statute prescribes the sentence of imprisonment for a certain number 
104 
of years, no longer than thirty, and that of life imprisonment . The FYROM 
Criminal Code for example contains the same sanctions but besides life 
imprisonment specifies the sentence of imprisonment for a certain time, 
limited to a maximum of fifteen years. The implementation by a domestic 
court of a sanction prescribed for criminal acts contained in the ICC Statute 
could result in activating the complementarity jurisdiction of the Court, with 
the explanation that the delivered sentence is not rigid enough and therefore 
not equitable, notwithstanding the provision of the ICC Statute about non- 
discrimination in the national implementation of punishments. National laws 
leave space for variations in the system of punishments in national 
legislation' 05 
. Angola stated that 
in the case of conflict between ICC provisions 
on penalties (Art. 77), including the possibility of life-imprisonment in 
exceptional cases and a maximum penalty of 24 years of imprisonment, the 
06 Angolan laws would be interpreted in line with the ICC Statute' . 
Future challenges for the ICC lie in the extent to which it succeeds in 
developing its penalty praxis by adopting principles and approaches designed 
to reconcile the 'local' with the 'global', both at the moral and normative level, 
or whether it is destined to function merely as a symbolic component of 
globalisation that exists to provide a language and mechanism for asserting 
'0' Conference on ICC Ratification in Lusophone Countries, PGA International Law and 
Human Rights Programme, 19/20 February 200 1, Lisbon, Portugal, Summary of the 
Conference Proceedings, pp-3-4. 
102 19 November 2004, UNMIK/REG/2004/46. 
103 Law on the Execution of Penal Sanctions 2004, Article 3 (emphasis added). 
104 ICC Statute Art. 77. 
105 ICC Statute Art. 80. 
106 Op cit, Dr Diogenes Boavida, President of the Constitutional and Legal Affairs 
Commission and former Minister of Justice, note 10 1, pA. 
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hierarchies of international power 107 . As with the ad hoc tribunals, this will 
depend on the ability of the ICC to extend beyond performance and legitimise 
its sentencing practice in terms designed to engage successfully with local 
mechanisms of accountability and the institutions of punishment'08. 
f) Plea Bargaining. Plea bargaining is an illustration 'of the relationship 
I)etiveen (lite process principles and practice and their significance for ICC 
senteiicing through an evaluation of the rationalefior discounting sentencing in 
return for guilty pleas and the status andjunction of a plea agreement in the 
109 context of international sentencing' 
Under the ICC Statute when an accused admits guilt' 10 the Trial Chamber must 
satisfy itself as to the voluntariness of the admission, that the accused 
understands the consequences and that the admission is supported by the 
charges and factual evidence available to it' 11. However, neither the ICC 
Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide an adequate 
explanation as to the impact of guilty pleas on sentencing. This is important; 
the reduction of sentences in return for a guilty plea is a problematic concept 
for common law jurisdictions where the fundamental due process objection is 
that such 'discounts' undermine the presumption of innocence and the 
necessity for the prosecution to prove its case 112 . In common law countries, a 
plea bargain occurs only where there is a change of plea from not guilty to 
guilty but no charge or fact bargain is involved. In such circumstances the 
'bargain' relates to the defendant exchanging his right to trial and possible 
acquittal for the certainty of a lower sentence than he would otherwise have 
107 Colquhoun C., "Human Rights and Extradition Law in Australia", 6 Australian Journal of 
Human Rights 2 (2000), p. 106. 
108 Op cit, Henham, note 78, p. 90. 
109 Ibid, p. 100. 
110 ICC Article 64 (8) (a). 
111 See ICC Article 65 (4) which provides that "Where a Trial Chamber is of the opinion that a 
more complete presentation of the facts of the case is required in the interest of justice, in 
particular the interests of the victims, the Trial Chamber may: (a) Request the Prosecutor to 
present additional evidence, including the testimony of witnesses; or (b) Order that a trial be 
continued under the ordinary trial procedures provided by the Statute, in which case it shall 
consider the admission of guilt as not having been made and may remit the case to another 
Trial Chamber". 
112 See Ashworth A. J., "The Criminal Process: An Evaluative Study" 1998, pp. 288-92. 
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received upon conviction 113 . 
In contrast, in civil law jurisdictions the guilty 
plea may not be accepted at all 1 14 . The 
fundamental due process issues 
surrounding guilty pleas relate to questions of whether evidence has been 
reviewed successfully in all of the pre-trial stages where pressure exists to 
encourage defendants to plead guilty as early as possible in the proceedings 
and whether there is a significant risk in developing inconsistencies in 
sentencing for defendants who plead guilty as compared to the sentences of 
those who go through a trial. The novel model emanating from the recent 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals takes two forms. The first one involves the 
proposition of unilateral fixed offers (take it or leave it basis) and the other 
involves negotiating with the defendants over benefits that they would receive 
in exchange for an act of self-condemnation 115 . The 
latter does not necessarily 
6 amount to a guilty plea' 1. Originally, the ICTY rejected suggestions made by 
the Government of the United States to introduce provisions under the ICTY 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence encouraging plea-bargaining as a way of 
eliciting evidence against most important defendants 117 . In arguing that plea- 
bargaining is incompatible with the unique objectives of international criminal 
courts, Cassese A. explained: 
in javour contend that it will be difficult for us to obtain evidence 
against a suspect and so we should do everything possible to encourage direct 
testimony. They argue that this is especially true if the testimony serves to 
establish criminal responsibility of those higher up in the chain o command 
Consequently, arrangements such as plea-bargaining could also be considered 
in an attempt to secure other convictions. The persons appearing before us 
will be charged with genocide, torture, murder, sexual assault, wanton 
destruction, persecution and inhumane acts. A er due reflection, we have ft 
113 See Goldstein A., "Converging Criminal Justice Systems: Guilty Pleas and the Public 
Interest", 49 Southern Methodist University Law Review (1996) pp. 574.575. 
114 See Jung H. on France and Germany practice in "Plea-Bargaining and its Repercussions on 
the Theory of Criminal Procedure" 5 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice (1997) at 112. See also Maffei S., "Negotiations 'on Evidence'and Negotiations 'on 
Sentence '-A dvers ar ial Experiments in Italian Criminal Procedure", Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, Vol. 2, No. 4 (2004), pp. 1050-1069. 
"5 Damaska M., "Negotiated Justice in International Criminal Courts" Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, Vol. 2, No. 4 (2004), p. 10 19. 
116 ibid 
117 See UN Doc. IT/ 14,17 November 1993. See also Combs N. A., "Prosecutor v Plavsic", 97 
American Journal of International Law, 2003, pp. 929-937. 
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decided that no one should be immune ftom prosecution for crimes such as 
these, no matter how us(lul their testimony may otherwise be" 118 . 
The ICTY jurisprudence shows however that although guilty pleas may not 
satisfy the common law general requirement that the prosecution prove its case 
they are significant in the work of an international trial'19 and as such may 
form part of the ICC praxis. Judge Cassese A. concluded: 
"It is apparent ftom the whole spirit of the Statute (ICTY) and the Rules, that 
by providing for a guilty plea, the draftsmen intended to enable the accused 
(as well as the Prosecutor) to avoid a possible lengthy trial with all the 
attended difficulties. These difficulties, it bears stressing, are all the more 
notable in international proceedings. Here, it often proves extremely arduous 
and time consuming to collect evidence. In addition it is imperative for the 
relevant officials of an international court to juýfil the essential but laborious 
task ofprotecting victims and witnesses... Thus, by pleading guilty, the accused 
120 undoubtedly contributes to public advantage" 
Such rationale for the acceptance and encouragement of guilty plea-bargaining 
undermines the quest for the truth 121 . Importantly, charge 
bargaining also 
distorts the historic record generated by international courts' 22 
What is also important here is that, and related to the different character of the 
act of self-condemnation, there are different effects of Anglo-American guilty 
pleas and Continental admissions of facts. Continental concessions lead to the 
reduction of punishment, Anglo-American ones can also affect charges. Again, 
118 Statement made at a Briefing of Members of Diplomatic Missions, UN Doc. IT/29,11 
February 1997 at 649,652. 
119 See i. e. Prosecutor v B. Plavsic, Case No. IT-0039&40/1-S), Sentencing Judgment, 27 
February 2003 at 132; Plea Agreement Between Jean Kambanda and the Office of the 
Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-23-1,29 April 1998. 
120 Prosecutor v Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Cassese to Erdemovic Appeals Judgement, 07 October 1997, para. 8. Following the practice of 
the ICTY Bosnia and Herzegovina has too introduced in relevant national legislation designed 
to deal with the core crime the instrument of plea-bargaining "because in makes proceedings 
much more speedier, efficient, and less expensive" in Prosecutor v Zeljko Mejakic et al., 
Case 
No. IT-02-65-PT, Rule I Ibis Hearing, 03 March 2005, p. 215 at 23-24. 
121 See Prosecutor v Todorovic, Case No. IT-95-99/1 -S, Sentencing Judgement, 31 July 200 1, 
para. 8 1. 
122 Scharf M-P., "Trading Justice for Efficiency: Plea-Bargaining and International 
Tribunals" Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 2, No. 4 (2004), p. 1070. 
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the ICTY is an excellent example. In the Plavsic Case' 23 , the Tribunal 
permitted 'charge bargaining' by agreeing to drop the charge of genocide and 
to issue a relatively lenient sentence of eleven years in return for the 
defendant's guilty plea on one count of crimes against humanity. More 
recently, in the Babic Case, the defendant entered a guilty plea to one of the 
fifteen counts in the indictment 124 . In exchange 
for Babic's plea of guilt and 
his continued extensive cooperation with the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor, 
the Prosecution recommended that the Trial Chamber impose a sentence of no 
more than eleven years of imprisonment (he was sentenced to thirteen years) 
and decided to withdraw several charges as well as alternative forms of 
criminal liability charged in the indictment 125 . 
Consequently, if the ICC follows and adopts such an 'administrative' 126 
approach to justice, provisions relating to the presumption of innocence, 
equality between the parties' 27,, the protection of self-incrimination, the 
validity and the commitment to the protection of such fundamental rights 
covered in the Statute and Rules will be questionable. By pleading guilty, a 
defendant voluntarily waives his significant procedural rights, such as the right 
to plead not guilty, the right to be presumed innocent until guilt has been 
proven beyond reasonable doubt at a trial, the right to a trial before the 
international court, the right to cross-examine witnesses, the right to compel 
and subpoena witnesses to appear on the accused's behalf, the right to testify 
or to remain silent at trial and the right to appeal a finding of guilty or to a pre- 
trial ruling 128 . As 
Henharn R. explains 129 : "As such, beyond the potential fior 
undermining [the] process, plea bargains in the international context may 
similarly be seen as unconstitutional in implicitly contravening the principles 
123 Prosecutor v B. Plavsic, Case No. IT-0039&40/1-S), Sentencing Judgment, 27 February 
2003, at 132. 
124 Prosecutor v M. Babic, Case No. IT-03-72-S, Sentencing Judgment, 29 June 2004, para. 
4. 
125 Ibid, paras. 10 1- 102. 
1260P 
cit, Henham, note 78, p. 105. 
127 See Chapter 2. 
128 Prosecutor v Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22, Sentencing Judgment, 05 March 1998, 
para. 10. 
129 Op cit, note 78, p. 107. 
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of legality established hY rclevant Statute and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidciwc -130 
. 
Moreover, under the ICC comPlementarity system, where a case falls within 
the realms of national law a State may either offer guilty pleas and thereby 
potentially demonstrate 'unwillingness and inability' to effectively investigate 
and try persons 131 , or offer guilty pleas in exchange for a lower sentence, in 
order to avoid exposing to the international arena the extent of egregious 
crimes committed either on its territory or by its nationals. 
1.3 Asserting jurisdiction: national v international prosecution 
Problems arising out of competing jurisdictions between national and 
international courts have so far only been tentatively resolved. These problems 
emerge when one or more states seek to assert criminal jurisdiction over 
specific crimes on grounds such as territoriality, nationality or universality. As 
Cassese A. argues' 32 : 
"There are no general rules determinative of this matter, just as there are no 
customary international rules designed to resolve the question of concurrent 
jurisdiction of two or more States, by giving pride ofplace to one legal ground 
of national jurisdiction (say, territoriality) over another such ground (say, 
nationality) ... while not even treaty rules 
have settled the possible conflict 
between States assertingjurisdiction over the same person ...... 
Cassese does however suggest that in a jurisdictional claim between a State 
and international criminal courts, the matter is actually resolvable by treaty 
130 See e. g. Ellison L., "The Adversarial Process and the Vulnerable Witness" (2002), p. 72: 
"Granting dqfendants an affirmative right tojace their accusers corresponds with cultural 
perceptions offairness and by so doing strengthens the integrity and legitimacy of the 
adversarialfact-finding process". See also Home Office, "Promoting Public Confidence in the 
Criminal Justice System" (2002), London. 
131 In Iraq for example, plea-bargaining is permitted under Art. 129 of the Iraqi Criminal 
Procedure Law but absent from the Statute of the Special Tribunal. 
132 Cassese A., "International Criminal Law" (2003), p. 348. 
42 
rules or 'binding resolutions' 133 , as 
in the case of Security Council resolutions 
for the creation of ICTY 
134 
and ICTR 
135 
. 
With regard to the ICC however, 
national courts do benefit from a jurisdictional 'priority' 136 under the 
complementarity principle. 
Whilst the Rome Treaty won approval by an overwhelming majority, 
sovereignty concerns persist in many States. In fact, many reluctant nations 
needed assurances that the ratification of the Treaty would not effectively 
amount to their country's handing over the power to prosecute their own 
nationals. One such assurance had been the passage of domestic legislation 
that criminalizes offences within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC. In 
this regard India stated that the only durable basis for the development of 
international cooperation was scrupulous regard for the fundamental principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations, thus the elimination of obstacles to the 
effective implementation of international criminal justice' 37 . 
Generally, States are also reluctant to defer their disputes to third parties and as 
already noted, both the lCJ jurisprudence and the law of treaties reflect that. 
Although there has been an increase in the use of third-party adjudication in 
interstate disputes, states prefer retaining control in the resolution of their 
disputes, and local (or regional) resolution is still predominant 138 . The more 
uncertain the outcome of a third-party conclusion over a dispute, the less 
willing a state will be to seek such adjudication. It follows that States will also 
be unwilling, and this was largely illustrated during the ICC Treaty 
negotiations (in particular with regard to the definition of crimes), to surrender 
to an international forum by making broad jurisdictional grants in advance, not 
knowing how the relevant law will be interpreted, applied, extended or limited. 
Recent ad hoc tribunals faced similar problems. For example, in the case of 
133 Ibid 
134 Resolution 808 (1993), 22 February 1993, S/RES/808, Security Council 3175 1h Meeting for 
the establishment of International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia since 199 1. 
135 Resolution 955 (1994), 08 November 1994, S/RES/955 (1994), Security Council 3453 rd 
Meeting for the establishment of International Tribunal for Rwanda. 
131 OP Cit, Cassese, note 130, p. 352- 
137 OP Cit, Mr Lahiri (India), note 34, p. 86, para. 47. 
138 See e. g. op cit, Merrills, note 25, pp. 164-66. 
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Rwanda, it was perceived that there were "no precedents or experiences to 
139 draw or learn ftom" . Similarly, the ICC is perceived as potentially 
performing a twofold function. When the Court deals with cases of individual 
culpability, it will have much in common with national courts and relatively 
little in common with inter-state dispute resolution international courts such as 
the ICJ"O. Problems arise in fact when the ICC has to determine the legality of 
official acts, adjudicating therefore on national laws that an accused thought 
were valid at the relevant time. During the Rome Conference, Singapore for 
instance stated that "Whereas the ICC must be endowed with the flexibility to 
contribute to the progressive development of legal principles, that must be 
distinguishedfirom the power to create offences" 141 . This is where the ICC 
moves from dealing with individual responsibility and has to confront sensitive 
political issues between States and navigate between opposing interests of the 
various parties. In performing such function, the ICC will inevitably resemble 
the Cj 142 .A comparative example can be made here with a case before the 
European Court of Human Rights 143 : several Moldovan nationals who had 
been sentenced to death or to terms of imprisonment by the "Supreme Court of 
the Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria" brought the case forward against the 
Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation. The self-proclaimed 
Transdniester Republic was in de facto control of the judicial authorities in that 
part of Moldovia. The ECHR considered that the Moldovan Government, the 
only legitimate government of the Republic of Moldova under international 
law, did not exercise authority over part of its territory, namely the part which 
was under the control of the Moldovian Republic of Transdniestria (MRT). 
However, even in the absence of effective control over the Transdniestrian 
region, Moldova still had a positive obligation under Article I of the European 
139 See "The position of the Government of the Republic of Rwanda on the International 
Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda (ICTR)" Government of Rwanda, 07 May 1998, p. 3, available 
at http: //www. rwandemb. org/prosecution/position. htin 
"0 Op cit, Morris, note 44, p. 25. 
141 Op cit, note 34, p. 8 1, para. 4. 
142 ibid 
143 ECHR, Application No. 48787/99, Ilie Ilascu et al. v Moldova and the Russian Federation, 
Grand Chamber Judgment of 04 July 200 1. 
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Convention 144 to take the measures that it had the power to make and that were 
in accordance with international law to secure to the applicants the rights 
guaranteed by the Convention. Consequently, the applicants were within the 
jurisdiction of the Republic of Moldova for the purpose of Art-1, but its 
responsibility for the acts complained of were to be assessed in the light of its 
positive obligations under the Convention (under the ICC Statute, such 
positive duty relates to states actively investigating and prosecuting 
international crimes). These related both to the measures needed to re-establish 
its control over Transdniestrian territory, as an expression of its jurisdiction, 
and to measures required to ensure respect for the applicants' rights, including 
attempts to secure their release. 
The European Court of Human Rights delivered a judgment 145 that illustrates 
the problem of de facto control of a self-proclaimed state's judicial organs. In 
ratifying the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Moldova had 
declared that it would be unable to guarantee compliance with the provisions 
of the Convention in respect of omissions and acts committed by the organs of 
the self-proclaimed Republic within the territory actually controlled by such 
organs, until the conflict in the region was finally resolved. The ECHR Grand 
Chamber, in considering the admissibility of the application, enquired into the 
nature of the declaration 146 . The 
Moldovan Government maintained that it had 
to be interpreted as a reservation within the meaning of the European 
Convention. The Grand Chamber concluded that the declaration "cannot be 
equated with a reservation ... so it must 
be invalid'. 
As this case demonstrates, States with which the ICC will have to deal most of 
the time are nations that are either in a conflict or in a post-conflict transition. 
Before such States cooperate with the Court, it will be necessary for them to 
re-establish functioning legal systems and introduce, in cases of secession for 
144 1953 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Art. 1: "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights andfreedoms defined in Section I of the Convention". 
145 ECHR, Application No. 48787/99, Ilie Ilascu et a]. v Moldova and the Russian Federation, 
04 July 200 1. 
146 The declaration was made with regard to Article 57 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights which provides that "On receiptftom the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe 
any High Contracting Party shallfurnish an explanation of the manner 
in which its internal la 
ensures the effective implementation of any of the provisions of this 
Convention". 
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example, new constitutions that will allow for the ratification of the ICC 
47 Statute' 
. Other issues may arise from the emergence of a new state or new 
federations, where national constitutional legal and political issues must be 
resolved in the first place, in order to determine who and to what extent 
existing international obligations bind and to determine who has the power to 
enter into international agreements 148 . Furthermore, where national 
constitutions do not meet high international legal standards 149 ý 
it must not be 
presumed that such a State is either unable or unwilling to prosecute the crimes 
under the ICC and it will be difficult for the Court to contend so. ICC 
provisions will be interpreted and applied in harmony with constitutional 
traditions, legal, political and social aims and purposes which may, and often 
will, differ from those advanced by the Rome Treaty. For example, the Statute 
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone criminalizes abuses of girls under 
150 fourteen, as well as the abduction and forced recruitment of children These 
provisions reflect the nature of the atrocities committed in Sierra Leone, where 
51 
thousands of children were abducted and forced to fight' . The Special 
Court 
also has the jurisdiction to try persons who were fifteen or older at the time 
they committed the crime' 52 and provides special safeguards in trials of 
juvenile offenders by emphasising the need for rehabilitating and reintegrating 
153 
such offenders back into society 
"' See for example Venice Commission, "Opinion on Responsibilities for the Conclusion and 
Implementation of International Agreements under the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina", adopted by the Commission at its 39t" Plenary meeting, CDL-INF(1999)009e, 
21 June 1999. 
148 Venice Commission, "Draft Opinion on the Compatibility of the Constitutions of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska with the Constitution of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina", CDL(I 996)056e-rev-restr, 05 July 1996. 
149 See for example Venice Commission, "Commentary on the Draft Albanian 
Constitution as 
Submittedfor Popular Approval on 06 November 1994", CDL(I 995)005e-restr, 16 January 
1995. The 1998 Albanian Constitution provides in its Article 4 (2) that "The Constitution is the 
highest law in the Republic ofAlbania". 
150 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone Arts. 4(c) and 5 
(a). 
151 See Bassiouni M. C., "Post-Conflict Justice" (2001), p. 583. 
152 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone Art. 7. 
... Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone Art. 
7. On 'constructive, pluralistic' approach 
to the problem of child soldiers see lontcheva 
J., "Nationalizing International Criminal Law", 
Conference Paper, The International Society for the Reform of Criminal 
Law, 18'h Conference, 
Montreal, Canada, August 8-12,2004, p. 41, available at 
www. isrcl. orý,, /papei-s/2.004/TLit-ner. pdf 
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1.4 Relationship between the ICC and National Legal Systems 
Crucial to the valuation of the relationship between the ICC regime vis-a-vis 
States Parties is the question of whether, and if so to what extent5 the rules of 
international criminal law bind the domestic legislator. It is important 
examining here the methods by which national courts determine the content of 
international criminal law. Answers to these questions will depend very much 
upon political, philosophical and the practical premises of each country. 
One of the most important features of international law is that it is based on a 
voluntary cooperation of States and in order for an inter-state community to 
exist the international legal system is largely based on the principle of 
sovereignty of States. As far as public international law is concerned, demands 
for justice and order have in many instances overlapped and the Nuremberg 
Tribunal for example, while it represented a fundamental breach from state 
sovereignty, it undermined the need for justice by attempting to restore order 
instead. This judicial flaw along with contradictions surrounding the 
sovereignty of states and their total independence or inter-dependence, seems 
to be the main source of theoretical as well as practical contemporary debate 
on the relationship between international and municipal law. Theoretical 
debates over (non) parallel roles of national and international laws lead to no 
conclusive and satisfactory explanations despite current trends in academic 
literature to advance and presuppose international law as the overriding legal 
system. The distinction in fact between public international law and internal 
law is not sufficiently precise. Disputes between monists, 54 and dualists are 
not, for the present argument, important per se, but are instead to be interpreted 
as a manifestation of the constant need to question the position of international 
law. Such constant debate illustrates the perception of international law as 
uncertain. 
154 See e. g. Schachter 0., "International Law in Theory and Practice" 199 1, pp. 305-314; 
AI lott P., "The Concept of International Law", European Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, 
No. I (1999), pp. 31-50. 
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There are three general theories on the relationship of the two systems. 
According to Cassese A. 155 these are: (1) monist theory advocating the 
supremacy of municipal law; (2) monist theory maintaining the supremacy of 
international law, "giving little weight to the proper law or applicable law 
notion based on the doctrine of the autonomy of the will of the parties", 56; (3) 
dualist theory proposing the existence of two separate distinct legal orders. 
This doctrine is typical of common law systems. Dualists base their 
argumentation on the thesis that international courts exclusively apply sources 
of international law and view domestic law as having only the quality of a 
'fact' 15 7; dualists rely on numerous findings of the PCIJ and ICJ to conclude 
that domestic law does not belong to the same legal order as international 
law' 58 . It is further suggested that the legal order of domestic law derives from 
international law by way of delegation 159 . This is a policy-orientated 
perspective on the impact of international law upon national law that does not 
recognise two distinct systems of laws but suggests instead the 'distribution of 
jurisdiction' 160 over particular events. Harris D. J. appears to approach the 
monist/dualist debate in a similar fashion: "On the inter-governmental 
plane... international law is not only supreme, but in effect is the only system 
there. Domestic law does not, as such, apply at all in the internationalfield ... It 
is a supremacy not arising ftom content but ftom field of operation" 161 . This 
proposition reflects the idea that each legal system is supreme in its own field 
155 Cassese A., "International Law" (2003), p. 162. 
156 Maniruzzaman A. F. M., "State Contracts in Contemporary International Law: Monist 
versus Dualist Controversies", European Journal of International Law, Vol. 12, No. 2 (200 1), 
p. 3 10. 157 Ibid 
158 Treatment of Polish nationals and other persons of Polish origin or speech in the Dantzig 
territory (Dantzig Case), P. C. 1 J., Ser. A/B. NO. 44, Advisory Opinion N. 4 (1932); See e. g. the 
Georges Pinson Case brought before the France-Mexico Claims Commission where the 
umpire dismissed the view that in a case of conflict between the constitution of a state and 
international law, the former should prevail, by point out that this view was 
"absolutely 
contrary to the very axioms of international law", Decision of 
18 October 1928, in the United 
Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. 5, pp. 393-4. See also Lauterpacht H., 
"Oppenheim's International law" (1955), pp. 37-39; Fitzmaurice G., "The General Principles 
of International Law Consideredftom the 
Standpoint of the Rule of Law" (I 957), Il 92 PC 5, 
pp. 70-71,79-80. 
159Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (1987), International law and Municipal 
law, 
pp. 238-239. 
... Weston B., Falk R., Amato A., "International Law and World Order" (1980), p. 186. 
16 ' Harris D. J., "Cases and Materials on International Law" (1998), pp. 68-69. 
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and neither has hegemony over the other 162 . During ICC negotiations, 
Paraguay was in favour of a restrictive concept of the powers of the Court, 
under complementarity, to 'supervise' national proceedings by pointing out 
that the ICC should not be converted into a court of higher instance over local 
163 courts . It stressed the importance of ensuring that the ICC is not 
manipulated to diminish the role of national courts or to interfere with internal 
affairs. 
Dualist theories maintain that there are two distinct legal systems and that they 
differ in 164 (1) their subjects; usually individuals in national and states in 
international legal systems; (2) their sources; parliamentary statutes and 
common law on one hand and treaties and customary rules on the other; (3) the 
content of the rules; national law regulating the internal functioning of a state 
and the relations between the state and individuals, whereas international law 
governs relations between sovereign states. 
The question of the relationship between international and domestic law may 
be resolved in a variety of ways; every state has its own rule of internal 
constitutional law and specific statutory provisions in dealing with 
compatibility matters. There are different approaches as to the domestic 
applicability of customary international law and international treaties. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, there are several problems related to the 
incorporation of customary rules. It was said in Chung Chii Cheung vR 
[1939] 165 that "International law has no validity save insofar as its principles 
are accepted and adopted by our own domestic law. There is no external 
power that imposes its rules upon our own code of substantive law and 
procedure... On anyjudicial issue they (the courts) seek to ascertain what the 
relevant rule is and, having found it, they will treat it as incorporated into 
domestic law, sojar as it is not inconsistent with rules enacted by statutes" 166 . 
162 On views of Fitzmaurice and Rousseau see generally Brownlie I., "Principles of 
International Law", (1998), p. 55. 
163 Op cit, note 35, Mr Sarubbi C. (Paraguay), p. 102, para. 90. 
164 0 Cit, P Cassese, note 154, p. 163. 
165 Chung Chi Cheung v The King [19391 AC 160 
166 Ibid Per Lord Atkin at 167-168. See also Lord Denning and Shaw U in Trendtex Trading 
Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529 (CA) at 554 and 579 respectively where 
they emphasised that international law does not know the rule of precedent and 
it overrules it 
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With regard to treaties, the main problem is that in case of conflict statute 
prevails over treaty. As the House of Lords has held: "As matter of the 
constitutional law o the United Kingdom, the royal prerogative, whilst it 
cmbraces the making qf treaties, does not extend to altering the law or 
conferring rights on individuals or depriving individuals of rights which they 
enjoy in domestic law without the intervention of Parliament ý, 167 . This 
constitutional rule is accompanied by the rule of construction, 68 which requires 
that Acts of Parliament and statutory instruments be interpreted as not to 
conflict with international law but, perhaps in contradiction to some extent, the 
same rule does not apply if the statute is otherwise clear and unambiguous, in 
which case it must be applied. Accordingly, there is a distinction between 
statutes enacting the treaty and those dealing with the same subject-matter but 
not enacting the treaty itself If the treaty forms an integral part of the enabling 
Act, being attached to it as a Schedule, the treaty and the Act are as one. If the 
domestic legislation is not clear and is reasonably capable of more than one 
meaning, the treaty then becomes relevant and the meaning that is consonant 
with it would be preferred, notwithstanding the rule of construction. Generally, 
the dominant principle in the application of customary international law is 
based on a monist approach. The doctrine of incorporation states that a specific 
rule of international law becomes part of national law without the need for 
express adoption. As a result, domestic courts have to apply that rule of 
international law as long as there is no explicit contradicting piece of law or 
judgment. The doctrine of transformation on the other hand stipulates that 
rules of international law do not become part of national law until they have 
been expressly adopted by the state. 
Then there is the so-called harmonising approach by which national 
legislatures and the courts to some extent have competence to bring about 
therefore. The case is relevant as it reinforced the doctrine of incorporation of customary rules; 
see also e. g. Westland Helicopters Ltd. V Arab Organisation 
for Industrial isation [1977] 1 All 
ER 881 
167 Per Lord Oliver in MacLaine Watson & Co Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [ 1989] 
3 All ER, at 545 
168 See e. g. Derbyshire County Council v Times 
Newspapers Ltd. [1992] 3 All ER 65 where 
the Court of Appeal outlined the circumstances in which 
domestic courts may rely on ECHR, 
including to resolve uncertainties or ambiguities in a statute 
(or in common law in general), to 
determine how courts should exercise discretion. 
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harmonisation. This is most apparent in the field of human rights. In Hungary, 
for example, the Constitution provides that the domestic legal system accepts 
the generally recognised principles of international law and shall harmonise 
the country's domestic law with the obligations assumed under international 
law 169 
. As already mentioned, domestic law, according to radical monist 
theory, has no functions in international law and in general, international 
courts should not deal with its interpretation or method of application on 
domestic laws. More importantly and in sharp contrast, national courts must 
always observe international law to the partial discretion when dealing with 
customary rules. As Brownlie 1. observes: "International Tribunals cannot 
declare the internal invalidity of rules of national law since international legal 
order must respect the reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction" 170 . 
For the purpose of harmonising contemporary international criminal law as 
well as humanitarian law and with the aim of encouraging conditions for the 
training of national judiciary and other relevant authorities, numerous stateS171 
have established committees in which members of the ICC could have 
participatory roles, having the function of: (a) promoting effective national 
implementation of international humanitarian rules and aims, including 
coordination with concerned agencies and the presentation of proposals in 
accordance with the public interest 172 ; (b) contributing to the preparation of 
training and development programs for persons in charge of serving 
international humanitarian law in the light of local national needs 173 and (c) 
recommending proposals for legislative regulations for the implementation of 
169 See e. g. 1949 Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, Act XX, Ch. 1, Art. 7. See also 
Mexican proposed Constitutional Amendment, 14 December 2002 at 
http: //www. iccnow. org/t-csourcetools/ratii-nptoolkit/nationalregioiialtools/aiialvsis/nix. cotist. ain 
. sp. pd and the Final Act, Gaceta Parlamentara 
VI, No. 1162,06 January 2003. 
"0 Browrille I., "Principles of International Law" (1998) p. 40. See e. g. Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) Case concerning the Payment in Gold of Brazilian Loans issued in 
France [1929], Dissenting opinion by Pessoa M, at 139, PCIJ Ser. A, No. 20/21, Judgment 
No. ] 5,12 July 1929; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United Kingdom v Iran) [ 1952], Judgment of 22 
July 1952 
171 See e. g. Slovenian Decree No. 762-01/99-1 (B) of 02 April 1999 setting up the 
Interdepartmental Committee for International Humanitarian Law; Ukrainian Cabinet of 
Ministers resolution No. 1157 of 21 July 2000; Uruguayan Decree No. 677/992,12 May 1992; 
Hungarian Government Resolution 2005/2000 (V. 9). 
172 Egyptian Prime Minister's Decree No. 149/2000 on the establishment of a National 
Committee for International Humanitarian Law, Art. 2. 
173 Ibid. 
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the obligations stemming from the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 
Additional Protocols, conventions of international humanitarian law, including 
the Statutes of international criminal courts 174 
1.5 Implementing and applying ICC law 
Several factors emphasise the significance of the debate on potential 
constitutional incompatibilities with the ICC Treaty. Procedural and political 
realities of amending a constitution are often controversial and complex. 
Numerous constitutions provide either that certain ratified treaties take 
precedence over domestic laws 175 or that such treaties benefit from a 
constitutional rank or provide for them to have pre-eminence over other 
constitutional provisions 176 In the Republic of Argentina, for example, the 
constitution affords constitutional rank to certain treaties such as the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, the American 
Convention on Human Rights and the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 177 . In Portugal, the 
Constitution provides that, once approved, international rules apply to national 
laws and once ratified and published become Portuguese law 17 8. The 
Portuguese Constitution now also stipulates that it "accepts thejurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court, with the conditions of complementarity and 
other stipulations as foreseen in the Rome Statute" 179 . In Paraguay, the 
constitution takes a step further providing that the country "accepts a 
supranational legal system that would guarantee the enforcement of human 
rights, peace, justice, and cooperation, as well as political, socio-economic, 
174 Greek Ministerial Decision of 20 March 2000 on the establishment of a Commission for the 
Implementation and Dissemination of International Humanitarian Law, Art. 3 (1). 
175 See for example Article II of the 1992 Constitution of Slovakia and Article 10 of the 2002 
Constitution of the Czech Republic. 
176 Duffy H., "National Constitutional Compatibility and the International Criminal Court" II 
Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 3 (2001) p, 6. 
177 1994 Constitution of the Republic of Argentina, Art. 75 (22). 
178 2001 Constitution of the Republic of Portugal (No, 1/200 1), Art. 8. 
179 Ibid., Art. 7 (7). 
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(117d cultural developmew"' 
80 
. In Angola, the government concluded that there 
is perfect constitutional compatibility between the ICC Statute and the 
181 Angolan basic law 
, which recognises the primacy of 
international law over 
national laws by requiring that "Coiistitutional and other legal norms be 
intciprcted and intcgraled in line with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, and other 
182 international instruments to which Angola is a party" . In contrast, 
Mozambique for example, encountered numerous problems in ratifying the 
Rome Treaty as the Constitution allows for the ratification of treaties only 
83 
when they are compatible with the Constitution' . 
In FYROM, the 
Constitution' 84 provides that international treaties that are ratified in 
accordance with the Constitution become part of the legal order and cannot be 
changed by law 185 . 
This is similar to the 'self-executing' model on treaties, predominantly adopted 
by the U. S. Self-executing treaties being applicable by national courts without 
any legislative act so long as their provisions are clear and precise enough for 
direct implementation. However, the distinction between treaties that are self- 
executing and those that are not may be problematic. It has been said in fact 
that,, -A treaty ... 
does not automaticall supersede local laws which are y 
inconsistent with it unless the treaty provisions are self-executing ... In 
determining whether a treaty is self-executing, courts look to the intent of the 
signatory parties as manifested by the language of the instrument, and, if the 
instrument is uncertain, recourse may be had to the circumstances 
surrounding its execution ... In orderfior a treaty provision to 
be operative 
without the aid of implementing legislation and to have the force and effect of 
a statute, it must appear that the ftamers of the treaty intended to prescribe a 
rule that, standing alone, would be enforceable in the courts" 186 . 
180 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Paraguay Art. 145. 
18 1 Loc cit, note 106. 
182 1992 Constitution of Angola, Art. 21 (2). 
183 1990 Constitution of Mozambique, Art. 85 (2). 
184 1992 Constitution of FRYOM, Art. 118. 
185 The Law on Ratification of the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court was 
adopted in 2002, Official Gazette No. 12/2002. 
186 Judgment of Gibson CJ in Sei Fuji, v State (1952), 38 Cal-2d 718,242 P. 2d 617 (1952), 
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States have adopted two ways of responding to the ICC Treaty implementation 
requirements. A small number of States have amended their constitution to 
ensure that it is compatible with the Treaty. For example, France amended its 
Constitution and has ratified the Statute. These amendments concern three 
specific aspects of the constitution but the amended constitution does not itself 
specify these issues. They related firstly to ICC Art. 27 (Irrelevance of official 
capacity), secondly to the fact that the Court could challenge national rules on 
statutory limitations or nationally adopted amnesty laws and thirdly to the ICC 
Prosecutor's capacity of conducting investigations on national territory without 
representatives of the French judicial system 187 . 
The Constitution now reads, 
"The Republic may recognise the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
,, 88 Court under the conditions specified by the treaty signed on July 18,1998 1. 
Germany had taken a slightly different approach, whereby it amended a 
particular provision of the German Constitution, the Basic Law, concerning the 
extradition of nationals. previously prohibited by the Constitution. Similarly, 
Jordan adopted a new implementing law establishing compliance with the 
Rome Statute and harmonising its own constitution with it, particularly with 
regard to the non-extradition of nationals. Article 9 of the Constitution 
provides that " (i) no Jordanian may be deported ftom the territory of the 
Kingdom; (ii) no Jordanian may be prevented ftom residing in anyplace, or 
be compelled to reside in any specified place, except in circumstances 
prescribed by law". Article 3 of the new law provides the need for the 
Statute*s implementation into national law. 
Other States have either concluded that their constitutional rules are consistent 
with the Statute and that any amendments are unnecessary, or that a 
constitution and the ICC Treaty may coexist as two parallel instruments. 
Nigeria for example, expressed the view during the ICC Treaty negotiations 
that it would "have difficulties with the statute if a hierarchy is established in 
which the ICC would be superior to national courts. Rather, recourse to the 
187 Decision 98-408 DC of 22 January 1999-Treaty on the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, in Journal Off iciel, No. 20,24 January 1999, p. 1317. 
188 Constitution of the Republic of France 1958,1999, Art. 53 (2). Brazil and Belgium have 
also followed this approach. 
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Cmio shoul(10171.1, be in the absence qf national. jurisdiction" 189 . Norway stated 
that, " The International Criminal Court ivill not take precedence over national 
criminaljitrisdictions in cases that come within the scope of the Court, such as 
war crimes, genocide etc. It iiill only exercise its functions of investigation, 
trial and conviction when the State concerned does not have the will or the 
abilin, to exercise these functions qf ficiently itself"90. Similarly, the Swiss 
Federal Law on Cooperation with the International Criminal Court 2001 
provides that the Swiss Central Authority may assert jurisdiction or, if 
necessary, it may challenge the jurisdiction of the Court 191 
The constitutional amendment approach seemed to be preferred by countries 
where constitutional changes were absolutely necessary, or where the 
constitutional change was simplified and straightforward. Various states, like 
Germany, looked at the ICC Treaty ratification as a timely opportunity to 
'update' national provisions. 
The other principal way of ratification is the interpretative approach, which 
implies that the ICC Treaty and the constitution can in fact be read 
harmoniously' 92 . 
Most importantly, the manner in which a constitution is 
interpreted will depend significantly on domestic constitutional theory and 
practice. On its face, this may imply practical inconsistencies amongst States 
when interpreting and applying ICC provisions, which may lead potentially to 
dissimilar application results. This could affect the rights of the accused. It is 
therefore important to view different constitutions as being flexible and 
193 
interpreted as "embracing scenarios not contemplated by their creators" . it 
is widely accepted that a constitution should be interpreted consistently with 
its own object and purpose without undermining the original intent of a 
particular constitutional provision. 
189 Statement of Ayewah 1. E (Nigeria), U. N. GAOR, 50 
th Sess., at 2 U. N. Doc. A/C. /6/50/SR, 
1995. 
190 Transcript of the debate in the Plenary of the Storting (The Norwegian Parliament) on 
27 
January 2000 (unofficial translation), provided by the Council of Europe, "The Implications 
for Council of Europe Alember States of the Ratification of the Rome 
Statute of the 
International Criminal Court-Norway", 18 October 2001, Consult/ICC (2001) 42. 
191 CICCL of 22 June 2001, Art. 7. 
192 op. cit, Duffy, note 175, p. 13. 
193 Ibid 
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Consideration of basic constitutional values and objectives and their 
compatibility with those of the ICV Statute will present a major contest in 
applyinp ICC provisions. Particular provisions that typically raise questions of 
constitutional compatibility are concerned with human rights, 94. Arguably 
therefore, any interpretation of the constitution that militates against the ability 
to hold accountable those responsible for grave international crimes may be 
inconsistent with a constitution's own purpose. Another principle of 
constitutional construction, which is the core of the present chapter, is that 
constitutional provisions should be interpreted consistently with international 
law obligations. This may include an obligation on a State not to recognise 
foreign law that is in violation of international law obligations but it may not 
include a duty on a State to enforce an ICC provision that would be in breach 
of an existing multilateral or bilateral treaty obligation. In fact, where there is a 
clear conflict between constitutional and international law,, it will be for the 
municipal law to determine the hierarchy between the two and apply the 
relevant law accordingly. Admittedly, however, where constitutional 
provisions permit different possible interpretations, there is a strong argument 
in favour of construing the constitution and international law consistently. If 
ICC provisions do represent, according to some, erga omnes obligations then 
contemporary international law accords such obligations priority over any 
other norms 195 . Optimistic ICC supporters would argue that 
by ratifying 
treaties (without any major reservations) such as the Convention against 
Torture, States have already accepted the duty to prosecute or extradite, 
notwithstanding any constitutional provision against such action which may be 
interpreted as indicating that relevant constitutional provisions, such as those 
granting immunities, did not apply to the prosecution of the crimes that are the 
subject matter of the treaties196. Such interpretation of the relationship between 
'9' lbid 
195 On erga omnes obligations see e. g. Malanczuk P., "The International Criminal Court and 
Landmines: What are Consequences of Leaving the US Behind', II European Journal of 
International Law 1 (2000), p. 77-90; Committee on Human Rights Law and Practice, "Report 
on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction on Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences", 
prepared by Kamminga M., International Law Association, Report of the 68"' Conference, 
Taipei, Taiwan, 1998. 
196 See e. g. Vienna Convention Art. 31 (3) (c) (general rule of interpretation) which states that 
"There shall be taken into account, together with the context, any relevant rules of 
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the ICC and States Parties is incomplete and somewhat simplistic. It is the 
recognition of constitutional autonomy that the ICC is based on, through the 
principle of complementarity, and it is in acceptance of constitutional 
sovereignty that the Rome Treaty is silent on the issues of amnesties and 
pardons. In Armenia for example, the Constitutional Court has declared 
incompatibilities with the Rome Statute as the ICC is seen as supplementing 
the national judicial system' 97 and because national authorities would be 
deprived of the right to grant pardons. There are inherent limits to the 
technique of treaty interpretation in light of 'any relevant rules Qf international 
lait, applicable in rclations between parties' 198 . as a means of reducing the 
occurrence of inconsistencies. These limits arise for example from the 
different context in which other rules of international law may have been 
developed and applied and/or the progressive purpose of many treaties in the 
development of international law' 99 . Armenia nevertheless introduced in 2003 
a new criminal code that covers 'crimes against peace and human security'. 
This section of the new code provides definitions of genocide, serious breaches 
of international humanitarian law during armed conflicts and crimes against 
human security, excluding any reference to the Rome Treaty. 
Constitutions and the values they represent would be better served by the 
200 
ratification of the Statute than not . In some 
States it has been perceived that 
such ratification requires parliamentary approval because of a perception that 
the executive may have excessive powers in the field of foreign affairs. In 
Australia it was felt that "the practice, whereby treaties were entered into by 
international law applicable in the relations between parties". See also European Court of 
Human Rights jurisprudence in Al-Addsani v United Kingdom, Application No. 35763/97 123 
I. L. R. (2001) 24; McElhinney v Ireland, Application No. 31253/96; Golder v United 
Kingdom, Judgment 21 February 1975, ECHR Ser. A[ 1995] No. 18; 
197 Contradicting Articles 91 and 92 of the 1995 Armenian Constitution. 
198 Vienna Convention Art. 31 (3) (c). 
199 Op cit, ILC, note 32, p. 300, para. 346. See also para. 349 where it was said that Article 31 
(3) (c) which is essential for promoting harmonisation and guaranteeing the unity of 
international legal system, did not however indicate any particular way in which this should 
take place (carry out the interpretation). Different rules would have to be weighted against 
each other in a manner that was appropriate 
in the circumstances. 
200 Op cit, Duffy, note 175, p. 16. 
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the CXCCIIIIIC without signýficant parliamentary involvement, is 
I undemocratic "'201 . And that: 
"Parliamentary approval of legislation which implements treaties is not a 
of accountability. Even when treaties are not implemented by 
legislation, theY maY still have domestic consequences. Treaties can af)ect the 
interpretation of law, by being used to resolve ambiguities in legislation or 
gaps in the common law. They are considered by the courts to be a legitimate 
source of influence on the development of the common law, and may be the 
source qf a 'legitimate expectation' under administrative law, the government 
qfficials will comply with ihe treaty when making administrative decisions 
, 202 which affect the rights ofpeople' 
Accountability is fundamental from the standpoint of international law; 
conflict over domestic process of treaty ratification may undermine the 
legitimacy of international law itself and result in a lack of public support for 
treaties and their results 203 A system where the power to ratify treaties is 
removed from the executive until approval has been granted by the legislature 
204 would potentially offer a better balance . 
In Sierra Leone for example, it was 
recently held that the Government of Sierra Leone acted unconstitutionally in 
establishing the Special Court205. It had been pointed out that there should 
have been a postponement of all operations of the Special Court until the 
Sierra Leone Government was able to actually hold a referendum in 
accordance with the Sierra Leone 
206 Constitution In Ireland, the 
201 Cranwell G., "The Casefor Parliamentary Approval of Treaties in Australia" 8 Murdoch 
University Electronic Journal of Law 4 (2001), p. 2, at 
http: //www. nlLli-doch. edLi. au/elaw/issues/y8n4i/cranweII84. htriii 
202 lbid, pp. 2-3. 
203 Shearer I., "The growing impact of international law on Australian domestic law- 
implications for procedures of ratification and parliamentary scrutiny" 69 Australian Law 
Journal (1995), p. 404. 
204 See Hendry J., "Treaties and Federal Constitutions" (1955) p. 89 "The great disadvantage 
of the English system is that, if the executive cannot obtain the necessary parliamentary 
approvalfor a treat, or if the courts declare the treaty unconstitutional, the state is 
internationally in default". 
205 Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prosecutor v Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR 72 E, 
the Appeals Chamber "Decision on Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction", 13 March 
2004, para3 
206 SCSL, Prosecutor v Morris Kallon, "Preliminary motion based on lack ofjurisdiction., 
establishment of Special Court violates Constitution of Sierra Leone", 16 June 2003, Case No. 
SCSL-2003-07-PT, para23. 
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implementation of the Rome Treaty did indeed require a referendum 207 as it 
was recognised that an ICC implementing act 208 contradicting the Constitution 
and necessitating other legislative amendments could only be introduced by 
democratic referendum. Only such a referendum could justify democratic 
chanile in the Constitution. Referring back to the process in Sierra Leone, it 
was, submitted that for the part of the Sierra Leone Government the President 
signed the Agreement on the establishment of Court between Sierra Leone and 
the United Nations. The main problem was the understanding by some that the 
Special Court amended the judicial framework and court structure in Sierra 
Leone and under the Sierra Leone Constitution (Art. 108 (4)) such 
amendments cannot be made without a referendum of the people of Sierra 
Leone and no such referendum had been held 209 . It was suggested that Sierra 
Leone acted "unconstitutionally in bypassing the views and wishes of the 
people of Sierra Leone ,2 10. The opposing view maintained that under the 
Ratification Act2l I (S. 11 (2)) the Special Court did "not form part of the 
Judiciary of Sierra Leone" and that "the Special Court does not exist or 
operate at all within the sphere of municipal law ... and is not a national court 
of Sierra Leone"212 . 
It was also emphasised that the Constitution is only 
14 concerned with the judiciary of Sierra Leone , 
213 
, within municipal 
law. The 
ICJ observed in the Norwegian Loans Case 
214 that: 
"A'ational legislation ... may 
be contrary, in its intention or efforts, to the 
international obligations of the State. The question of conformity of national 
legislation with international lcm, is a matter of international law. The notion 
that if a matter is governed by national law it is for that reason at the same 
time outside the sphere of international law is both novel, and if accepted, 
subversive of international law. It is not enough for a State to bring a matter 
under the protective umbrella of its legislation, possibly of a predatory 
20' Referendum to the 23 rd Amendment to the Constitution (of 29 December 1937) was held on 
07 June 2001. 
208 See Twenty-third Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2001. 
209 Op cit, note 205, paras5-7. 
210 Ibid, para 18. 
21 1 2002 Special Court Agreement (Ratification) Act. 
212 Op cit, note 204, para9 (a). 
213 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone, Chapter 7. 
214 Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, ICJ Reports (1957) 9, p. 27. 
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character, in order to shelter ii e1jeclivelyfirom any control by international 
/ait", 
In another case,, the Pyramids Case 215 ,a tribunal accepted that national law, 
Egyptian law, was the proper applicable law but at the same time it took the 
view that international law is indeed part of Egyptian law and concluded that: 
-Rýlcrciwe to Egyptian hm, must be construed so as to include such principles 
of international law as may be applicable and that national laws of Egypt can 
be relied upon only in as much as they do not contravene said principles"216 . 
In South Africa, the adoption of the Rome Treaty represented a 'compromise 
package' where unresolved issues, primarily those relating to national laws, 
pose serious challenges to the ICC217. In the AZAPO Case 218 the South 
African Constitutional Court, by holding the amnesty legislation to be 
constitutional, is said to have proceeded from the assumption that international 
lav, - was irrelevant if it was inconsistent with the Constitution. This is 
confirmed by the 1996 Constitution which provides that "Customary 
international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the 
I ý', 19 Constitution or an Act of Parliament . As a result, the 
Court maintained that 
"International law and the contents of international treaties to which South 
Africa might or might not be a party at any particular time are ... relevant 2onl 
in the interpretation of the Constitution itseýf on the grounds that the 
lawmakers of the Constitution 220 should not lightly be presumed to authorise 
any law which might constitute a breach of the obligations of the state in terms 
of international law"221 . It 
is worth noting that the 1996 South African 
215 SPP (Middle East) Ltd and Southern Pacific Projects v Egypt and EGOTH [ 1998] LAR 
309. 
216 lbid at 330. See also Polish Nationals 'In Dantzig Case, P. C. I. J, Ser. A/B, no. 44,1931, at p. 24 
where it was said that "according to generally accepted principles... a state cannot adduce as 
against another state its own constitution with a view to avoiding obligations incumbent upon 
it under international law or treaties inforce". 
217 See 2001 South Africa International Criminal Court Bill, Government Gazette No. 22456 
(04 July 2001). 
218 Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and Others v President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others, Const. Court CCT 17196, Judgment of 25 July 1996. 
219 Sec. 232 of the 1996 South Africa Constitution, Act. No. 108. See also Sec. 233 which 
provides that "When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable 
interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative 
interpretation that is inconsistent with international law". 
220 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
221 Op cit, note 217, para. 26. 
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Constitution provides that "The Republic is bound by international agreements 
which are binding on the Republic when the Constitution took effect 5Q22 and in 
striving to achieve harmony between South African and international human 
rights jurisprudence, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court must 
223 224 consider international law and may consider foreign law It has also been 
noted 22ý that in light of the prescriptions in the South African Interim 
Constitution relating to the importance of international human rights law in the 
process of constitutional interpretation 226 and the place of customary 
international law in domestic law 227 
, the 
Constitutional Court would have 
examined the conventional and customary rules that demand prosecution for 
human rights violators, the practice of other states in transition and whether the 
drafters of the Interim Constitution intended to overrule international law on 
amnesties"" 8. By contrast, the Czech Republic's 1992 Constitution provides 
that ratified and promulgated international accords on human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are immediately binding and are superior to national 
-129 law . Some commentators maintain 
however that a conclusion in which 
international law overrides national laws in the event of inconsistencies and so 
attributes supremacy to international law, is an expression of the monist 
doctrine but such a formulation is "in doubt because it is contrary to the 
, 230 practice of most states' 
In the United Arab Emirates, the government is currently examining the ICC 
Statute and how to modify the national laws in accordance with the crimes in 
the Rome Treaty, prior to ratification. Reports have indicated that whilst legal 
compatibilities issues have nearly been resolved, political barriers remain the 
222 Section 23 1 (5). 
223 1996 South African Constitution Sec. 39 (1) (b). 
224 lbid Sec. 39 (1) (c). 
225 Dugard J., "International Law and the South African Constitution", European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 8, No. I (1997) pp. 88-89. 
226 1993 South Africa Interim Constitution Act 200, Sec. 35 (1). See also e. g. Keightley R., 
"Public International Law and the Final Constitution" 12 South African Journal of Human 
Rights (1996) at 408. 
227 1996 Constitution, Sec. 231 (4). 
228 Op cit, note 224, p. 89. 
229Art. 10 of the 1992 Czech Republic Constitution. 
230 0P Cit, Maniruzzman, note 155, p-318. 
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main obstacle to ratification2 
31 
. Many Arab countries have delayed the 
ratification of the ICC Treaty having concerns about the non-definition of the 
crime of aggression in the Treaty. The Syrian Arab Republic has for example 
indicated that it would wait until the crime of aggression was defined before 
deciding its position on the (, C232. 
From a theoretical perspective, the question is how can there be an impartial 
and politically independent legal order in which 'Ihere are no institutions for 
the interpretation of law which cire independent of states ý233 . 
Speculating 
further the argument may be extended so as to conclude that there is little to be 
expected from the possibility of an independent judiciary, as judges are 
inevitably state appointees, both at national and international leve1234 . As Prof 
Carty A explains: 
-Even ýf an individual judge is independent in spirit, the power of a state 
apparatus considers that its national security is at issue. This is, in fact, 
reflected in judicial interpretations of the meaning of the concept of national 
security. The power of the state has, further, huge implications in terms of the 
access of the judiciary to the facts that could form basis of an objective 
decision. The court is not necessarily in any better position to extract 
information ftom individual states than is apolitical body such as the Security 
ý23 Council' 
During the Rome Conference, it was largely felt that granting the Security 
Council substantial powers to determine the docket of the Court was 
incompatible with the establishment of an effective judicial body. Many States 
had in fact expressed concerns about the not-sufficiently defined relationship 
between the Court and the Security Council. Defining the relationship between 
23 'See Country Report by the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) at 
http: ///www. iccnow. orc,, /countryinf'o/iiorthafi-icai-niddleeast/unitedarabei-nit-ates. liti-nl 
232 Ibid, Report on Syria, at 
http: //www. iccnow. org/countryinfo/liorthafricainiddleeast/sy, ria. hti-nl 
233 Carty A., "The terrors offreedom. - the sovereignty qf states and thefreedom tojear" in 
"Law after Ground Zero" Strawson J (Ed) 2002, p. 47. For a further discussion see inconsistent 
understanding and application of international law see Carty A., "Convergences and 
Divergences in European International Law Traditions" II European Journal of International 
Law 3 (2000) 713-732. 
234 Ibid, Carty (2002). 
235 Ibid. 
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the United Nations and the Court is important in strengthening and 
legitimising the work of the Court. The respective competence of the Court 
and the Security Council must be carefully appraised as to reconcile the 
236 former's independence with the latter's prerogatives . The United Stated 
described as simplistic the argument that Security Council referrals would 
politically influence the ICC Prosecutor and that proprio motu investigations 
would ensure impartiality 237 . Such argument either ignores or underestimates 
the considerable political pressure that States and organisations would impose 
on the Prosecutor. In addition, the argument that the Prosecutor could base a 
decision on whether to initiate investigations solely on legal criteria is, as the 
United States stressed, weak and not persuasive 238 . If the Prosecutor has 
authority and responsibility to pursue all credible allegations, there would be 
many more complaints than the Prosecutor could possibly handle 239 An order 
to prioritise the most serious allegations, the Prosecutor will inevitably be 
required to assume public policy decisions. Such decisions, in the views of 
many participants at the Rome Conference, would be best made elsewhere, 
namely the Security Council. For example, the Czech Republic argued that the 
Court should not be able to consider an act of aggression unless the Security 
Council had first determined that such an act had been committed 240 . 
The complementarity provisions of the ICC Statute (Articles 17 to 19) are 
central to the understanding of the effect of constitutional incompatibilities 
with the ICC. The ICC Statute limits the Court's investigations to those 
situations where a State concerned is unable or unwilling to investigate and 
prosecute, and thus if it carries out genuine investigations the ICC will have no 
jurisdiction, thereby potential constitutional incompatibilities will be avoided. 
The Court must not supplant national criminal justice systems or act as a 
236 Statement by Mr Minoves Triquell (Andorra), Rome Conference, UN Doc. 
A/CONF. 183/13 (Vol. 11), p. 81, para. 2. Also, Ms Almeida (Observer for the International 
Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development) said that granting the Security 
Council sweeping powers to determine the docket of the Court was incompatible with the 
establishment of an effective judicial body. 
237 Mr Scheffer (United States), Rome Conference, 901 plenary meeting, 22 June 1998, 
A/CON F. 183/C. I /SR. 9, p. 202, para. 127. 
238 Ibid, para. 128. 
239 Ibid 
240 Mr Janda (Czech Republic), Rome Conference, I Oth plenary meeting, 22 June 1998, 
A. CONF. I 83/C. I /SR. 10, p. 209, para. 8 1. Supported by Australia, see Mr Rowe, at p. 213, 
para. 15. 
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supervisory body over them 241 . 
For example, with regard to ICC Article 19 (3), 
which provides that the Prosecutor may request the Court to review a decision 
of inadmissibility, it was said during the Treaty negotiations that such a review 
procedure gave the ICC Prosecutor too wide a power of appreciation over 
national proceedings 242 . In order to be able to have jurisdiction over a case 
under the complementarity principle, several countries have amended their 
domestic legislation 243 
. 
The need for such changes, as already discussed, 
depends on the efficiency of existing national law. The process of 
implementation of the ICC Treaty has involved, amongst other things, 
including the crimes within the ICC jurisdiction into domestic law 244 ; elevating 
national rules to international standards and characterising them, where 
appropriate. as international crimes. In Germany for example, the Federal 
Cabinet adopted the Act of Ratification of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court and the Act Amending Article 16 of the Basic Law which 
allows for the extradition of nationals to the ICC and to other member states of 
the European Union 245 , 
by specifying "it will be possible to decide differently 
by law regarding the extradition to a member state of the European Union and 
to an international court"246 . In other 
States such as Canada and New Zealand, 
implementation has involved extending the jurisdiction of domestic courts to 
cover crimes committed outside the territory of these States, providing for 
247 universal jurisdiction 
241 Op cit, Statement fTom Ghana, note 34, p. 85, para. 38. 
242 See Mr Holmes (Canada), Rome Conference, I Vh Meeting, 22 June 1998, 
A. CONF. I 83/C. I /SR. 11, p. 213, para. 2 1. 
243 See for example how the Republic of South Africa amended its Criminal Procedure Act 
1977 by adding to its sec. 18 (g) the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and the crime of aggression as contemplated in sec. 4 of the South African International 
Criminal Court Act 2001, and amendments to the Military Discipline Supplementary Measure 
Act 1999. 
244 This is a fundamental aspect of a correct implementation of the ICC law because a state 
should not circumvent its obligations simply because the international crimes 
lack adequate 
definition in domestic law. See e. g. Cameroon Case No. 337/COR, Court of Appeal, 21 
February 1997 where a request was surrender was challenged on the grounds that the crimes in 
the relevant arrest warrants were not criminal offences under the ordinary penal 
law of 
Cameroon. 
245 Adding to draft law No. 715/99- 
246 The Cabinet approved the final drafts and the Code of Crimes Against 
International Law 
and the Implementing Act on January 
16,2002, full text available at 
http: //www. iuscr. iiii. mp, Q. de/forsch/onIitie pub. html*. legaltex 
247 For example, Canada and New Zealand 
have adopted such implementing legislation. See 
Canadian Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act 2000, c. 24., and 
2000 New Zealand 
International Criminal Court Act. 
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The most noticeable constitutional barriers in implementing the Rome Treaty 
relate to (1) the jurisdictional monopoly of national courts to adjudicate 
individuals; (2) the regimes of expulsion and extradition, which are 
constitutionally reserved to national judicial authorities and are subject to 
constitutional discipline; (3) in many States, the constitutional prohibition of 
life- imprisonment and (4) the regulation on immunities for certain State 
officials, which is contrary to the ICC Statute. 
The most important and most recurrent of these incompatibilities between the 
national laws and provisions of the ICC Statute relate to the prohibition of 
extradition of nationals. Usually such prohibitions are a direct bar on 
extradition. For example, the Bulgarian constitution provides that "no citizen 
of the Republic of Bulgaria shall be expatriated or extradited to another 
state" 
148 
; the Latvian constitution provides that "a citizen of Latvia may not be 
ý, 249 extradited to aforeign country . Other constitutions such as that of Estonia, 
provide that extradition of its citizens is permitted in cases prescribed by an 
international agreement, such as the ICC Treaty. In Portugal, a solution had 
been proposed to avoid the "painful process of chirurgical review of the 
Constitution' 250 and to establish an acceptance clause in the Constitution and 
leave all specific issues to the implementing legislation that gives effect to 
complementarity 251 . 
Constitutional inconsistencies regarding the prohibition 
against extradition of nationals and obligations under the ICC Statute have 
been resolved , in theory at 
least, by introducing the concept of 'surrender' to 
an international court as opposed to 'extradition' to another state 
252 ; 
complementarity will not always resolve these incompatibilities but it is a 
method of exercising jurisdiction by States and a method of preserving their 
constitutional sovereignty in areas such as immunities, amnesties and 
sentences. 
248 Article 25(4) of the 1991 Bulgarian Constitution. 
249Article 98 of the 2003 Latvian Constitution. 
250 Op cit, note 10 1, Dr Jorge Lacao, President of the Portuguese 
Constitutional Affairs and 
Civil Liberties Commission. 
251 ibid 
252 For a full discussion see Chapter 2. 
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The Rome Statute does not explicitly impose the duty to adopt cooperation 
legislation, " ý' although States are under an obligation to adopt appropriate 
legislation to implement the cooperation obligations under Part 9 of the 
Statute. Neither the signatory States nor the States Parties have any clear 
obligation to bring their domestic legislation into harmony with the basic 
provisions of the Rome Statute, nor is there an explicit obligation under the 
Rome Statute on States Parties to prohibit in their national law the crimes 
falling within the ICC's jurisdiction 254 . 
The Council of Europe's Spanish 
Progress Report 255 for example, concludes that: "Strictly speaking, the Statute 
does not include (n7Y obligation on the part of the States parties to incorporate 
those criminal provisions into their internal law, as they only concern the 
scope and exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court"256 . As "any interpretation 
of an international treaty has to start with its text, such absence militates its 
2 57 existence" it is reasonable to conclude that the Court is susceptible as it is 
fundamentally dependant on the political will of domestic authorities to 
enforce its mandate. These lacunae in the Rome Statute are the result of an 
"unusual last-minute negotiating history" which resulted in issues not being 
addressed nor resolved 258 . There was no 
debate on either the text or its 
substantive merits and the final text was described as a "take - it-or-leave- it 
package that had been cobbled together behind closed doors during the middle 
of the night... of the last day of the Conference"259 . In the United 
States it has 
been pointed out in fact that "Because of the extraordinary way the Court's 
jurisdiction was ftamed at the last moment, a country willing to commit war 
crimes couldjoin the treaty and opt out of war crimes jurisdiction for 7 years, 
253 On the view that States do not have an obligation to implement see e. g. Robinson D., "The 
Rome Statute and its Impact on National Law" in Cassese A., Gaeta P. and Jones J. (eds. ), 
"The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary" (2002), p. 1860. 
254 Op Cit, lontcheva, note 2, p. 10. 
255 Council of Europe, "The Implicationsfor Council of Europe Member States of the 
Ratýfication of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court-Progress Report by 
Spain", CONSULTACC (2001) 28,04 September 200 1, p. 5. 
256 Note however that this conclusion does not affect jus cogens norms outside the ICC regime. 
See e. g. Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment of 10 December 1998, 
paras. 153-155. 
257 Kleffner J. K., "The impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive 
International Criminal Law", Journal of International Criminal Justice 1(]) [2003], p. 9 1. 
258 Newton M., "Comparative Complementarity. - Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court", 167 Military 
Law Review (2001), p. 22. 
259 lbid 
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while wii-party states could deploy its soldiers abroad and be vulnerable to 
, 260 assertions of l'uriscliction' 
The challenge to the ICC's legitimacy and authority has three dimensions. 
Firstly, there are only few structural checks in place to ensure that the Court's 
functions and powers are executed fairly and consistently. For example, 
concerns have been expressed over the wide scope of discretion that the ICC 
Prosecutor enjoys in initiating investigations proprio motu, without any 
external oversight. The ICC Statute provides that the Prosecutor's actions are 
subject to review by a three-judge ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, which must find 
reasonable grounds for an investigation 261 . This does not reflect a general 
proposition made during the negotiation of the ICC Treaty, that the Prosecutor 
should have the consent of the interested State before proceeding with an 
investigation 262 . States have however expressed different approaches to the 
possible primacy of an ICC investigation and prosecution. Portugal for 
example clearly stated its "intention to exercise its jurisdictional powers over 
everypersonfound in the Portuguese territory, that is being prosecutedfor the 
crimes setforth in article 5, paragraph 1263 of the Rome Statute ... within the 
respectfor the Portuguese criminal legislation', 264 . The Swiss Federal Law on 
Cooperation with the International Criminal Court provides that it is its Central 
Authority that finalises decisions on the admissibility of cooperation, on 
cooperation procedures and challenges to the jurisdiction of the ICC265. It also 
provides that "If the Court (ICQ claims jurisdiction over proceedings, the 
Central Authority may, in agreement with the competent authorities in the 
Swiss proceedings, assert Swiss jurisdiction as indicated in article 18 of the 
Statute... "266 
. 
Similarly, Pakistan expressed its preference for the exhaustion of 
160 Op Cit, Scheffer, note 18, p. 13. 
261 ICC Statute Art. ] 5 (4). 
262 See 1995 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, U. N. GAOR, 5 oth Session, Supp. No. 22, U. N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995), para. 25. 
263 ICC Art. 5 (1 ) (a) the crime of genocide; 5 (1) (b) crimes against humanity; 5 (1) (c) war 
crimes; 5 (1) (d) the crime of aggression. 
264 See Portuguese Declaration upon ratification at www. Liti. orý,, /Iaw/icc/statLite/roniefra. htiii 
p. 12 
265 CICCL Art. 3 (2) (b). Article 6 (1) also provides that "On application by the Federal 
Department of Justice and Police (Department), the Federal Council shall 
decide on questions 
of immunity relating to Article 98 in conjunction with Article 
27 of the Statute which arise in 
the course of the execution of requests" 266 CICCL Art. 7 (1). 
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domestic remedies before deferring jurisdiction to the ICC: "In the first 
insimice, the actions required should be taken by national authorities. Where 
all such iiational mcusures of redress have been exhausted or are unavailable 
or inactive, recourse cmi be made to available international mechaniSMS,, 267. 
Australian ICC legislation is also interpreted as not compromising Australia's 
268 sovereignty . Importantly, this legislation provides that no prosecution may 
be initiated, or proceedings conducted, without the consent of and in the name 
of the Attorney General269. The Australian legislation also includes a clause 
limiting judicial review of any decision of the Commonwealth Attorney 
General to give or refuse consent to an arrest on a warrant issued by the Court, 
the surrender of a person to the Court, or conduct a prosecution under 
Australian law in relation to the offence contained in implementing 
legislation270. Similarly, in Denmark, the ICC implementing legislation 
provides that the Minister of Justice decides upon a request from the Court on 
extradition of persons against whom the Court has initiated criminal 
proceedingS27,1. In addition, he/she decides upon a request on extradition for 
execution of the Court's Judgment272. 
Secondly, and this is highly debatable, it has been contended that the Court 
cannot base its authority exclusively on State consent, because it can exercise 
273 
its jurisdiction over nationals of States that are not parties to the ICC Treaty 
Thirdly, the isolation of the Court from national legal processes and legal 
opinions, severely limits the extent to which the Court's interpretation of 
'167 See statement by Ambassador Munir Akram, Permanent Representatice of Pakistan to the 
United Nations, to the Security Council on the occasion of renewal of Resolution 1422 
regarding International Criminal Court, 12 June 2003, para. 5. 
268 See Statement by the Australian Prime Minister, The Hon John Howard, MP on 20 June 
2002, at littp: //NvNv\v. pm. vov. aLl/lIeWS/`niedia releases/2002/iiiedia release I 708. htm 
269 bid. Similarly, in South Africa criminal prosecution cannot be instituted without the 
consent of the National Director of Public Prosecutions, who must also designate a court to 
hear any matter arising from the application of International Criminal Court Bill 2001, Part 3, 
Art. 9 of the same. 
270 Ibid. 
27 1 Act No. 342 of 16 May 2001, Sec-2. 
272 Ibid Sec. 2 (2). 
273 On state consent see generally the ICJ jurisprudence, e. g. the Monetary Gold Case (Italy v 
France, United Kingdom and the United States, 1954, I. C. J. 19,15 June 1954 and the 
Nicaragua Case (Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 
1984, I. C. J, Jurisdiction and Admissibility Judgement of 26 November 1984,43 1) where the 
ICJ held that the requirement for consent to jurisdiction by each party to the dispute applied 
only where the legal interests of the non-consenting state 
"would not only be affected by a 
decision, but wouldform the very subject-matter of the decision". 
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international criminal law could be informed and rendered legitimate. In this 
context and with reference to ICC war crimes provisions, the United Kingdom 
declared- "The United Kingdom understands that the term 'the established 
firamcwork of international law' used in article 8 (2) (h) and (e), to include 
customary international law as established by State practice and opinio 
.1 
. 111, iS-274. Similarly, Switzerland expressed the view that "it is still true that one 
qf the main characteristics of public international law remains the general 
need fior States to implement international customary and treaty norms in 
order to guarantee its efficiency, effective application and respect by 
275 individuals" . From a more theoretical perspective, there is a line of 
argument according to which the consent of states is not enough to ground 
international law; the 'constitution' of an international community rests "not 
on a formal treaty but on a formlosen Konsensus whereby states recognise 
each other as equal and subject to, especially, original norms necessary for 
the creation offurther law"276 . 
At the Rome Conference, numerous States also expressed reservations about 
the precedent effects of ICC decisions, as the rules of genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity are still very much in formation. For example, 
ICC Statute Art. 30 aimed at codifying and setting a uniform standard for the 
mental incapacity of individual criminal responsibility but had in fact failed to 
do so. What Article 30 has done instead was to present an opportunity for a 
277 consistent understanding of mens rea 
Likewise, the definition of the crime of aggression is inconclusive and 
unsatisfactory 278. Its non-inclusion in the Statute is also one of the main 
274 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Declaration upon ratification at 
WWW. Lill. orR/Iaw/icc/statLite/romeft-a. htni p. 13. 
275 Weber D., "Implementation of the Law of Armed Conflict: National Alleasure", written 
summary of the speech delivered on 29 October 1999 on the Swiss Seminar on the Law of 
Armed Conflict (SLAC) in Geneva, available at 
http: //www. vbs. admin. ch/iiiternet/GST/KVR/f/weber-ai-t. fitin 
276 Op cit, Carty, note 232, p. 716. 
277 Werle G. and Jessberger F., "Unless Otherwise Provided-Article 30 of the ICC Statute and 
the Mental Element of Crimes under International Criminal Law", Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, Vol. 3 (1) [20051, pp. 35-55. See i. e. Arnold R., "The Mens Rea of Genocide 
under the Statute of the International Criminal Court", 14 Criminal 
Law Forum (2003), 
pp. 127-15 1. 
2781CC Statute, Article 5 (1) (d) provides forJurisdiction over the crime of aggression but the 
Statute also provides that the ICC shall not exercise 
its jurisdiction over that crime until such 
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reasons some States have been reluctant to ratify the Treat Y279. Some have 
criticised the ICC Statute for deliberately leaving the definitions of crimes to 
national legislature, a "gap that could lead to prosecutorial abuse and make 
any ICC prosecution the eqiiivalent of a common laii, crime' ý280 . In Ireland, the 
International Criminal Court Bill provides that it is the law of the State, 
including common law, which should determine whether a person has 
committed an ICC offence 281 . In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the 
legislation does not know a criminalisation of "crimes against humanity" as 
such. Since crimes against humanity are usually qualified as common offences, 
Dutch law will cover their commission in the NetherlandS282. In East Timor, 
crimes against humanity are defined in Security Council Regulation 
2000/15 283 . This definition corresponds to ICC Article 7 except for two 
differences 284 . Further, Colombia declared the "Rome Statute is limited 
exclusively to the exercise of complementarity jurisdiction ... and to the 
cooperation of national authorities with it, Colombia declares that none of the 
provisions of the Rome Statute alters the domestic law applied by the 
Colombian judicial authorities in exercise of their domestic jurisdiction within 
285 the territory of the Republic of Colombia" . On a different note, Jordan made 
the assertion that "nothing under its national law including the Constitution, is 
inconsistent with the Rome Statute ... 
As such, it interprets such national law as 
giving effect to the full application of the Rome Statute and the exercise of 
relevant jurisdiction there under". Egypt also stated that it "affirms the 
importance of the Statute being interpreted and applied in conformity with the 
time as the Treaty is amended to include provisions defining the crime of aggression and 
setting out the conditions under which the Court will exercise its jurisdiction (ICC Article 5 
(2)). 
279 For example, Syrian Arab Republic indicated that it would wait until the crime of 
aggression was defined before deciding its position on the ICC. See Coalition for the ICC 
Country Report at http: //www. iccnow. OrRICOLiiitryinfo/nortliafi-icat-niddIeecast/syi-ia. litiTi1 (16 
Oct. 2003). 
280 Wible B., "De-jeopardising Justice: Domestic Prosecutionsfor International Crimes and 
the Needfor Transnational Convergence", Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 
Vol. 3 1, No. 2 (2003) p-267 
28 1 2003 International Criminal Court Bill, Part 2 (Domestic Jurisdiction in ICC Offences), 
Art. 13 (1). 
282 See Council of Europe, "Implications for Council of Europe Member States of the 
Ratýfication of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court-Progress Report by the 
Netherlands" 19 July 2001, Consult/ICC (2001) 21, p. 4. 
283 Sec. 5. 
284 Op C it, Curries, note 93, p. 44. 
285 Colombia's Declaration No. 4. 
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gencral principles and fundamental rights which are universally recognised 
286 
and accepted by the whole international community" . By extension, 
differences in procedural rules and judicial interpretations of definitions could 
287 
raise the ex post facto issue . Australia for example declared "its 
understanding that the offences in Article 6,7 and 8 will be interpreted and 
applied in a way that accords with the way they are implemented in Australian 
288 domestic law" 
. During the Rome Conference, Singapore stressed the 
importance of precision and consistency in interpreting the ICC Statute 
provisions. It said for example that "The principle nullum crimen sine lege 
must apply in defining precisely what conduct entailed criminal responsibility 
so that individuals could be fully aware of the consequences of their 
IS actions" 
At present, international criminal law cannot be precise 290 . Instead, it 
develops 
like common law, gradually applying the principles of previous decisions to 
new situations 291 . 
That international criminal law cannot be precise can be 
demonstrated through three types of legal 'fragmentation' 292 in a self- 
contained regime, such as that of that of the ICC, which to a great extent 
represents a lex specialis regime. A first example of fragmentation is evident 
from conflicting interpretations of general law 293 ; the second emanates from 
the emergence of special law as an exception to the general law 
294 and the third 
form appears from the conflict between different types of special law 
295 ; the 
lex specialis aims at harmonising conflicting standards through interpretation 
or establishment of definite relationships of priority between them. It is often 
difficult to distinguish between the interpretations of a special law (ICC, 
human rights law 296 , 
humanitarian law 297) in the light of general law 
286 Arab Republic of Egypt Declaration upon signature, No. 2. 
287 OP Cit, Wible, note 279, p. 268. 
288 Australia's Declaration upon ratification at www. un. oi-, 2/law/iCC/StatLitcilroiiiefra. liti-n p. 2. 
289 Op cit, note 34, p-8 1, para. 4. 
290 Ibid 
291 Ibid 
292 0 Cit, P ILC, note 32, p. 284, para. 303. 
293 Ibid. 
294 Ibid. 
295 Id. 
296 See e, g. Bankovic v Belgium and others 
(52207/99), 123 I. L. R. (2003), p. 108, para. 57; 
Fogarty v the United Kingdom (37112/97) 
21 November 200 1, ECHR 2001 -XI, para. 36. 
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(municipal law) and the setting aside of this general law in view of the 
existence of a conflicting specific rule 298 . Lex special's should not be seen in 
'overývfiormal or rigid' manner 299 ; its 'legal-systemic' 300 environment always 
conditions its adoption and interpretation. A self-contained regime is never 
actually isolated from general law as such a regime "can receive (or fail to 
receive) legally binding force ("validity') only by reference to (valid and 
binding) rules or principles owside it 5301 . In fact, whether a State exercises its 
territorial jurisdiction, for example, is traditionally a question to be treated by 
reference to general law. What is more,, a superior legal order does not 
automatically overrule rules of general law as they remain in operation if the 
special regime fails to function properly (i. e. mixed tribunals). 
It is usually perceived that special law derogates from general law and it is by 
extension more authoritative than a general rule. The special legal system may 
be used to (1) determine the relationship between a special and general 
provision 302 (2) determine provisions in two different instruments; 
importantly, (3) determine between a treaty and a non-treaty standard 303 ; and 
between two non-treaty provisions304. A special rule can be interpreted as 
being an application, elaboration or updating of a general standard (look at 
states that have amended their laws-Germany) or it may be taken as overruling 
or setting aside of a general rule. This distinction has however been described 
as ýartifiicial-)305 . The preference 
for the special rule does not necessarily 
extinguish the general rule that remains 'in the background, 306 and 
importantly, 'affects the interpretation' 307 or the special rule. Although most 
general international law could derogate from lex specialis, there are instances 
297 See e. g. Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, Advisory opinion, I. C. J. Reports, 
1996, paras. 24,27,34,37 and 51. 298 0 Cit, P ILC, note 32, p. 284, para-304. 
299 Ibid 
300 Ibid 
301 Ibid, p. 290, para. 3 18. 
302 See Beagle Channel Arbitration, Argentina v Chile, 18 February 1977, U. N. R. I. A. A., vol. 
XXI, p. 55. 
303 See e. g. INA Corporation v Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal, Case No. 161,08 July 1985, Iran-U. S. CTR 1985-1, vol. 8, p. 378. 
304 See e. g. Right of Passage over Indian Territory, Portugal v India, Judgment, I. C. J. Reports, 
1960, p. 44. 305 0 Cit, P ILC, note 32, p, 286, para-308. 
306 ibid 
307 ibid 
72 
where the general rule prohibits such derogation such as in cases of jus cogens. 
Lex specialis can either operate as an interpretative device of the national laws 
or in an independent special legal regime (ICC). 
The next point is the hierarchy of laws as, according to the International Law 
Commission, there is no homogenous, hierarchical system "realistically 
avýiilable to deal with problems arising ftom conflicting rules or legal 
regimes"308 . It is widely agreed that there is no formal or informal hierarchy 
between the sources of international law: "If a treaty was normally given to a 
general custom this was not due to a hierarchy in law but merely to the need to 
., 
Te 
.) ct 
to the will of the parties' give ef ý309 . Importantly, it may not always be 
appropriate to draw hierarchical analogies from domestic legal systems, as 
there is "no well-developed and authoritative hierarchy of values in 
international law and thus no suitable hierarchy of techniques by which to 
5310 resolve conflicts' 
Bassiouni M. C. 31 1 also argues that there have been limited attempts to impose 
a hierarchy on the criminal justice system. This can be demonstrated by 
looking at the recent ad hoc tribunals. For example, the ICTY and ICTR share 
a common appeals chamber and theoretically apply consistent law. The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone is also required to follow ICTY and ICTR 
precedent 312 but there is no common appeals chamber and no formal 
mechanism to ensure consistency. The Government of Rwanda, whilst making 
proposals to optimise the work of the ICTR Prosecutor and relevant national 
authorities, emphasised that "For purposes of uniformity of international 
jurisprudence, the Appeals system in force would remain" 313 . Appeals made at 
national level will be different and inconsistent 
314 
. The 
U. N. Secretary General 
explicitly rejected a proposal that a common Appeals Chamber for the 
308 Ibid p. 291, para. 324. 309 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
310 Ibid, pp. 302-03, para. 353. 
31 ' Bassiouni M. C., "Crimes against Humanity The Needfor a Specialized Convention" 1994, 
31 Colombia Journal of Transnational Law, p. 470. 
312 See Article 20 (3) of the Statute of the Special Court directs the judges of the Special 
Court's Appeal Chamber to be guided by the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals. Article 14 (1) 
adopts the Rwanda Tribunal's rules of procedure and evidence 
'mutatis mutandis'. 
313 Op cit, note 138, p. 4. 
3140 
PC it, Wible, note 279, p-268- 
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Yugoslavian and Rwandan Tribunals with the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone should be shared. 
The history of the recent ad hoc tribunals demonstrates furthermore that the 
remoteness of international tribunals damages both their legitimacy and 
effectiveness. The ICTY has been perceived as an inconsequential and biased 
tribunal, which had a very small contribution to make in the reconciliation 
process in the countries of the region 316 . For example, press reporting over the 
years since the creation of the ICTY shows almost inevitably that Serbs regard 
the tribunal as undeniably biased against them 317 (the (non) validity of such 
claims is not discussed here). 
Moreover, even legal professionals admit they do not understand the ICTY 
318 procedures because of its unique blend of civil and common law procedures 
Judge Cassese A. points out that "International criminal procedure does not 
originate from a uni rm body of law. It substantially results ftom an fo 
amalgamation of two different legal systems, that obtaining in common-law 
countries and the system prevailing in countries of civil law (although for 
historical reasons, there currently exists at the international level a clear 
ý, 319 imbalance infavour of the common-law approach) 
One of the objections raised with regard to the extensive use of common law in 
the ICTY relates to evidence by hearsay, evidence that is usually inadmissible 
in civil laws. An ICTY expert witness pointed out the danger on relying 
315 See Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, at 8, U. N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000) rejecting a joint appeal chambers as "legally 
unsound andpractically notfeasible". 
316 Nizich I., "International Tribunals and Their Ability to Provide Adequate Justice: Lessons 
from the Yugoslav Tribunal", 2001,7 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, 
pp. 353,355. 
317 See i. e. Verfuss T., "Trying Poor Countries' Crimes in a Rich City: The Problems of the 
Pressfrom the Former Yugoslavia", Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 2, No. 2, 
2004, pp. 509-515. 
318 The ICTR has also been perceived as 'an inherently foreign' institution that has 'forfeited 
any impact on Rwandan society', see International Crisis Group, "International 
Criminal 
Tribunalfor Rwanda: Justice Delayect' 24,200 1. 
319 Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese to Erdemovic Appeals Judgment, Case 
No. IT-96-22,07 October 1997, para. 4. Civil law legal tradition is the basis of the law in the 
majority if countries of the world, especially in continental 
Europe but also in Quebec 
(Canada), Louisiana (USA), Japan, Latin America. 
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substantially on common laW320. He pointed out that in civil law systems there 
could usually be no murder without a body. The ICTY tried persons for 
murder for example without discovering a body, relying instead on hearsay. In 
his opinion "iestimony of a witness who heard somethingfrom someone else, 
that is hcarsqv, is the lowest degree of evidence of a witness. Many authors in 
the world, both in America and in Europe, write that such testimony is more an 
indication that a testimony, than evidence , 321 . He also maintained that not 
even the accumulation of such indications could represent such evidence 322 
During ICC negotiations, France proposed that the Court should draw both 
from Romano-Germanic legal tradition and the common law. France therefore 
committed it self to provide training to national judges who would participate 
in investigating cases in cooperation with the Prosecutor from the preliminary 
stage 323 . In the ICTR for example, the personnel was recruited from both 
common and civil law backgrounds and this factor created problems with the 
interpretation and application of the relevant law 324 : 
"One of the first issues that should have been thrashed out as a prelude to 
mapping out a prosecution strategy is how to marry these two major legal 
systems. It was one of the first problems Nuremberg tried to grapple with. The 
JCTR has never addressed this fundamental problem. It has proceeded on the 
false and unfair assumption that only people from common law backgrounds 
are sufficiently competent to do the work dismissing decades of professional 
work spent by people from civil law backgrounds". 
An ICTY Investigations Commander recounts that being labelled as a French 
magistrate, placed her in an "uneasy position" with respect to other 
320 Dr Aleksic Zivojin, Expert Witness for the Defence in Prosecutor v D. Tadic, Case No. IT- 
94- 1 -T, Open Session Transcript, 26 April 200 1, p. 11070, at 10- 11. See e. g. Scallen E., 
"Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three Dimensional Confrontation 
Clause", 76 Minnesota Law Reivew (1992) p. 623. 
321 Ibid, p. 11072, at 5- 10. 
322 The ICTY has tentatively moved towards increased production of written evidence. See 
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 92(bis) and Rule 94 (B). See Kay S. QC, "The 
Moveftom Oral Evidence to Written Evidence", Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
Vol. 2, No. 2,2004, pp. 495-502. 
323 Op cit, note 3 5, Mr Vedrine (France) p. 10 1, para. 73. Mr Frieden (Luxembourg) also stated 
that "The Court must apply international law and general principles of law applicable in most 
Member States". 
324 Loc cit, note 138. 
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investigators and legal advisors, the majority of whom where from common 
law backgroundS3215. Partly in recognition of this problem and from the need to 
engage national judiciaries, the ICTY recently adopted a Rule 326 permitting the 
referral of a case under indictment to the authorities of a state of which the 
accused is a national, or where the crime was committed. 
By comparison, even in the European Union, where the majority of states are 
civil law countries, it had been said, whilst negotiating the European 
Constitution 327 
, that the unification of so many different criminal laws and 
legal traditions would be impossible, as it had been widely accepted that 
fundamental national traditions may not be transferable to other states and 
susceptible of subjecting foreign individuals 328 . What was considered more 
attainable was an agreement on and adoption of a set of common criteria for 
the interpretation of criminal law 329 . 
When interpreting the ICC provisions States will inevitably have to look at the 
legislative history of the ICC Statute. The methods and extent of using such 
sources differ in common and civil law systems. In France, for example, a 
judge has the power and the obligation to interpret statutes on the basis of the 
French Penal Code 330 , which provides that criminal 
law must be applied 
strictly. Under the French Code , judges are 
however prohibited from making 
general law-making pronouncements on matters submitted to them 
331 
. This 
is 
substantially different from the common law tradition. This means that all 
cases are based on statute. When the statute is clear it must be applied, but 
when it requires interpretation the French codes contain no provisions 
regarding methods of interpretation. It would seem therefore that most civil 
325 Pantz S., Investigations Commander within the Investigations Section of the ICTY Office 
of the Prosecutor (OTP) from 1996 to end 1999, "From Bosnia to Kosovo and to Bosnia 
Again", Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 2, No. 2,2004, p. 461. 
326 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 11. 
327 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 2004, Official Journal of the European Union, 
16 December 2004, No. 2004/C 3 10/0 1. 
328 Prof. Dr. Bacigalupo E., "Il Alletodo Comparatistico e L'Unita del Diritto Penale Europeo", 
at the Conference on "The Evolution of Supranational 
Criminal Justice- Comparing 
International and European Criminal Law", 27 May 2004, European University 
Institute, 
Florence. 
329 bid., P. 11. 
330 French Penal Code [2004], No. 2004-164,20 Feb. 2004, Article 111-4. 
331 Ibid. Article 5. 
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law countries would have to resort to legislative history and travaux 
332 preparatoires to interpret the ICC Statute 
1.6 ICC involvement at the national level 
A possible way of implementing international criminal law in the absence of a 
strong ICC is for national courts to prosecute crimes committed on their 
territory or by their nationals. Such prosecutions may be initiated either under 
international law or domestic legislation. Whereas some national courts have 
been lagging in their obligation to prosecute war criminals and gross human 
rights violators, others have persistently pursued such trials. Compared to 
international trials, national prosecutions seem to be more effective in the long 
run and rarely encounter serious enforcement problems 333 . 
On the other hand, 
however. political pressure on local judges or a serious lack of resources can 
lead to unfair trials and seriously undermine the rights of accused persons. 
Because international tribunals are more likely than local courts to be 
334 
impartial, they are also more able to build objective records of events 
However, the top-down theories of international prosecutions seem to rest on a 
series of overstated claims. It is suggested the deterrent effect of international 
trial is at best minima, 335 and that the record-building function of international 
336 
tribunals has often been exaggerated . 
On the other hand, with regard to the 
almost unexpected ratification of the ICC Treaty by Burundi and Liberia, 
332 Documents of the legislative history of law include in France: (1) the Government's 
statements of reasons for bill (expose des motifs); (2) the reports of successive examinations, 
with amendments proposed and rejected, by Parliamentary Committees in both the National 
Assembly and the Senate and (3) the floor debates in the two houses. See Germain C. M., 
"Approaches to Statutory Interpretation and Legislative History in France" 13 Duke J. of 
Comp. & Int'l L 3,2003, p. 199. On Greek growing tendency to give importance to case law, 
see Tassopoulos 1. A., "New Trends in Greek Contemporary Constitutional 
Theory. - A 
Comment on the Interplay between Reason and Will", 10 Duke J. of 
Comp. & Int'l L. 1,1999, 
pp. 223-247. 
333 0p Cit, lontcheva, note 2, p. 16. 
334 See Judge Claude Jorda in U. N. SCOR, 55 th Session, 4161th meeting, at 3, U. N Doc. 
S/PV. 416 1. 
335 Wippman D., "Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice" 1999,23 
Fordham International Law Journal, at 473. 
336 A Ivarez J. E., "Crimes of StateslCrimes of Hate. - Lessonsftom Rwanda 
" 1999,24 Yale 
Journal of International Law, at 365. 
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countries which are both situated in major conflict centres in Africa, it has 
been commentated that "llie veryfticl that ICCjurisdiction is being accepted 
ýv governnients is alreatýv starting to have a deterrent effect against the 
commission qf heinous crimes on the continent' 
337 
. 
Because international criminal tribunals are isolated from the communities 
338 affected by their decisions, diverse perspectives do not test their judgments 
This inevitably undermines the courts' accountability. The ICC's contribution 
to a uniform and harmonised global international criminal law is undeniable 
but rather symbolic. The isolation of the ICC, which is implied in a dominant 
and centralised ICC regime, will undermine the Court's legitimacy. Before the 
Preparatory Committee for the ICC it was said that: 
-If the ICC is to Junction at all, we will have to rely on the maximum possible 
cooperation ftom all States, including States Non-Parties. Therefore, we 
should alw(ývs startftom the assumption that cooperation and assistance ftom 
States Parties should be forthcoming and that any exceptions ftom this rule 
are in need of i t'ell-founded justification. We should also try andfind ways of 
making cooperation with States non-Parties as easy as possible"339 . 
The Court will have to make difficult legal, political and moral judgments and 
therefore advance further developments and clarifications in international 
criminal law that are unquestionably needed 340 . In 
light of this, several nations 
felt that it was "unrealistic to conceive of inherent or compulsory jurisdiction 
for the Court in view of the widely diverging views on the specific elements of 
certain crimes, the proposed inclusion of elements ftom multilateral 
instruments to which several states were not parties and the absence of 
337 Statement by William Pace, Convenor of the CICC on Burundi and Liberia ratification of 
the ICC Treaty, Coalition for the International Criminal Court, September 22,2004. 
338 0 Cit, P lontcheva, note 2, p. 19. 
339 Statement made by the Representative of Germany, Mr. Hans-Peter Kaul from the 
Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, before the Preparatory Committee on 
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court at the United Nations General Assembly 
52 nd Session-International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, New York, I December 1997. 
340 See Morris M., "The Democratic Dilemma qf the International Criminal Court" 5 Buffalo 
Criminal Law Review 2 (2002) pp. 597-98. 
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consensus on the current status of customary international law with respect to 
several of those critnes"341 . 
The open-ended nature of international criminal law raises in fact vital 
questions about the direction in which these international norms should 
advance and what the appropriate context and forum for debating them iS342. 
For example, problems will become apparent when the Court has to find 
support in statutory text for many complex decisions it encounters and the 
judges do not have a solid base of precedent to guide them in their 
interpretation of the Statute. The jurisprudence on crimes against humanity, 
genocide and war crimes is limited to the judgments of the Nuremberg, Tokyo 
tribunals and ad hoc ICTY/ICTR343. The difficulties the ICC Preparatory 
Committee had in writing the Elements of Crimes344, which were to serve as 
non-binding guidelines to judges, reflect the lack of authoritative sources and 
agreement on the content of international criminal law and "the second 
obstacle was that such a document had never before been elaborated in 
international law. While some crimes had been examined by Nuremberg, 
Tokyo, former Yugoslavia, and the Rwandan international criminal tribunals, 
many crimes had not. Even in those cases where crimes had been discussed, 
their elements were often unclear"345. Nevertheless, Norway stressed the 
importance of the Elements of Crimes, stating that they should be, and will be, 
346 disseminated by the Norwegian authorities to its armed forces . It also 
emphasised the need for all ICC States Parties to "translate and internalise in 
their own system , 347 the Elements of Crimes. The Irish International Criminal 
Court Bill 2001 provided for example that a court, when interpreting the Act, 
may take into account, inter alia, "the travaux preparatoires relating to the 
"' Op cit, Mr Lahiri (India), note 34, p. 86, para. 48. 
342 See Marquardt P. D., "Law Without Borders. - The Constitutionality of an International 
Criminal Court" 1995,33 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 73, p. 136. 
343 Op cit, lotncheva, note 2, p20; the Elements of Crimes, which were meant to provide more 
detailed guidance are not binding on the judges, ICC Statute Art. 9. 
344 Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, New York, 
Part 11, Finalised draft text of the Elements of Crimes, UN DOC PCNICC/200/lAdd. 2 (2000) 
(02 November 2000). 
345 Kirsch P. and Oosterveld V., "The Post-Rome Preparatory Commission", 
in Cassese A., 
"The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary" (2002), p. 98. 
346 Statement by H. E. Mr. Ole P. Kolby, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of 
Norway to the UN, before the Sixth Committee of the 57 
th Session of the UN General 
Assembly, 14 October 2002, GA/L/3214- 
347 Ibid 
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ICC Statute and published views of commentators on its text and give them 
sitch weight (is may appear to the court to be appropriate in the 
- 348 CirclimstancTs . Referring to war crimes, Malta's International Criminal 
Court Act 2002 provides that when interpreting and applying provisions 
relating to such crimes, a national court should take into account "any relevant 
Judgment or decision of the ICC and account may also be taken of any other 
349 
relevant international. jurisprudence" 
The United States government strongly asserts that there exists significant 
evidence in the military sphere to strongly support the claim that a "distant 
legal body will have no deterrent effect on hard men like Pol Pot and Saddam 
Hussein most likely to commit crimes against humanity,, 350. And that,, "the 
ICC's advocates mistakenly believe that the international search for justice is 
everywhere and always consistent with the attainable political resolution of 
serious political and military disputes', 351 . 
From this point of view, 
experiences in Bosnia, Rwanda, South Africa, Cambodia and Iraq militate in 
favour of a case-by-case approach rather than the artificially imposed 
uniformity of the CC . 
352 
Ad hoe tribunals on the other hand have been described over the years as 
inadequate because (1) they were only temporary forums with limited ratione 
personae and ratione tempore jurisdiction; (2) they encountered great 
difficulties in apprehending persons indicted for international crimes and are 
perceived to encourage selective justice 
353 
.A 
former ICTY Investigations 
Commander for the OTP concludes that "Luxurious, expensive and distant 
courts cannot and will not suffice alone to do justice, ensure peace and 
reconcile human beings, and neither will the International 
Criminal Court. In 
regions traumatized by war, crisis and hatred, all efforts must 
first and 
foremost be channelled at re-establishing the rule of law on the ground 
3 54 
. 
348 Article 3 (1 ) (c). 
349 Malta International Criminal Court Act 2002, Act XXIV, Art. 54 E 
(4). 
350 Op cit, note 18, statement of Hon. Bolton 
J., p. 27. 
... Ibid. 
352 Ibid 
353 Noone P. G. and Moore W. D., "An introduction to the 
International Criminal Court", 
Naval Law Review (1999), p. 117. 
354 Op cit, Pantz, note 325, p. 459. 
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Mixed tribunals, because of their location, manage better to coordinate their 
functions with other domestic institutions dealing with human rights abuses 
such as for example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions set up in 
Sierra Leone and East Timor 355 . Moreover, such coordination prevents overlap 
and encourages a more efficient division of institutional responsibilities for 
dealing with the past 356 . 
For example, with regard to the situation in East Timor, the UN Security 
Council observed recently that "Increasing national ownership of the process 
357 is important" . Although the Timorese justice system does not have the 
capacity to handle a great number of cases the government is developing plans 
for the serious crimes process. In the meantime, UNMISET 358 has taken 
preliminary measures to assist the governments in addressing the issue 359. The 
role of UNMISET includes assistance in the conduct of serious crimes 
investigations and proceedings as well as assistance in changing the current 
judicial composition of the Special Panels so that Timorese judges can hear 
cases with little or no international participation 360 . 
At the moment, UNMISET 
civilian advisers continue to perform line functions as judges, public 
defenders, prosecutors and court administrators at both the Court of Appeal 
and district courts 361 . 
Furthermore, the presence of international judges has 
reduced the backlog of pending cases, although the operation of district courts 
362 
remains sporadic and weak . 
Whilst the Serious Crimes Unit, the Defence 
Lawyers Unit and the Special Panels are preparing to handover the necessary 
materials to the Timorese authorities 363 , the government 
is still heavily reliant 
on international judicial support as it was announced in January 2005 that all 
national judges had failed the written evaluation test and could not therefore 
... Op cit, note 2, lontcheva, p. 42. 
356 ibid 
357 UN Security Council, "Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Mission of Support in East Timor (for the periodftom 10 November 2004 to 16 
February 
2005)", 18 February 2005, S/2005/99, p. 7, para. 30. 
358 UNMISET has been established by the UN Security Council Res. 1410 (2002). 17 May 
2002. On the role played by the United Nations after independence of 
East Timor, see "Report 
of the Se cretary- General on the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor", 
17 April 2002, UN Doc S/2002/432, paras. 62-98. 
35 9 Loc cit, note 358. 
360 ibid. 
361 Ibid, p. 5, para. 18. 
362 Ibid Only the district court in Dili operates on full-time basis. 
363 Ibid, p. 7, para. 29. 
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become career judgeS364. It follows that national judges will have to 
discontinue the exercise of their judicial functions, which will result in 
complete reliance on international judges for both criminal and civil caseS365 , 
Moreover, access to justice including access to legal services and advice 
remains weak. However, international presence and international judicial 
assistance have encouraged the National Parliament to strengthen the country's 
legal framework through adoption of key legislation relating to, amongst 
others, statutes on the Public Prosecutor366. In this regard, the UN Security 
Council also noted that the Timorese Government is making constant efforts to 
meet its human rights treaty obligations. At the same time, the Security 
Council Report predicted that a significant number of cases would not have 
been investigated or prosecuted by the end of May 2005 367. A number of cases 
that have been referred to the Serious Crimes Unit by the Commission for 
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation involve serious crimes and are considered 
therefore to be unsuitable for reconciliation process. These cases have not yet 
been investigated. The formal legal process of such crimes at the national level 
is a crucial aspect of efforts to reach reconciliation. 
The recent praxis of the Security Council demonstrates how in practice 
complementarity is bypassed as the outcome of the latest SC resolution 
indicates that international crimes should be investigated and prosecuted under 
international mechanisms even where states are able and willing to investigate. 
Such policy on the part of the Council is incompatible of ICC Article 17 and 
the essence of the Rome Treaty. Confirming fears of political interference and 
influence on the ICC, in its recent report on Sudan, the Security Council 
reasoned that "there may indeed be instances where a domestic legal system 
operates in an effective manner and is able to deal appropriately with 
atrocities committed within its jurisdiction. However the very nature of most 
international crimes implies, as a general rule, that they are committed by 
State officials or with their complicity; often their prosecution is therefore 
364 Ibid, p. 5, para. 19. 
365 Ibid 
366 Jbid, p. 2, para3. 
367 jbid, p. 8, para3 1, The indictments filed by the Serious Crimes Unit cover 572 of the 
estimated 1.400 murders committed in the 1999 violence. 
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better 10 to other mechanisms"368 . At the 
Rome Conference, India expressed 
the view, with regard to proprio motu investigations by the ICC prosecutor, 
that such investigations would interfere with a state's sovereignty (if that state 
has a functioning legal system) and that the approach of the ad hoc tribunals 
could not constitute a precedent or be considered automatically applicable to 
the ICC369. In its report, the Secretary -General also stated, in contradiction to 
its conclusions on the situation in East Timor, that "national ownership of the 
process is important" and should be encouraged through a reconciliation 
process and that referring the matter to the ICC would be "conducive, or 
contribute to, peace and stability in Darfur, by removing serious obstacles to 
national reconciliation and the restoration ofpeaceful relations". This may be 
interpreted as the Security Council attributing political rather then exclusively 
legal functions to the ICC to which a number of both ICC Party and non-Party 
States objected. During the Rome Conference some states supported the use of 
the ICC as an important tool in the hands of the Security Council in 
maintaining peace and security 370 . Russia saw "no conflict 
between the 
political' role of the Security Council and the activities of the Court. The 
Council is intended to have a political impact on States and the Court would 
be playing an essential role in the maintenance ofpeace and security , '371. It is 
important remembering that Security Council referrals to the ICC will be more 
significant that those referred to by States in that the Security Council could 
oblige every country to comply with the ICC. India furthermore argued that 
any pre-eminent role of the Security Council in triggering ICC jurisdiction 
constitutes a "violation of sovereign equality and equality before the law 
because it assumed thatfive veto-wielding States did not by definition commit 
the crimes covered by the ICC Statute, or if they did, that they were above the 
law and possessed de jure impunity ftom prosecution. The anomaly of the 
composition and veto of the Security Council could not be reproduced in an 
368 UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan pursuant to 
paragraphs 6,13 and 16 of the Security Council resolution 1556 (2004), paragraph 
15 of the 
Security Council resolution 1564 (2004) andparagraph 17 of the Security Council resolution 
1574 (2004)", 31 January 2005, UN Doc. SC Res. S/2005/57, p. 144, para568. 
369 Op Cit, Mr Lahiri (India), note 34, p. 86, para. 50. 
370 Jbid, Statement from Albania, p. 82, para. 14. 
I" Op cit, note 241, Mr Gevorgian (Russian Federation), p. 212, para. 9. 
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international criminal court""'. France also firmly stated that the Court could 
only exercise its jurisdiction on States Parties 373 . To enable the Court to act 
effectively, the State on whose territory the crimes were committed and the 
State of nationality of the perpetrators of the crimes would have to be parties to 
the ICC Statute. 
During the Rome Conference, delegations expressed different positions on the 
role of the Security Council under the ICC Statute. Some States supported an 
affirmative action before the Court could act, 374 whereas others were in favour 
of an affirmative action to require the Court not to act 375 . With regard to the 
first option, only Malawi expressly supported the option which prohibits the 
Court from commencing a prosecution arising from a situation with which the 
Security Council is dealing, unless the Council decides otherwise 376 . New 
Zealand too expressed concern at the 'secrecy' 377 of the Security Council 
indicating very likely politicisation of the Council, emphasising that the 
Council must be transparent in its relationship with the Court. New Zealand 
objected at this implied politicisation by referring to the secret inforinal 
consultation where the permanent members of the Security Council have "the 
upper hand in the agenda-setting opposed to the smaller states who rotate 
every two years"378 . The 
Czech Republic also stated that it could not support 
the idea that the Security Council should have the power to preclude 
proceedings before the Court if the Security Council, under Chapter VII, is 
dealing with a situation 379 . 
It argued that "Chapter VII situations are precisely 
those in which crimes within the Court's jurisdiction are most likely to be 
committed ý380 - At the 
Conference it was stressed that the ICC must be 
372 Op Cit, Mr Lahiri (India), note 34, p. 86, para. 5 1. 
373 Op cit, note 3 5, Mr Vedrine, p. 10 1, para. 76. 
374 See Art. 10 (7) of the ICC Draft Statute, Option 1, A/CONF. I 83/2/Add. I (1998) 
375 See Singapore Proposal, Art. 10 (7), ICC Draft Statute, Option 2, A/CONF. I 83/2/Add. 1 
(1998) 
376 Mr Nyasula (Malawi), Rome Conference, 6thplenary meeting (18 June 1998), p. 172, 
para. 29. 
377 Op cit, note 3 75, Ms Trotter (New Zealand), p. 100, para. 64. See also No Peace Without 
Justice, "New Zealand Protests at Security Council 'Secrecy "', 23 June 1998, at 2. 
378 Ibid See also Hafner G., Boon K., Rubesame A. and Huston J., "A Response to the 
American View as Presented by Ruth Wedgwood', 10 European Journal of International Law 
1,1999, p. 114. 
379 Mr Talicka (Czech Republic), Rome Conference, 3 rd plenary meeting (16 June 1998), 
A/CONF. I 83/SR3, p. 74, para. 23. 
380 Ibid. 
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impartial and independent from political influence of any kind, including that 
of United Nations organs, in particular the Security Counc11381. 
This potential for political interference by the ICC through a referral 
mechanism by the Security Council is also the primary reason why many 
States have not ratified the Rome Treaty and/or do not wish to become parties. 
The U. N. Se cretary- General once stated that "Thefact that trial proceedings 
would be conducted in the Hague ... 
far awayftom the community over which 
those persons still wield authority and where theirfollowers live, might ensure 
a natural atmosphere and prevent trials ftom stirring up political, ideological 
or other passions"382 . This seems at odds with the deterrent effect of the ICC 
Treaty whereby national trials should be encouraged and given financial 
support precisely with the goal of exposing the extent of atrocities and 
therefore helping nations to initiate a transition from militant politics and 
ideologies to a democratic political and judicial process383. 
With regard to the ICTR, it was said that there was a "regrettable 
misconception ý1384 of the role and the mandate of the Tribunal and that the 
Prosecutor had made decisions "which are difficultfor the Rwandese public to 
comprehend or accept"385 . The ICTR 
Prosecutor was found to have said on 
record that her objective is to render "deluxe justice 3086 . The ICTR was 
established not only to try persons responsible for genocide but also to 
promote reconciliation and peace in Rwanda 387 . It 
had also been said that the 
Tribunal, and the Prosecutor in particular, should show understanding for the 
381 Op cit, Hafner, Rubesame and Huston J, note 379, p. 1 15. See also Italian Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Mr Dini, who called for solutions that balance relations between the Security 
Council and the Court, ensuring that it can perform its judicial functions in total independence 
and without hindrance, Opening Statement before the Plenipotentiaries Conference on the 
Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 17 June 1998. 
382 UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary- General on the Sudan pursuant to 
paragraphs 6,13 and 16 of the Security Council resolution 1556 (2004), paragraph 15 of the 
Security Council resolution 1564 (2004) andparagraph 17 of the Security Council resolution 
1574 (2004)", 31 January 2005, UN Doc. SC Res. S/2005/57, p. 144, para572. 
383 See e. g. on the influence of international presence on national political and judicial process 
UN Security Council "Report of the Secretary- General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo", 14 February 2005, UN Doc S. 2005/88. 
384 Loc cit, note 138. 
385 Ibid 
386 Ibid 
387 See Security Council Res. S/RES/955 (1994), 3453 rd Meeting, 08 November 1994. 
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388 389 people, sensitivity for their customs and respect for their institutions . The 
ICTR Prosecutor had been perceived as "displaying bitter hostility to 
Rivanda's l7cit'judicial system andpolitical institutions', 390 . 
At the Rome Conference it was also stressed that since the ICC will not have 
its own enforcement agencies and its effectiveness will depend on the 
cooperation of States Parties, then "account must be taken of the diversity of 
regional interests, dýfferent stages of development and social and cultural 
traditions, and the position of the major Powers, in order to achieve a broad 
5391 consensus and build an effective, working institution' 
In Kosovo, in consideration of the sensitive nature of the crimes committed 
during and after the conflict, as well as the level of inter-ethnic hatred, special 
measures were necessary to enable and ensure efficient criminal investigation 
and prosecutions 392 . UNMIK successfully re-established a functioning justice 
system in less that a year. Initially, LJNMIK rejected the proposal for an 
international judiciary in Kosovo as it was perceived that Kosovan judges were 
fully competent to handle these serious crimes, knowing that the qualifications 
for becoming an international judge or prosecutor in Kosovo do not require 
any knowledge of the relevant Yugoslav law, or of international human rights 
or humanitarian law 393 . Similarly, the proposal 
for a Kosovo War and Ethnic 
Crimes Court (KWECC)394, which envisaged the participation of international 
judges, was rejected. UNMIK however had great difficulty recruiting qualified 
individuals to serve as judges and prosecutors, which resulted in LTNMIK 
388 Ibid. The ICTR had been criticised for having exhumed mass graves without notice to the 
authorities or relatives of the victims and left the remains on site. The Rwandan people 
perceived this as 'abomination' of their culture. 
389Loc 
cit, note 386. 
390 ibid 
'9' Op cit, Singapore, note 34, p. 82, para. 6. 
392 See Cerone J. and Baldwin C., "Explaining and Evaluating the UNMIK Court System" p. 48 
in Romano C. P. R. et al. (Eds. ) "International i sed Criminal Courts-Sierra Leone, East Timor, 
Kosovo and Cambodia" (2004). 
393 Sec. 2 of the LYNMIK Regulation 2001/1 provides the criteria for appointing international 
judges and prosecutors in Kosovo. These include: a university degree in law, five years of 
experience, high moral integrity and a clean criminal record. 
394 Originally, the intention was to give KWECC subject matter jurisdiction over crimes under 
international law, as well as serious inter-ethnic offences under domestic law. See US Mission 
to Kosovo, "Kosovo Judicial Assessment Mission Report" April 2000, p. 23, available at 
http: //pri stin a. usin iss ion. goy/i ud. p 
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Regulation 2000/34-'()', through which a system of international judges and 
prosecutors was introduced, including the appointment of international judges 
to the Supreme Court. LTNMIK Regulation 2000/64 now governs the use of 
international judges and prosecutors which allows "the competent prosecutor, 
the accused or the defence counsel" to petition the Department of Justice 396 for 
the assignment of an international prosecutor and the appointment of a panel 
consisting of a majority of international judges on a case-by-case basis. The 
presence of international personnel in mixed tribunals in Kosovo has, to a 
degree, dismissed a perception of bias and judicial partiality 397 . The task of 
international judges and prosecutions has also been to train and monitor the 
local judges, enhance the existing standards of justice, and remedy this widely 
spread realitýý of a biased judicial process. The presence of international judges 
and prosecutor has "improved the appearance of objectivity , 398 which has 
resulted in important investigations and prosecutions. 
Internationalised prosecutions are not exclusively concerned with international 
crimes. For example, the Special Court for Sierra Leone may prosecute a 
399 
number of crimes under Sierra Leone law . The Cambodian Law on 
Extraordinary Chambers 400 provides for the prosecution of crimes under the 
401 Cambodian Penal Code . 
In Kosovo, the International Panels can deal with 
'sensitive cases 402 ; these include the prosecutions for war crimes, genocide 
but also 'ordinary crimes' of murder, illegal possession of weapons and drug 
trafficking403. Also, in East Timor, UNTAET Panels have been established 
with exclusive jurisdiction over serious criminal offences. 
395 UNMIK Reg. 2000/34 On the Appointment and Removal from Office of International 
Judges and International Prosecutors of 27 May 2000. 
396 UN MIK Reg. 2000/64, Sec. 1.1.1. 
397 OSCE Mission in Kosovo "Report 9 On the Administration of Justice", March 2002, pp. 6- 
7. 
398 Loc cit, Cerone, note 393. 
399 See Article 5 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
400 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea 200 1, Law 
NS/RKM/0801/12. 
401 See Article 13. The crimes under Cambodian law are homicide, torture and religious 
persecution. 
402 Section 2 of UNMIK Regulation 2000/64,15 December 2000, On Assignment of 
International Judges/Prosecutors and/or Change of Venue. 
403 See UN Security Counci I "Report of the Secretar -General on the United Nations Interim Y 
Administration Mission in Kosovo" 02 October 2001, UN Doc S/2001/926 para. 49. 
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In Cambodia the UN General Assembly approved in 2003 the agreement 
between the United Nations and the Cambodian Government (UN Agreement) 
for UN assistance in the establishment and operation of "Extraordinary 
Chambers" within the domestic court system of Cambodia 404 . These Chambers 
have the jurisdiction to prosecute serious violations of Cambodian penal law 
and international humanitarian law committed between 1975 and 1979405 . The 
previous agreement between the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) and the Cambodian government, the Paris Peace Accords 
1991, did not impose an obligation on either parties to prosecute similar 
crimes. Two trials were conducted in absentia and where considered show 
trials. The proposed trial of Ta Mok, Khmer Rouge general, for genocide 
under Cambodian law by a Cambodian military court was postponed in 1999 
under a law that permitted the extension of detention without trial for up to 
406 three years 
Despite the United Nations involvement and the exercise of international 
judicial and prosecutorial presence, the Extraordinary Chambers are criticized 
for failing to meet fundamental international standards of justice and 
"threatening the integrity of the United Nations in the provision of post- 
conflict justice"407 . Accordingly, 
in 1999 the Cambodian government sought 
assistance from the United Nations in drafting domestic legislation to establish 
a specialized national court with jurisdiction to try, with international 
participation 
408 
, Khmer Rouge officials. The court was to be therefore in the 
form of "national courts, within the existing court structure of Cambodia, 
A09 
established and operated with international assistance' . In Chambers, 
procedural matters are dealt within the realm of national law and the 
Agreement adds: "[w]here Cambodian law does not deal with a particular 
404 Draft Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia 
Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea, 17 March 2003, Approved by GA Res. 57/22813.13 May 2003. 
405 Article I UN Agreement and Article I Special Law. 
406 Williams S., "The Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers-A Dangerous Precedentfor 
International Justice? " International Criminal Law Quarterly, Vol. 53, January 2004, p. 227. 
407 Ibid, p. 228; see e. g. Human Rights Watch, "Serious Flaws: Why the UN General Assembly 
Should Require Changes to Draft Khmer Rouge Tribunal Agreement" 30 April 2003, at 
http: //hrw. org/back(,, rounder/asia/caiiibodiaO43003-bck. pdf 
408 Letter from Prime Minister of Cambodia, Hun Sen, to HE Hammarberg T, Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia, 17 July 1999. 
409 GA Res. 57/228, para2. 
88 
malter, or where there is uncertainty regarding the interpretation or 
application (? 1'a relevant rille qf Cambodian law, or where there is a question 
regarding the consistency oJ' such a rule with international standards, 
aw (/ancc mai, also be sought in procedural rules established at the national 
leivl-'10. The Law, like the Agreement, refers to national procedural law with 
regard to investigation, prosecution and trial proceedings. The opening in the 
Law for the use of international procedural standards provides that only "[iff 
necessary, and if there are lacunae in these existing procedures", the 
Extraordinary Chambers, co-prosecutors, or co-investigating judges "may seek 
guidance in procedural rules established at the international level,, 411. 
In Kosovo, the Legal Systems Monitoring Section (LSMS), part of the Human 
Rights Rules of Law Department of the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Pillar III (Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe-OSCE), has the mandate to monitor the justice system 
in Kosovo in promoting its compliance with domestic and international human 
rights standards, and towards recommending sustainable solutions to ensure 
that such standards are met 412 . The LMSM 
has two main objectives. The first 
one is achieving compliance with human rights standards and the second to 
ensure that courts apply consistently the guarantees and standards provided in 
applicable legislation. Importantly, the scope of LMSM is to provide 
comprehensive overviews of all the cases in which acts of war crimes and 
genocide have taken place against the civilian population, as defined by the 
applicable law in Kosovo and "place the trials andjudgments in the broader 
context of other international humanitarian law jurisprudence, as developed 
by various national jurisdictions and by the international criminal courts', 
413 
such as ICTY and ICTR. LSMS conclusions possess merely a recommending 
nature and address war crimes jurisprudence in Kosovo: 
4 10 Article 12 of the 2003 Agreement between the UN and the Royal Government of Cambodia 
over the Law on Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers. 
Articles 20,23,33 and 36. 
412 UNMIK, Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, "Kosovo's War Crimes Trials. - A 
Review", September 2002, p. 6 
413 Ibid, p. 7. 
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"The universal character of these crimes and the public attention that they 
usuallY attract means that the verdicts are regarded as a body of legal 
opinions, which, by Ortue of their quality, may form sound jurisprudence 
aimed at guiding or providing relerence during subsequent similar trials or to 
leoul professionals interested in researching such cases. Furthermore, 
considering that the court panels hearing these cases have mostly been 
composed of international judges, the standards of legal writing and 
argumentation should be even higher"414 . 
In Kosovo, a comparison of factual allegations in the indictments with the 
crimes charged demonstrated that local prosecutors often did not understand 
the elements of criminal offences they laid out, nor did they effectively assess 
415 how the evidence at their disposal could support the elements of the crime 
Local prosecutors charged genocide in four cases but none of them resulted in 
a conviction for genocide 416 . 
The ICTY acknowledged the difficulties of 
genocidial convictions in the Jelisic Case where it pointed out that "it will be 
very difficult in practice to provide proof of the genocidal intent of an 
individual if the crimes committed are not widespread and if the crime charged 
is not backed by an organisation or a system', 
417 
. To establish such 
intent 
means that evidence towards a systematic and organised operation is required. 
Such evidence must be collected and supported by "extensive work of research 
and analysisfrom historical, legal and sociological perspectives"418 . Providing 
in-depth analysis and citations to relevant cases or other authorities in Supreme 
Court decisions would help local judges, prosecutors and attorneys increase 
their capacity for understanding the legal issues involved in war crimes trials. 
It would also render the judgments more persuasive. Moreover, such 
judgments could help establish the basis for a dynamic, critical, independent 
jurisprudence of a state (Kosovo) 
4 19. This in turn aims at attaining a higher 
level of professionalism, coherence and overall legal equality, and thus 
fulfils 
414 Ibid 
415 Ibid., p. 34. 
416 Ibid. Sec. 11: Case Summaries, pp. 12-29. 
417 Prosecutor v Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10, Trial Chamber 1, Judgment of 
14 December 1999, 
para. 10 1- 
418 Op cit, note 413, p. 34. 
419 Ibid., p. 8. 
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its ultimate scope of promoting truth and reconciliation on Kosovo. UNMIK 
reports demonstrate that the presence of international legal personnel has also 
contributed to the consistency in interpretation and application of the law. In 
fact, reports suggest that differential treatment of similar cases has been 
420 
substantially reduced 
It is crucial here to understand the importance of dealing with international 
crimes at 'home', the causal effect of exposing the nature and extent of 
atrocities rather than promoting a culture of denial421 , as well as accepting 
responsibility and studying how to approach such serious crimes under a 
regime that aims at achieving international legal standards. It is a painful and 
long process for any country in transition but it is also an essential one; 
domestic trials are of crucial importance for the evolution of a society towards 
reconciliation and acknowledgment of the truth as any society in transition has 
the need to balance legal, political and cultural interests as it moves towards a 
democratic ideal422. 
420 UNM I K, "Strategyfor Justice" (200 1), available at 
http: //www. osce. orv, /kosovo/docLii-nents/reports/justice/strateRy iustice e. d- 
421 See e. g. Green P. S., "A fugitive Croatia General is a Hometown Favourite", New York 
Times, June 05 2003; Erlanger S., "Did Serbia's Leader Do the West's Bidding Too Well", 
New York Times, March 16,2003, reporting that only 12% of Serbs supported extradition of 
Serb suspects to the Hague. 
422 McGregor L., "Individual Accountability in South Africa: Cultural Optimum or Political 
Facade" 95 American Journal of International Law 2001, p. 32. In an important Italian 
comparative study on the Swiss, German and Austrian 
law reforms, it had been concluded that 
it is the historic-comparative research method that the theoretical speculation put 
itself in line 
with reality, see Grispigni F., "Il nuovo Diritto 
Penale negli avamprogetti di Svizzera, 
Germania edAustria", Scuola Positiva, 1911, p. 3. 
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1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter aims at assessing and ultimately validating the institutional 
legitimacy of the ICC judicial framework against the predicted degree to 
which the Court administers equal justice in comparable cases. This 
examination of the objectives and balances of justice, in a broad sense, is 
conducted from a series of perspectives such as legitimacy, accountability, 
impunity and deterrence. Legitimacy is assessed against the political 
background surrounding the interconnectedness between the Court and the 
Security Council. The institutional furtherance of disproportionate treatment of 
ICC States Parties emanates from the continued advancement of the unequal 
power among Security Council permanent members; as well as giving the 
latter the authority to refer cases to the Court and to suspend cases from 
investigation and prosecution, the veto held by the permanent members 
protects them against referrals to the ICC. In practice this creates a paradox 
and a binary applicability of the ICC Statute, to the detriment of the principles 
of equality and fairness in criminal proceedings. An author provides the 
correct example of Chechnya. He explains: "The Russian Federation is the 
State of territoriality and nationality jurisdiction. If it were not a state party at 
the relevant time the only possibility of referral would be ftom the Security 
Council, a possibility which the Russian Federation could veto"423. This 
determination of fundamental fragmentation and therefore inconsistent 
application of the ICC Statute (outlined here through the preservation of 
national judicial sovereignty through the examination of implementation 
methods on the one hand, and consequential ICC Statute is compromised 
through the compatibility of amnesties, sentencing, plea-bargaining and 
immunity agreements on the other) and international criminal law in general 
between States Parties and States Non-Parties is inherently reflected in the 
multiplicity of implementation methods and diverse political and 
legal 
dimensions within which the Rome Statute is applied. The discussion on the 
423 McGoldrick D., "The Legal and Political Signýficance of a Permanent International 
Criminal Court" in McGoldrick et al. (eds. ) "The Permanent International Criminal Court", 
2004, p. 461. 
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consequences these diverging implementation and interpretation models have 
on the definition of the law as codified by the ICC Statute, their reach and 
scope, leads to a conclusion that the application of the ICC Statute is irregular 
and fragmented. This is further emphasised by the fact that non-Western legal 
424 traditions are not represented in the Statute to a sufficient degree . For these 
reasons, regional and local measures of (non) accountability have survived in 
the implementation of the ICC Statute. Nonetheless, the need for the ICC is 
undeniable, and its doctrinal value is timely and decisive in the move towards 
a global and uniform system of standardised accountability mechanism. 
However, in its present embryonic phase the Court may serve its purpose most 
efficiently through the encouragement of national proceedings at which the 
ICC should have a participatory function, through training of local judiciary 
and monitoring of local trials. In this way the ICC should play an important, 
leading role in deterrence, thus decreasing impunity by stimulating States 
through dissemination of international criminal law, to enforce compliance 
with the responsibility to investigate and prosecute relevant crimes, and by not 
being part of the international peace and security institutional structure (like 
ICTY and ICTR for example), provided of course that complementarity is not 
bypassed. This interconnectedness between international standards of criminal 
justice and national socio-legal traditions should be promoted with a particular 
view of meeting the needs of the host country and of involving the local people 
with the proceedings. The needs of the State in question are met by the 
adoption of both international and national laws, whereby national laws are 
gradually amended or introduced to meet international standards of justice. 
See e. g. Sadat L., "The ICC and the Transformation of 
International Law" (2002). 
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Chapter 2 
Surrender of Suspects and Accused Persons under the ICC Regime 
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2.1 Introduction 
As seen in the previous Chapter, the lack of a clear framework contributing to 
judicial vagueness in enforcement systems of international criminal law 
represent major uncertainties in the functionality and effectiveness of the ICC 
legal regime. The fragmented approach to the ICC is very clear when 
extradition and surrender are considered. Surrender under the ICC Statute is 
examined here at three levels. The first examination goes behind the reasoning 
for adopting the term 'surrender' in place of 'extradition'. The second analysis 
focuses on the necessary and predictable survival of extradition laws in ICC 
proceedings, especially with regard to defences to extradition such as ne bis in 
idem, amnesties and specialty. The judicial relationship between surrender and 
extradition is of particular importance when the rights of the accused are 
considered, such as that of habeas corpus. The third point of analysis questions 
whether States have the power, under their constitutional orders for instance, 
to waive due process and fundamental fairness guarantees available under 
extradition proceedings and what are the consequences for the ICC in adhering 
to the mala captus bene detentus maxim. As illustrated in the previous 
chapter, it seems not only that States will retain the power to control, to a great 
degree, the pre-trial proceedings, not least because of complementarity, but 
also as they are under duties emanating from human rights laws not to act to 
the detriment of an accused and to respect fundamental procedural guarantees. 
The primary obligation rests on national authorities to interpret and apply 
domestic law since failure to comply with domestic law entails a breach of 
international law'. Consequently, national courts "can and should exercise a 
certain power to review whether this law has been complied with', 
2 
. The 
exception to this position will be surrenders executed under a Security Council 
resolution or where it is considered that the interests of the international 
community outweigh the interest of an individual who then becomes but a 
1 ECHR Art. 5 (1) stipulating that no one shall be deprived of his liberty unlawfully, without 
the applicable extradition procedure being followed. 
2 Ocalan v Turkey, App, No. 46221/99, Judgment of 12 May 2005, para. 84. 
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subject of international criminal law. This latter exception is more likely to 
occur in monist legal systems 3, as there are no standards of procedure 
applicable to all States. Accordingly, the ensuing question is whether the 
fundamental right of a presumption of innocence will survive the interests of 
the international legal community by bringing to trial defendants charged with 
atrocities. Lacunae revealed by a non-uniform model of applying the ICC 
Statute may be remedied through human rights law. However, the greatest 
human rights tensions are likely to emerge when they interfere with a 
surrender process, since such procedures frequently reflect a pronounced 
political dimension. Yet the correct implementation and effective application 
of the ICC Statute and human rights remains a responsibility incumbent, 
without exception, on the State Patties and the Court itself 
Surrender proceedings in the realm of the International Criminal Court will 
yield benefits only if its regime is generally fair and effective. A fair and 
effective judiciary in the context of the ICC system requires a culture of 
respect for the fairness and impartiality of the extradition and surrender 
process and the derivative rights of suspects and accused persons as well as 
equality. 
2.2 ICC, extradition and surrender 
The obligation imposed on national authorities to surrender persons to the 
Court is one of the most important aspects of the duty to cooperate. The 
surrender mechanism in this context is different from extradition, which refers 
to the surrender of a person by one state to another, usually under the principle 
of reciprocity and double criminality. Surrender in the ICC regime consists of 
3 See e. g. Art. 10 of the 1947 Italian Constitution on the supremacy of 
international legal order 
over national laws or Art. 25 of the German 
1949 Constitution. 
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a transfer of one person by a State to the Court where no reciprocity exiStS4. 
States Parties are in theory, obliged to comply with ICC requests for arrest and 
surrender, regardless of whether they have included the ICC Statute's crimes 
in their domestic legislation 5. The non-inclusion should not be a valid defence 
against requests from the ICC6 . 
The ICC Statute expressly instructs that 
'surrender' means delivering of a person by a State to the Court, whereas 
'extradition' involves the delivering of a person by one State to another as 
provided by a treaty, convention or national legislation 7. During the drafting of 
the ICC Statute, the Republic of Congo for example strongly favoured the term 
'surrender' in preference to that of 'extradition; in their view, the term 
ýextradition' was highly problematic since extradition is a matter of relations 
between equal States 8. The use of such terminology is demonstrative of the 
fact that States -did not ... consent to extradite nationals in general but 
accepted such an obligation only in the very specific context of the 
Court 
... 
Such clear distinction at the terminological level should, as was the 
underlying thinking, at the same time contribute to a growing awareness on 
the national level for the substantial differences between horizontal and 
9 vertical cooperation" 
ICC travaux preparatoires also reveal that the most important reason for this 
terminological distinction was a need to avoid any possibility of an accused 
raising the defence of political offence to his/hers surrenderlo. In other words, 
what is being avoided is the use of traditional extradition defences as 
'extradition' refers to the domestic restrictions of extradition laws that are in 
4 For example Article 29 (e) of the ICTY Statute, Article 28 (e) of the ICTR and Article 102 of 
the ICC Statute. 
5 See 1CC Statute, Part 9 (International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance). 
6 ICC Art. 88. In relation to the ICTY and ICTR see Security Council Resolution S/RES/827 
(1993), 25 May 1993 and S/RES/955 (1994) and Amnesty International, "International 
Criminal Tribunals. - Handbookfor Government Cooperation", Al Index: IOR 40/07/96, 
August 1996. 
7 ICC Statute Art. 102. 
8 See Republic of Congo: Proposal regarding article 87, A/CONF. 183/C. I /WGIC/L. 4,25 June 
1998. 
9 Kress C., "Article 102. - Use of Terms" in Triffterer 0. (Ed), "Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court" (1999) pp. 1157-58. 
10 See e. g. Dutch International Criminal Court Implementation and Amendment Act 
2002; 
Swedish Act on Cooperation with the International Criminal Court 2002, No. 329. 
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contravention with the cooperation regime of the ICC 11 - It is worth 
remembering that ICC States Parties may still refuse extradition of nationals 
due to constitutional provisions 12 . In fact, the opening wording of ICC Article 
102 (use of terms), - . 
1or the purpose of this Statute", reveals the emergence of 
discretionary powers as to whether or not to implement literally the wording of 
this Article' 3. 
For instance, most extradition treaties usually provide for reciprocal surrender 
of persons arrested within the respective states' jurisdictions. Depending on 
the national laws of the state concerned, the judicial branch may be 
empowered to render a decision against the extradition of a requested person 14 . 
In Europe, in order to harmonise and therefore facilitate cooperation in 
extradition, a Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) 
has replaced the main multilateral extradition treaties and agreements such as 
the 1957 European Convention on Extradition, its First Additional Protocol 
1975, Second Additional Protocol 1978, the U. N. Model Treaty on Extradition 
1990 and the Convention Relating to Extradition between Member States of 
the European Union 1996. The EAW is implemented in the form of a judicial 
decision issued by a Member State with a view to the arrest and surrender by 
another Member State of a requested person, for the purposes of conducting a 
criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order. 
Member States will execute these arrests warrants on the basis of mutual 
recognition. However. in a number of these States, implementation has been 
mired with difficulties in national parliaments due to lack of trust in standards 
15 
in the application of basic procedural safeguards in criminal proceedings . 
Therefore, although all EU Member States are parties to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
" See e. g. Dutch International Crimes Act 2003, Sec. 12 which stipulates that crimes referred 
to in the ICC Statute and the Act should not be considered to be offences of a political nature 
for the purposes of the 1998 Extradition Act or the Surrender of War 
Crime Suspects Act. 
12 For a full discussion see Chapter 1. 
13 Op cit, Kress, note 9, p. 115 8. 
14 Dixon R. and Khan K., "Archbold-International Criminal Courts: 
Practice, Procedure and 
Evidence" 2002, p. 424- 
15 See Amnesty International, "Justice and Home Affairs Council I 91h February 2004: Amnesty 
International Concerns Regarding Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant", available 
at littp: //www, amnesty. ie/IayoLit/print/coiiteiit/view/fLiIi/1606 
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(ECHR), governments still retain the right to refuse to extradite an individual 
if such extradition would result in a breach of that person's human rightS, 6. 
The EAW may be relevant in supplementing the ICC Statute by facilitating 
cooperation when a suspect or accused person is found in one of the European 
countries and should be either extradited to another European state for the 
prosecution of the ICC crimes or the Court itself. 
In extradition proceedings, a custodial state receiving the extradition request is 
generally not required to comply. If it finds that proceeding in the requesting 
state would be unfair or the punishment excessive, it may refuse to extradite 17 . 
Yet, there is little indication that states do actually scrutinize the requesting 
state's procedure and most refusals to extradite are made by European 
8 countries opposing the death penalty' . In order to reconcile the ICC Statute 
surrender mechanism and interstate extradition, some commentators have 
advanced the idea that the ICC should be understood as an extension of the 
9 State's own jurisdiction' 
Issues underlying the prohibition against extradition involve the guaranteeing 
of due process rights of the accused. These rights along with human rights 
have been largely incorporated into the ICC Statute and its Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence 20 . The French Conseil Constitutionnel found recently that the 
ICC Statute indeed contained sufficient guarantees for the protection of the 
basic rights of accused persons 21 . 
The process of surrender begins when the ICC Prosecutor submits a request to 
a State to obtain custody of the accused. In cases of surrender the accused is 
16 Ibid. In September 2001 Extraordinary European Council agreed in principle with the 
development of the European arrest warrant as part of the EU response to the events of II th 
September 2001 stating, "In parallel, fundamental rights and freedoms must be guaranteed". 
17 Topiel M. S., "The Doctrine of Non-Inquiry and tlýe Preser'vation of Human Rights: Is There 
Roomfor Reconciliation? "9 Cardozo Journal of International and Contemporary Law, 200 1, 
p. 408. 
18 See e. g. Bassiouni M. C., "International Extradition: United States Law and Practice" 
(2002), 602. 
'9 Bassiouni M. C., "Observations on the Structure of the Consolidated Text" in Sadat Wexler 
L. (Ed. ) "Observations on the Consolidated ICC Text 12" (1998). 
20 See ICC Arts. 55 and 67. 
21 See Decision No. 98-408 DC, 1999 J. 0. (20) 1317. 
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usually already in the custody of relevant national judicial authorities whereas 
in requests for transfer, those national authorities have already acted in 
accordance with the Court's order to secure the custody of the accused. 
Noticeably, as the experience of the ICTY and ICTR show, the success of 
these proceedings have not been in recent years consistently adhered t022 
An ICC State Party that receives a request for arrest and surrender has an 
obligation to "immediately take steps to arrest the person in question in 
2' 
accordance with its laws" '. That State must therefore bring the accused before 
a 'competent judicial authority' where it should be determined whether: (1) the 
warrant applies to that person, (2) procedural safeguards have been protected 
and (3) the rights of the accused have been respected 24 . These determinations 
are to be conducted in accordance with the national laws of the custodial state. 
In particular, ICC Article 89 (1) emphasises that once the ICC transmits the 
arrest warrant, "States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Part and the procedure under their national law, comply with requests for 
arrest and surrender". 
While there are provisions in the ICC Statute that govern cooperation and 
judicial assistance, the wording of Article 89 is somewhat problematic 25 as the 
exclusion of extradition laws at a national level vis-a-vis ICC requests has not 
been completely abandoned, even though there is no explicit reference to them 
in the ICC Statute. It is argued in fact that the lack of consensus regarding the 
wording in the Statute suggests that States will approach the execution of 
arrest warrants on their own terms, on a state-to-state basis or use extradition 
laws where it is politically convenient26. Consequently, failure to specifically 
exclude the use of extradition laws as reflected in the plain language of ICC 
Art. 89 (1), could effectively, allow custodial states and accused persons to 
22 See Escurel A., "Surrender of Accused by Domestic States to the ICTR", Memorandum for 
the Office of the Prosecutor, November 29,2001, Issue 9, New England School of 
Law- 
Inter-national War Crimes Project Rwanda Genocide Prosecution. 
23 ICC Art. 59 (1). 
24 ICC Statute Art. 59. 
25 Sunil Kumar Gupta, "Sanctumfor the War Criminal: Extradition Law and the International 
Criminal Court", 3 California Criminal Law Review, 2000, p. 4, para. 18, available at 
www. boalt. orý,, /CCLP, /v3/v3ý,, uptaiif. liti, n 
26 Ibid., para. 28, 
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assert extradition defences in matters before the ICC27 . This legal vagueness is 
a potential impediment with regard to laws on surrender within the ICTY and 
ICTR judicial framework. In fact, numerous countries felt it necessary to 
specify that the fact of nationality could not preclude cooperation as sending 
an accused to a Tribunal was a matter of surrender and not extradition 28 . This 
is very important, as nationality is a major extradition defence. For example, 
the U. S. Restatement of Foreign Relations Law provides that a state may 
regulate the activities, interests, status or relations of its nationals outside as 
well as within its territory 29 . The idea that underlines nationality jurisdiction is 
that citizens of a nation owe certain duties to their homeland, regardless of 
their current residence, as long as they maintain bonds of allegiance 30 . 
Nationality jurisdiction is considered linked to the burdens and benefits of 
citizenship 31 . If an accused is found in a state that is not tied to the conduct in 
question or is not the state of nationality of the accused, there may not be the 
problem of the reluctant state. Thus, such a state's application of extradition 
laws may be more appropriate. Provided there are no other parties with 
jurisdiction able or willing to prosecute the accused, the custodial state may in 
fact cooperate through its extradition safeguards. However, it is perhaps more 
likely that an accused will remain in a state that is favourable to him, not one 
that is willing to extradite him. Therefore, it is more probable that the ICC will 
receive cases in which the States involved are reluctant to become cooperative 
32 because of their refusal to genuinely investigate and prosecute . In 
fact, 
knowing that a State is favourable to one's interests and that traditional 
extradition law would be applicable, an indicted war criminal will specifically 
seek sanctum in one of these reluctant States. Consequently, allowing these 
27 See e. g. (Malta) International Criminal Court Act 2002, XXIV, Art. 14 (Amendment of the 
Extradition Act) 
28 See e. g. Art. 5, Austrian Federal Law on Cooperation with the International Tribunals, 
Bundesgesetzblatt No. 37/1995,25 May 1995, which refers to 'citizenship', whereas the 1996 
Croatian Law on Cooperation (Constitutional Act on the Cooperation of the Republic of 
Croatia with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible 
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia since 199 1) makes reference only to 'residence' (Art, 16 (b)). 
29 Sec. 402 (2) Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. 
30 See e. g. Chandler v United States, 171 F. 2d 921 (Is' Cir. 
1948), treason and relations with 
enemy. 
31 Estey W., " Thefive basis of extraterritorialjuris diction and thefailure of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality", Hasting International and 
Comparative Law Review, 1997-1998, 
Vol. 2 1, p. 182 
32 Op cit, Gupta, note 25. 
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nations additional mechanisms under extradition law to prevent the ICC from 
hearing a case only intensifies the exact problem the ICC was designed to 
prevent 33 . Illustrative of the problem are ICC implementing legislations and 
relevant, already existing, national provisions of States Parties. Here are some 
examples from different jurisdictions that demonstrate how various countries 
have overcome or have attempted to overcome the apparent conceptual 
contradiction between surrender and extradition. 
Latin America represents in this respect an awkward situation since the laws of 
its countries have failed for almost a decade to provide for legal surrender to 
the two ad hoc tribunals (ICTY/ICTR). In most cases, states here refuse to 
extradite their nationals, undertaking instead to try them in their own courts. In 
other cases, extradition requests are dismissed if the crimes committed are 
political, military, or tax crimes or when they are time-barred or have been the 
matter of amnesty laws or when the extradition may impair 'national 
sovereignty, security or public order or other essential interests 34. Most 
domestic legislations in Latin American countries refer exclusively to inter- 
state extradition 35. Only the adequate implementation of the Rome Statute's 
provisions will lead the way in avoiding conflicts of law with constitutional or 
statutory provisions and thus ensure effective cooperation with the Court 
36 
. 
In 
Argentina the proposed draft bill on the implementation of the Rome Treaty 
expands the scope of jurisdiction currently acknowledged in the Penal Code. 
The Argentine Penal Code essentially restricts its courts' jurisdiction to the 
territoriality principle. However, the implementing bill also encompasses the 
active personality principle and any other principle 'established in 
international conventions to which the Argentine Republic is a party', thus 
33 Ib id, p. 3, para. 15. 
3' Relva H., "The Implementation of the Rome Statute in Latin American States" (2003) 16 
Leiden Journal of International Law 2, p. 358. 
35 Ibid. See 2000 Venezuelan Penal Code Art. 6; Mexican Law on International Extradition 
Art. 14; 1998 Ecuadorian Constitution Art. 25,1949 Costa Rican Constitution; 1995 Honduran 
National Constitution Art. 102; 1992 Nicaraguan Penal Code Art. 20. Contra Art. 27 of the 
1985 
Constitution of Guatemala. 
36 The term 'extradition' is still frequently adopted in legislation regarding the 
ICC. See for 
example Article 8 of the Ecuador's Draft Implementation 
Law 2002 provides "A losfines de la 
extradition entre la Republica del Ecuador y un 
Estado Parte del Estatuto de Roma que no 
tengs un tratado de extradicion, podra considerarse 
lapresente ley como basejuridical 
necesaria para la extradicion... ), . 
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including the passive personality and universal personality principles when 
recognised by treaty. The bill also includes a restrictive form of the aut dedere 
aut judicare rule, pursuant to which Argentina undertakes to try any accused 
person in its own courts if an extradition request by another state is refused. A 
broader form, as the one found in Article 7 (1) of the Convention against 
Torture, would require submission of the case to the appropriate authorities for 
prosecution whether or not another state has requested extradition, thereby 
avoiding the possible problem of impunity in the absence of an extradition 
request 37 .A 
further positive aspect of the implementation bill is that it permits 
the ICC Prosecutor to fulfil, directly and without the intervention of Argentine 
competent authorities, a request for assistance provided no coercive measures 
38 are needed 
In the Republic of Croatia, international agreements concluded, ratified and 
published in accordance with the Constitution make up a constituent part of the 
interior legal order of Croatia attaining a status above national law. 39 Since the 
Rome Statute is an international agreement, Article 140 of the 2004 Croatian 
Constitution 40 comes into operation. Under the Constitution, a Croatian 
national may not be extradited to another country, but there is no impediment 
for the surrender of a Croatian national to the International Criminal Court 41 . 
The requirements for extradition have been specified in the Croatian Criminal 
Procedure Act 2003 42 in compliance with Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Extradition. Under ICC Article 89(l) the Court may transmit a 
request for the arrest and surrender of a person, together with material 
supporting the request, to any territory of which that person may be found and 
shall request the cooperation of that State. The above represents a unilateral 
obligation of extradition to the body of international jurisdiction, different 
37 See e. g. Supreme Court of Spain, Judgment of 25 February 2003 (327/2003) on the 
jurisdiction of Spain for genocide and torture in Guatemala. 
38 0P Cit, Relva, note 34, p. 361. 
39 Mandic Mirta, Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia 
on the Progress Report on Croatia, Prague Conference on Ratification and 
Domestic 
Implementation of the Statute of the International Criminal Law, Prague 7-8 December 
2001, 
available at www. npwL. org/modules. php? naine:: --newsfile=-article&sid= 
159 
40 Official Gazette, No. 55, June 15,2001. 
41 2001 Constitution of Republic of Croatia, Article 9(2). 
42 Article 512 (Official Gazette no. 62/03). 
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from extradition to another country, In order to comply with such requests 
Croatia has adopted a Law on the Amendments to the Law on Ratification of 
the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons of the Council of Europe 
in which it extended the application of this Convention in respect of 
procedures provided in Art. 9(l)(a), 10(l) and (2)43. 
The provisions of the ICC Statute regarding extradition and surrender (ICC 
Article 89 and 102) could also be in contradiction with the constitutional 
clause regarding the prohibition on extradition of FYROM nationals (Art. 4), 
which provides that a national of the Republic of Macedonia cannot be 
expelled or surrendered to another State 44 . So far many States have amended 
or are in the process of amending their constitutions in order to overcome the 
extradition related limitations. Other States have accepted the distinction 
between extradition and surrender offered by the ICC Statute itself, Article 102 
and on the basis of this distinction the constitutional prohibition is interpreted 
as a prohibition relating only to extradition 45 - For the purpose of compatibility, 
FYROM Constitution prohibits extradition of nationals to other States, 
defining this as a prohibition of 'expulsion or surrendering'. The Constitution 
does not however prohibit surrendering to the International Criminal Court as 
it "implicitly accepts the already established practice in the previous trials for 
international crimes"46 . Moreover, the same provision regulating extradition or 
surrender in the Rome Statute demonstrates that the apparently very stringent 
principle of extradition of a State's nationals does not provide for protection 
from criminal prosecution in genera147 , 
but it does provide for protection from 
prosecution in another state if the basic guarantees are not ensured and if there 
are possibilities of human rights violations 
48, Since the FYROM Constitution 
prohibits surrender to other States, but not to the ICC, despite the fact that it is 
43 Croatia is also preparing a new, specialized Law on International Legal Assistance and 
Enforcement of International Agreements in Criminal Matters. 
44 The Implications for Council of Europe Member States of the Ratification of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Progress Report by the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, para. 4 (a), (29 October 2003) Council of Europe, 3 
rd Consult/ICC (2003) 13. 
45 bid 
46 id. 
47 d. 
48 See for example ICC Article 55 on Rights of the Persons During an Investigation and 
Article 59 on the Arrest Proceedings in the Custodial State. 
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located in another State, experts accept that there is no need for changing and 
adapting the Constitution, it not presenting an obstacle for implementation of 
the provisions of the ICC Statute relating to the surrender FYROM nationals to 
the Court4Q. What the FYROM government is required to introduce, however, 
is legislation adjusting the procedure for assistance and cooperation with the 
ICC and for implementation of its decisions which would deal with 
international cooperation and judicial assistance under Part 9 of the ICC 
Statute, having in mind that assistance and cooperation with the Court differ 
from other kinds of mutual criminal-legal assistance that include extradition, 
small criminal legal assistance and transfer of criminal proceedings all of 
which are contained in the provisions of the FYROM Law on Criminal 
50 Procedure 
In Poland, the adopted interpretation is that the prohibition to extradite a Polish 
citizen as stipulated by the 1997 Constitution 51 applies to relations with states 
and its scope does not cover the ICC52 . Reconciliation 
between national 
provisions on extradition and those of the ICC Statute has been achieved by 
declaring that (1) the institutions of surrender and extradition are two 
qualitatively different forms of international cooperation; (2) ICTY and ICTR 
had already been operating at the time the Polish Constitution of 1997 was 
enacted; arguably, there was no need to introduce separate regulations 
concerning surrender which gives grounds for an assumption that the concept 
of surrender, stipulated in the Statutes of both tribunals, was not considered to 
amount to extradition. 
Lithuania introduced the new Code of Criminal Procedure in 2004, the 
provisions of which are fully compatible with the provisions of the Rome 
Statute and provide that officers of foreign courts, prosecution and pre-trial 
investigation institutions of the ICC shall be permitted to institute proceedings 
on Lithuanian territory only in cases provided for in an international agreement 
49 Loc cit, note 44. 
50 ]bid 
51 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland 1997, Dziennik Ustaw No. 78, Article 
55. 
52 Council of Europe, "The Implicationsfor Council of Europe Member 
States of the 
Ratýfication of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court - 
Progress Report by 
Poland', 07 August 2001, CONSULT/ICC (2001) 22. 
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to which Lithuania is a party and with the participation of the of icers of the fi 
Republic of Lithuania 53 . The Code also provides that the person whose 
extradition or transfer to the ICC is requested shall be arrested on the grounds 
provided for in international agreements to which Lithuania is party and the 
Code itself5 4. The ICC Statute should govern the duration of detention. 
As will be shown below, notwithstanding the generally uniform acceptance of 
the doctrinal,, qualitative differences between 'surrender' and 'extradition', in 
practice extradition and its traditional defences will apply to ICC proceedings. 
2.3 Ne bis in idem and other conventional extradition safeguards 
As already mentioned, one of the reasons for distinguishing extradition from 
ICC surrender proceedings, is to limit the scope of traditional extradition 
defences. The defence of ne bis in idem or double criminality survived this 
distinction and is provided for in ICC Art. 20. The maxim states that no one can 
be put on trial twice for acts for which he/she has already been judged and for 
which a final court decision has been delivered. The principle of ne bis in idem 
is a safeguard present in several multilateral and regional conventions 
55 
!1 most 
extradition treaties and domestic constitutions 56 . 
The status of the norm in 
international criminal law is considered somewhat anachronistic as it serves an 
important purpose predominantly in conventional inter-state extradition 
proceedings and the jurisprudence of international criminal courts and 
tribunals indicate that it does not stretch far enough to constitute a uniform 
57 
human right guarantee 
53 2004 Code, Article 67 (4). 
54 Ibid. Art. 72. 
" See e. g. 7t' Additional Protocol of the ECHR Art. 4; American Convention of Human Rights 
Art. 8 (4); ICCPR Art. 14 (7); 1970 European Convention on the International Validity of 
Criminal Judgments and 1972 European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in 
Criminal Matters. 
56 See e. g. Art. 14 of the 1992 Constitution of the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. 
57 See Tallgren I., "Article 20" in Triffterer 0., "Commentary on the Rome Statute on the ICC" 
1999; A. P. v Italy, B 204/1984, para. 7-3 where the U. N. Committee for Human Rights 
held 
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The ICC Statute, although based on complementarity, does not exclude the 
prospect of a second trial before the ICC, subsequent to a final decision 
reached by a national court. Thus, for instance, if there is a final decision that 
stops investigations or prosecutions, it should not be forgotten that the 
jurisdiction of the Court could be activated. ICC negotiating history illustrates 
that this latter jurisdiction may be justified if the 'other court 58 fails to take 
proper account of the grave nature of the crime, at either the trial or the 
sentencing stage 59 . If there is an assessment that the procedure before the 
domestic court is not conducted independently and/or impartially, another trial 
is not unfeasible even if the previous procedure culminated in a final decision. 
It has been noted that such an inquisition into a State's 'unwilling or unable' 
judiciary is "a difficult allegation to prove, especially if ICC judges are 
deferential to nation states sensitivities about theirjustice system"60 . Yet, the 
ICC Statute holds on the maxim ne bis in idem that there can be no retrial for 
an act for which the person is sentenced or released by the Court 61 . Despite 
this apparent collision of a domestic (constitutional) norm and the ICC Statute, 
it is worth noting that the norm resolves the issue of respecting 'res judicata' in 
the national legal system. However, amending national laws or constitutions in 
order to implement ICC Article 20, implies, on a practical level, expressing 
doubts about the domestic judiciary. This in turn may be inconsistent with 
other constitutional principles, particularly regarding an independent and 
impartial judiciary, and therefore render itself unreasonable. In such a case and 
contrary to the complementarity rule, national laws become subordinate to the 
ICC Statute 62 . Following 
Article 20 a person sentenced by the ICC, and who is 
in the custody of the State of enforcement, shall not be subject to prosecution 
or punishment before a third State for any conduct engaged in prior to that 
person's delivery to the State of enforcement, unless such prosecution or 
that the relevant provisions of the international human rights conventions 
do not guarantee ne 
bis in idem with regard to the national jurisdictions of two or more States. 
58 ICC Statute Art. 20 (3). 
59 UN A/CONF. 183/13, p. 29, fn. 64. 
60 Robertson G., "Crimes Against Humanity" (1999), p. 350. 
61 ICC Art. 20. 
62 Knoops G-J A., "Surrendering to International Criminal Courts: Contemporary Practice 
and Procedure" (2002), p. 317. 
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punishment has been approved by the Court at the request of the State of 
enforcement 63 . Some States have correctly declared that this provision is 
contrary to the principle of independence of justice under the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and thus contrary to national 
constitutions 64 . 
a) Nulla poena sine lege 
Directly related to the observance of ne bis in idem is the principle of nulla 
poena sine lege. Traditionally, extradition proceedings have been reserved for 
persons who have allegedly committed a serious offence and therefore based 
on the maxim of nulla poena sine lege, a request for extradition will only be 
granted if the alleged conduct of the accused amounts to a crime in both the 
requesting and the requested state 65 . The principle of reciprocity has resulted in 
most states complying with the principle of double criminality ensuring that a 
requested state is not forced to extradite a fugitive for conduct which is not 
regarded as criminal; in inter-state situations the requested state has no 
jurisdiction to inquire into the substantive criminal law of the requesting state 
to determine whether the conduct amounts to an extraditable offence 66 . In the 
ICC regime, this will probably only pose a problem concerning cooperation 
requests with non-Party States. 
In the United Kingdom the House of Lords recently considered the double 
criminality principle in respect to extraterritorial offences in the case of ex 
parte Pinochet (No. 3) [1999]67 . 
Lord Goff agreed with the analysis as to the 
63 ICC Art. 108 (1). 
64 The International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, 
International Criminal Court - Manual for the Ratification and Implementation of the Rome 
Statute, March 2003 (Seconded. ), p-58. 
65 See e. g. Cvjetkovic Case, Austrian Supreme Court, Decision of 13 July 1994, where the 
defendant, accused of genocide, argued that a lower court erred in applying Art. 64 of the 
Austrian Penal Code (acts committed abroad which are punished without consideration for the 
law in force in the place where they were committed) instead of Art. 65 (acts committed abroad 
which are only punished if they are punishable under the law 
in force in the place where they 
were committed). See also the Cvjetkovic Case, Judgment of 31 
May 1995. 
66 See also the effect of a negative list of crimes in Justice Comments 
(Memorandum from 
Justice) on the Council's Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and surrender 
procedures between Member States, October 
200 1. 
67 Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3) [199912 All ER 97 
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determination of which charges survived the application of the double 
criminality principle but disagreed with the finding on immunity68 . He would have found that Pinochet did have immunity ratione personae as a former head 
of state because the Torture Convention lacked an express waiver of immunity 
and because the application of the double criminality principle eliminated the 
other charges that would have led to a finding of systematic or widespread 
torture 69 . 
Under the ICC Statute, when the arrested person believes he or she has already 
been prosecuted for the same offence, or conduct that relates to that offence, 
the person may bring a challenge before the national court under the principle 
70 
ne bis in idem . 
If a person sought for surrender makes such a challenge, the 
requested State is under an obligation "to consult immediately with the Court 
to determine if there has been a relevant ruling on admissibility" by the 
CoUrt7 1. If the latter has already determined that the case is admissible, then 
the requested State must proceed with the surrender. If on the other hand an 
admissibility ruling is pending, the requested State may postpone the execution 
of the request until the Court makes its determination on admissibility 72 . When 
such a situation arises, the Chamber dealing with the case must "take steps to 
obtain ftom the requested State all the relevant information about the ne bis in 
idem challenge brought by the person"73 . As long as the admissibility ruling is 
pending, the ICC Prosecutor may seek an order from the Court requesting the 
State to prevent the escape of the accused 74 . It is interesting to observe here the 
reach of complementarity. Substantive ICC implementing legislations vary, as 
seen in Chapter 1, from implementation of rules in general terms75 to detailed 
enumeration of the crimes, either by adopting definitions incorporated in the 
68 Ibid Opinion of the Lords of Appeal, per Lord Goff, at77. 
69 lbid 
70 See Article 20 and Article 89 (2). 
7' Article 89 (2). 
72 bid 
73 Rule 181. 
74 Article 19 (8) (c). 
75 See e. g, 2000 Canada's Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, Sections 4 and 6; 
1998 Congolese Law on the Rendition and Repression of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes 
against Humanity (No. 8-98), Art. 4. 
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Statute verbatim 76 , or, as seen in Germany, by redefining theM77. Other States, 
such as those in Latin America, rely instead on 'ordinary' domestic crimes 78 . 
For instance, pursuant to the U. N. Convention on Torture 79 and the regional 
Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons8o, States 
Parties are obliged to prosecute such crimes whenever they are committed, 
even if they are committed in an isolated or sporadic manner. This means that 
crimes under these conventions do not need to be part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population, a requirement of crimes against 
humanity as defined under the ICC Statute. The ordinary crime exception to 
the principle ne bis in idem was omitted from the Draft ICC Statute as 
members of the Preparatory Committee had differing views on a definition of 
-ordinary crimes' and some opposed the concept as such 81 . Hence, it cannot be 
argued that the classification of a conduct as an ordinary crime renders the 
national legal system unable to carry out investigations, as it had been the case 
under the ICTY regime. Here, a person who has been tried by a national court 
for acts constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law may 
be subsequently tried by the International Tribunal if the act for which he/she 
was tried was characterized as an ordinary crime 82 . Nevertheless, 
investigations and prosecutions on the basis of ordinary crimes do not seem to 
automatically constitute cases inadmissible. This conclusion is supported by 
the 'upward 83 ne bis in idem maxim as laid down in the ICC Statute in Article 
20 (3). This provision allows for a new trial by the ICC of a person who has 
76 Kleffner J. K., "The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive 
International Criminal Law", Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2003) 
p. 95. 
7' Germany's Code of Crimes Against International Law 2002, Sections 8-12. 
78 op cit, Relva, note 34, p. 338. 
79 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, G. A. res. 39/46, [annex, 39 U. N. GAOR Supp. (No. 5 1) at 197, U. N. Doc. 
A/39/51 (1984)], June 26,1987, Arts. 4,5 and 7. 
80 Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons 1996,33.1. L. M. 1429, 
Articles I (b) and VII 
81 ICC Draft Statute, Art. 18, March 1998. See Holmes T. J., "The Principle of 
Complementarity" In Lee R. S. (Ed. ), "The International Criminal Court, The 
Making of the 
Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results" 1999, pp. 57-58. 
82 ICTY Statute Art. 10 (2) (a); ICTR Statute Art. 9 (2) (a); see also 1996 Draft Code of 
Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its 48 th Session, 06 May-26 July 1996, 
GAOR, 5 I't Session, 
Supplement No. 10 (A/5 I /10), Draft Art. 12 (2) (a) (i). 
83 C. van den Wyngaert and Ongena T., 
"Ne bis in idem Principle, Including the Issue of 
Amnesty" in Cassese A., Gaeta P. and Jones J., "International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary" 
(2002) pp. 724-726. 
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been tried by another court for conduct, not crimes, under ICC Arts. 6,7 or 8. 
The choice of the term conduct and not crimes seems to suggest that the 
classification of a conduct as an ordinary crime is not sufficient to render Art. 
20 (31) applicable and thus does not allow for a retrial before the ICC84 . Hence, 
exceptions to the 'upward' ne bis in idem principle do not include the 
possibility of a retrial before the ICC of a person previously tried by a national 
court for acts constituting ICC crimes on the ground that those acts had been 
characterized as ordinary crimes 85 . Contrary to this conclusion is the argument 
that characterization of an ICC crime as an ordinary crime presupposes 
determining adequate and proportional sentences against the gravity of the 
crime and "states parties implementing the Rome Statute are bound to 
establish a standard not inferior to that created by this international 
instrument,, 86 . 
Gravity in turn must match the conduct constituting a crime 
belonging to the most serious crimes of international concern 87 . In this respect 
international rules differ from ordinary crimes in as much as they protect the 
88 interests of the international community . The problem becomes apparent if 
one considers a situation in which the ICC would characterize pillage as a war 
crime89 but the national court would determine a sentence for the ordinary 
crime of theft9o. A further example is the crime of murder9l which gives rise to 
extensive analysis as its prosecution may occur within a legal framework that 
permits prosecution under both national and international laW92 .A case in 
84 Op cit, Kleffner, note 76, p. 96. 
85 See e. g. El Zeidy and Mohamed M., "Egypt and Current Efforts to Criminalize 
International Crimes" International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 2,2005 pp. 247-266. 
86 Op cit. 34, Relva, p. 339. 
87 ICC Art. 5 (1) on Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law. 
88 ICTY stated that "core crimes transcend the individual because when the individual is 
assaulted, humanity comes under attack and is negated' in Prosecutor v Erdemovic, Case No. 
IT-96-22-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 29 November 1996, para. 28; see also Attorney General 
of Israel v Eichmann, 36 International Law Reports (ILR) 5 (Jerusalem District Court 1961); 
Attorney General of the Government of Israel v Adolf Eichmann (1962)(Isr. Supreme 
Court 1962), 36 ILR 28; Federacion nationale des deportes et internes resistants et patriots and 
others v Barbie (1988) 78 ILR 125 and the Demjanjuk Case (1996) 445 US 10 16,89 L. Ed. 2d 
312. 
89 ICC Art. 8 (2) (b) (xvi) and 2 (e) (v). 
90 Op cit, Kleffner, note 76, p-97- 
91 The International Law Commission declared that "murder is a crime that is clearly 
understood and well defined in the national law of every State", Report of the ILC on the work 
of its 48 th Session, 06 May-26 July 1996, p. 96. 
92 See e. g. Prosecutor v Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16, Judgment of 14 January 2000, 
para. 82 1; Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment of 02 
September 1998, 
para. 587. 
point is East Timor, where the regulatory framework of UNTAET affords 
prosecuting authorities significant influence in deciding as to which law, 
national or international, is relied upon in individual prosecutionS93 . 
Here the 
prosecutor has the discretion to determine whether an offence will be pursued 
in spite of the absence of precise instructions as to the compatibility of 
Indonesian law 94 
. 
Under UNTAET Regulations crimes against humanity are 
one of the most serious criminal offences within the jurisdiction of the Special 
Panel and this jurisdiction 95 
, unlike that for murder under national law, is 
universal96. Under the Regulations, the definition of crimes against humanity 
corresponds to the ICC Statute 97. Article 7 of the Elements of Crime 98 sets out 
the context element for the offence of murder as a crime against humanity 
within ICC Art. 7 (1) (a); it addresses the issue of knowledge regarding a 
-ii, idespread or systematic attack against a civilian population" in general 
terms, not addressing therefore the specific knowledge which is required to 
99 constitute the mental element of murder . Hence, the Article is drafted in 
broad terms. As a result, reliance has to be sought in provisions outside the 
ICC Statute, such as in the jurisprudence of other international tribunals, 
00 mainly the ICTY and ICTR1 . 
9' Curries G., "Murder as a Crime against Humanity in International Law: Choice of Law and 
Prosecution of Murder in East Timor", European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2003), p. 4 1. 
94 Linton S., "Rising From the Ashes: the Creation of a Viable Criminal Justice System in East 
Timor" 25 Melbourne University Law Review, 200 1, p. 137. 
95 UNTAET Regulation 15/2000, Sec. ](3). 
96 Ibid, Sec. 2(2). On the 'legitimizing link' whereby universal jurisdiction does not apply in 
cases where some kind link cannot be established between the crime and the prosecuting state 
see Ambos K. and Wirth S., "Genocide and War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia Before 
German Criminal Courts (1994-2000) " in Fischer H. et al. (Eds. ) "International and National 
Prosecution of Crimes Under International Law-Current Developments" (2001) pp. 778-783 
97 ICC Art. 7. 
98 Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Part 11, 
Finalised draft text of the Elements of Crimes, UN Doc PCNICC/2000/1 Add. 2 (2000). 
99 See e. g. Elewabadar M., "Allens rea-Mistake ofLaw and Mistake of Fact in German 
Criminal Law: A Surveyfor International Criminal Tribunals" International Criminal Law 
Review, Vol. 5, No. 2,2005, pp. 203-246; also Timmerman W. K., "The Relationship between 
Hate Propaganda and Incitement to Genocide. A New Trend in International Law Towards 
Criminalisation of Hate Propaganda" - Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, Issue 2, 
2005, pp. 257-282. 
100 For example, on the 'context element' of crimes against humanity see Prosecutor v Blaskic, 
Case No. IT-95-14,03 March 2000, Trial Chamber, para. 15 1; Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovac 
and Vukovic, IT-96-23,22 February 200 1, Trial Chamber, para. 4 10 ff.; Prosecutor v Dusko 
Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, 07 May 1997, Trial Chamber, para. 559; Prosecutor v Clement 
Kayishema and Obed Ruzindan, ICTR-95-1-T, 21 May 1999, para135; Prosecutor v Alfred 
Musema, ICTR-96-12, Judgment of 27 January 2000, para. 215. 
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There is an additional problem with States that have established offences that, 
although not based in international law, are categorized as 'international'. An 
example is the Congolese ICC implementing legislation that widens the group 
against whom genocide may be committed'01. Another one is the Colombian 
New Penal Code which includes the failure to provide humanitarian assistance 
in favour of protected persons despite being obliged to do so 102 . In fact, several 
Latin American states have adopted innovations in relation to the Genocide 
Convention's four 'protected groups' as defined in all international 
instruments in which the crime is set out 
103 
. Some of these States have 
04 
eliminated 'racial groups' in their penal codes' . 
Peru added 'social groups' 
whereas Costa Rica replaced the reference to 'ethnic groups' with 'political 
groups' 105 . 
Not following the ICC Elements of Crimes 106 , 
Germany took the 
position that it is not necessary for the crime of genocide, under international 
customary law, for the killing to be committed in a larger context of similar 
acts. With regard to general principles, Germany also chose a non-literal 
adoption of Part III of the ICC Statute. It will instead apply general principles 
as provided in its Criminal Code 107 . 
This Code goes further than the ICC 
08 Statute in comprising and defining dolus eventualis' . 
These unilateral introductions of apparently international law provisions 
potentially broaden the scope of international offences and the punitive regime 
applicable to them'09. Some ICC implementation laws specifically provide that 
constitutional and other legal norms must be interpreted in accordance with 
"31 Congo/Brazzaville Law No. 8-98, Art. I- 
102 Colombia's New Penal Code, Law 599/2000,24 July 2000 (Offences Against Persons and 
Objects Protected by International Humanitarian Law) Art. 152. 
103 Genocide Convention, Art. 11; Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, Art. 17; ICTY Statute, Art. 4. 
104 1989 Penal Code of Paraguay, Art. 319; 1973 Bolivian Penal Code, Art. 138 (Bolivia is not a 
party to the Genocide Convention); 1973 Guatemalan Penal 
Code, Art. 376. 
105 1997 Costa Rican Penal Code, Art. 375 (No. 7732). 
106 Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, U. N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add. 2. 
107 Code of Crimes against International Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany of 29 June 
2002, Sec. 2 (Application of general law). 
108 Ibid. 
109 For a discussion see e. g. Gaeta P., "The Defence of 
Superior Orders: The Statute of 
International Criminal Court versus Customary International Law", 10 European 
Journal of 
international Law 1999,172-191. 
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international instruments to which a particular states is party to" 0. Although 
the ICC Statute provides that the principle nullum crimen sine lege shall not 
affect the characterization of any conduct as criminal under international law 
independently of the Statute"', the unilateral scope-broadening of 
international law risks undermining the rights of the accused under ne bis in 
idem terms. For instance, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela do not 
punish genocide despite being parties to the Genocide Convention. A further 
example is Uruguay where torture is not classified as a crime, despite Uruguay 
being party to the U. N. Convention on Torture, the Inter-American Convention 
on Torture and the Rome Statute. Again, Germany is a further solid example. 
The only crime Germany was able to prosecute until recently was genocide, as 
it was provided for and defined in the German Criminal Code 112 as a result of 
the ratification of the Genocide Convention. Therefore, prosecution of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes was not possible as these crimes lacked 
definition in German law. Thus, a Bavarian Court tried and convicted an 
accused from the Bosnian war for aiding and abetting manslaughter, instead of 
the war crime of wilful killing 113 . Moreover, there are war crimes as provided 
for in the Geneva Conventions (e. g. forcing a protected person to serve in the 
forces of a hostile power) that cannot be prosecuted at all under domestic laws 
for lack of definition, even as ordinary crimes 114 . 
The reference to 'another court' in ICC Article 20 (3) lacks any precise 
standard as to the judicial weight to be attributed to it. This is important as 
rulings of investigatory domestic commissions may well provide basis for a 
defence to surrender 115 as a "sincere truth commission project amounts to a 
form of investigation that does not suggest 'genuine unwillingness' on the part 
110 See e. g. 1992 Constitution of Angola, Art. 21 (2). 
1" ICC Art. 22 (3). 
112 2002 German Criminal Code, Sec. 220 (a). 
113 Djajic Case, Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht (BayObLG), Judgment of 23 May 1997,3 
St 20/66. 
114 Wirth S., "International Criminal Law in Germany Case Law and Legislation", 
Presentation to the Conference "Combating International Crimes Domestically", 3 rd Annual 
War Crimes Conference, Ottawa, 22-23 April 2002. 
115 ICC Statute Art. 89 (2). 
114 
qf the state to administer justice" 116 . The surrender related problem here is that 
State-establ i shed investigation commissions provide no uniformity of practice 
neither with respect to evidentiary principles nor with regard to ne bis in 
idern 117 
. Being one of the major surrender defences, unfortunately, the 
principle of double criminality relies substantially on the subjective assessment 
of legal value of domestic investigation efforts and trials' 18 - 
b) Specialty 
In addition to ne bis in idern and nulla poena sine lege, the majority of treaties 
also contain reciprocal specialty provisions requiring states to undertake to 
prosecute the accused only in respect of extradition crimes set out in the 
extradition request. The specialty rule aims at providing the fugitive with 
protection against unfair treatment in the requesting state" 9. It is an important 
safeguard against the abuse or circumvention of other protective principles and 
procedures as it ensures that requests made in respect of offences and 
circumstances which meet the requisite conditions for extradition and are not 
used as a pretence to obtain surrender for offences for which extradition would 
not be granted. In order to comply with the rule, the requesting state must give 
the fugitive an opportunity to leave the country before instituting criminal 
proceedings for any other offence. For example, under Article 14 of the 1957 
European Convention on Extradition a person has 45 days to leave before 
being charged with a new offence. Under the ICC Statute,, a person 
surrendered to the Court may not be prosecuted for any conduct committed 
prior to surrender, other than the conduct which forms the basis of the crimes 
116 Schabas W. A., "An Introduction to the International Criminal Court" (200 1) p. 69. See 
also Villa-Vicencio C., "Why Perpetrators Should Not Always be Prosecuted: Where the 
International Criminal Court and Truth Commissions Meet" 49 Emory Law Journal 1,2000, 
p. 215 where the author describes the ICC Statute as "both morally impressive and 
legally a 
little ftighten ing" as "it could be misinterpreted, albeit incorrectly, asforbidding the use of 
truth commissions". 
1" Ratner S. R. and Abrams J. S -, "A ccountabilityfor 
human rights atrocities in international 
law: beyond the Nuremberg legacy " (200 1), p. 255. 
118 See e. g. 1995 South Africa Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act. 
1'9 See the Preparatory Committee on Establishment of International Criminal Court where 
Finland expressed the view that the inclusion of the specialty rule was essential, 
09 April 
1996,1 "Session, 2 01h Meeting, L/2780- 
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for which the person was surrendered 120 . However, the Court is empowered to 
request from the custodial State a waiver of this requirement if necessary after 
the provision of additional information 121 . The accused person may provide 
his/her views to the ICC on a perceived violation in this matter 122 . Specialty is 
yet another extradition safeguard and as such, according to some, should be 
expressly excluded for crimes under international law 123 and should not 
prevent the ICC Prosecutor from amending an indictment. Nonetheless, this 
provision is present in most ICC implementing legislations. 
2.4 Aut Dedere Aut Judicare 
Crimes under the ICC Statute are crimes in respect of which international law 
imposes obligations on States to investigate and prosecute. States parties to 
international instruments such as the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), the Genocide 
Convention (1948). the Geneva Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War 
(1949), the U. N. Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of 
Extra-Legal Arbitrary and Summary Executions 124 commit themselves to 
investigate and prosecute these crimes. 
Traditionally, the offence-orientated approach to extradition has been widely 
applied in multilateral conventions prescribing international crimes. Typically 
those instruments consist of two provisions. The first one confers a 
jurisdictional competence on the signatory states to prosecute the respective 
offence or obliges them to establish such a jurisdiction. The jurisdictional 
clause is usually followed by a separate proviso on the principle aut dedere aut 
j udicare 1 25 . As 
far as national jurisdictions go, the former provision can be 
120 ICC Article 101 (1). 
121 ICC Article 101 (2). 
122 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 196. 
123 Amnesty International, "Ireland- Comments and recommendations on the International 
Criminal Court Bill 2003", Al Index: EUR 29/001/2004,29 April 2004. 
124 See General Assembly, A/C. 3/57/L. 56/Rev. 1,57 
th Session, Third Committee, 19 November 
2002, "Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions", at 6. 
125 See Bassiouni M. C. and Wise E. M., "Aut Dedere Aut Judicare" (1995), p. 
68, 
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seen as a corollary of the former, which establishes the obligation of a state 
party to extradite or prosecute an individual who is allegedly responsible for 
the crime defined in the ICC Statute. The jurisdictional component of this 
system is intended to secure the possibility for the custodial state to fulfil its 
obligation to extradite or prosecute by opting for the second alternative with 
respect to such an individual. This alternative for the custodial state consists of 
a prosecution by its competent national authorities through the 
complementarity norms. It is meaningful only to the extent that the courts of 
the custodial state have the necessary jurisdiction over the crimes set out in the 
particular instrument to enable that state to opt for the prosecution alternative. 
Failing such jurisdiction and providing an extradition treaty exists between the 
parties, the custodial state would be forced to accept any requests received for 
extradition, which would be contrary to the alternative nature of the obligation 
to extradite or prosecute and under which the custodial state does not have an 
absolute obligation to grant a request for extradition. 
The custodial state has an obligation to take action to ensure that such an 
individual is prosecuted either by the national authorities of that state or by 
another state which indicates willingness to prosecute the case by requesting 
extradition' 26 . 
The custodial state is in a unique position to ensure the 
implementation of the Rome Treaty by virtue of the presence of the alleged 
offender on its territory. The principle aut dedere aut judicare is considered as 
representing not only a rule of customary international law but also a rule of 
27 jus cogens' . 
126 Examples of this approach can be found in both multilateral and bilateral treaties on 
extradition. The 1957 European Convention on Extradition provides one of them. Its Article 6 
(I) (a) confers on the contracting states a right to refuse extradition of their nationals. 
Consequently, paragraph 2 of that Article stipulates that "if the requested Party does not 
extradite its national, it shall at the request of the requesting State submit its case to 
its 
competent authorities in order that proceedings may be taken if they are considered 
appropriate. For this purpose, the files, information and exhibits relating to the offence shall 
be 
transmitted without charge by the means of article 12 (1). The requesting Party shall be 
informed of the result of its request. See also Article 44 (a) Treaty on Legal Assistance 
in 
Criminal Matters 1992 and the UN Model Treaty on Extradition. 
127 Wise E. M., "Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International 
Law" (1999), p. 28. 
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The ICC Statute, while based on the principle of complementarity, demands 
the requested State to give priority, in cases of competing requests, to a request 
128 by the Court . In particular, the ICC Statute stipulates that where a State 
Party receives a request from the Court for the surrender of a person, as well as 
one from any other State for the extradition of the same person for conduct 
other than crime for which the Court seeks the person's surrender, the 
requested State shall 129 (a) if it is not under an existing international obligation 
to extradite the person to the requesting State, give priority to the request from 
the Court and (b) if it is under an existing obligation to extradite the person to 
the requesting State, determine whether to surrender the person to the Court or 
to extradite the person to the requesting State. In making this decision, the 
State must give due weight to all relevant factors, including but not limited to 
the interests of the requesting State, including whether the crime was 
committed on its territory and the nationality of the victims and/or the 
possibility of subsequent surrender between the ICC and the requesting 
State 1 30 
, 
but shall give special consideration to the relative nature and gravity 
of the conduct in question. At the Rome Conference, Croatia suggested the 
inclusion of a provision under which a State should not refuse a request for 
surrender of persons by the Court as obligations deriving from such a request 
shall prevail over any legal impediment to do so, be it under national law or 
extradition treaties of the State concerned131. However, ICC negotiations show 
that there is a general agreement that where the Court has determined a case 
inadmissible, this does not on its own place the requested State under any 
international obligation to surrender the person to the requesting State132. For 
example, through its ICC implementation Act, Germany will step back and 
leave a case for the ICC only under very particular circumstances when 
requirements for complementarity are not fulfilled. Under the German Rome 
Statute Implementation Act, Germany need not prosecute a suspect if the ICC 
128 ICC Statute, Article 90 (2). 
129 ICC Statute Art. 90 (7). 
130 Ibid, Art. 90 (6). 
131 Croatia: Proposal regarding art. 87, A/CONF. 183/C. I/WGIC/L. 9,29 June 1998. For a 
similar position see Italy at A/CONF/1 
83/C. I /WGIC/L. 3,25 June 1998. 
132 UN A/CONF. 183/C. I /WGIC/L. 11. 
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has agreed in advance to take over a case 133 . In the United Kingdom, the 
interpretation afforded to Article 90 is that States Parties must give priority to 
the ICC request unless the country requesting extradition is a non-Party and 
the requested State is under an existing obligation to extradite the person to 
that State Non-Party 134 
. In a case of an interpretational conflict, the ICC should 
enforce the principle in dubio pro reo, whereby the more favourable 
construction to the interests of the accused should be adopted, 35 . Some ICC 
implementation laws stipulate that when a State has effectively initiated or is 
conducting an investigation with regard to a person sought by the Court, that 
State has the right to ask the ICC Prosecutor to restrain its competence in 
136 favour of the jurisdiction of the State 
Nevertheless, countries in transition reveal potential indistinctness between the 
obligation to investigate, prosecute or surrender on the part of former and 
present governments. The American Court of Human Rights decision in 
Velasquez Rodriguez 137 and the Inter-American Commission conclusions in 
cases involving Argentina and Uruguay 13 8 held that a succeeding government 
is under an obligation to prosecute those members of the previous government 
responsible for human rights violations. South Africa is a case in point. In the 
Azapo Case 139 , the 
Court was expected to thoroughly examine conventional 
and customary rules that appeared to require prosecution of human rights 
violators as well as the practice of other states in transition. It was also 
expected to consider whether the drafter of the, at the time, Interim 
Constitution intended to overrule international law on amnesty. This was not 
done and the Court only considered the question whether the provisions of 
the1949 Geneva Conventions requiring prosecution for 'grave breaches' were 
133 Law for the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 21 
June 2002, Sec. 28. 
134 House of Commons, "International Criminal Court Bill-Explanatoty Notes", 14 December 
2000, para. 13, available at 
http: //w. ww. publications. parliament. uk/pa/cm20000 I/cmbills/070/en/0 I 070x-b. litm 
135 ICC Art. 22 (2). See also Pacegueiro C., "International Criminal Court", The International 
Society for the Reform of Criminal Law, 17 th International Conference, The Hague, 
Netherlands, August 24-28,2003, available at www. isrcl. orv, /papers/ylp brazil. pd 
136 See e. g. 2002 Ecuador's Draft Implementation Law, Art. 13 0. 
137 Judgment of 29 July 1988, Series no. 4, reported in ILR 259. 
138 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Reports nos. 28/92 and 29/92,02 October 
1992. 
139 See Chapter I 
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applicable (which were held not applicable in the South African situation), and 
had not examined whether customary law rules relating to genocide, torture, 
v, -ar crimes and crimes against humanity required prosecution of offenders 140 
No attempt had been made by the Court to assess apartheid as a crime against 
humanity under customary law. The General Assembly 14 1 and the 1973 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid had classified early apartheid as a crime against humanity. 
Most national rules provide, and this is a long-standing principle of civil law 
142 countries, that a prosecutor must prosecute if there is sufficient evidence 
Some national legislation also provides for deferral of a case if a foreign 
prosecutor is closer to the crime, providing therefore for inter-state 
complementarity in extradition matters 143 . 
2.5 Arrests and surrender under the ICC Statute 
Article 55 (1) (d) ICC Statute provides that when the Court is investigating a 
case ýa person shall not be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention and shall 
not be deprived of his liberty'. The ICC will have to substantially rely on 
national authorities to detain suspects, or otherwise put a notice that their 
presence is required at the Court and then to ensure the attendance by those 
persons before the Court. The Court may request these forms of assistance by: 
(1) issuing an arrest warrant along with a request for arrest and surrender of the 
person; 144 (2) issuing a warrant along with a request for provisional arrest in 
urgent cases where the required supporting documentation is not yet 
140 Dugard J., "International Law and the South African Constitution", European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 8, No. 1,1997, p. 89. 
141 See GA Res. 39/72A, 1984. 
142 See e. g. 2001 German Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 152 (2). 
143 For a full discussion see Kress C., "War Crimes Committed in Non- Intern ation al 
Armed 
Conflict and the Emerging System of International Criminal Justice", 30 Israel 
Yearbook on 
Human Rights, 2000,103,170. 
144 ]CC Statute Articles 58,67,89 and 91 and Rules 117,123 (1) and 187. 
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available; 14 5 (3) issuing a summons with or without conditions restricting 
liberty (other than detention) if provided by national law where the Pre-Trial 
Chamber is satisfied that a summons is sufficient to ensure the person's 
appearance. It seems that both accused persons and suspects have the right to 
challenge the Jurisdiction of the Court or the preliminary admissibility of a 
case 146 . Throughout the ICC Treaty negotiations it was suggested in fact that 
the right to these challenges should not be limited only to 'accused" 47 persons 
but should extend to 'suspects' who are subject to an investigation and are 
arrested on the basis of a pre-indictment arrest warrant 148 . 
The European Court of Human Rights confirmed in three separate judgments 
that Article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights is applicable to 
pre-trial detention. Article 5 (4) of the Convention provides: "Everyone who is 
deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to make 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily 
by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful". In Garcia 
Alva and Lietzow Case 149 , the ECHR concluded that German authorities had 
improperly elevated the prosecution's interest in the integrity of the 
investigation above the fundamental freedom interest secured by Art. 5 (4). In 
the Ocalan Case, the ECHR emphasised again the need to prioritise rights 
enshrined in Art. 5 (4) against other interests' 50 emphasising also that remedies 
required under this provision must be of judicial nature 151 . Whereas the 
European Court acknowledged that in the interest of an effective investigation 
there may be instances where some information may be kept secret in order to 
prevent suspects from interfering with evidence and undermining the course of 
justice, information which is essential for the assessment of the lawfulness of a 
detention should be made available in an 'appropriate manner' to the suspect's 
145 ICC Statute Article 58 (5), 67 and 92 and Rules H 7,123 and 187-9. 
146 ICC Statute Art. 19. 
147 For example, under the U. K. 1989 Extradition Act, Art. 1 (1) (a) extradition may be granted 
in respect of an 'accused person'; for a purposive interpretation of 'accused persons' see e. g. 
Rey v Government of Switzerland [1998] 3 WLR 1. 
148 UN A/CONF. 183/13 p. 28, fn. 53. 
149Garcia Alva v Germany (23 541/94) [200 1] ECHR 86,13 February 200 1; Lietzow v 
Germany (24479/94). 
"' Ocalan v Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, Judgment of 12 May 2005, p. 22, para. 60. 
151 See e. g. Winterwerp v the Netherlands, Judgment of 24 October 1979, Series A no. 33, p. 24, 
para. 60. 
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lawyer' 52. In this case the German Code of Criminal Procedure required that a 
suspect be given the opportunity at his or her detention hearing to "present 
those, facts which are in his favour" 153 . 
This right may only be enjoyed if a 
suspect or one's defence have been given the chance to become aware of such 
favourable evidence in possession of the Prosecution 154 . 
This is the reason why 
the German Code of Criminal Procedure grants the defence the right to inspect 
the prosecution file upon request in pre-trial detention proceedings, 55 . 
The ICC 
Statute provides that when the Pre-Trial Chamber issues an arrest warrant, the 
application of the Prosecutor shall contain a summary of the evidence and any 
other information which establish reasonable grounds to believe that the 
156 person committed the alleged crimes . At the confirmation of the charges 
before the trial and within a reasonable time before the hearing, the person 
"shall be informed of the evidence on which the Prosecutor intends to rely at 
the hearing. The Pre-Trial Chamber may issue orders regarding the disclosure 
of information for the purposes of the hearing ý157 . 
In addition to these 
disclosure obligations, the Prosecutor' 58 must also, as soon as practicable, 
disclose to the defence any exculpatory evidence, or evidence mitigating the 
guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution 
159 evidence 
An accused also has the right to 'provisional liberty' 160 or bail before his/her 
surrender to the Court. Where an application for bail is made, the State has to 
consult with the ICC and such application should not be granted without full 
152 Garcia Alva v Germany (23 541/94) [200 1] ECHR 86,13 February 200 1, para. 42; see also 
Schops v Germany (25116/94), 13 February 2001 where the ECHR refused the German 
government's formalistic approach to the requirement that the suspect or his lawyer request 
access to the file. 
153 German Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 115 (3). 
154 See Chapter 3. 
15' German Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 147. 
156 CC Statute Art. 58 (2) (d). 
157 CC Statute Art. 61 (3) (b). 
158 ICC Statute Art. 67 (2). 
159 For similar national guarantees see e. g. 2002 U. S. Department of 
Defence Military Order 
on the Rules and Procedures governing 
Trials before Military Commissions (21 March 2002), 
Sec. 5(E) providing that "The Prosecution shallprovide the 
defence with access to evidence 
the Prosecution intends to use at trial and with access to evidence 
known to the Prosecution 
that trends to exculpate the accused'. 
1602004 Argentine Draft Implementation Bill, Art. 33. 
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consideration of any recommendations made by the ICC161. In considering any 
application for bail, the ICC should consider whether given the gravity of the 
offence, there are urgent and exceptional circumstances justifying release on 
bail and also whether any necessary measures have been or will be taken to 
secure that the person will surrender to custody in accordance with the terms 
of the bail. When an accused is already in the custody of the ICC in the pre- 
trial stage, the Pre-Trial Chamber may set conditions restricting liberty, 
including for instance that the person must not travel beyond limits set by the 
Court; the person must not contact directly or indirectly victims and witnesses 
or that the person must not engage in certain professional activities 162 . 
The ICC Statute confirms that the accused person has the right to a fair trial 
and pre-trial process' 63 which includes the right to be properly informed and in 
detail of the nature, cause and content of the charge, in a language that the 
accused fully understands and speaks 164 . 
These rules form part of the 
obligations on States Parties under the Statute to fully comply with requests for 
arrest and surrender 165 . 
What would be of significant assistance to the Court is 
local authorities undertaking to inform the Court, if they arrest an accused, and 
if these authorities are also made aware beforehand of the possibility that the 
ICC may send some additional documentation with the request for arrest and 
166 surrender . 
It would be of ample assistance too if the arresting authorities 
were required to provide this additional documentation to the arrested person 
on behalf of the Court in order to ensure that all the arrested person's rights are 
protected from the moment of arrest and avoid any possible process 
167 challenges 
161 ICC Article 59 (5). See e. g. 2002 Malta's Draft International Criminal Court, Art. 26 N (b) 
and (c). 
162 ICC Rule H9 (Conditional Release). 
163 ICC Statute Article 67. 
164 ICC Statute Article 67 (1). Also, under Rule 187 the Court's request for arrest and 
surrender must be accompanied by the translation of the warrant of arrest or of the 
judgment of 
conviction and by the translation of the text of any relevant provisions of the 
Statute, in a 
language that the accused fully understands. 
165 ICC Article 89. 
166 The International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, "The 
International Criminal Court. Rules of Procedure and Evidence - Implementation 
Considerations" March 2003, p. 17. 
167 See e. g. Barayagwiza v Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR 
72, Appeal Chambers 
Decision, 03 November 1999, paras. 102-112 where the Tribunal held that in the event of 
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Furthermore, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber is also under an obligation to ensure 
that the person that has been arrested is notified of the provisions of Article 61 
(2) which authorise the Court to hold a confirmation hearing in the absence of 
168 the accused, inter alia, where the accused has waived his right to be present . 
The Pre-Trial Chamber is also required to ensure that the arrest warrant has 
actually been issued 169 and if the warrant of arrest has not been executed 
within a reasonable period of time after issuance of the same, that all 
170 reasonable measures have been taken to locate and arrest the person . The 
need for cooperation of the requested State under these circumstances is 
consistent with the obligations to "immediately take steps to arrest the person 
in question" once the request is received and to "consult with the Court 
without delay" 171 on issues relating to the execution of a request from the 
CoUrt172. 
173 
In urgent cases the ICC may request States to provisionally arrest a person 
The requirements for supporting documentation in such cases are different 
from requests for arrest and surrender 174 . Delivery of the 
ICC's arrest warrant 
and the request for surrender cannot serve as prerequisites for provisional 
arrest. However, persons who are provisionally arrested are entitled to receive 
certain information from the ICC once they have been arrested and the Court is 
aware of their arrest. Namely, they are entitled to (1) a copy of the arrest 
warrant issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber, together with relevant provisions of 
deliberately misleading prosecutorial conduct the only remedy available was dismissal of 
indictment and release of the accused. 
168 Under Article 61 (2) (b), in determining whether to hold the hearing in absence of the 
accused is whether "all reasonable steps have been taken to inform the person of the charges 
and that a hearing to confirm those charges will be held'. See U. N. A/CONF. 183/13, pp. 
297- 
298. 
169 It is important that arrest and surrender requests be transmitted strictly according to the 
provisions of the Statute and the Rules and in cases of states non-parties through proper 
diplomatic channels so as to avoid the challenging of or refusal to execute requests. 
See e. g. 
Cameroon Case No. 337/COR, Court of Appeal, 21 February 1997 where the Court refused to 
execute an extradition request on procedural grounds, namely that the request 
did not meet the 
conditions laid down in the Cameroon's extradition 
law since it had not been forwarded 
through diplomatic channels (unreported). 
170 ICC Rule 123 (3). 
171 ICC Article 59. 
172 ICC Article 97. 
173 ICC Article 92. 
174 See ICC Article 92 (2). 
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the Statute-, 17 and (2) notification of the provisions of Article 61 (2) on 
confirmation hearings' 76 . 
Where the ICC subsequently forwards the request for 
surrender to the State, it must be accompanied by documents such as a 
translation of the warrant of arrest and as already stated above, a translation of 
the text of any relevant provisions of the Statute, in a language that the person 
fully understands and speaks' 77 . As with the execution of arrest warrants, the 
requirement for this document to be given to the arrested person does not place 
any obligation on the requested State. 
Furthermore,, the ICC Statute allows the Court to issue summons with or 
without conditions restricting liberty, other than detention, as long as these 
conditions are provided for by national law 178 and it is for the Court to 
ascertain the relevant national provisions of the State receiving the summon 179 
Once a person has been arrested, or provisionally arrested by national 
authorities, that person must be brought promptly before the competent 
national authority in the custodial State' 80 and be provided with the 
opportunity to apply for interim release pending surrender 181 . 
There are 
however some unresolved issues of customary international law in this respect. 
175 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 117 (1). 
176 Rule 123 (1). 
177 See Rule 187. 
178 Article 58 (7). See also Rule 119 (1) that provides some examples of conditions that the 
ICC may impose. These include that (a) the person must not travel beyond territorial limits set 
by the Pre-Trial Chamber without the explicit agreement of the Chamber; (b) the person must 
not go to certain places or associate with certain person as specified by the Pre-Trial Chamber; 
(c) the person must not contact directly or indirectly victims or witnesses; (d) the person must 
not engage in certain professional activities; (e) the person must reside at a particular address 
as specified by the Trial Chamber; (f) the person must respond when summoned 
by an 
authority or qualified person designated by the Pre-Trial Chamber; 
(g) the person must post 
bond or provide real or personal security or surety for which the amount and the schedule and 
mode of payment shall be determined by the Pre-Trial Chamber and 
(h) the person must 
supply the Registrar with all identity documents, particularly 
his or her passport. 
179 ICC Rule 119 (5). 
180 ICC Article 59. 
181 ICC Article 59 (2) and (3). Also, under Article 59 (5) the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber must be 
notified and make recommendations 
if a person applies for interim release. Under Rule 117 
(4), the Pre-Trial Chamber must observe any time limits that the custodial 
State may set upon 
the Pre-Trial Chamber in terms of providing its recommendations. 
National authorities in this 
respect must give full consideration to such recommendations 
before rendering any decisions 
on interim release (Article 59 
(5)). See also Article 59 (6) and Rule 117 (5) on State's 
obligation to cooperate with the 
ICC if the person is granted interim release. 
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The Milosevic Case 182 in the ICTY reflects this. Here the defendant appealed 
against the decision of the federal government to defer a criminal case to the 
ICTY, on which appeal the Supreme Court of the Republic of Yugoslavia had 
to decide within 15 days after receipt of a notice for appeal. This condition was 
not met as he was transferred to the ICTY at the time the appeal pursuant to 
the cooperation decree 183 was still pending. The rendition of the accused 
absent a judicial finalisation reflects a major source of uncertainty in 
international law' 84 . By accepting a rendition of an indictee or even by 
cooperating with the sending State, the ICC could indirectly transpose the 
national proceedings to it, thus substitute the national authorities in this area 185 . 
It can be conceded therefore that acceptance of a defendant that has been 
transferred to the seat of the Court prior to hearing his motion for habeas 
corpus relief will amount to an infringement on of Articles 9 (4) ICCPR and 5 
(1) and (4) of the ECHR 186 . It is worth also observing that the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights confirms that "Everyone convicted of a 
crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a 
higher tribunal according to law"' 87 . Decisions upheld by the Human Rights 
Committee suggest that this provision does oblige the parties to provide for a 
complete second treatment of the merits of the case 188 . 
182 Prosecutor v Milosevic S., Case No. IT-02-54. 
183 Art. 13 (1) Decree on the Procedure Ruling the Cooperation with the ICTY, 23 June 200 1, 
Appendix 2. 
184 Again, the ICTY in its decision on preliminary motions did not pronounce on the element 
of ultra vires governmental conduct. 
185 See e. g. State v Ebrahim [1991] 2 S. Afr. L. R. 553; U. S. v Toscanino, 500 F. 2d 267 
(1974), para. 275 holding that a court must "divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of a 
defendant where it has been acquired as the result of the Government's deliberate, unnecessary 
and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional rights"; see also Drozd and Janousek 
v Spain and France (12747/87) [1992] ECHR 52,26 June 1992 where the Court found that 
national authorities could refuse a transfer in the case of a serious and flagrant breach of, inter 
alia, fundamental rights of the defence, such as to deprive the judgment of legal validity; see 
mututis mutandis in Soering v the United Kingdom, Judgment of 07 July 1989, Series A, No. 
161, p. 45, paral 13. 
186 See e. g. Prosecutor v S. Musabyimana, ICTR-2001-62-1, "Defence Motion on the Violation 
of Rule 55 and International Law at the Time ofArrest and Transfer" 05 October 2001 where 
the Defence contended that a transfer under these circumstances is null and void. The Motion 
was denied in its entirety. See also Rv Horseferry Road Magistrate's Court, ex parte Bennett 
[ 1994] 1 AC 42; Reg. v Hartley [ 19781, New Zealand Law Reports 1978, Vol. 2, p. 199; United 
States v Toscanino [1974] 555 F. 2d. 267,268 and the decision in Mohammed and Dalvie v 
The President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, 28 May 2001 (CCT 17/01,2001 (3) SA 893 CC). 
187 ICCPR Art. 14 (5); see e. g. Benham v the United Kingdom, Judgment of 10 June 1996, 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-111, p. 753, at 41. 
188 See Antonio Martinez Fernandez v Spain, Views of 29 March 2005, Comm. No. 1104/2002. 
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Where a person has been provisionally arrested and denied interim release, the 
national authorities may subsequently release the person from custody if the 
request for surrender and documents supporting the arrest are not received 
within 60 days from the date of provisional arrest 189 . However, once the 
relevant documents arrive, the person must be arrested again and brought back 
before the competent judicial authority. Moreover, a provisionally arrested 
person may voluntarily consent to being surrendered to the ICC before the 
relevant documents arrive, if national law permits this 190 . In that case, the 
requested State may surrender the person to the Court as soon as possible and 
the Court is not required to provide the documents'91. 
ICC Article 59(4) states that it shall not be open to the domestic court to 
consider whether the ICC properly issued the warrant of arrest. Article 59 (5) 
is intended to implement that obligation. It also provides that the competent 
court shall not consider whether there is evidence to justify the person's trial 
before the ICC. However, the Statute does not set any other adjudication 
limits. Both in national and international criminal law there is a pre-trial 
defence available to an accused that intends to challenge his/her arrest and 
surrender to the ICC192 ; that is the fundamental human right to presumption of 
innocence or the defence of alibi. In executing arrest and surrender order from 
international courts, common law countries in particular hold that at the 
extradition hearing in the requested States, the requesting state must submit 
evidence tantamount to a prescribed domestic standard which requires the 
proof the allegations beyond reasonable doubt, or on the balance of 
probability. Civil law jurisdictions on the other hand are more flexible since 
surrender may be approved without the need to conduct extradition 
proceedings or rules 193 . 
Some national extradition laws clearly specify that the 
hearing court be required to examine the exculpatory evidence directly at the 
hearing, in order to determine his/her innocence. The rationale here is that it 
189 ICC Rule 188. 
190 ICC Article 92 (3). 
191 ICC Rule 189. 
192 See e. g. the 1988 Constitution of the Republic of Brazil 1988, Art. 5 (LIV). 
193 See e. g. Spanish Implementing Legislation, Organisation Act 15/1994, Art. 6, U. N. Doc. 
A/49/278. 
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would be unjust for an accused person to await trial in the requesting State 
before this defence can be lodged 194 . 
In the case of surrendering to the ICTY 
and ICTR it was held by a Dutch court that the defence of alibi or innocence 
was not available to an accused subject to surrender proceedings because of 
the supremacy of the ICTR in this case, as a subsidiary organ of the Security 
195 Council 
. In disregard of the ICTR Rule that the defence of alibi may be 
presented at a pre-trial stage 196 , the Dutch court had to set aside both domestic 
law and treaty obligations. In fact, with regard to the ICTYACTR substantive 
defences as to the lack of criminal liability, intent or guilt are to be exclusively 
dealt with by these tribunals. The jurisdictional supremacy of the ICTY and 
ICTR over national courts should not however result in the breach of 
fundamental human rights at a local level. As it was reasoned by the ICTR: 
"The Statute of the tribunal does not include specific provisions akin to speedy 
trial Statutes existing in some national jurisdictions. However, the underlying 
premise of the Statute and Rules are that the accused is entitled to a fair and 
expeditious trial. The importance of a speedy disposition of the case benefits 
both the accused and society, and has been recognised by national courts" 197 . 
The jurisprudence of several common law countries upholds the principle that 
a stay of proceedings is the only possible remedy for failure to bring an 
accused to trial promptly 198 . 
Whereas resort to habeas corpus may not be available at national level arising 
from requests from the ad hoc Tribunals, this right must exist at the surrender 
stage under the ICC complementarity principle and JCC Article 59 (2) or 
(3)'99. The right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention is widely 
protected in various international instruments and regarded as "an essential 
194 See e. g. 1988 Dutch Extradition Act, Art. 26 (3). 
195 Prosecutor v Simon Bikindi, ICTR-2001-72-1 The defence of alibi was based on the fact 
that the accused was not present in Rwanda at the time the alleged crime was committed. 196 ICTR Rule 67 (A) (ii) (a). 
197 Prosecutor v Barayaguiza J. B., ICTR-97-19-AR72, Appeal Chamber Decision, 03 
November 1999, at 105; See ICTR Statute Art. 19 (1). 
198 See e. g. the Canadian Supreme Court ruling in R. v Askov, 2 R. C. S. 1199 (1990). 
199 ECHR has stressed the importance of remedies such as habeas corpus, to provide protection 
against arbitrary behaviour and incommunicado detention (see for example Brannigan and 
McBride v United Kingdom, ECHR, 26 May 1993, Series A, No. 258-B, pp. 55-56, paras. 62- 
63). See also Bozano v France, ECHR, Judgment 18 December 1986, Series A, p. 23, para. 54 
and Wassink v the Netherlands, ECHR, 27 September 1990, Series A, No. 185-A, p. 11, para24. 
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element of the due process protections which provide safeguards for any 
200 
personfirom abuse of power" Anticipating domestic and international law 
defences of alibi or innocence inevitably results in lifting the warrant of 
arrest 201 and there are no principles of national or international law that 
prohibit a domestic court to control the arrest proceedings initiated by the ICC 
by virtue of Article 59 (3), and grant interim release for example. 
Other pre-surrender defences under international human rights law include the 
defence of life imprisonment 202 and political asylum. Although the ICC Statute 
does not contemplate that the possibility of imposing life sentence is a bar to 
surrender 203 , the ICC negotiating history reveals that, in practice, this might 
lead to defences pursuant to a request under ICC Art. 59 (2). A complaint 
against a custodial State or an application for interim measures under ECHR 
Rules is also a possible route 204 . 
Another unresolved issue under the ICC 
Statute is the question of how to resolve a surrender request for a person who 
has applied for political asylum in the requested State for reasons of risk of 
205 persecution in the host State of the Court or a third State . As yet, the ad 
hoc 
tribunals have not addressed this issue so it will be interesting to see how the 
ICC will confront the matter. According to the non-refoulement principle a 
refugee may not be sent back to the country where he risks persecution 206 . For 
example, this guarantee may be found in the 1951 UN Convention on the 
Status of Refugees. It prohibits expulsion or return to the frontiers of territories 
where a refugee's life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion 207 . The exception to this guarantee occurs 
in a situation where a 
200 Bassiouni M. C., "Extradition Law and Practice of the United States" 11 International 
Criminal Law p. 260,1999. See e. g. lCCPR Art. 9 (1), Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Art. 9, AMCHR Art. 7 (3), African Charter on Human and People's Rights Art. 6. 
201 Schlunck A., "Commentary on Article 58, Margin No. 22 and 25" in Triffterer 0. (Ed. ), 
"Commentary on the Rome Statute of the ICC" 1999, p. 768 202 For a full discussion see Chapter 3. 
203 Constitutional obstacles as regards maximum penalties might challenge surrenders to the 
ICC (See Chapter on Transfer of Criminal Proceedings). 204 Rules of Court of the ECHR, Rule 39. 205 Op cit, Knoops, note 62, p. 189, 
206 See e. g. Lopez Burgos, U. N. Doc. A/36/40 (198 1) where the Human Rights Committee 
ruled that forcible abduction of a Uruguayan refugee from Argentina, by Uruguayan agents, 
represented a violation of ICCPR Art. 9 (1). 
207 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, Art. 33 (1). 
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refugee who is regarded as a danger to the security of the country or who, 
having been convicted of a particular serious crime, constitutes a danger to the 
community of that country. From this perspective a surrender request of the 
ICC could be an impediment to an asylum grant but at the same time an 
asylum claim may result in the suspension of surrender to the ICC as long as 
the domestic asylum or refugee procedure is not concluded. The requested 
State might then be able to conditionally surrender the person under the 
promise of return to it after the finalization of proceedings before the ICC. The 
question is what position, in the hierarchy of national laws, do these provisions 
hold and whether they will supersede, through complementarity, obligations 
under the ICC Statute. In a situation of such concurrence, States will have to 
make balancing judgments taking into consideration current human rights law. 
In Amuur v France for example, the ECHR ruled that detention or confinement 
"must not deprive the asylum seekers of the right to gain effective access to the 
procedure for determining refugee status, 208 . However, refugee protection is 
not absolute and the 1951 Convention provides that these guarantees should 
not apply if there are serious doubts that a person has committed a crime 
against humanity, against peace, a war crime or a serious non-political crime 
before being admitted to the country as a refugee 209 . What must be borne in 
mind however is that States have granted amnesty in respect of acts of 
torture 210 . Amnesties are generally regarded as incompatible with the duty of 
States to investigate crimes 21 1 but they are, as it will be evidenced later, still 
applicable for the crimes under the ICC Statute. The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights also grants an accused habeas corpus relief at a 
208 Lalima, Abdelkader and Amuur v France, ECHR No. 17/1995/523/609,20 January 1994, 
para. 50 
209 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, Art. I (f) and U. N. Declaration on 
Territorial Asylum, Art 1 (2), G. A. res. 2312 (XXII), 22 U. N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 81, U. N. 
Doc. A/6716 (1967). There are exceptions to these provisions and states are allowed to take 
measures in cases involving national security (see. e. g. the Angolan reservations). 
210 See e. g. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20,10 April 1992, para. 9. 
21 1 ECHR Art. 3 states that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhumane or degrading 
treatment orpunishment". In Chahal the Court held that Article 3 ECHR makes no provision 
for exceptions and no derogation from it are permissible even in the event of a public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation (Chahal v U. K., No. 70/1995/576/662, Judgment 
of 15 November 1996, paras. 79-80); See also Ahmed v Austria (1996) 24 EHHR 278, 
Judgment of 17 December 1996. 
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domestic court of the State where asylum is sought prior to actual surrender to 
the ICC212. 
ICC Article 59 (6) provides that a competent court shall also consider whether 
the person has been lawfully arrested under the warrant and whether his rights 
have been respected. Subsection (6), following Article 59(2), does not seek to 
spell out all the rights that the court may consider. If a domestic court 
considers that there have been violations of proper process or of the person's 
rights, the ICC will be informed of this determination. It is intended that this 
determination will not, however, affect the court's decision whether or not to 
issue a delivery order under subsection (2). Importantly, this clause does not 
exclude any other procedure available under domestic law for the remedy of a 
violation of a person's rights. 
If the arrested person is already being investigated, or is serving a term of 
imprisonment for a different offence than the one described in the ICC arrest 
warrant, then the requested State must consult with the Court after granting the 
request for surrender, in order to determine the most appropriate course of 
action 213 . The requested State may 
in fact postpone the execution of the 
request for a period agreed with the Court if the immediate execution of the 
request would interfere with an ongoing investigation or prosecution of a 
different matter 214 . Moreover, the requested 
State may temporality surrender 
the person sought by the Court 215 . In such cases, the person will 
be kept in 
custody whilst appearing before the ICC and transferred back to the requested 
State when the necessary proceedings have been completed 216 . 
Significantly, where the surrender of the accused would require the requested 
State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law, the ICC 
212 ICCPR Art. 5 (2): "There shall be no restriction upon or derogationftom any of the 
fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State Party to the present Covenant 
pursuant to law, conventions, regulations or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant 
does not recognize such right or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent". 213 ICC Article 89 (4). 
214 ICC Article 94. 
215 ICC Rule 183. 
216 ibid 
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will be prevented from requesting the surrender of the accused under ICC Art. 
98. Some domestic rules assert furthermore that requests for assistance may be 
refused on the ground that the request requires a State to carry out measures 
that are inconsistent with its national laws and practice 217 . Immunities obtained 
by the United StateS218 through Article 98 (2) ensure de facto immunity from 
ICC jurisdiction for US nationals with the effect that the rule encompassed in 
Art. 27 of the ICC Statute does in practice not apply to nationals of non-state 
parties 2 19. For example, it is yet to be assessed to what extent the application of 
Article 98 immunity agreements will dilute overall ICC jurisdiction at both 
220 international and national levels . 
ICC Article 27 (Irrelevance of Official 
Capacity) has also proved to cause compatibility problems with regard to 
immunity provisions in national constitutions and although States have 
indicated readiness to overcome these problems, incompatibilities remain. An 
example is the Dutch International Crimes Act 2003 providing for immunities 
of foreign heads of states, heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs 
and other persons as long as they are in office 221 , and other persons 
in so far as 
their immunity is recognised under customary international law 222 . 
Further, the 
Act recognises immunity for those persons who have been granted immunity 
223 
under a treaty or convention to which the Netherlands is a party 
As seen in Chapter 1, some countries have amended their constitution 
(Luxembourg), some have announced that constitutional amendments might be 
necessary (e. g. Austria, Slovenia, Mexico) while others have stated that 
amendments of their constitution is probably not necessary (Spain, Norway). 
Others have chosen to ratify the ICC Statute first and deal with possible 
incompatibilities later (Belgium, Ital Y)224. States have also avoided the issue of 
217 See e. g. 2003 Mauritius Mutual Assistance in Criminal and Related Matters Act, Act No. 35 
(17 September 2003), Art. 5 (2) (b) (viii). Requests for assistance may also be refused if the 
compliance with it would be contrary to the Constitution (Art. 5 (2) (1)). 
218 See Chapter 4. 
219 Van Alebeeck R., "From Rome to the Hague; recent developments on immunity issues in 
the ICC Statute" 13 Leiden Journal of International Law 3 (2000), p. 485. 
220 See Chapters I and 4. 
22 1 2003 Dutch International Crimes Act, Sec. 16 (a) relies inter alia, on the ICJ decision of 14 
February 2002 in D. R. Congo v Belgium. 
222 Ibid 
223 2003 Dutch International Crimes Act 2003, Sec. 16 (b). 
224 ibid 
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Article 27 incompatibility by declaring that constitutional immunities are only 
relevant within the internal constitutional order and are therefore not affected 
by the ratification of the Statute. This argument however avoids the actual 
process of surrender to the ICC because the surrender to the Court (under Art. 
27) of a head of state by national authorities is at least in breach of any 
inviolability the head of state may enjoy within the constitutional order 225 . 
The 
ICC Statute does however address the possible conflict between a request for 
surrender or assistance and requested State's obligations under international 
law when this would put the requested State in the position of having to violate 
its obligations under international law with regard to immunities. It does so by 
purporting that the relevant provision on cooperation with respect to waiver of 
226 immunity and consent to surrender does not , in any way, undermine the 
effect of ICC Article 27 on the irrelevance of official capacity. Possibly, the 
customary law status of Article 27 leads to the conclusion that there are no 
immunities under international law for acts within the jurisdiction of the 
CoUrt227. Such interpretation, based on ICC Article 98 (1), does not affect the 
Court's initial jurisdiction since it only plays a role at the stage of the request 
of surrender and does not affect the possibility that other States Parties, not 
under an international obligation to refrain from surrender, will be able to 
surrender when they obtain jurisdiction over the individual concerned 228 . 
Moreover, an ICC State Party that has been requested to surrender a person 
must notify the Court where it also receives a request from any other State for 
the extradition of the same person for the same alleged conduct which forms 
the basis of the crime for which the Court seeks the person's surrender. If the 
ICC subsequently finds the case to be inadmissible, but the State Party then 
decides not to extradite the person to the requesting State, the requested Party 
must notify directly the ICC Prosecutor of this decision. 229 The Statute 
225 ibid 
226 ICC Article 98 (1) 
227 See for example section 70 of the Canadian Crimes Act (Bill C- 19) and the 1985 Canadian 
State Immunity Act. 
228 See The International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy 
(ICCLR), International Criminal Court - Manual for the Ratification and Implementation of 
the Rome Statute, March 2003, (Seconded. ), p. 80. 
229 See Article 90 (8) and Rule 186. 
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however does not add any other clarifications where the arrested person is 
already being investigated by the requested State for the same offence so the 
State may postpone execution of the request in most circumstanceS230. 
The Court may also request the temporary transfer of a person in custody of a 
State Party in order for him/her to assist with an ICC investigation or 
prosecution 23 1. The person must consent to such a transfer and the requested 
State needs to agree, subject to conditions it may wish to impose. In such a 
situation, the State should make the necessary arrangements but the ICC 
Registrar will be responsible for the "proper conduct of the transfer, including 
, 232 the supervision of the person while in the custody of the Court' 
The ICC Statute sets out the arrangements for transferring persons from the 
State of enforcement upon completion of their sentences but it fails to clarify 
what should happen to a person who is released from custody of the Court 
other than on completion of a sentence 233 . This may occur after a successful 
admissibility challenge by the accused, or by a government 234 . Lastly, any 
prosecutorial misconduct affecting surrender proceedings must be taken into 
account in the sentencing judgment. ICC Article 78 (1) allows for such a 
determination, aside from the obligation to deduct time, if any, previously 
spent in detention pursuant to an ICC order. The drafting history of this Article 
reveals that in avoiding the controversial question of aggravating and 
mitigating factors the final text abstains from implementing an exhaustive list 
of such factors. The final text only addresses the gravity of the crime and the 
individual circumstances of the convicted person 235 and omits the prohibition 
of a more severe punishment without deducting the previous conviction 
already served. This is a principle of deduction, frequently encountered in 
23('The International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (ICCLR), 
"The International Criminal Court. Rules of Procedure and Evidence - Implementation 
Considerations" March 2003, p. 23, para. 2.4 (g). 
231 Article 93 (7). 
232 Rule 192 (2). 
233 Article 107. 
234 See Article 19. 
235 Jennings M., "Commentary on Article 79" in Triffterer 0. (Ed. ), "Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court" 1999, 
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domestic legislation, especially in circumstances of prior detention in the 
requested State. 
As already stated, an accused person has a right to a second level of 
jurisdiction. The Human Rights Commission has held that whereas this right 
does not include a right for an appeal court to re-conduct the trial in toto, it 
concerns the right to review by a higher court of the proper conduct of the 
proceedings of the first instance trial, including the application of the rules that 
lead to the finding of guilt. Contrary to the proposition that an appeal should 
not permit genuine review of the conviction and sentence and that an appeal is 
intended only to standardize the interpretation of the law 236 , the object of the 
review is to verify that the decision at first instance is not manifestly arbitrary 
and that it does not constitute a denial of justice 237 . Such a review should also 
include an examination of facts, the law and the judgement 238 . The 
Commission held that limited review by a higher tribunal does not meet the 
requirements of ICCPR Article 14 (5). 
2.6 Mala captus, bene detentus and the right to challenge the legality 
of arrests 
This maxim 239 is based on a doctrine that presupposes the benefits of trying 
persons who have been abducted or lured in order to face criminal proceedings 
and have committed a crime that outweighs the injury caused by non- 
adherence to procedural laws. In the context of international crimes, it has 
been contended that it may not be 'arbitrary' to capture a person whose 
236 See e. g. Alba Cabriada v Spain, decision 01 November 2004, Comm. No. I 10 1/2002; 
Cesario Gomez Vasquez v Spain, Case No. 701/1996, View of 20 July 2000 
237 For instance, in Riepan v Austria, 35115/97 [2000], ECHR 573 p. 175the Court said: "Given 
the possible detrimental effects that a lack ofpublic hearing before the trial court have on 
fairness of the proceedings, the absence ofpublicity could not in any event be remedied by 
anything other than a complete re-hearing before the appellate court". 238 Antonio Martinez Fernandez v Spain, Views of 29 March 2005, Comm. No. 1104/2002. 
239Also known as the 'Eichmann Principle', see Attorney General v Eichmann [1961] 36 ILR 
5 68-71 (DC), (1962) 305-306; in the United States also called Ker-Frisbie-Machain doctrine. 
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activities form part of an armed attack for example, and are therefore deemed 
as violations of the laws of the United Nations 240 . Moreover, the praxis of the 
ICTY and ICTR reveals that if capture and transfer are conducted as part of a 
Security Council authorised operation in preventing or ending, for example, 
acts of aggression, then the illegal arrest appears to be justified. The 
compatibility of forcible abductions with both national and international laws 
has been examined extensively in domestic courts as well as in the European 
Court of Human Rights. Whereas in most legal systems in personam 
jurisdiction is sufficient to proceed with a case 241 , as 
far as international law is 
concerned,, every person must enjoy the fundamental right to habeas corpus 
and have the opportunity, before trial proceedings commence, to challenge the 
legality of his arrest and/or detention. However, remedies for infringements of 
this right vary. While at a domestic level such rendition may be properly 
remedied by the release of the person in question, amounting effectively to a 
defence against surrender, in cases of egregious international crimes, the 
illegal arrest may be a mere mitigating sentencing factor 242 . Here, I will 
be 
assessing both national and international jurisprudence on the matter as 
suspects and accused persons may fall, under complementarity, into either of 
these legal regimes. 
Generally, the courts of prosecuting states should either proprio motu or at the 
request of an accused raise the illegal nature of the apprehension and refuse to 
hear the case. New Zealand was the first country within the Commonwealth 
legal system that distanced itself from the mala captus, bene detentus 
approach 243 . In the Zimbabwean case of Beahan 
it was affirmed that: 
"[I]t is essential that, in order to promote confidence in and respect for the 
administration ofJustice andpreserve the judicial process from contamination, 
a court should decline to compel an accused person to undergo trial in 
240 Paust J. J., "Universality and the Responsibility to Enforce International Criminal Law: No. 
US. Sanctuaryfor Alleged Nazi War Criminals" II Houston Journal of International Law, 
pp. 337-340 (1989) 
241 See e. g. United States v Yunis (No-3) (1991) 924 F 2d 1086. 
242 See e. g. ICC Statute Art. 69 (7) (b) on illegally obtained evidence. 
243 See Rv Hartley [1978] 2 NZLR 199 followed then in Levinge v Director of Custodial 
Services [1987] 9 N. S. W. L. R. 546. 
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circumstances where his appearance before it has been facilitated by an act of 
abduction undertaken by the prosecuting State ... For abduction is illegal under 
international law ... A contrary view ivould amount to a declaration that the 
fies the means thereby encouraging States to become law end fusti t -breakersin 
244 
order to secure the conviction ofprivate individuals" 
Several human rights bodies have highlighted how a state-organised abduction 
of an individual for the purpose of trial may indeed constitute a violation of his 
fundamental rights 245 . For 
instance, although the ECHR had been criticised for 
its avoidance in conducting independent examinations of the evidence and the 
tendency to succumb to the position of the relevant national government 246 5 
it 
had all the same recognised that "a government's discharge of [its] 
responsibilities is essentially a delicate problem of appreciating complex 
factors and balancing conflicting considerations of the public interest" and 
expressed respect for the space that the government needs to make these 
247 difficult policy determinations . In 
deciding how wide a margin to afford to a 
government, the ECHR tends to look at the degree of consensus among the 
national laws of signatory states with respect to the challenged PoliCY248. In a 
recent judgment in the Ocalan Case 249 1 the European Court of Human Rights 
pointed out that it is "well aware of the immense difficulties faced by States in 
modern times in protecting their communities from terrorist violence"250 . It 
held nevertheless that even in these circumstances the rights of suspects and 
accused persons must be respected as such obligations impose an absolute 
prohibition on states to use coercive measures such as torture, inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim's conduct 251 . 
244 Chief Justice Gubbay in State v Beahan [1992] (1) SACR 307 (A), at 317 
245 See e. g. Castillo Garcia v Ecuador, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/319/1988 (1991); Celibert, de 
Casariego, U. N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981). 
246 Gross 0., "Once More Unto the Breach: The Systematic Failure of Applying the European 
Convention on Human Rights Entrenched Emergencies", 23 Yale Journal of International 
Law, 1998, pp. 437-497. 
247 Lawless v Ireland, I ECHR (Ser. B) at 408 (1960-196 1) 
248 Helfer L. and Slaughter A., "Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication", 
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 107, No. 2,1997, pp. 316-317. 
249 Ocalan v Turkey, Application no. 46221/99, Judgment of 12 May 2005. 
250 Ocalan v Turkey, Application no. 46221/99, Judgment of 12 May 2005, at 179. 
251 See e. g. Almeida de Quinteros v Uruguay, HRC Comm, No. R24/107 (Decision of 21 July 
1983); Celiberti de Casariego v Uruguay, Comm. No. ] 3/56 (Decision of 29 July 198 1) and 
Canon Garcia v Ecuador, Comm. No. 319/1988. 
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Importantly, the European Convention makes no provision for exceptions and 
no derogation from it is permissible 
252 
even in time of war or other national 
251 
emergency . 
International human rights law forms part of the applicable law 
of the ICC as its Articles 21 (1) (b) and (3) unequivocally impose an obligation 
to harmonise the Statute's law "vvith internationally recognised human rights". 
From this perspective, the ICC judiciary carries the responsibility of upholding 
the international rule of law 254 . 
Since the Statute is silent on ICC obligations to enquire into the custodial 
State's legality of arrest and detention, I will here look at some of the case law 
from the ICTY/ICTR and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 
order to try and determine what approach the ICC is likely to adopt in the 
future. 
In recent years, there have been a number of irregular arrests legitimised by 
'implicit justificati I on 255 . 
They include the aim of safeguarding the functioning 
and effectiveness of the judiciary in which case detention may be justified if 
there are grounds to believe that the suspect indeed attempted to suppress 
evidence, either by destroying evidentiary material or by influencing witnesses 
or where it is believed that the alleged offender is likely to commit further 
criminal actS256 . 
Another instance where procedurally irregular detention is 
tolerated is in ending atrocities. This concept has traditionally been regarded 
consistent with the mala captus bene detentus rule. Normally, national courts 
tend to follow this doctrine but recently there have been instances in which 
several jurisdictions have questioned the validity of this norm and occasionally 
ruled that trying an offender that was unlawfully arrested, could amount to 
abuse of court proceSS257. However, safeguards such as those contained in 
ECHR Art. 5 (4) are not absolute, and thus their applicability is not uniform. 
The enforcement of this provision depends in fact largely on the context of the 
252 Not even under Art. 15 of the Convention. 
253 See e. g. Chahal v the United Kingdom, Judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports 1999-V, 
p. 1855, at 79. 254 CC Statute Art. 21 (1) (b) and (c). 
255 Safferling C. J. M., "Towards an International Criminal Procedure" (2003), p. 137. 256 ibid 
257 See e. g. Mullen [ 1999] 2 Cr App R 143. 
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particular case and, where appropriate, also on the terms of the relevant statute 
under which the power of detention is exercised 258 . In the 
Cevizovic Case 259 9 
the European Court of Human Rights held that the German government had 
been in violation of ECHR Article 6 (1) by keeping a defendant in detention 
and not suspending an arrest warrant on the basis that the applicant remained 
under a strong suspicion of having committed the crimes he was accused of 
and on the grounds that, considering the serious nature of those offences, the 
applicant would be very likely to abscond if released. Whilst the European 
Court accepted that there was indeed reasonable suspicion that the accused 
committed the offence of a very serious nature, it observed that the possibility 
of a severe sentence alone is not sufficient, after a certain lapse of time, to 
260 justify detention based on a danger of flight Concluding that there have 
been relevant and sufficient grounds for the continued detention of the 
accused, his rights had to be protected. The Court found that there has been a 
violation of Article 5 (3) of the European Convention, namely that the accused 
has not been brought promptly before a judge and it awarded damages. 
As an alternative to seeking a warrant of arrest, the ICC Prosecutor "may 
submit an application requesting that the Pre-Trial Chamber issue a summons 
for the person to appear"261 . 
However, successful granting of such application 
is subject to the existence of reasonable grounds to believe that the person has 
committed the crimes alleged and that a summons is sufficient to ensure the 
person's appearance. Furthermore, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall issue the 
summons ý(. with or without conditions restricting liberty (other than detention) 
ifprovided by national law, for the person to appear"262 . The ICC 
Statute does 
not however go as far as the Sierra Leone Special Court Statute which 
provides that "where a person against whom a warrant of arrest is 
issued ... escapes or is unlawfully at 
large, he may be arrested without warrant 
by an arresting officer and, if so arrested, shall be delivered into the custody of 
258 See e. g. in the ICTY the Dokmanovic Case (IT-95-13a), Talic (IT-99-36/1) and in the 
ICTR the Nzirorera Case (ICTR-98-44- 1). 
259 Cevizovic v Germany, App. No. 49746/99, Judgment of 29 July 2004 
260 The Court looked at Wemhoff v Germany, Judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A, No. 7, 
para. 14; Bv Austria, Judgment of 28 March 1990, Series A, No. 175, p. 16, para. 44. 261 ICC Statute Art. 58 (7). 
262 ibid 
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the Special Court -)3263 . This seems to suggest that an accused person does not 
have the right to domestic remedies before appearing before the Special Court. 
The ICC Statute acknowledges a summons to be less restrictive than a warrant 
of arrest as it does not necessarily constrain the liberty of the person sought 
264 
and does not entitle detention . Consequently, substantive deficiencies in the 
variety of arrest warrants can reflect on the legality of a subsequent surrender 
order and actual transfer to the ICC265 . The ECHR explained in the De Cubber 
Case that the possibility certainly exists that a higher court or the highest court 
might, in some circumstances, make reparation for an initial violation of one of 
the Convention's provisions: this is precisely the reason for the existence of 
the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies (namely Art. 6 (1) - right to a fair 
trial)266. 
While under the ICC Statute national authorities are forbidden from inquiring 
whether the warrant was properly served by the Pre-Trial Chamber and direct 
recourse to the Court seems, prima facie, the only remedy available to 
challenge any deficiency in an arrest warrant, domestic courts will 
nevertheless have to observe ECHR Art. 5 (4). In particular, they must observe 
the principle that it is not merely the right of judicial review of pre-trial 
detention that is guaranteed under the Convention, but a full, fair and effective 
judicial review of pre-trial detention and of the 'equality of arms' doctrine. 
The German Code of Criminal Procedure for example, provides that a detained 
suspect must appear before the judge without delay for a hearing during which 
he or she can challenge the basis of the detention 267 . The suspect must also 
be 
informed of the right to appeal a decision of his or her confinement. The 
suspect may challenge the detention at any time at a full judicial hearing 268 . 
The ICC Statute does not explicitly stipulate that the accused should be 
informed of his right to appeal269 . 
The European Court of Human Rights 
263 Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Vol. CXXX, No. 11,07 March 2002, The Special 
Court Agreement, 2002, Ratification Act, 2002, Sec. 28. 
264 CC Statute Art. 58 (7). 
265 Op cit, Schlunck, note 201, p. 768. 
266 De Cubber v Belgium ECHR, 26 October 1984,8/1983/64/1999 
267 2001 German Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 115. 268 Ibid., Art. I 18a. 
269 See ICC Art. 67 (Rights of the Accused). 
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affirms that where state authorities are involved in a luring, the rights of the 
individual under the Convention are violated 270 . The European Court interprets 
Article 5 (2) of the European Convention as meaning that every person 
arrested should be told the essential legal and factual grounds for his arrest so 
as to be able,, as he sees fit, to apply to a court to challenge its lawfulness. This 
implies that the accused must be informed under which law he was arrested 
and the reasons for being held. This type of safeguard is very important in 
cases of abduction and illegal detention as these "necessarily involve 
infringements of human rights, as well as the infringement of territorial 
sovereignty, 271 . The 
issue of sovereignty infringement will usually arise only 
when the injured State protests in some way against the fact that the accused 
was taken out of its territory without the national authorities being involved in 
272 
the cross-border transfer of the accused . 
Whereas the European Convention 
on Human Rights contains no provisions concerning the circumstances under 
which extradition may be granted or the procedure to be followed before 
extradition is granted, it implies nonetheless that those procedures should be a 
result of cooperation between States. This cooperation should provide the legal 
basis for the order for arrest,, through an arrest warrant issued by the authorities 
of the accused's State of origin 273 . 
This is significant as an arrest warrant 
made by the authorities of one State on the territory of another State, without 
the consent of the latter, affects the accused's right to security (ECHR Art. 5 
(1))274 
. 
Again, the proper remedy for the infringement of this right would have 
to be of judicial nature, be it in the requesting or requested State, or before the 
ICC. Conventionally, the powers of national courts have not encompassed the 
right to consider the issue of fair trial in the requesting state or question the 
legality of an arrest in that state. However, it was recently held in Ex parte 
270 Stocke v Germany, Judgement of 19 March 1991. 
27 1 Borelli S., "Terrorism and Human Rights: Treatment of Terrorist Suspects and Limits on 
International Cooperation" (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 4, p. 803. 
272 See e. g. Kirgis F. L., "Alleged CIA Kidnapping of Muslim Cleric in Italy" ASIL Insight, 07 
July 2005; also Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, "Decision on Defence 
Motion Challenging the Exercise ofJurisdiction by the Tribunal", 09 October 2002, para. 95 
273 The Court stated that if such procedure is followed "even an atypical extradition cannot as 
such be regarded as being contrary to the Convention" in Ocalan v Turkey, App. No. 
46221/99, Judgment of 12 May 2005, para. 89. 
274 Ibid, para. 85; see also Stocke v Germany, 12 October 1989, Series A No. 199, Opinion of 
the Commission, p. 24, para. 167. 
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Rachid Ramda 275 that a court may refuse extradition if satisfied that evidence 
supporting the request may have been obtained by oppression and that the 
requesting state may indeed refuse to hear argument in the matter 276 . Similarly, 
in Re Saifi277 the Court decided that it could refuse a request for extradition if 
satisfied that the evidence on which the request for extradition was based had 
been obtained in bad faith. However, making assessments of foreign justice 
systems may create political difficulties and may also be, as for example, in 
the case of the European arrest warrant, contrary to the principle of mutual 
recognition and reciprocity278. Under the ICC Statute, States are not able to 
question and examine the basis and content of arrest warrants. 
The ICC Statute does not specify which rights of the accused should be 
respected, nor does it specify what would happen if the competent national 
judicial authority determines that there has been a violation of Article 59 (2) 
(b) and (c), that a person arrested shall be brought promptly before the 
competent judicial authority in the custodial State which shall determine, in 
accordance with the law of that State, that the person has been arrested under 
proper process and that the person's rights have been respected. In particular, 
nothing in the Statute allows a State to refuse surrender to the ICC on the 
grounds that the person has not been properly arrested or his rights have not 
been respected. Hence, the United Kingdom government has chosen to 
interpret the Statute as meaning that it will be for the ICC to determine the 
consequence of any violations. This is innovative, although it remains to be 
seen how it will be applied in practice, particularly since the ICTR has 
consistently held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the legal circumstances 
attending the arrest of a suspect in so far as the arrest had been made pursuant 
275 Rv Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Rachid Ramda [2002] EWHC 
1278 
276 See e. g. ICTR Rule 66 entitled "Evidence obtained by means contrary to internationally 
protected rights" provides that "any evidence obtained directly or indirectly by means which 
constitute a serious violation of internationally protected human rights shall not be 
admissible". 277 [2001] 4 All ER 168. 
27' The Tampere Council Conclusions in 1999 endorsed the principle of mutual recognition as 
"the cornestone ofjudicial cooperation" as "enhanced mutual recognition ofjudicial decisions 
and the necessary approximation of legislation wouldfacilitate cooperation between 
authorities and thejudicial protection of human rights". 
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to the laws of the arresting state 279 . 
The United Kingdom's interpretation stems 
from the ICC Statute which emphasises that "It shall not be open to the 
competent authority of the custodial State to consider whether the warrant of 
arrest was properly issued in accordance with article 58, paragraph I (a) and 
(ý)-280, States will be unable to contest the reasonable grounds on which it is 
believed a crime has been committed, nor will they be able to question the 
necessity of an arrest 281 . Nevertheless, the International Criminal Court Act 
2001 in the United Kingdom provides that a competent court may of its own 
motion, and on the application of the person arrested, determine whether the 
person was lawfully arrested in pursuance of a warrant and whether his rights 
have been respected 282 . However, any 
determination to this effect remains 
inconsequential as far as the rights of the accused are concerned; a competent 
court may determine whether or nor a person has been lawfully arrested or 
whether or not that person's rights have been respected but the court is only 
obliged to make a declaration and may not grant any other relief283 . In the 
United Kingdom a court may also adjourn proceedings and extend the 
detention period pending the outcome of any challenge before the ICC as to 
the admissibility of a case or the jurisdiction of the Court 284 . The 
2001 Act 
leaves in this case the issue of unlawful detention unresolved as it does not 
specify the procedural guarantees and remedies if a case is found inadmissible 
before the ICC and where national authorities decide not to prosecute. Any 
court that does examine an appeal against detention must provide guarantees 
of a judicial procedure 285 . For example, Article 
5 (4) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights stipulates: "Everyone who is deprived of his 
"9 See Prosecutor v Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44- 1,10 December 1999, para. 4.3. I.; 
Prosecutor v Ngirumpatse, Case No. ICTR-97-44-1, para56; Prosecutor v Kalelijell, Case No. 
ICTR-98-44-1, (08 May 2000), paras. 34-35. Also in Brdjanin and M. Talic, IT-99-36-PT, the 
ICTY held that no order for detention of an accused is required following his lawful arrest and 
transfer to the seat of the Tribunal for that detention to be lawful. The detention remains 
lawful, with or without a formal order of detention. 
280 ICC Art. 59 (4). 
281 See e. g. U. K. 2002 International Criminal Court, Art. 5 (5)(b) which provides that "In 
deciding whether to make a delivery order the court is not concerned to enquire ... whether 
there is evidence tojustify his trialfor the offence he is alleged to have committed'. 212 Ibid., Art. 5 (6) (a) and (b). 
283 Ibid, Arts. 5 (7), (8) and (9). 
284 Ibid Art. 5 (4). 
285 For internationally recognised right to appeal see e. g. ICCPR Art. 14 (5); Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights Art. 10; American Convention on Human Rights Art. 8 (2) (h); 
African Charter on Human and People's Rights Act. 7(l). 
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liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the 
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release 
ordered if the detention is not lawful". Moreover, proceedings in that case 
should be according to the ECHR and many constitutional provisionS286 
287 
adversarial in nature 
The ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide that suspects may have 
their arrest warrant re-examined on their request by a court of law. 
Importantly, the competent court, as illustrated above is the ICC and not a 
national court 288 . 
This is problematic as State authorities may arrest persons 
and conduct seizures without the need of a formal request from the ICC and as 
in the case of Germany's relevant legislation, under certain circumstances even 
citizens, and not merely official authorities, are empowered by law to 
289 provisionally arrest suspected perpetrators of core crimes 
In relation to this principle and the abuse of process doctrine, the ICTY stated 
that there exists a close relationship between the obligation of the Tribunal to 
respect the human rights of the accused and the obligation to ensure due 
process of law that encompasses more than merely the duty to ensure a fair 
trial for the accused. It also includes questions such as how the parties have 
been conducting themselves in the context of a particular case and how the 
parties have been brought into the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In a situation 
where an accused is very seriously mistreated, perhaps even subjected to 
inhurnan,, cruel or degrading treatment or torture before being handed over to 
the International Tribunal, this may constitute a legal impediment to the 
exercise of jurisdiction over such an accused. In the case of Barayagwiza the 
ICTR stated that cumulative breaches of the accused's rights could cause 
irreparable damage to the integrity of the judicial process. It further found that 
286 See e. g. 1988 Constitution of the Republic of Brazil, Art. 5 (LV) which provides "litigants 
in court or administrative proceedings and defendants in general are assured of the use of the 
adversary system and offull defence, with the means and remedies inherent thereto". 
287 For ECHR jurisprudence on the matter see e. g. Imbrioscia v Switzerland [ 19931 IIHRL 100 
Judgment of 24 November 1993, Series A no. 275, p. 13, at 36; Schops v Germany, No. 
25116/94,13 February 2001, para. 44. See also Chapter 2. 
288 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 117 (3). 
289 Sec. 13 (1) of the 2001 Draft Rome Statute Implementation Act, in connection with Sec. 127 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
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the dismissal of charges and release of the accused are the only possible 
remedy and such a disposition should serve as a deterrent in committing 
serious violations in the future 290 . This decision was later reversed on the 
grounds that new facts have emerged 291 . The Tribunal observed that "in 
national jurisdictions, thefacilityfor review exists in differentforms, either 
specifically as a right to review a decision of a court, or by virtue of an 
alternative route which achieves the same result"292 . The ICC Statute and 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence merely provide that the Court shall 
determine whether a national authority has violated ICC Article 59 (2) (b) and 
(c) but as already stated, nothing in the Statute prevents that authority from 
surrendering a person to the Court. Moreover, the ICC Statute does not specify 
what remedies,, if any, are available to an accused. 
In the ICTY Nikolic Case, the accused argued that he had been arrested and 
detained by SFOR and transferred to the Tribunal. He argued that this involved 
kidnapping. The degree of illegality and the extent of violations of 
fundamental human rights were so degrading that the dangers of appearing to 
condone by a judicial body set up with, inter alia, objectives- of preserving 
human rights, can have no proper outcome but to make it plain that jurisdiction 
will not be entertained in such circumstances. The critical issue was therefore 
what effect any illegal act committed during arrest prior to handing over of the 
accused to the Tribunal could have on the proceedings. The ECHR reaffirmed 
recently that ill treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall 
within the scope of the Convention's Article 3. The assessment of this 
'minimum' depends on all the circumstances of the case such as the duration 
of the treatment, both its physical and/or mental effects and in some cases, the 
293 
sex, age and state of health of the victim . In addition, the public nature of 
the treatment or the mere fact that the victim is humiliated in his/her own eyes 
290 Barayagwiza, Jean Bosco v Prosecutor, Case No: ICTR-97-19-AR 72, Appeals Chamber 
(Decision) (03 November 1999) para. 105 
29 1 Barayagwiza, Jean Bosco v Prosecutor, Case No: ICTR-97-19-AR 72 "Decision: 
Prosecutor's Request for Review or Reconsideration", Appeals Chamber (31 March 2000), 
para. 4 1. 
292 Ibid para. 39, 
293 Ocalan v Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, Judgment of 12 May 2005, para. 180. On inhumane 
treatment see e. g. Kundla v Poland, No. 30210/96, s. 92, ECHR 2000-XI. 
145 
may be a relevant consideration 294 . In the Nikolic Case, the Defence tried to 
rely on the principle upheld by various national jurisdictions, that the unlawful 
rendition of a defendant should lead to the conclusion that international law 
has to some degree been breached and that the violation, be it one of human 
rights or state sovereignty, needs to be remedied above all considerations. The 
ICTY Trial Chamber reviewed the case law of various national jurisdictions 
relating to the question of forced cross-border abductions and noted that it is 
far from uniform 295 . Importantly, the Chamber attached importance to the fact 
that all case law is based on various forms of cross-border abductions which 
occur between States (on the horizontal level) and that therefore the 
interpretation of national case law must be "translated" in order to apply to the 
particular context in which the ICTY operates (on the vertical level). The 
ICTY Trial Chamber emphasised the difference between the legal context in 
which national case law has been developed and again the context in which the 
Tribunal operates. In deciding in the Nikolic Case that there was no breach of 
state sovereignty296 . the Tribunal concluded even if there was a violation, the 
accused should first have been returned to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
whereupon the State would have been immediately under an obligation to 
surrender the accused to the Tribunal297 . This is because the ICTY was 
established under Security Council mandate; it was nevertheless reiterated by 
an ICTY Judge that even Article 29 should be construed in a manner which 
gives effect, rather than nullifies, the customary right to challenge the legality 
of one's arrest; such an approach is consistent with the general rule of 
interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Yet, 
the ICTY adopted a pragmatic approach by distinguishing between luring and 
forcible abduction, reckoning that the former was acceptable while the latter 
294 See e. g. Tyrer v the United Kingdom, Judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A, no. 26, p. 16, at 
32. 
295 See e. g. Re Argoud, Cour de Cassation, 04 June 1964,45 ILR JDI 92 (1965), p. 98 where it 
was held illegal rendition was no impediment to trial; followed in a German case 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision of 17 July 1985-2 BvR 1190/84, in EUGRZ 1986, at 18- 
2 1. See also Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, "Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise ofJurisdiction by the Tribunal", 09 October 2002, paras74 and 94. 
296 Ibid. The Trial-Chamber observed at para. 114 that the "assumedfacts, although they do 
raise some concerns, do not at all show that the treatment of the Accused by the unknown 
individuals was of an egregious nature". The Trial Chamber reasoned that 'some violence' did 
not suffice to raise concerns of abuse of process, para. 113. 297 ICTY Statute Art. 29. 
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might constitute grounds for dismissal 298 . 
Such a distinction is largely regarded 
as resting on an artificial distinction between luring and abduction 299 ; even 
where the manner of apprehension violates international law, courts may apply 
the 'Eichmann. Principle' 300 , while at the same time recognising that the mala 
captus bene detentus principle is generally inconsistent with the modern law of 
human rightS301 . The ICTR had too consistently ruled that the manner 
in which 
a sovereign State exercises its powers is beyond its authority. In comparison, 
the ICC will only look into national proceedings where there are concerns 
regarding a State's unwillingness or inability to conduct proceedings but it is 
unlikely that it will provide an appeal forum where accused persons can 
challenge the legality of their arrest and decisions of first instance courts. It is 
argued that the parties "for the simple reason that errors, mistakes and 
deficiencies of the investigations may be restored in the appeal procedure , 302 
do not take first instance proceedings seriously. If the ICC assesses that first 
instance proceedings are inadequate, it may ask for a case to be deferred to it. 
If this occurs, the jurisdiction of the ICC prevails which means that an accused 
will be denied of the right to domestic remedies, such as the right to judicial 
review. 
The enforcement of arrest warrants and surrender orders within the ICC 
system relies on the duty imposed on States Parties but no explicit provision is 
endorsed as regards interference by NATO and UN led forces 303 . In contrast to 
the ICTY and ICTR 304 , the 
ICC is not a supranational organization and non- 
compliance with its orders does not carry Security Council sanctions. 
However, the validity of the potential relationship between the ICC and a 
298 Prosecutor v Slavko Dokmanovic, IT-95-13a; for a commentary see Scharf M. P., "The 
Prosecutor v S. Dokmanovic: Irregular rendition and the ICTY", Leiden Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 11, No. 2,1998, p. 369. 
299 Ibid 
300 Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v A. Eichmann (1961) 36 ILR 5. 
30 ' Loc cit, note 298. 
302 De Roos T. A., "Appeal in Dutch criminal procedure in an international and comparative 
perspective", The International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law, 17'h International 
Conference, The Hague, Netherlands, August 24-28,2003, p. 5, available at 
http: //www. isrcl. org/Conference Papers/deRooUdf 303 Op cit, Knoops , note 
62, p. 374. 
304 See e. g. Gaeta P., "Is NATO Authorised or Obliged to Arrest Persons Indicted by the 
ICTY? " 9 European Journal of International Law 1998, pp. 174-18 1; also Jones J. R. W. D., 
"The Implications of the Peace Agreementfor the International Criminal Tribunalfor the 
former Yugoslavia" 7 European Journal of International Law 1996, pp, 226-244. 
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military force like SFOR is crucial. A determination should be made as to the 
effects of this type of relationship developing into one of agency. It would be 
useful to decide what will be the responsibility of the ICC in taking over an 
accused from peacekeeping forces for example; who will the illegal conduct be 
attributed to and whether such conduct may form the basis of jurisdiction by 
the Court under the mala captus bene detentus maxim. It is not difficult to 
imagine the Security Council establishing a peacekeeping force with respect to 
a situation referred to it by the ICC. Sudan, a party to the ICC is a prime 
examp e 305 . The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, adopted a 
resolution establishing the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 306 
consisting of up to 10.000 military personnel and 715 civilian police and 
mandated with supporting the implementation of the Sudan North-South Peace 
Agreement. In addition, the United States, non-party to the ICC, adopted 
recently the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act 2005 307 , which stipulates 
that,, notwithstanding the American Servicemembers' Protection Act 2002, the 
United States should render assistance to the efforts of the ICC to bring to 
justice persons accused of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity in 
Darfur 308 . It must 
be concluded that the cumulative effect of the Security 
Council's resolutions modifies the effect of the Rome Statute (namely the 
concept of complementarity), especially in light of the fact that Sudan has 
expressed its willingness to investigate and prosecute crimes in the Darfur 
region. Sudan has in fact issued a resolution setting up a national committee 
for investigation. Accordingly, the Sudanese National Assembly urged prompt 
action and implementation of recommendations of national investigations 309 . 
305 U. N. Security Council referred the situation in Sudan to the ICC through Resolution 1593 
(2005). 
306 Security Council Resolution 1590 (2005), 24 March 2005,5151s'meeting, S/RES/1590. 
307 2005 Darfur Peace and Accountability Act (29 June 2005) HR 3127. 
308 Ibid. Sec. 4(6). This assistance is subject to assurances by the Security Council or the ICC 
that no current or former United States official or employee (including any contractors), 
member of the United States Armed Forces, or United States national will be subject to 
prosecution by the ICC in connection with those efforts. 
309 Sudanese National Assembly, Emergency Session, Resolution of the National Assembly on 
Security Council Resolutions Nos. 1590,1591,1593 regarding situations in Darfur, para. 1(2), 
17 April 2005. The Sudanese government felt that "the United Nations, deliberately 
collaborating with the United States, persisted in unfairness and exaggerated in unjust and 
prejudiced attitudes its unfair selective... duplicity. This became evident in resolutions 1591 
and 1593 in both of which it gave no consideration whatsoever to law, principles of 
international legitimacy, the role of international organisations and the rights of the people of 
the Sudan... This impedes the efforts of the state in keeping security". 
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Absent any explicit provisions and legal mandates, the legal position of the 
said forces with respect to their enforcement role within the confinements of 
the ICC Statute, remains entangled in the same dichotomy as that faced by the 
310 ICTY and ICTR 
The ICC has yet to determine how much of the ICTY jurisprudence it will 
draw upon regarding these issues since the Tribunal, not having found any of 
the arrests illegal, decided it would not consider the issue as to whether it 
would still have jurisdiction over an accused if his/her arrest had violated 
fundamental human rights. What the ICTY emphasised recently is that 
domestic procedures relating to the surrender and transfer of a person from a 
State in respect to whom a request for arrest and transfer has been made are 
not to be used as a basis for not complying with the request 311 . 
Notwithstanding the wel I -established doctrine of international law that states 
are under a duty to bring national law in conformity with obligations under 
international law 312 
ý ICC Article 88 provides that States "shall" ensure that 
there are domestic procedures available for the execution of ICC surrender 
requests. The choice of this term elucidates a balancing act in light of the 
controversy surrounding the very topical debate on horizontal and vertical 
approach in international penal cooperation. 
In the Talic Case 313 the accused sought to enforce a right which, it was argued, 
arose out of Article 5(4) of the ECHR, which allows a detainee to challenge 
the lawfulness of his detention. Talic relied on a statement of the European 
Court of Human Rights in Brogan v United Kingdom [1988]314 according to 
which , in such proceedings and pursuant to Article 5(4), the court should 
"0 See e. g. Neha Jain, "A Separate Lawfor Peacekeepers: The Clash between the Security 
Council and the International Criminal Court" European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, 
No. 2,2005; see also Simic et al. Case No. IT-95-9-PT, "Decision on Motionfor Judicial 
Assistance to beprovided by SFOR and others" (18 October 2000) paras. 9 and 46-47. See also 
International Law Commission, Art. II of Draft Articles of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts 1998 on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, A/53/10. 
31 1 Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, Trial Chamber on Preliminary 
Motions, 08 November 2001, para. 45. 
312 See e. g. PCH Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Advisory Opinion [ 1925], PCIJ, 
Series B, No. 10,21 February 1925, at p. 17. 
313 Prosecutor v Talic, Case N. IT-99-36-PT 
314 Brogan and Others v The United Kingdom [ 1988], (11209/84) 11 EHRR 117, Judgment of 
29 November 1998. 
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examine not only the compliance with procedural requirements but also the 
reasonableness of the suspicion grounding the arrest 315 . Importantly, in the 
Brogan case, the Court emphasised that the purpose of depravation of liberty 
must be considered independently of its achievement. This conclusion 
prompted a notice of derogation under Article 15 ECHR by the U. K. 
government. The ICTY Pre Trial Chamber rejected this argument in the Talic 
case by pointing out that the ECHR had stated that the scope of the review is 
not uniform, that it depends on the context of the particular case and, where 
appropriate, also on the terms of the relevant statute under which the power of 
detention is exercised. The ECHR held lately that on the question of whether 
detention is 'lawful', including whether it complies with a 'procedure 
prescribed by law', the obligation is on national law to conform to substantive 
16 
and procedural rules thereoe . In the United 
Kingdom for example, the 
Human Rights Act 1998 had been adopted "to givejurther effect to rights and 
5ý fireedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights . 
Under the Convention there is an implicit three-tiered hierarchy of rights 
which ultimately affect the strength of a given right, and the degree to which 
its guarantee will be upheld. 317 Absent from the new Act is the derogation 
clause under Article 15 of the Convention and present are sections 14 and 15 
which allow for designated derogations and reservations to be placed on any 
right of freedom. Not only are all rights now derogable, but the set of reasons 
315 Ibid at para 65: "According to the Court's established case-law the notion of 'lawfulness' 
under paragraph 5 (4) has the same meaning as in paragraph I (art. 5 (1)), - and whether an 
'arrest'or 'detention'can be regarded as 'lawful'has to be determined in the light not only of 
the domestic law, but also of the text of the Convention, the general principles embodied 
therein and the aim of the restrictions permitted by article 5 para. P. Article 5 (1) says that no 
one shall be deprived of their liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a 
competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for non-compliance 
with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed 
by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him 
before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence 
or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing 
after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of 
educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the 
competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the 
spreading of infectious disease, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or 
vagrants; (0 the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his affecting an unauthorised 
entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to 
deportation or extradition. 
316 Ocalan v Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, Judgment of 12 May 2005, at 83. 
317 Black-Branch J. L., "The Derogation of Rights under the UK Human Rights Act: 
Diminishing International Standards? " (200 1) Statute Law Review, Vol. 22, p. 7 1. 
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for derogations have also been removed opening it up potentially to any 
political reason. As a result, we have moved into a new era whereby 
formalized rights have been accorded to the citizen under domestic legislation 
on the one hand, but their realization is now subject to political scrutiny, on the 
other 318. In Rv Latif (1996)319 it was pointed out that: 
"It is for the judge to decide whether there has been an abuse of process 
which amounts to an affront to the public conscience and requires the criminal 
proceedings to be stayed The speeches in ex parte Bennett conclusively 
establish that proceedings may be stayed in the exercise of ajudge's discretion 
not only where a fair trial is impossible but also where it would be contrary to 
the public interest in the integrity of the criminal justice system that a trial 
should take place. The judge must weigh in the balance the public interest in 
ensuring that those who are charged with grave crimes should be charged and 
the competing public interest is not conveying the impression that the court 
9320 will adopt the approach that the endjustifies the means' 
In applying Bennett and Latif in the Mullen case, the illegal deportation of the 
defendant from Zimbabwe had been described as "a blatant and extremely 
serious failure to adhere to the rule of law... The need to discourage such 
conduct on the part of those responsible for criminal prosecutions is a matter 
ofpublic policy to which ... very considerable weight must 
be attached)321. 
The House of Lords rejected in ex parte Bennett the mala captus bene detentus 
principle as inconsistent with evolving standards of human rights 322 . However, 
in Mullen [1999]323 where the British authorities initiated the appellant's 
deportation by unlawful means in disregard of extradition arrangements, and in 
order to prevent him from challenging his deportation, and denied him access 
to legal advice, the court reversed the position held in Bennett and in 
exercising discretionary powers, maintained that a court should balance the 
318 ibid 
'19 Rv Latif [1996], IAII ER 353. 
320 Ibid Per Lord Steyn at p. 112 H. 
321 Per Lord Justice Rose in Rv Mullen [ 1999] 2 Cr. App. R. 143, pp. 156-157. 
322 Regina v Horseferry Road Magistrate's Court (ex parte Bennett) [1994] 3 All ER 138 
323 Rv Mullen [1999] 2 Cr App R 143. 
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seriousness of the crime against the need to discourage such conduct on the 
part of those who are responsible for criminal prosecutions. Also in Rv Davis 
and others [2 000]324 the Court of Appeal said that there was authority 
suggesting that the safety of a conviction was to be considered irrespective of 
the trial process by which it had been procured, but the court preferred the 
approach of Re Mullen. Worth mentioning briefly is that in the United State's 
criminal procedure, the exclusionary rule invalidates the unlawful arrest of a 
suspect; in practice, however, the U. S. Government continues to employ luring 
as an alternative to extradition, and the U. S. court system has upheld the 
legality of this practice. The U. S. has in fact authorized law enforcement 
officials to lure defendants out of their homeland even where there is an 
existing treaty with that country. It was the case of United States v Alvarez- 
Machain [1992]325 that affirmed that U. S. courts had jurisdiction to try an 
individual forcibly abducted from Mexico absent the consent of that 
326 
country 
In the Nzirorera Case 327 , the accused contested 
his arrest on the basis that there 
was no arrest warrant 328 , 
indictment, or any other document presented to him 
at his arrest. It was also argued that the arrest of the accused was in violation 
of the ICTR Rules that "in case of urgency, the Prosecutor may request any 
State [ 
... 
] to arrest a suspect andplace him in custody... , 329 . In support of this 
argument, the Defence submitted that at the time of the arrest of the accused, 
there was no urgency. The Defence concluded that there was no legal basis for 
the arrest of the accused and that it was illegal. The Defence further contended 
that the accused was arbitrarily detained for more than one month because he 
was not promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest. For example, the ICC 
Statute provides that an arrested person shall be 'promptly' informed of 
324 Rv Davis and others (No. 2) in the Court of Appeal, 17 July 2000 
325 United States v Alvarez-Machain, 504 US 655, at 699 (19921 
326 For a discussion see e. g. Wilke S. and Schiller T., "Jurisdiction over Persons Abducted in 
Violation of International Law in the Aftermath of United States v Alvarez-Machain" (1998) 5 
University of Chicago Law School Roundtable, 205-242. 
327 The Prosecutor v J. Nzirorera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, "Decision on the Motion 
Challenging the Legality of the Arrest and Detention of the Accused and Requesting the 
Return of Personal Items Seized" 07 September 2000, paras. 1-8. 328 In violation of ICTR Statute Articles 17 and 18 and Sub-Rules 55 (A) and (B). 329 ICTR Rule 40. 
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charges against him or her 330 . 
On a national level however such promptness 
varies,, so in Germany, a provisionally detained suspect must be brought before 
a judge no later than one day following his arrest, in order to be informed of 
the nature of the accusation and to permit the suspect to object to his or her 
331 332 detention . In East Timor this period amounts to no more than 72 hours 
The ICCPR 333 also provides that everyone has the right to liberty and security 
of person, that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention, and 
that no one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in 
accordance with, such procedure as established by law. 
Contrary to the ICTY distinction between abduction by fraud and abduction by 
force, scholarly opinion suggests that international law must condemn the use 
of irregular rendition: 
"Abducting a person ftom a foreign country or enticing a person under false 
pretences to come voluntarily ftom another country in order to subject a 
person to arrest and criminal prosecution, is contrary to public international 
law and should not be tolerated and should be recognised as a bar to 
prosecution. The victim of such violation should have the right to be brought 
into the position which existedprior to the violation". 334 
330 CC Statute Art. 59 (2). 
331 1994 German Basic Law, Art. 104. 
332 UNTAET Regulation 2000/30,25 September 2000, as amended by UNTAET Reg. 
2001/25,14 September 2001 on Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 2 (2) (e); see 
e. g. Yugoslav Draft Law on Cooperation 2002, Art. 22 (1) providing that, where there is a 
threat that the suspect wi II disappear, aj udge may order detention that wou Id last unti I the 
request for surrender is served. If the request for surrender, together with a confirmed 
indictment is not served within 48 hours, the suspect must be released (Art. 22 (2)). Also, in the 
Ocalan Case, Judgment of 12 May 2005, the ECHR found that seven days in detention were 
unjustifiable and ruled that such amount of time is in breach of Art. 5 (3) of the Convention; 
see also e. g. Dikme v Turkey, No. 20869/92, ECHR 2000-VIII (Judgment of II July 2000), 
para. 66. 
333 ICCPR, Art. 9 (1). 
334 XVth Congress of the International Association of Penal Law resolution on the 
Regionalisation of International Criminal Law and the Protection of Human Rights in 
International Cooperation in Criminal Proceedings. 
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2.7 Amnesties and the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Although the quest for justice is perceived as inconsistent with peace and 
reconciliation processes, both punitive and restorative accountability schemes 
aim at resolving the aftermaths of conflict-torn societies by acknowledging and 
accepting responsibility for crimes and wounds inflicted on the victims; by 
creating a just and inclusive social and political order that creates means of 
peaceful resolution of future conflicts as well as guaranteeing conditions for 
non-recurrence of conflicts and by restoring a sense of common purpose 
among a divided population 335 . Amnesties are often applied to encourage 
authoritarian leaderships to relinquish their powers and therefore advance 
peace processes on one hand, and on the other 336 , they aim at persuading the 
perpetrators to expose the extent of the crimes they have committed and 
therefore, disclose the truth 337 , this 
being the indispensable element of the 
338 reconciliation process 
The Rome Treaty is frequently described as a 'compromise package' 339 among 
participating nations, since unresolved issues such as the status of national 
amnesties pose a serious challenge to the Court. Amnesties and pardons have 
been rejected at the international level by, inter alia, the UN Secretary General, 
335 Statement by Ambassador Dr. Gunter Pleuger, Permanent Representative of Germany to 
the United Nations at the Security Council on "National Reconciliation on Post-Conflict 
Situations: The Role of the United Nations", 26 January 2004. 
336 See e. g. Russian Federation Amnesty declaration with respect to persons who committed 
socially dangerous acts in connection with the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic, issued 
13 December 1999, introduced "in order to achieve civil peace and accord in the Russian 
Federation and guided by the principles of humanism ...... 337 See e. g. Boraine A., "A Country Unmasked: South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission" (2000). 
33 ' For a different view see e. g. Rousso H., "The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in 
France since 1944" (199 1) p. 215 where the author asserts that "Nothing but a trial could 
satisfy the victims' needforjustice ... And their statements after the trial made it clear that this 
is what theyfelt too, far more that they cared about participating in any educational process". 
339 Phenyo Keiseng Rakate, "International criminaljustice and reconciliation: lessonsftom 
the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the International Criminal 
Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia", Foundation for Global Dialogue, Occasional Paper 
No. 19, July 1999, available at www. iý,,, d. za/pub/v, -dialo, ý4Lie/niLiltilateral aiialysis/ici. litm 
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the UN General Assembly 340 , the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
the ICTY, the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee. 
These organs have followed the lead of the 1993 World Conference on Human 
Right, which concluded: "States should abrogate legislation leading to 
impunity for those responsible for grave violations of human rights such as 
torture and prosecute such violations, thereby providing a firm basis for the 
rule of law' 5341 . In many parts of the world state practice has been 'distinctly 
unsupportive' 342 of the duty to prosecute the most serious international crimes 
and to grant amnesties and condone de facto impunity. In fact, the Human 
Rights Committee has expressed in recent years serious concerns regarding the 
incompatibility of recently introduced amnesties in Argentina, Croatia, El 
Salvador, France, Nigeria, Peru, the Republic of Congo and Uruguay with the 
obligations of States Parties under the ICCPR. For example, the Committee 
expressed its concern with the Croatian Amnesty Law 343 because, while it 
specifically states that amnesty does not apply to war crimes, the term 'war 
crimes' has not been defined in the legislation and there is danger that the law 
will be applied so as to grant impunity to persons accused of serious human 
344 rights violations . The Committee has welcomed the prohibition in national 
law of amnesties for violations of the ICCPR in countries such as Ecuador 345 . 
Also, the Committee against Torture has repeatedly criticised amnesties and 
recommended that they not apply to torture in a number of countries, including 
340 The General Assembly has opposed legislative and other measure of impunity with regard 
to crimes against humanity and war crimes since the early 70's. See e. g. "Principles of 
International Cooperation in the Detention, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons 
Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity", GA Res. 3074 (XXV11) (1973), para. 8: 
"States shall not take any legislative or other measures which may be prejudicial to the 
international obligations they have assumed in regard to detection, arrest, extradition and 
punishment ofpersons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity". 
341 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
Vienna 14-15 June 1993, UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/23,12 July 1993, para. 60. 
342 Scharf M. P., "The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court" 32 Cornell International Law Journal 3 (1999), p. 521. 
343 Law on General Amnesty 1996 provide for amnesty from prosecution and proceedings 
applied to acts perpetrated in the period between 17.08.1990 and 23.08.1996. 
344 Ibid. Art. 3. See "Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Croatia", U. N. 
Doc. CCPR/CO/7 I/HRV, 30 April 200 1, Para 11. 
345 See "Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Ecuador", U. N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/ADD. 92,18 August 1998, Para 7: "The Committee welcomes the information that 
Article 23 of the Constitution prohibits the enacting of amnesty legislation or granting 
pardonsfor human rights violations". 
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Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Peru and Senegal and it has welcomed the absence of 
346 
amnesties for torture in Paraguay 
The Trial Chamber of the ICTY stated in the Furundjija case 347 that "It would 
be senseless to argue, on the one hand, that on account of the jus cogens value 
of the prohibition on torture, treaties or customary rules providingfor torture 
would be null and void ab initio, and then be unmindful of a State say, taking 
national measures authorising or condoning torture or absolving its 
perpetrators through an amnesty law. If such a situation were to arise, the 
national measures, violating the general principle and any relevant treaty 
provision-would not be accorded international legal recognition' 1348 . Yet, the 
prohibition of national measures, such as amnesties and pardons, which 
prevent or mitigate the punishment for the commission of the core crimes, are 
not absolute. In fact their proscription is not widespread even under the 
ICTY/ICTR compulsory regimes. The ICTY Statute provides: "If, pursuant to 
the applicable law of the State in which the convictedperson is imprisoned, he 
or she is eligible for pardon or commutation of sentence, the State concerned 
shall notify the International Tribunal accordingly. The President of the 
International Tribunal, in consultation with the judges, shall decide the matter 
on the basis of the interests ofjustice and the general principles of law"349. 
With regard to pardons, it is the Tribunal and not national authorities that 
finalise the decision, which consequently, is not subject to appeal350. In 
determining whether a pardon is appropriate the Tribunal takes into account, 
inter alia, "the gravity of the crimes for which the prisoner was convicted, the 
treatment of similarly-situated persons, the prisoner's demonstration of 
rehabilitation, as well as any substantial cooperation of the prisoner with the 
346 See "Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Azerbaijan", U. N. Doc. 
A/55/44, paras. 68,69. 
347 The Prosecutor v Furundjija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-TIO, Judgment, Trial Chamber 10 
December 1998, para. 155 
348 See e. g. Teitel R. J., "Transnational Justice" (2000), p. 60 asserting that "Crimes against 
humanity pose a limit on considerations of clemency andpolitical restraints, a limit that 
appears to be largely immune to national politics". 
349 ICTY Statute, Art. 28; see e. g. Art. 9 (Measures Relating to Pardon) of the Italian Provisions 
on Cooperation with the ICTY (Decree-Law No. 544 of 28 December 1993). 
350 See ICTY, "Practice direction on the procedurefor the determination of applicationfor 
pardon, commutation of sentence and early release ofpersons convicted by the international 
tribunal", IT/146,07 April 1999, at 9. 
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Prosecutor -)i, 3 51. Importantly, in the case of a granted pardon, and at the 
discretion of the President of the Tribunal, the Registry shall inform all 
persons who testified before the International Tribunal during the trial of the 
convicted person of his or her release, the destination he or she will travel 
upon release, and any other information that the President considers 
relevant 
35. 
National amnesties and pardons that aim at preventing the materialization of 
accountability may potentially enable the ICC to exercise its concurrent 
jurisdiction under Article 17 (2) (a). This Article envisages that in deciding 
whether a State is unwilling to exercise jurisdiction, the Court should 
determine whether the proceedings were or are being undertaken, or whether 
the national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person 
concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court. During the drafting of the ICC Statute it was strongly maintained by 
numerous states that the standards for determining 'unavailability' and 
'effectiveness' were not intended to allow the ICC to pass judgment on the 
operation of national courts in genera1353 . However, as it will be evidenced in 
the next Chapter, the inquiry into national proceedings by the Court relates, 
according to the guidelines for the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), only to 
proceedings and not the outcome. There is therefore a general duty to 
investigate and prosecute, an obligation that "is undoubtedly relevant but is not 
determinative o the stance of the ICC in carrying out its mandate"354 . 
Furthermore, a duty to prosecute implies that prosecution is the only 
acceptable way of fulfilling one's duties under the ICC Statute. This may be 
misleading; referring to the ongoing peace process in Uganda and the Republic 
of Congo, which include amnesties, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor stated 
that: " We have to look at the peace process and make sure that our 
351 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 125 (General Standards for Granting Pardon 
or Commutation). 
352 Op cit, note 350, at II 
353 Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U. N. GAOR, 
5 Oth Session, U. N. Doc. A/AC. 244/l/add, at 9, para. 43. 
354 Meintjes G., "Domestic Amnesties and International Accountability" in Shelton D. (ed. ), 
"International Crimes, Peace and Human Rights: The Role of the International Criminal 
Court" 2000, at 90. 
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investigations are not an obstacle to these peace settl I ements 15355 . This implies 
that as a consequence of complementarity, the amnesty defence to surrender 
survives its apparent incompatibility with the ICC Statute and other 
international norms. Moreover, under ICC Article 53, the Prosecutor may 
exercise his discretion not to prosecute and/or defer if an investigation or 
prosecution is deemed not to be in the interest of justice 356 . Specifically, this 
Article requires the Prosecutor to consider whether, taking into account the 
gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless 
substantial reasons to believe that the investigation would not serve the 
interests of justice 357 . Obviously, the ICC must be resolute in endorsing 
widespread prosecution of international crimes as the most effective strategy in 
ensuring accountability and deterrence. There are however limits to a State's 
duty to prosecute. These limitations are twofold as this duty is not absolute, 
since transitional governments for example are not required to prosecute all 
offenders; prosecution of those bearing the greatest responsibility may be 
sufficient 358 . Secondly, the duty is subject to the exception of 'necessity' 
359 
where new governments cannot be required "to press prosecution to the point 
of provoking their own collapse 3ý360 . These 'necessities' may also involve 
active participation of truth and reconciliation commissions that may well be 
empowered to grant amnesties on a case-by-case basis 361 . Hence, these claims 
of necessity must be subject to international scrutiny, as a State would still be 
under an obligation to demonstrate that there had been an investigation and 
then justify its decision. In transitional societies dealing with mass atrocities, 
amnesties for lower-ranking offenders coupled with the prosecution of those 
... Ms Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi at the Third Session of the Consultative Assembly of 
Parliamentarians for the International Criminal Court and the Rule of Law, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 06 December 2004, at http: //www. pRaction. org/proR 
__ 
inte past. asp? id=170 
356 ICC Statute Art. 53 stipulates that the Prosecutor shall initiate an investigation unless he/she 
decides that there is no reasonable basis to proceed. 357 ICC Statute Art. 53 (1) (c). 
358 Orentlicher D. F., "Settling Accounts: the Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a 
Prior Regime" Yale Law Journal Vol. 100, No. 8,199 1, p. 2548. See also Huyse L, "Justice 
after Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing with the Past" in Kritz N. J. 
(ed. ), "Transnational Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes" 
1995; Morgan J. P., "The Communist Torturers of Eastern Europe: Prosecute and Punish or 
Forgive and Forget" 27 Communist and Post-Communist Studies 1994, pp. 95-109. 359 Ibid. 
360 Id. 
361 See e. g., The South African Model, sections 16-21 of t he 1995 Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act 1995. 
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most responsible for such crimes is likely to invoke and justify a deferral from 
the ICC. The most ardent supporters of the ICC have also concluded that there 
is scope for it to defer to national amnesties and truth commission initiatives 
when these are determined necessary mechanisms to a transition from conflict 
362 to peace and stability 
Under complementarity, the Court does not have supervisory powers over 
domestic policies regarding sentencing 363 . This 
is an additional issue posed by 
amnesty law, since a country where a person is serving a sentence could decide 
on an amnesty and justify such decision according to its own national laW364. 
As far as sentencing goes therefore, the enforcement model does not impose 
any binding obligations on States Parties to enforce ICC sentences and such 
enforcement relies entirely on States' willingness to do so 365 . In this respect 
ICC Article 106, enabling 'supervision of enforcement of sentences and 
conditions of imprisonment', seems out of place as it inflicts a hierarchical 
relationship between the ICC and the enforcing State. The employment of 
amnesties substantiates the conclusion that States Parties have rather 
autonomous powers in commuting ICC sentences. For example, the Danish 
ICC implementing legislation states that execution of sentences shall as far as 
possible be in accordance with Danish rules and may not result in the 
deterioration of the convicted person's situation under criminal law 366 . The 
Costa Rican government also reiterated during the ratification of the ICC 
Treaty that whilst the application of the penalties regulated by the Statute are 
subject to national law, the constitutionality of ICC provisions on sentencing 367 
can be maintained but extradition of a person likely to be condemned to life 
... OP cit, Scharf, note 342, p. 507. 
363 See e. g. UN A. CONF. I 83/C. I /WGP/L. 3/REV. 1 
364 For a full discussion see e. g. Kamatali J. M., "The Challenge of Linking International 
Criminal Justice and National Reconciliation: the Case of the ICTR", 16 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 2003, pp. 115-133. 
365 The ICTY for example had to enter into separate agreements with States to ensure that 
domestic authorities are not allowed any latitude in altering the sentences imposed by the 
Tribunal; for example Germany signed two ad hoc agreements of 17 October 2000 with regard 
to Dusko Tadic and on 14 November 2002 with regards to Drago1jub Kunarac. See also 
Agreement of the Italian Government, (06 February 1997), the Finland Agreement (07 May 
1997), United Kingdom (I I March 2004). 
366 See e. g. Sec. 3 (2) of the Danish Act. No. 342 of 16 May 200 1. 
367 ICC Statute Arts. 77-78. 
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imprisonment would violate constitutional Principles and thus would not be 
368 
possible 
It is also possible to envisage the endorsement of amnesties through the U. N. 
Charter doctrine of preservation of international peace and security. In this 
unlikely but purely theoretical scenario, it is conceivable that the Security 
Council may request deferral from the ICC where a sensitive truth and 
reconciliation process is ongoing. Determinative considerations by the Council 
would involve the advancement of international peace and security, which may 
include the abovementioned national necessities or emergencies, conflict 
prevention, peace building and reconciliation. The rationale behind the 
employment of amnesties may be adduced by describing briefly the South 
African experience. Although apartheid has been recognised in the Rome 
Treaty as a crime against humanity 369 , 
South Africa's Constitutional Court 
upheld the amnesty process for this crime at the time the Rome Treaty was 
being negotiated. This Court held that amnesty for criminal liability was 
permitted because without it there would be no incentive for offenders to 
disclose the truth 370 . The 
Court argued that the truth might come to the surface 
with such an amnesty, assisting in the process of reconciliation and 
reconstruction 371 . It maintained that amnesties were a crucial component of the 
negotiated settlement without which the South African Constitution would not 
have been realised. It also found that amnesty provisions were not inconsistent 
with international norms and did not breach any of the country's obligations in 
terms of public international law instruments 372 . The 
Court took into 
consideration the experience of other states in post-conflict transition and 
concluded that there was not a single uniform international practice in relation 
to amnesty 373 . 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court described how 
international law and the content of international treaties to which South 
368 Consulta preceptiva de constitucionaliclad sobre el proyecto de ley de aprobacion del Estato 
de Rome de la Corte Penal Internacional, EXP. 00-008325-0007-CO, Res. 2000-09685,01 
November 2000. 
369 CC Statute Art. 7 (2) (h). 
370 See Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and Others v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others, Constitutional Court, Judgment 25 July 1996, CCT17/96. 371 See e. g. Mexican Law on Amnesty (situation in Chiapas), 20 January 1994. 372 AZAPO, para. 26. 373 Ibid para. 24. 
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Africa is or is not a party at any given time, are relevant only in the 
interpretation of the Constitution itself, on the grounds that the lawmakers of 
the Constitution would not have authorised any law which might constitute a 
374 breach of the obligations of the State in terms of international law . 
South 
Africa ratified the Rome Treaty in 2000. Parallel to its efforts to comply with 
the provisions of the ICC Statute it has also developed a discussion on 
legislation providing further amnesties 375 . 
Two other African States have 
adopted legislation providing for amnesties for acts of rebellion, but expressly 
excluded crimes under international law. The Democratic Republic of Congo 
adopted legislation in 2003 stipulating that, pending the adoption of an 
amnesty law, a temporary amnesty for acts of war and political offences would 
apply for the period between 02 August 1998 and 04 April 2003, with the 
376 exception of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity 
In Sierra Leone, through the Lome Peace Agreement 1999377, the parties 
committed themselves to respect human rights. This ceasefire agreement 
proposed measures to promote peace and reconciliation and the creation of a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This Commission has the power to deal 
with impunity and questions of human rights violations in Sierra Leone since 
the beginning of the conflict in 1991. Article IX of the Agreement provides 
that "In order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone, the Government of Sierra 
Leone shall take appropriate legal steps to grant Corporal Foday Sankoh 
absolute and ftee pardon. After the signing of the present Agreement, the 
government of Sierra Leone shall also grant absolute andftee pardon and 
reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in respect of anything done 
by 
them in pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present 
374 The U. N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan had suggested that it would be 'inconceivable' for 
the ICC to set aside an approach to the peace process like that adopted in the South African 
situation, Speech at the Witwatersrand University Graduation Ceremony (0 1 September 
1998), 
quoted in Villa-Vicencio, "Why Perpetrators Should Not Always be Prosecuted. - 
Where the 
International Criminal Court and Truth Commissions Meet", 49 Emory Law Journal (2000), 
205, at 222. 
375 See Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, "Truth andJustice. - Unfinished 
Business in South Africa", 13 February 2003, Al Index: AFR/53/001/2003. 
376 Art. I Decret-Loi No. 03-00 1, portant amnestie pour faits du guerre, infractions politiques et 
d'opinion. 
377 Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United 
Front of Sierra Leone, S/ 1999/777. 
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378 Agreement" 
. 
The Agreement was subsequently amended and a disclaimer 
had been attached to it to the effect that amnesty provisions "shall not a ly to 
international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and other serious 
Oolations of international humanitarian law". Nonetheless, this provision does 
not cover future amnesties or pardons after conviction by the Special CoUrt379. 
Some ICC implementing laws have rendered the prohibition of amnesties 
operative. In Brazil the ICC implementing legislation expressly excludes the 
granting of amnesties for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
Article 3 of the 2002 draft legislation provides: "The crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes are imprescriptible and are not subject to 
amnesty, clemency or pardon"3 80. A trial court in Argentina also held recently 
that amnesties for crimes against humanity violated international law as 
381 
incorporated in Argentine law 
The ICC Statute provides moreover for non-applicability of a statute of 
limitations 382 . This provision is 
innovative with regard to many domestic 
criminal norms 383 . Being a recognised universal principle, 
it is utilized in 
378 Article IX furthermore provides: "To consolidate peace andpromote the cause of national 
reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official orjudicial action 
is taken against any member of the RUFISL, ex-SLA or CDF in respect of anything done by 
them in pursuit of their objectives as members of those organisations. In addition, legislative 
and other measures necessary to grant immunity toformer combatants, exiles and other 
persons, currently outside the countryfor reasons related to the armed conflict shall be 
adopted ensuring thefull exercise of their civil andpolitical rights, with a view to their 
reintegration within aframework offull legality". 
379 Swart B., "Internationalized Courts and Substantive Criminal Law" in Romano C. P. R. et 
a]. (eds. ), "Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and 
Cambodia", 2004, p. 314. 
180 See Federative Republic of Brazil Constitution 1988 (Constitutional text of October 5, 
1988, with the alterations introduced by Constitutional Amendments No. 1/92 through 18/98 
and the Revision Constitutional Amendments No. 1/94 through 6/94), Chapter I (Individual 
and Collective Rights and Duties), Art. 5 (XLIII) provides that "The practice of torture, the 
illicit traffic of narcotics and related drugs, as well as terrorism, and crimes defined as 
heinous crimes shall be considered by law as non-bailable and not subject to grace or amnesty 
and their principals, agents and those who omit themselves while being able to avoid such 
crimes shall be held liable"; see also Legislative decree no. 112,12 June 2002. 
381 See for example Simeon and Del Cerro Case, Order of 06 March 200 1, Case N. 8686/2000, 
Juzgado National en lo Criminal y Correccional Federal NA, Buenos Aires. The Order has 
been appealed to the Supreme Court. 
382 CC Statute, Art. 29; see also Council of Europe's treaty on Non-applicability of Statutory 
Limitations to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, E. T. S. No. 82,25 January 1974. 
383 See e. g. Congolese Law on the Implementation of the Statutes of the International 
Criminal 
Court, March 30,2002 (Statement of Motives). 
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different national orders when common criminal acts are dealt with. 
Prescription however cannot be invoked in cases of grave violations of 
international law. For instance, the 1968 United Nations Convention on 
Imprescriptibility of Crimes of War and Crimes against Humanity determines 
that there is no prescription for these crimes regardless of the date they were 
committed 384 . There are in fact numerous examples of national courts deciding 
to exercise jurisdiction over persons accused of crimes under international law 
covered by national amnesties in other countries. For example, in the United 
Kingdom, the House of Lords permitted a Magistrate's court to determine 
whether extradition of the former Chilean President Pinochet could proceed 
despite a national amnesty and a similar measure of impunity. 
During the ratification of the Rome Statute the issue of amnesties and pardons 
was initiated in the Netherlands and the question arose as to whether Article 
122 of the Constitution stipulating that pardon is granted by 'royal decree' (i. e. 
by the Minister of Justice) after approval by the Head of State, would be in 
conflict with Article I 10 of the ICC Statute. 385 It was decided that there was no 
conflict for there was another constitutional measure that allows this 
386 
administrative power to be transferred to an international organisation 
Article 122 (1) of the Dutch Constitution 1983 provides that "pardon shall be 
granted by royal decree upon the advice of a court designated by act of 
parliament and with due regard to regulations to be laid down by or pursuant 
to an act of parliament". Article 122 (2) also states that, "amnesty shall be 
granted by or pursuant to an act ofparliament". 
384 Convention on Impresciptibility of Crimes of War and Crimes against Humanity, G. A. Res. 
2391 (XXII) of 1968. 
385 Council of Europe, "The Implicationsfor Council of Europe Member States of the 
Ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court", CONSULT/lCC (2001) 
2 1, para. 2 (d). 
386, bid Article 92 of the Constitution. 
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2.8 Conclusion 
Considering that the primary aspect of surrender implies a depravation of the 
right to freedom, national courts must exercise a degree of supervision, 
through habeas corpus writs, over fundamental human rights that involve, inter 
alia, protection from arbitrary arrests and prima facie cases before the ICC. 
Individuals should be able to invoke and enforce State responsibility regarding 
State obligations and acquired rights or conditions to surrender. If the ICC 
decides to take over a case and the rights of the accused have been infringed in 
the custodial State, the Court in tandem with human rights law, must afford 
remedies by creating a process whereby an accused may challenge the legality 
of his/her arrest. A progressive application of the common law doctrine of 
abuse of process should be elevated to the international level in order to 
resolve the pragmatic imbalance posed by the mala captus bene detentus 
principle. 
The substantive resumption of extradition proceedings in the ICC surrender 
model strongly elucidates not only the binary nature of ICC Statute 
interpretation (monist/dualist) but also the subsequent disparity in both the 
nature and availability of protection of fundamental human rights. Such 
conclusion demonstrates that the ICC legal system is sui generis and also that 
the model fails to harmonise and raise different legal systems to international 
elevated standards of criminal justice. The ICC surrender model seeks to 
diminish inconsistencies between domestic and international legal obligations 
by producing in the Statute the lowest common denominator between States 
PartieS387 
. This approach 
implies setting low evidentiary thresholds in order to 
charge an accused prior to his surrender and undermines most domestic 
probable cause standards and human rights norms. In this respect the 
application of international law remains fragmented and to a large extent, with 
the exception of the Security Council law enforcement methods, remains in the 
hands of national courts. 
387 The final wording of ICC Article 88 is evidence of an attempt to endorse the principle of 
equality in order to minimise the many different domestic cooperation measures. 
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The ICC as well as States Parties will have to demonstrate their integrity by 
respecting the proper judicial process in surrender proceedings. Valuing 
human rights of all individuals, even of those accused of the most serious of 
ICC crimes,, must be respected in the Court as the Court is yet to fully gain 
public confidence and wider political support. 
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Chapter 3 
Pre-trial Issues Relating to Transfer Criminal Proceedings under the ICC 
Model 
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3.1 Introduction 
This Chapter examines pre-trial issues surrounding the transfer of criminal 
proceedings and deferral mechanisms under the ICC Statute and assesses their 
scope and effectiveness in initiating criminal proceedings and establishing a 
prima facie case. The validation of the ICC deferral model is examined 
through ICC procedural safeguards vis-d-vis national safeguards and the 
jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals. This comparison 
unveils disparities, a conclusion that leads to a discussion as to the degrees of 
impact such inconsistencies are likely to have on the rights of the accused in 
pre-trial proceedings. In particular, under scrutiny here is the process of 
transfer of criminal proceedings within the ICC regime as opposed to interstate 
deferrals. Whereas deferral of jurisdiction is relatively unproblematic from an 
inter-state perspective, when the ICC model is examined, the inconsistent 
application of the Statute denotes that with respect to analogous facts or 
circumstances, the model causes varying outcomes with regard to jurisdiction 
and accordingly, the rights of the accused in pre-trial proceedings. 
Circumstances in which transfer of proceedings may be requested both on the 
part of the ICC and national courts are analysed here. This two-way system is 
particularly examined within the parameters of complementarity and the need 
for judicial scrutiny over the proprio motu Prosecutor in the interest of 
protecting the rights of suspects and accused persons. Because of this 
fundamental complementarity principle on which the ICC Statute is based, an 
accused may well face criminal proceedings both before national and 
international courts. Firstly, the procedural safeguards in asserting and 
exercising jurisdiction are examined, followed by substantive elements relating 
to pre-trial equality of arms in collecting, admitting and disclosing evidence. 
Particular reference is made here to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
International Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
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Transfer of criminal proceedings is studied here through (1) the hierarchy of 
obligations within the correlative proprio motu Prosecutor, vis-a-vis 
complementarity where the imbalance of investigative and prosecutorial 
powers are revealed through a discussion of 'equality of arms'; (2) a 
proposition that transfer of criminal proceedings within the ICC system is 
primarily a question of jurisdiction rather than the end result of an agreement, 
where the proceedings are more likely to succeed in consideration of matters 
such as the location of evidence and the proximity between the victims and the 
crime committed and finally and most importantly (3) through an analysis of 
the nature and extent of all of the above factors and consequential interference 
with the rights of the accused as protected both in the ICC Statute and 
fundamental human rights instruments. 
3.2 Pre-trial procedural considerations in asserting jurisdiction 
Fundamental questions concerning pre-trial investigations concern the 
interaction between the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber as well as the 
respective roles of the prosecution and defence. 
The general powers of the Prosecutor are to (1) to conduct on site 
investigations on the territory of a State 2 in accordance with the provisions of 
Part 9 (International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance) 3, or if it is 
authorised by the Pre-Trial Chamber 4, (2) collect and examine evidence, (3) 
request the presence of and questioning investigated persons, victims, 
witnesses in order to obtain oral and written statements or testimonies, (4) to 
take or request necessary measures for the preservation of evidence. There is a 
strong view that for the purposes of effective investigation and prosecution the 
1 Originally, in the ILC draft there was no mention of a power for the Prosecutor to initiate 
investigations proprio motu, Security Council and States being the only trigger mechanisms. 
See e. g. Crawford J., "The ILC adopts a Statutefor an International Criminal Court", 88 
American Journal of International Law (1995), pp. 404-416. 
2 ICC Article 54 (2). 
3 ICC Articles 93,96 and 99. 
' ICC Article 57 (3) (d). 
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Prosecutor is required to have a 6permanent presence' on the territory where 
crimes have been committed 5. 
Throughout the investigation and prosecution, interventions of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber may be structured under three main categories of function 6: (I) 
authorise 'ex ante', upon application of the Prosecutor, the exercise of 
"intrusive and coercive powers of investigation that interfere with individuals' 
rights and liberties, in particular detention and search and seizure ,7, (2) 'post 
facturn' judicial review of the legality of prosecutorial actions with respect to 
investigation and the conduct of proceedings and finally (3) filter charges 
which appear unfounded and are not susceptible to further developments even 
prior to the preliminary hearings 8. 
The ICC Prosecutor may seek assistance from various international 
organisations for preliminary witness identification or information that may be 
relevant to the assessment of a situation or crisis. Identification activities 
should be as broad as possible to allow an early start to the investigation, while 
maintaining that these activities are necessary ancillary functions of the 
preliminary examination and not as such part of an investigation. Some ICC 
Statute implementing laws, such as Malta's International Criminal Court Act 
2002 9, offer a comprehensive list of tasks that national authorities may 
undertake in complying with an ICC assistance request. This legislation 
provides that the Minister may enact regulations aiming to meet requests for 
assistance by the ICC and in particular, without prejudice to the generality of 
that power, may enact regulations prescribing the conditions and procedures 
for the execution of such request for all or any of the following purposes: (a) 
the questioning of persons being investigated or prosecuted by the ICC; (b) 
5 See "The position of the Government of the Republic of Rwanda on the International 
Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda (ICTR)", Government of Rwanda, 07 May 1998, p. 3, available 
at http: //www. rwandemb. orR/prosecution/position. litm 
6 Virgi I -Constantin I., "International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Proceedings, Pre-Trial 
Functions and Powers of the ICC Prosecutor" (2003) Conference Paper, International Society 
for the Reform of Criminal Law, 17 th International Conference, 24-28 August 2003, The 
Hague, p. 18. 
7 Freiburg Declaration on the Position of the Prosecutor of a Permanent International Criminal 
Court 1998, Article 8. 
8 Ibid 
9 International Criminal Court Act 2002 (XXIV), Art. 4. 
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taking or producing of evidence; (c) service of any document or act of the 
proceedings before the ICC, (d) temporary transfer to the ICC of a prisoner for 
the purpose of identification or for obtaining testimony or other assistance; (e) 
entry and search of any premises and the seizure of any item; (f) taking of 
fingerprints or non-intimate samples; (g) the exhumation of a body; (h) 
provision of records and documents; (i) investigation of proceeds of any ICC 
crime; 0) freezing or seizure of proceeds for eventual forfeiture; (k) 
verification of evidence or other material. In addition, and with the aim of 
facilitating investigations, several other implementing legal instruments, such 
as the Uruguayan proposed ICC legislation, authorise 'any other type' of 
assistance not prohibited under the ICC Statutelo. 
Under ICC Article 15, the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber must assess 
the issue of admissibility and jurisdiction in relation to an authorisation under 
that Article. However, this assessment appears to be only of a preliminary 
nature and does not affect any subsequent determinations". Moreover, it is 
unclear from the ICC Statute whether the notification to States of an 
investigation shall take place before or after authorisation of the Pre-Trial 
12 Chamber 
ICC Article 15 (2) requires that the Prosecutor receive written or oral 
testimony at the seat of the Court. Given that the Prosecutor may seek 
information from States and other entities listed under Article 15 (2) and the 
fact that the limitation applies only to testimony received by the Prosecutor, 
there appears to be nothing preventing the Prosecutor from asking States 
and/or organisations to obtain information from potential witnesses as part of 
'seeking information', including through obtaining voluntary written 
statements. Potentially, the Prosecutor may also be able to directly obtain 
information from witnesses as 'other reliable sources' with the State's consent, 
10 See Uruguayan General Assembly on the procedures for the national application of the ICC 
Statute, 17 January 2003, available at 
http: //www. pres. idencia. gub. Liy/proyectos/2003011701. htm 
11 ICC Article 15 (4). 
12 See ICC Article 18 (2). 
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provided these do not amount to the type of testimony that needs to be taken at 
the seat of the Court. 
Whether or not the Prosecutor's gathering of information at the pre- 
authorisation stage constitutes an 'investigation' and therefore whether or not 
cooperation under Part 9 of the ICC Statute be made available is unclear from 
the ICC Statute and the Rules. The important question is whether the 
Prosecutor initiates an investigation under Article 13 or 15. The negotiating 
history of the Rome Treaty points out that there was a general intention not to 
allow States to challenge the admissibility of a case at this preliminary stage. 
Irrespectively, it is clear that the difference is foreseen in the activities of the 
ICC Prosecutor's pre and post-authorisation competence13. Obtaining 
information and evidence at this stage will have to be drawn from hearings in 
the Pre-Trial Chamber14. It would be useful therefore if the information 
received was in a form that would later be admissible at a confirmation hearing 
and trial' where the Prosecutor decides to use it as evidence 16 . The Prosecutor 
may also, when he/she considers that there is a serious risk that it may not be 
possible for the testimony to be taken at a later stage, request the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to appoint a counsel or a judge from the same Chamber to attend an 
Article 15 hearing or written testimony 17 . However, given the 
differing 
standard and purpose of Article 15 hearings and the limited ways in which 
information will be gathered, it may not always be possible to obtain it in 
admissible form. 
An important issue at the preliminary stage will be the protection and 
preservation of information pending authorisation for the initiation of an 
investigation. At this stage the Prosecutor will have to protect the 
confidentiality of the received information and testimony or take other 
13 International Criminal Court, Informal Expert Paper, "Fact-finding and investigative 
functions of the Prosecutor, including international cooperation" (2 003) p. 7, para-32, 
available at 
,, ans/otp/state cooperation. pdf http: //www. icc-cpi. 
int/li. brary/or, g 
14 ICC Statute Art. 15. 
15 ICC Article 6 1. 
16 See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 47. 
17 ICC Article 15 (2). 
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18 necessary measures . ese measures may include, and most inevitably will 
involve, questioning individuals through national authorities. Consequently, 
the Prosecutor's relationship with the relevant State will be critical in 
facilitating cooperation and so the degree to which there is a cooperative 
arrangement with that State will determine the Prosecutor's ability to act 
effectively within its territory. Under the ICC Statue, the standards that need to 
be followed in such circumstances are unquestionably, legal standards19 but 
their successful application will depend to a great extent on political 
20 discussions and arrangements undertaken between the Court and the State . 
The ICTY for example faced many problems in investigating freely and 
effectively. Numerous states, including those civil law countries where 
prosecutors are endowed with different roles in the investigation of cases, 
found it difficult pursuant to national norms to authorise an international 
prosecutor to conduct investigations in the most effective way 21 . Under the 
ICC model, culpability of an uncooperative State will be referred to the 
Assembly of States or the Security Council. States Parties have no remedies 
available to them against potential abuse of power on the part of the Court, 
namely the Prosecutor; the ICC binding power vis-d-vis State Parties to 
cooperate through a referral mechanism inherent in the relationship with the 
Security Council attributes asymmetrical powers and functions to the parties of 
the Rome Treaty 22 . Not only 
does this represent a serious power imbalance but 
it also questions the accountability in international law of the Security Council 
in rendering legal judgments and opinions. In unilaterally altering the terms of 
obligations of States vis-d-vis the ICC, the Council effectively extends the veto 
of the Court therefore "seriously calling into question the principle of equality 
18 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 46. 
'9 ICC Article 17 (Issues of Admissibility). 
20 Op cit, note 13, p. 8, para. 37. 
21 Amnesty International, "International Criminal Trib unals-Handb ook for government 
cooperation", August 1996, Al Index: IOR 40/07/96, p. 9. 
22 See for example Swiss Federal order on cooperation with the ICTY (21 Dec. 1995), Art. 3 (1) 
(c) and Art. 9; Romanian Law on Cooperation with the ICTY (Law No. 159/28 July 1998) Art. I 
and 6; some states, whi Ist providing for the primary jurisdiction of the ICTY, impose 
conditions on automatic transfer of proceedings and accused persons. See Greek Cooperation 
Law (Law No. 2665-17 Dec. 1998) Art. 5; Italian Cooperation Law (Decree Law No. 544-29 
Dec. 1993) Art-3. 
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of individuals bqfore the law"23 . As an author concludes: "the UN Charter 
does not tie the Security Council in any way either to decisions of the 
International Court qf Justice or even international law... There is clearly 
nothing to oblige the Council to consider any question in an impartial or 
quasi-judicial fash ion"24 . 
As already described above, States are not, at least in theory, allowed to 
challenge the admissibility of a case during an Article 15 stage, though 
pursuant to ICC Article 19 the determination on the issue of admissibility 
becomes more decisive. In case of a deferral, the Prosecutor will have to 
follow up the national development of the case in question and the State may 
be under a duty to provide the Prosecutor with periodical information on its 
progress In such cases it will be difficult for the Prosecutor to conduct an 
investigation and it is uncertain whether he/she could have any recourse to the 
measures of cooperation under Part 9. Consequently, information from 
external sources, in possession or control of a State, may be the only material 
available of forming the basis for a review of a deferral under ICC Article 18 
(3 )26 . The Prosecutor may also apply 
for an authorisation for provisional 
investigative measureS27. In case of a deferral these provisional measures 
amount to 'necessary investigative steps for the purpose of preserving 
evidence where there is a unique opportunity to obtain evidence or there is a 
significant risk that such evidence may not subsequently be available' . 
28 Thus, 
it may be possible for an investigation to be deemed as initiated for the 
purpose of imposing provisional measures explicitly authorised by the Pre- 
23 Gowl land-Debbas V., "The International Legal System in Quest of Equality and 
Universality" (200 1), p. 63 7. See also Boas G., "Comparing the ICTY and ICC. - Some 
Procedural and Substantive Issues" 47 Netherlands International Law Review (2000), pp. 267- 
292. 
24 Carty A., "The terrors offreedom: the sovereignty of states and thefreedom tojear" in 
Strawson J. (Ed), "Law after ground zero" (2002), p. 48; for an opposing view see Shaw M. N., 
"The Security Council and the International Court ofJustice. - Judicial Drift and Judicial 
Function" in Mulles A. S. et al., "The International Court of Justice: Its Future Role after Fifty 
Years" (1997), p. 228- 
25 ICC Article 18 (5). 
26 This Article states that "the Prosecutor's deferral to a State's investigation shall be open to 
review by the Prosecutor six months after the date of deferral or at any time when there has 
been a significant change of circumstances based on the State's unwillingness or inability 
genuinely to carry out the investigation". 27 ICC Article 19 (8). 
28 ICC Article 18 (6). 
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Trial Chamber in spite of a deferral, and thus Part 9 on cooperation may 
indeed be applied. 
Challenges to the admissibility of a case should be done at a stage when Part 9 
on cooperation becomes available and investigations should be suspended 
pending the outcome of such challenge 29 . Then, the available measures are 
more extensive and may include the taking of testimony from witnesses, 
completion of the collection and examination of evidence already initiated and 
preventing a suspect from escaping 30 . Meanwhile, orders and warrants ordered 
by the Court before the challenge remain valid and States Parties continue to 
be under the obligation to fulfil requests based on such orders and warrantS31. 
3.3. Investigations and deferral of criminal proceedings 
It is often perceived that the prosecution of grave international crimes at an 
international level gives rise to complex conflicts and highlights the tension 
between international politics on the one hand and the enforcement of law's 
natural justice goals on the other. From this angle, and assuming a good faith 
execution of the ICC Statute, the decision to initiate domestic investigations 
and prosecutions of ICC crimes may be founded on the principles of legality, 
or in the pursuance of governmental policies. For instance, the German penal 
system embraces the principle of legality with respect to the exercise of 
functions of criminal investigations and prosecutions. Unlike the Italian 32 or 
29 ICC Articles 19 (7) and (8). 
30 See ICC Articles 58 and 87. 
31 See ICC Article 19 (9). 
32 Chiavario M., "LAzione Penale tra Diritto e Politica" (1995), Cedam: Padova. 
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the Spanish 33 systems, the German legal structure affords the prosecutor only a 
very limited political discretion 34 . 
In this respect, the ICC differs from other ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals. As already explained, the Prosecutor under the ICC Statute enjoys 
ample and unprecedented powers. Prosecution may be initiated by the 
Prosecutor or by a reference to the Prosecutor from any State Party, 
cooperating state, or by referral from the Security Council so long as the 
required nationality or territoriality link exists. In fact there should be "a 
preliminary presumption that, if possible, a prosecution should take place in 
the jurisdiction where the majority of the criminality occurred 35 . 
Many States have expressed concern over the extensive powers conferred to 
the ICC Prosecutor 36 : "A prosecutor who is housed in a democratically 
responsible political branch of government perforce is democratically 
accountable in a system of checks and balances. This situation will not exist in 
the ICC,, 37. Moreover, from the American perspective: "While sovereigns have 
the right to try non-citizens who have committed offences against their citizens 
or on their territory, the United States has never recognised the right of an 
international organisation to do so absent consent or a UN Security Council 
mandate and Security Council oversight"38 . 
In contrast, the Philippines 
reiterated: "The ICC is endowed with competence andjurisdiction as ajudicial 
body. The exercise of such jurisdiction must not be limited by the 
33 See Spanish Constitution 1978, Part VI, Art. 124 (4). Here the Chief Prosecutor is appointed 
and removed by the Government; Italian Constitution 1947, Art. 105. 
34 See e. g. Hermann J., "Bargaining Justice-A Bargainfor German Criminal Justice? " 53 
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 755 (1992). 
35 Eurojust Annual Report (2003), p. 61. See e. g. Adv. J. H. De Lange, South Aftican Hansard 
(I I June 2002) on the implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Act, p. 27 on the 'need' for extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
36 See Representative of Argentina to the 6 th Committee of the 57 th session of the UN General 
Assembly, 15 October 2002: "Elproblema mas delicato que enfrenta hoy la Corte Penal 
proviene de los temores de que susjuices Ileven a cabo un desempeno inaddecuato de sus 
junctiones, o de la eventual politizacion de susfunctionesjudicales". 
37 Statement made by Mr. Rostow N. (United States), General Counsel, US Mission to the 
United Nations, to the 6 th Committee of the 57 th session of the UN General Assembly, 15 
October 2002. 
38 lbid On surrender of US citizens to a Security Council Tribunal see for example the 1994 
Agreement on Surrender of Persons between the Government of the United States and the 
ICTY, Art. I- 
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delermination of political bodies of the United Nations, which are not only 
.11 mhcialýv 
incompetent to determine facts but are also not impartial arbiters Qf 
events-39 . 
Nonetheless, the interpretation of the actual duties arising from the ICC 
Statute, Part 9, should be enhanced by the general obligation to cooperate 40 . 
This obligation demands a purposive interpretation of the ICC Statute. State 
Parties have to comply with requests for the types of assistance listed in the 
41 Statute 
, which must also 
be included into national laws, and with any other 
types of request for assistance unless prohibited by domestic law 42 . Exception 
to these obligations may be asserted under national security provisions 43 . The 
Statute also requires that the requests should be executed in the manner 
specified unless national law prohibits this 44 . In 
fact, the Prosecutor may 
specify what is necessary for evidence gathering. The request process under 
Part 9 is the starting point for evidence gathering on the part of the Prosecutor 
unless a situation relating to Article 99 (4) arises, which allows him/her to act 
without the presence of national authorities and execute requests directly. For 
example, the Prosecutor may specify in the request that he/she wishes that 
investigators within his Office be notified of the time and place of witness 
questioning in order to attend these and have the opportunity to directly 
interview the witnesses. The requested State may not be able to refuse to carry 
out such request unless it can prove there is a relevant prohibition under 
national law 45 . The understanding and correct application of provisions 
relating to other forms of cooperation are crucial here 46 since they may well be 
interpreted as establishing the basis for on-site investigations 47 .A 
duty of 
39 See Representative of the Philippines to the 6 
th Committee of the 57 
th 
session of the UN 
General Assembly, 14 October 2002. 
40 See ICC Article 86. 
41 ICC Article 93 (1) (a) to (k). 
42 ICC Article 93 (1) (1). 
43 ICC Article 72. Also, under Article 93 (4) a State may deny a request for assistance on 
national security grounds and the reference to 'relevance' of national security issues in this 
Article will be read in the context of Article 72 which refers to 'prejudice' to national security. 
It is unclear whether the determination of what amounts to information and evidence relating 
to national security will also be dealt by ICC judges. 
44 ICC Article 99 (1). 
45 Ibid. 
46 ICC Article 93. 
47 Article 93 (1) (1). 
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passive assistance seems to be implied in the wording of Part 9 provisions 48 . 
In practice this entails that the requested State will retain control over the 
execution of the request. At the same time it must also be acknowledged that 
States, as well as international organisations, may have legitimate reasons for 
wishing to withhold and protect sensitive information or sourceS49. It follows 
that the ICC Statute consents national authorities participating in the execution 
of requests and the Prosecutor should maximise the requests for assistance in 
order to avoid the need to review requests in light of new questions as well as 
to ensure admissibility of evidence in subsequent proceedings. However, since 
States indicting international crimes rely on mutual legal assistance to collect 
evidence, officials in the country where the evidence is located may have 
profound influence on the trial's shape 50 . Evidence may 
be located in a country 
unwilling to cooperate with the Court, or in a State that wishes to establish, 
under complementarity, a case ahead of the Court. 
In order to comply with requests of 'other forms of cooperation' 51 , the 
requested State may use procedures under its national law such as ICC 
implementing legislation. The lack of national procedures does not constitute 
grounds for refusal52 but it may emphasise a political setback. The requested 
State may also rely on an existing fundamental legal principle of general 
application in order to make the execution of the request conditional and/or 
modified. Additionally, what constitutes a national existing fundamental 
principle will be determined, in case of interpretational conflict, by ICC 
judges 53 . 
48 See Article 99 (1). 
49 Statement by Ms Johnson (Norway) at the Rome Conference, 2 nd plenary meeting (15 June 
1998) Vol. 11, A/CONF. 183/13, p. 66, para. 22 
50 Wible B., "De-Jeopardising Justice: Domestic Prosecutionsfor International Crimes and 
the Needfor Transnational Convergence" 2003, Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy, Vol. 3 1, No. 2, p. 281. 
51 ICC Article 93 (1). 
52 ICC Article 88 (Availability of Procedures under National Law). 
53 See ICC Article 119. For a discussion on ICC 'competence de la competence' see Rowe and 
Donnelly in "The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues" (2004), 
at 89; and Safferling C. J. M., "Towards International Criminal 
Procedure" (2003), at 93. 
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As previously mentioned, the ICC Prosecutor may in certain circumstances 
execute requests directly without a submission to the State PartY54 . However, 
the relevant provisions are limited to measures that do not require a court order 
or other forms of judicial authorisation and are intended mainly for the 
Prosecutor to interview witnesses. Importantly, in fact, the requested State is 
able to raise concerns and impose conditions on the requeSt55 ; the consent of 
that State is not actually required in so far as the State cannot impose 
conditions contrary to the meaning and purpose of Article 99 (4), such as 
requiring the presence of officials of the State 56 . With regard to Art. 4 of a 
Human Rights Watch report concluded that "The Court may exercise its 
functions and powers... on the territory of any State Party and, by special 
agreement, on the territory of any other State" does imply, to a degree, a 
consent regarding restriction of national sovereignty 57 and that "consensual 
limitations on sovereignty are the prerogative of the State in its contraction of 
58 international obligations" . Canada's purposive interpretation is that: "The 
Rome Statute is a carefully balanced instrument which fully respects the 
sovereignty of law-abiding states willing and able to fuýfil their existing legal 
obligations to investigate and, where necessary, prosecute those who commit 
the most heinous crimes" 59 . In exceptional circumstances, the ICC Statute 
allows for in situ investigations without securing the cooperation of the State. 
It may be predicted that if the consent of the State in question is not sought, 
such investigations will be extremely difficult to conduct without the 
assistance and possible obstruction of the local authorities. Even the most 
unrestrained domestic legislations on assistance stipulate that fundamental 
54 See Article 99 (4) and 93. 
55 See Article 99 (1) of the Republic of Panama ICC implementation law, 14/2002, Gaceta 
Oficial 15/03/2002, No. 24.512, which seems to imply that generally no conditions may be 
imposed on a request for assistance, unless specific form of assistance would amount to a 
breach of a national provision. 
56 Op cit, note 13, p. 15, para. 68. 
57 See e. g. the 2003 Constitution of Cuba (Gaceta Oficial, edicion extraordinaria, No. 3), Art. II 
which reads "The Republic of Cuba rejects and considers illegal and null all treaties, pacta 
and concessions which were signed in conditionsfor inequality or which disregard or 
diminish its sovereignty and territorial integrity". 
58 Questions Raised by the Technical Services of the Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica 
Regarding the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available at 
http: //www. hrw. oi-ý,, /campaiý,, ns/icc/docs/costarica fillal. pd 
59 Statement by Ms. Chatsis D., Representative of Canada to the 6 th Committee of the 57"' 
session of the UN General Assembly, 15 October 2002. 
178 
principles of national legal order must be observed 60 . In order to authorise an 
on site investigation the Pre-Trial Chamber must determine beforehand that 
"the State is clearly unable to execute a request for cooperation due to the 
unavailabillq, qf any authority or any component of its judicial system 
competent to execute the request for cooperation under Part 9,, 6 1. National 
legislations enabling on site investigations vary. Under the Provisional 
Memorandum of Understanding on Privileges and ImmunitieS62 between the 
International Criminal Court and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Court 
(in effect the Office of the Prosecutor) is guaranteed in particular the authority 
to carry out its activities in the field independently, safely and confidentially 63 . 
In contrast, other governments have felt it necessary to express within their 
ICC implementing legislation that the ICC Prosecutor may operate within the 
State's territory only with the participation of national officers. For example, 
the Lithuanian new Code of Criminal Procedure 64 provides that officers of 
foreign courts, the prosecution and pre-trial investigation institutions, or the 
International Criminal Court shall be permitted to undertake proceedings in the 
territory of the Republic only with the participation of the officers of the 
Republic of Lithuania 65 . 
Under the Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber performs a two-fold role by issuing 
necessary orders and warrants that may facilitate investigations and also by 
scrutinising the work of the Prosecutor following completion of an 
investigation 66. Upon the application of the Prosecutor, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
decides whether or not to issue a warrant for the arrest and surrender of a 
60 See e. g. Portuguese Statute on the international judicial assistance in criminal matters, 
No. 104/200 1, Art. 146 (2): "At the express request of theforeign State, or by virtue of an 
international agreement, treaty or convention, the assistance may be given in compliance with 
the legislation of that State, provided it does not contravene thefundamental principles of 
Portuguese law and does not cause serious damage or loss to those involved in the 
proceedings". 61 ICC Statute Art. 57 (3) (d). 
62 Signed on 12 October 2004. 
63 A similar memorandum of understanding between the Government of Rwanda and the 
ICTR 
has been described 'futile", see op cit. note 5, p. 3. 
64 2004 Code of Criminal Procedure, Part 4, Art. 67. 
6' The Republic of Lithuania has ratified the Agreements on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the International Criminal Court (2002), on 14 December 2004. 
66 CC Statute Art. 57 (3) (a). 
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person suspected of committing an ICC crime 67 . 
Prior to issuing a warrant, the 
ICC Chamber must take into consideration various factors,, including 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed the crime under 
68 investigation 
. States Parties are required to assist the Court in executing 
requests to arrest and surrender persons to the ICC69. Once the person is 
brought before the Court, either voluntarily or by means of a warrant, the Pre- 
Trial Chamber must hold a confirmation hearing to ensure that the Prosecutor 
has sufficient evidence to support each charge 70 . The accused has a right to 
apply for interim release at several stages in the pre-trial phase 71 . There are 
also several opportunities for the accused as well as the competent national 
authorities to challenge the Prosecutor's decision before the Pre-Trial Chamber 
and to request a review of the same prior to the commencement of a trial72. 
Either party may appeal against a decision rendered by the Pre-Trial or the 
Trial Chamber in preliminary proceedings on an issue that would significantly 
affect the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or, the outcome of 
the trial73 . 
However, in its first decision, dismissing an appeal requested by the 
Prosecutor challenging the authority of one of the Court's organs to issue 
warrants of arrest and requests for cooperation, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 
held that not every issue that may influence the course of the proceedings in 
general terms may form the basis for an appea174; it is only those issues that are 
bound to specifically affect the decision of the trial in favour of or against the 
accused, namely those relating to his/her guilt or innocence 75 . In this Motion, 
the Prosecutor submitted that irregular issuance of an arrest warrant 
"significantly affected the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or 
67 CC Statute Art. 58. On the functions of the Pre-Trial Chamber see e. g. Marchesiello M., 
"Proceedings before the Pre-Trial Chamber" in Cassese A., Gaeta P. et al (eds. ), "The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary" (2002) pp. 1231-1246. 68 ICC Statute, Article 58. 
69 CC Statute, Articles 58 and 89. 
70 CC Statute, Article 61 (5). 
71 ICC Statute, Articles 59 (3) and 60 (2). 
72 ICC Statute, Articles 19 and 53. 
73 ICC Statute, Article 82 (1) (d). 
74 Pre-Trial Chamber 11, Situation in Uganda, "Decision on the Prosecutor's Applicationfor 
Leave to Appeal in Part Pre- Trial Chamber H's Decision on the Prosecutor's Applicationsfor 
Warrants ofArrest under Article 58", ICC-02/04-01/05, para. 48,19 August 2005. 
75 Ibid For examples of these 'significant issue' see Prosecutor v Bizimungu C. et al., Case 
No. ICTR-99-50-T, "Decision on the Motion of Bicamunupaka and Mugenzifor Disclosure of 
Relevant Material" (04 February 2005), para. 26. 
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the outcome ql'the /,. I -tIl,, 76 . The Prosecutor further argued that, in denying his 
request to prepare and transmit the request in question, the Chamber incurred 
both errors of law and procedural errorS77 . The consequences of such argument 
are twofold. Firstly, it implies that the Chamber failed to correctly consider the 
objectives of ICC Art. 89 (1) which envisages some flexibility in issuing orders 
by a an organ of the Court which has the widest capability to obtain 
international cooperation and exploit any opportunities for a possible arrest. 
Secondly, it was submitted by the Prosecution that the timing of issuance of 
requeStS78 was erroneous and that "a breach of trust of any organ of the Court, 
the mishandling qf information provided confidentially to the Court or oa ?f 
cooperation relationship could potentially undermine an extremely precarious 
security situation andlor damage the network of cooperation , 79 which in the 
case of Uganda "thusfar has strongly supported the ongoing investigations". 
The Prosecutor's request for appeal here underscores the fact that the 
Chamber's Decision represented the first, unexploited opportunity to interpret 
the Statute and the Rules of the Court regarding the preparation and the 
transmission of requests for Part 9 cooperation. The Prosecutor felt it improper 
to leave the determination of the correct process for the preparation and 
transmission of requests for final review after a determination of the merits of 
a case at trial. This is a significant point since an accused person has a right to 
such appeal under national law and therefore every ground to maintain that 
his/her criminal proceedings are to remain within national competence. It can 
be said with a sufficient degree of certainty, that as far as interlocutory appeals 
are concerned, the Court will endorse the approach taken by the ad hoc 
tribunals; their jurisprudence indicates that the question of the possible impact 
of the timing of interlocutory appeals sought on issues concerning the fairness 
80 of the proceedings are normally raised only at the trial stage 
76 Id, p. 4, para. 9. 77 Ibid 
78 Id The Prosecutor maintained in fact that the Chamber incorrectly determined that it should 
automatically 'make' a request for cooperation simply because the Pre-Trial Chamber was 
requested by the Prosecutor to issue a warrant order or decision, p. 5, para. 10 (iv). ICC Art. 57 
(3) (a) sets out in fact that the Pre-Trial Chamber 'may' and not 'shall' issue such order as may 
be required in the interests of an investigation. 
79 Id. para. 26. 
80 Id. p. 20, para. 30. 
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3.4 Transfer of criminal proceedings from the ICC to national courts 
Whereas the previous paragraphs dealt with the procedural requirements in 
determining jurisdiction, under examination at present are the effects of 
complementarity by which the ICC may refer proceedings to national 
authorities. Instrumental to this assessment is the reference to the recent 
experience of the ICTY and ICTR. Clearly defined procedures regarding 
cooperation and transfer of proceedings from the Court to national competent 
authorities are essential both within the Statute and implementing legislations, 
in order to enhance and advance the interaction between the two parties, with 
the aim of benefiting suspects and accused persons in pre-trial proceedings. In 
the Ntuyahaga case for example, the Tribunal refused to cooperate in the 
transfer of the defendant to Belgium due to a lack of power under the ICTR 
Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence 81 to defer investigations and 
82 criminal proceedings to national courts 
The accumulation of cases at the ICTY and the length of time it takes to 
adjudicate a case have resulted in creating a facilitating scheme for the 
Tribunal to operate effectively and within a reasonable time frame 83 . As part of 
a new policy which involved returning cases to national courts of the former 
Yugoslavia, the so-called "Rules of the Road' Agreement 84 was implemented 
in order to enable a screening procedure of domestic investigations by the 
81 See ICTR RPE, Rule II bis. 
82 Prosecutor v Ntuyahaga, No. ICTR-98-40-1, Decision of the Trial Chamber, 18 March 1999. 
83 See Security Council Resolution 1534,26 March 2004 which urges the ICTY and the ICTR 
Prosecutors to review the case load of those Tribunals with a view to determine which cases 
should be proceeded with and which should be transferred to competent national jurisdictions. 
In reviewing and confirming any new indictments, each Tribunal should ensure that any such 
indictments concentrate on the most senior persons responsible for war crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the relevant Tribunal. On 15 February 2006 the ICTR Prosecutor filed his first 
motion under Rule II bis requesting the Trial Chamber to transfer the case of Michel Bagaraza 
to the Kingdom of Norway for trials, see ICTR/INFO-9-2-47 LEN, 15 February 2006. 
" Signed on 18 February 1996. 
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ICTY Prosecutor, without whose consent a local prosecution could not have 
taken place 85 . 
Successful local prosecution of serious international crimes and enforcement 
of ICTY jurisdiction became challenging for a short while in Bosnia as three 
main ethnic groups began arresting individuals from the other groups. Many of 
these local arrests were based on political rather than legal bases. The Rules of 
the Road severely limited the parameters within which the police and other 
national authorities could arrest and detain persons. Only after an individual 
has already been indicted by the ICTY for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, or of an indictment by one of the three parties has already 
been reviewed by the Tribunal and found to be consistent with international 
legal standards, may that person be arrested 86 . In order to 
facilitate and 
implement a mechanism for transfer of cases to Bosnia and Herzegovina's 
courts, the establishment of a special court had been considered. The ICTY 
arrived at the conclusion that only mixed composition Special Chambers could 
ensure prosecution in full respect for the integrity of the judicial process, due 
87 88 
process and impartiality . In 
fact, issues associated with such a court were : 
political and other influence upon proceedings; serious concerns about the 
independence of the judiciary, widespread concerns over impartiality and 
ethnic bias 89 , objections to cantonal or 
district courts having a role as that 
would have been open to influence at local level, need for a mixed judiciary 
representing the three main ethnic groups, protection of witnesses and the need 
to harmonise local law with the practice of ICTY jurisprudence and therefore 
85 See Bohlander M., "Last Exit Bosnia- Transferring War Crimes Prosecutions ftom the 
International Tribunal to Domestic Court", Criminal Law Forum 14 (2003) p. 60. See also 
ICTY Press Release CC/PIU/3 14-E where the Prosecutor declared readiness to assist national 
authorities in the prosecution of ICTY crimes. 
86 Ibid. See also Jones J. R. W. D., "The Implications of the Peace Agreementfor the 
International Criminal Tribunalfor theformer Yugoslavia", European Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 7, No. 2 1996, pp. 226-244. 
87 See "Report on the Judicial Status of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former 
Yugoslavia and the Prospectsfor Referring Certain Cases to National Courts", UN Doc. 
S/2002/678 
(12 June 2002). 
88 Op cit, Bohlander, note 85, p. 68. 
'9 For example, Zadar (Croatia) District Court, 24 April 1997, K. 74/96 where 19 Serbs were 
sentenced for genocide in absentia (unreported); Split (Croatia) District Court, 26 May 1997, 
K. 15195 where the Court sentenced 39 people, 27 of them in absentia for war crimes. 
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reduce the disparity between national and international verdicts for persons 
accused of the same crimes 
90 
. 
In Croatia for example, largely bias and lack of legal professionalism are 
characteristic of most war crimes trials; officials, judges and lawyers have 
been criticised for not recognising the need that proper trials require expertise 
just as much as ethnic impartiality 91 . 
Targeting the grounds for transfer of 
criminal proceeding from national to international level, a recent report 92 
concluded that trials before ordinary courts suffer from (1) ethnic bias on the 
part of judges and prosecutors, (2) poor case preparation by prosecutors, (3) 
inadequate cooperation by the police with investigations, (3) poor cooperation 
between states on judicial matters, (4) a lack of witness protection mechanisms 
and (5) uncertainty on prosecuting command responsibility. Ethnic bias is a 
frequent problem. War crimes trial monitoring by the OSCE during 2002-2003 
reveals a significantly different rate of conviction and acquittal depending 
upon the ethnicity of the defendants. To provide an example, while 83 percent 
of Serbs were found guilty in 2002, only 18 percent of Croats were convicted 
93 during that same year . 
On the other hand, 17 percent of Serb defendants were 
acquitted or the prosecution was dropped, while 82 percent of Croats were 
found not guilty or the charges were dropped 94 . National 
investigations and 
prosecutions of war crimes are frequently obstructed by inadequate police 
cooperation. In Serbia, for example, where the police committed many of the 
war crimes, the prosecutors rely on the same police to investigate and obtain 
relevant evidence regarding these crimes 95 . 
In Bosnia and Croatia, local police 
in rural areas are frequently unwilling to investigate crimes against the 
minority population where suspects are members of the ethnic majority and 
90 Loc cit, note 85. 
91 Ibid Croatian county courts outside large cities, which have heard the majority of war 
crimes cases, are particularly prone to bias and lack of professionalism. In October 2003, the 
Croatian parliament adopted legislation that would permit the transfer of war crimes cases 
from county courts with territorial jurisdiction to county courts in Croatia's four biggest cities 
(Zagreb, Osijek, Rijeka, Split). The legislation has yet to be applied to any war crimes case. 
92 Human Rights Watch, "Justice at Risk: War Crimes Trials in Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro" October 2004, available at 
http: //hrw. org/reports/2004/icty 1004 
93 bid, P. q. 
94 See OSCE Mission in Croatia, Status Report No. 13, December 2003, pp. 21-22. 
95 Ibid. p. 15. 
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may hold positions of influence in that local area 96 . Furthermore, the regional 
legal framework governing cooperation has been and still is rather inadequate. 
For example, cooperation between Serbia and Bosnia lacks a bilateral 
97 agreement on judicial assistance in criminal matters, including extradition . In 
one of the war crimes trials held in Montenegro 98 the accused was held in pre- 
trial detention for 6 years because of the refusal of the Republika Srprska to 
cooperate with the competent court in the early stages of the proceedings. The 
above described complexities surrounding national investigations and 
proceedings must not rule out their usefulness and the necessity to enhance and 
advance national mechanisms enforcing international law to the highest 
possible criminal justice standards by imparting knowledge through 
international presence, training and monitoring". In the last two years there 
has been an ever-increasing number of war crimes trials conducted by all the 
relevant parties involved in the former Yugoslav conflictloo. Typically, 
international observers scrutinize these trials. International organisations, 
NGOs and representatives of foreign governments monitor all current war 
crimes trials in Serbia. For instance, the ongoing Ovcara Caselo' is screened by 
the Regional Team of the Centre for Peace, Humanitarian Law Centre from 
96 Id p. 16. See also United Nations High Commissioner For Human Rights, "Human Rights 
Field Operation in Serbia and Montenegro" October 2003, Report with Recommendations in 
the Investigations into Mass Gravesites in Serbia. 
9' By contrast, in 1996 Croatia and Bosnia concluded an agreement on judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters (Agreement Between the Government of Bosnian and Herzegovina, the 
Government of the Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Government of the Republic of 
Croatia on Legal Assistance in Civil and Criminal Matters, Sluzbeni List Republike BiH- 
official gazette of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina-Special Edition, International 
Agreements, May 27 1996) and there is also a bilateral agreement on mutual legal assistance in 
civil and criminal matters between Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro, concluded in 1998 
(Agreement Between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on Legal 
Assistance in Criminal and Civil Matters, Alarodne Novine-Special Edition, International 
Agreements, No-611998, April 10,1998). 
9' Ranisavljevic N. was charged with a war crime against the civilian population on 09 
September 2002, High Court in Bielo PoIje, Montenegro. 
99 So far the ICC has held one seminar with Ugandan Judicial Authorities with the aim of 
providing information about the ICC and exchange views on the role of national judicial 
institutions with respect to the operations of the Court (26 October 2005, Kampala). See also 
Humanitarian Law Centre 2001 and 2003 Specialized Training Courses and Seminar in 
International Humanitarian Law conducted in Serbia with the aim to educate judges, 
prosecutors, attorneys and police investigators on how to apply and implement international 
humanitarian law and the jurisprudence of the ICTY on a national level. 
100 For most recent cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) see e. g. the case of Simic Boban, 
No. KT-RZ-2105,28 th June 2005; in Republika Srpska (BiH) see the proceedings of the Trial 
Chamber of the District Court of Banja Luka, 17 May 2004. 
'0' War Crimes Chamber of the District Court in Belgrade, K. V. No. 0 1 -2003,09 March 2004. 
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Belgrade, Research and Documentation Centre from Sarajevo, NGOs and 
representatives of the mission in Serbia and Montenegro, representatives of the 
Government of the Republic of Croatia and members of the "Mothers of 
Vukovar" Association and representatives of the OSCE mission in Serbia and 
Montenegro 102 
. 
There are however instances where an accused person fears the bias, non- 
impartiality or inexperience of the national judiciary. The issue arises then 
whether he/she has the right for the proceedings not to be referred to the state 
103 104 of nationality . In the Jankovic Case before the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
the Appellant contested a decision by the Referral Bench to refer his case to 
the relevant court in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), by submitting that the 
State lacked a 'fully competent judicial system'. Fearing an unfair trial in BiH, 
he argued that, since a case might be prosecuted either in an international 
forum or before a competent national court, his case be referred to Serbia and 
Montenegro, which had a "cohere n tjudic ial system", or instead be tried before 
the Tribunal. He also submitted that the severity of the crimes in the 
indictment did not justify referral to national courts' 05 . The Appeals Chamber 
rejected both his arguments and stated that neither the gravity of the crimes 
alleged nor the level of responsibility of the accused demanded that this case 
be brought to trial before the International Tribunals 106 and that "nothing in 
Rule I Ibis of the Rules indicates that the Referral Bench is obliged to consider 
the gravity of the crimes charged ... Although the 
Referral Bench may be guided 
by a comparison with an indictment in another case, it does not commit an 
error in law if it bases its decision or referral merely on the individual 
102 In the Republic of Croatia, the war crimes trial N. K-7/03 against Hrastov M. (member of 
the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia), County Court in Karlovac, 20 
September 2004, was monitored by the Committee on Human Rights (Karlovac), Centre for 
Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights (Osijek), Humanitarian Law Centre (Belgrade), 
Centre for Peace Studies (Zagreb) and Civil Committee on Human Rights (Zagreb-Helsinki 
Committee). 
103 See Case No. IT-96-23/2-1, Party Confidential Motion by the Prosecutor Under Rule I Ibis, 
With Annexes 1,11,111 and Confidential Annexes IV and V, 29 November 2004, para. 26. 
104 Prosecutor v Gojko Jankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2-ARI Ibis. 2, Appeal's Chamber 
Decision on Rule I Ibis Referral, 15 November 2005. 
'05 For example, see 1972 European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal 
Matters Art. 8 (a) (b) and Art. 3 I which provide that in settling concurrent jurisdiction claims 
the residence of the person must be considered. 
106 Supra, note 103, para. 23. 
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circumstances Qý' the case... " 
107 
. In an earlier decision the Tribunal also 
affirmed that under international law it is appropriate to resolve conflict of 
competing claims for jurisdiction on the basis of the more effective nexus 
08 between the crime and the forum State' . Some ICC implementing 
legislations provide that if the State that made a request for extradition in a non 
Party State, extradition should be denied in favour of the ICC request'09 but 
this approach is exceptional and therefore far from representing uniform state 
practice. The European Committee on Crime Problems also concluded recently 
that rather than establishing a hierarchical order among jurisdictions "the 
objective is to devise a practical way to determine, on the face of concrete 
circumstances of a case, using objective criteria, how better to ensure that 
justice is done"110. Moreover, "the sentencing powers of the courts in the 
different potential jurisdictions must not be a primary factor in deciding in 
which jurisdiction a case should be prosecuted, and the Prosecution should 
not seek to prosecute cases in a jurisdiction where the penalties are 
highest 
The gradual increasing willingness of the ICTY to refer war crimes trials to 
national legal authorities, underscores the importance of effective and fair 
112 domestic trials to secure justice and promote the rule of law 
Furthermore, reports suggest that an understanding and application of 
international law in national courts is, in general, improving 113 . This 
is 
'0' Ibid para. 26. 
108 Op cit, note 104, Prosecution Respondent's Brief, Appeals Chamber (05 August 2005), 
para. 3.3. 
109 See e. g. Ecuador's 2002 Draft Implementation Law, Art. 9. Contra see e. g. Finnish 2002 
Act on Implementation of provisions of a legislative nature of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court and on the application of the Statute, Sec. 3 (2) and 1994 Finnish 
International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (4/1994), Sec. 13 (3) and (4). 
"0 CDPC, Reflection Group on developments in international cooperation in criminal matters 
(PC-S-NS), Final Activity Report and Summary Report of the 5 th Meeting (Strasbourg, 18-20 
March 2002), p. 22 (emphasis added). 
111 Op cit, Euroj ust, note 3 5, p. 3 1. 
112 A significant number of referrals had been made in pursuance of the aims established by 
Security Council Resolution 1534 (2004), U. N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (2004), 26 March, paras. 4- 
5. See e. g. Human Rights Watch, "Croatia: Conviction Spotlights Justice Failings" 19'h July 
2004, p-3. 
113 See e. g. Humanitarian Law Centre, "The Failure of the Nis Judicial System", 28 July 2005, 
available at 
http: //www. hlc. or. L, -yu/english/Facing The Past/Press_Releases/iiidex. php? file=1214. htmI It 
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evidenced, for instance, by an increasing number of accounts of fair trials 
being conducted in ex-Yugoslavian states 114 . In order to further advance the 
correct application of international criminal law it has been proposed that 
ICTY evidence be admitted into national courts to facilitate and increase the 
effectiveness of war crimes trials. The use of the Tribunal's evidence allows 
local judges and prosecutors to benefit from the investigative expertise and 
resources of the ICTY. Since under the ICC Statute a State may make a 
request for referral from the Court concerning relevant evidence and additional 
information' is I it would be constructive for such evidence to become 
automatically admissible in national courts. For example, the ICTY concluded 
that evidence gathered by the Prosecutor would be of great value for the 
internationalised Panels in Kosovo 116 . There should be no statutory limitations 
to that effect' 17 . By admitting statements given to the ICC during proceedings, 
national courts could avoid direct examination of witnesses who have already 
testified in judicial proceedings regarding the same events. 
A combination of difficulties in assessing on part of the ICC, the 
ýunwillingness' and 'inability' to conduct trials, the appropriateness of a 
referral of cases to national courts constitute significant impediments. States 
may express a readiness and willingness to investigate and try cases but 
regional cooperation mechanisms may be missing, a fact which does not 
automatically imply the 'inability' of the national judicial system to satisfy the 
requirements under complementarity. Mexico, for instance, expressed 
dissatisfaction with the definition of complementarity, as not presenting 
is important to remember that such failure relates here only to a court and does not reflect on 
the entire national judicial system. 
114 On improving criminal justice standards and fair trials see for example, Humanitarian Law 
Centre, "Analysis of War Crimes Trials in Vukovar (Croatia)", 05 January 2005, available at 
http: //www. hic. orp-. yu/enp-lish/War Crimes Trials Before National Courts/Croatia/index. plip 
? file= 10 1 5. htmI 
115 ICC Statute Art. 93 (10) and Rule 194. 
116 ICTY Press Release CC/PIU/314-E. 
117 In relation to the ICTY, with the exception of Croatia, it is unclear at present whether 
witness statements made in ICTY proceedings and investigations are admissible in 
proceedings before national courts. Lawmakers in Serbia have yet to decide on the matter. In 
Bosnia, a court, in a war crimes trial (Ilijasevic Case, Cantonal Prosecutor v Zenica, 
indictment against Dominik Ilijasevic, No. KT. 1/2000, February 20,2001) refused to admit 
into evidence videotaped interviews the ICTY conducted with an eyewitness. The court held 
that the testimony was inadmissible partly because it was not obtained pursuant to the 
provisions of the law on criminal procedure in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
188 
sufficient opportunity for a State to claim jurisdiction at an early stage and for 
not giving due weight to views of an interested state'' 8. In fact, the ICC Draft 
Statute provided for the 'earliest opportunity' challenge but it left unanswered 
the question as to what consequences, if any, should flow from a failure of a 
119 State to make a timely challenge . Although ICC Article 17 (Issues of 
Admissibility) states that the Court "shall determine that a case is 
inadmissible" if the requirements of Art. 17 have been met, this phrase must be 
read in conjunction with the first sentence of Article 19 which requires the 
Court to satisfy itself as to the jurisdiction, but makes sua sponte 
determinations of admissibility purely discretionary 120 . The question therefore 
is whether ICC Articles 17 and 53 (Initiation of an Investigation) permit 
national measures such as amnesties for example, that may be indicators of 
'unwillingness' and/or 'inability' to interfere or hamper cooperation in 
preliminary stages. Canada for example, assumed the interpretation of Article 
17 (1) (b) as meaning that a State (Canada) may conduct an investigation and 
then decide not to proceed or to carry out an investigation and accordingly 
acquit' 21 . The concept of 'collapse' should be evaluated from two 
perspectives: (1) in relation to the need for competent, independent and 
122. It f 11OWS impartial courts and (2) from the conduct of criminal proceedings 0 
that the requirements of Article 17 (3) will be satisfied if the national legal 
system has only collapsed in the region where the crime has been committed. 
It can be predicted with a substantial degree of certainty that this will often be 
the case in countries involved in an armed conflict or emerging from one. The 
question of unavailability on the other hand should not be seen as coinciding 
with the absence of a national judicial system but only of its substantial 
unavailability 123 : 
118 Rome Conf. Doc A/CONF. I 83/C. I /L. 14/REV. 1 (24 June 1998), p. 239. 
119 ICC Draft Statute, Art. 17 (4), A/CONF. 183/13. 
120 Sadat L. N. and Carden S. R., "The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy 
Revolution", 88 Georgetown Law Journal 381 (2000) p. 381. 
12 1 Bennett C. before Canada's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade on "Crimes Against Humanity" 45'h meeting, (I I May 2000). 
122 Hall C. K., "Suggestions Concerning International Criminal Court-Prosecutorial Policy 
and Strategy and External Relations", Expert Consultation on the General Issues Relevant to 
the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (28 March 2003) p. 17. 
123 bid 
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"First, the system could be. functioning perfectly in a region or a state for the 
general population, but be i int wal lable to religious, ethnic or political groups 
or, on certain issues, women. Second, the system could be functioning perfectly 
well in a region or in the entire state for all crimes except the crimes in the 
Rome Statute. If the state has given amnesties for these crimes that prevented a 
judicial determination of guilt or innocence, the emergence of the truth or 
awards of reparation to victims ... 
If warrants for arrest, subpoenas for the 
production of evidence or subpoenas to witnesses to appear are not executed 
ý, 124 in a national system, that confirms unavailability 
The discontinuance of domestic proceedings does not, per se, preclude a 
possible institution of fresh proceedings at a later date; the Statute does not 
however address the matter of when cooperation or deferral begins in such 
circumstance. Acquittals are interesting to observe here. The ICC Statute sets 
out that the Prosecutor is entitled to appeal against a decision of acquittal as 
well as a conviction or sentence' 25 . 
The Prosecutor may appeal for a 
procedural error, an error of fact or of law. This may be construed as 
broadening the powers of review on factual issues, which is a significant 
extension of the right to appeal under certain national laws. For example, the 
International Criminal Court Bill 2004 of Trinidad and Tobago provides for an 
appeal on questions of law, on a national level. Specifically, these appeals 
refer to the 'Eligibility for Surrender' 126 : if such a situation arises,, 'the party 
may appeal against the determination to the Court of Appeal on a question of 
127 law only' . 
Conversely, attributing right of appeal to the Prosecutor may well 
be criticised for interfering with the rights afforded to an accused under the ne 
bis in idem maxim. 
The effect of complementarity will subject national prosecutions for ICC 
crimes to great scrutiny, opening the proceedings' legitimacy to question. The 
fact that national proceedings of international crimes are often idiosyncratic 
124 Ibid 
125 ICC Statute Arts. 81-83. 
126 Art. 67(l). 
127 lbid, Art. 67(2). Also, Art. 68 provides that "Rules of the Supreme Court relating to 
appeals to the Court ofAppeal shall, with all necessary modifications, apply to an appeal 
under s. 6 7" - 
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raises many questions; many international crimes remain inadequately defined, 
leaving domestic courts significant scope to fill in details, and it is often 
unclear which procedural rules are applicable' 28 . As an author explains: 
"The sense of inequity resultingftom courts in the north sitting injudgment on 
leaders ftom the south is most likely insurmountable in a world of 
asymmetrical power... whatever one may think of this imbalance as a political 
or moral matter, the relative quality of courts and judges in, for example, 
Spain as opposed to the Sudan suggests that there may be reason to prefer this 
1 129 sense of inequity'to the alternative" 
Combating and punishing grave violations of international law require 
conventional, regional mechanisms for cooperation, such that ensure the most 
effective, long-term assistance between nations in criminal matterS130 
The detrimental effect of appropriating national investigations and proceedings 
has, in the long run, a detrimental effect on rebuilding and/or reforming a 
national judicial apparatus. Taking into account the different legal natures of 
the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC, ICTY's jurisprudence is interesting in 
understanding the basis on which deferral requests may be made. The 
Tribunal's reasoning is not altogether dissimilar form the one adopted by the 
Security Council in referring the Sudanese criminal proceedings to the Court 
and it pinpoints to a potential detrimental effect of Security Council referrals to 
the Court by bypassing the complementarity principle, notwithstanding the 
willingness of a State to rebuild its judicial accountability mechanisms. In Re 
The Republic of Macedonia 131 , the ICTY 
held that the procedure for deferral 
128 Op Cit, Wible, note 50, p. 265. 
129 Ibid, p. 266. 
"0 For a recent decision in favour of the locus jurisdiction see Prosecutor v Zeljko Mejakic et 
al, Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Rule I Ibis Hearing (03 March 2005), p. 199. See also Resolution by 
the Republic of the Philippines House of Representatives, urging the Philippine President to 
transmit the ICC ratification Bill to the Philippine Senate, Twelfth Session, Second Regular 
Session, No. 800, October 2000 which stated that individuals must be held accountable 
nationally as it is crucial to aid victims especially and serve as a deterrence to violations of 
those crimes. 
13 1 Re The Republic of Macedonia, Case No. IT-02-55-MISC. 6, "Decision on the Prosecutor's 
Requestfor Deferral and Motionfor Order to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", 
04 October 2002. 
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of cases under its Rules of Procedure and Evidence 132iS to be followed in each 
case and without exemption. It was maintained that the relevant Rules allowed 
the Prosecutor to propose that a request for referral be made' 33 , and that these 
were to be interpreted and applied as to allow only a Trial Chamber to decide 
with finality on the issue 134 . The ICTY Prosecutor applied to the Tribunal to 
issue a formal deferral request to the FYROM the day before the 
commencement of two criminal proceedings regarding five investigations and 
prosecutions of alleged crimes committed by the National Liberation Army 
(NLA) and the FYROM forces in 2001. The Prosecutor requested too that the 
competent authorities of the Republic of Macedonia defer to the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal 'all current and future' 135 investigations and prosecutions of 
alleged crimes committed by members of the NLA and concerning activities of 
FYROM forces against FYROM-Albanian civilians in FYROM in 2001. In its 
response, FYROM proposed that three of the five cases 136 be deferred to the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal and it did not oppose the deferral of two 
investigations in question' 37 . Most importantly, however, it called the Tribunal 
to deny the request for deferral of all current and future investigations and 
proceedings in response to which the Prosecutor modified her application and 
requested the Tribunal to enter a 'clause' in its Decision according to which 
the judiciary of FYROM would be obliged to inform the Prosecutor about its 
findings in future investigations and, in particular, obliging FYROM to comply 
with any declaration of primacy by the Prosecutor in the absence of a formal 
request for deferral to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal which noted the 'intense 
ftustrating effect' that such far-reaching deferral would have on FYROM 
jurisdiction. The FYROM government pointed out that such a request for 
deferral would 'effectively block domestic courts from initiating any 
investigation or prosecution with regard to these groups of alleged 
132 In particular, ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 9 and 10. 
133 See for example Spanish Organisation Act on Cooperation with the ICTY (Organisation 
Act 15/1994 - 01 June 1994), Art. 4 (4): "No Spanishjudge or court may create a conflict of 
jurisdiction with the International Tribunal. They shall confine themselves to stating the 
reasons that in their estimationform the basis of their own competence". 134 Supra note 134. 
135 Ibid, para. 7. 
136 The "NLA Leadership" Case, the "Mavrovo Road Workers" Case and the "Lipkovo Water 
Resrve" Case. 
137 The "Neprosten" and the "I-juboten" investigations. 
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138 
perpetrators' . 
In determining the 'appropriateness' of the deferral, the 
Tribunal took into account the principle of concurrent jurisdiction and the 
primacy of the Tribunal over national courts which did not aim to preclude or 
prevent the exercise of jurisdiction by national courts and that, on the contrary, 
national courts should be encouraged to exercise their jurisdiction in 
accordance with relevant national laws and procedures. Outside the ICC 
complementarity regime, the presumption in favour of State action is based on 
the recognition of duties arising out of the 'aut dedere aut judicare' 
39 principle' . 
In an earlier case, the Djukic case, the ICTY Prosecutor decided 
not to request the deferral of criminal proceedings by Bosnian authorities to 
the competence of the Tribunal on the basis that "the mere fact of two trials 
being held simultaneously for the same crime against the same accused is 
140 likely to prejudice the rights of the accused ... according to which the 
accused has the right to have adequate time andfacilities for the preparation 
141 
of defence ( ... )" 
On the one hand,, the focus of the ICC Prosecutor on investigating and 
prosecuting those bearing the greatest responsibility has raised concerns of a 
so-called 'impunity gap' which may become apparent when the Office of the 
Prosecutor is limiting, or seems to be limiting its actions to key leaders and 
major situations of crisis 142 . 
The ICTY recently observed that 'key leaders' and 
'persons bearing greatest responsibility' for the purposes of establishing 
jurisdiction and recommending referrals are persons, "who by virtue of their 
138 On recent successful war crimes prosecution see the Dusseldorf Supreme Court, Jorgic 
Nikola Case, 30 April, 3StR 215/98; Bavarian Appeals Court, Djajic Case, 23 May 1997,3 St 
20/96. 
139 See e. g. Cavallo Case where Mexico extradited the Accused to Spain under the duty to 
either prosecute or extradite, Juez Sexto de Distrito de Procesos Penales Federales en el 
Distrito Federal, Extradiclon de Miguel Angel Cava] lo/Expediente de Extradicion 5/2000 
(VII/230/1324/2000). 
140 As stated in Art. 14 of the ICCPR and Art. 21 (4) (b) of the ICTY Statute. 
141 Prosecution v Djukic D., IT-96-20, Decision of Trial Chamber 1 (26 April 1996) p. 160. 
142 See e. g. Colitti M., "Geographical and Jurisdictional Reach of the ICC: Gaps in the 
International Criminal Justice System and a Rolefor Internationalised Bodies" in Romano C. 
P. R. et al (eds. ), "Interriationalised Criminal Court-Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo and 
Cambodia" (2004) p. 418. See also International Criminal Court (ICC-OTP), "Comments and 
Conclusions of the Office of the Prosecutor" in the Summary of Recommendations Received 
during the First Public Hearing of the Office of the Prosecutor, convened from 17-18 June 
2003, Hague, p-2, available at http: //www, icc- 
cpi. i it/library/organs/otp/ph/ph I conclusions. pdf 
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position andjunctions in the relevant hierarchy, both de jure and de facto, are 
alleged to have exci-cisedsuch a degree qf authority that it is appropriate to 
describe them as among ihe 'most serious'143 , rather than 'intermediate "' 
144 
. 
On the other hand, no clear consensus has yet emerged on the appropriate and 
relevant form for the complementarity practice of the Office of the Prosecutor, 
There have been some concerns for the Office not to overstate the presumption 
in favour of State action in the Statute as a hard rule that somehow demands 
the exhaustion of local remedies by victims of massive crimes, or shift 
prosecutorial responsibility as far as possible onto the national level 145 , 
especially in reluctant, uncooperative countries. 
In line with this reasoning, ICC Article 94 (1) envisages that in similar 
circumstances the Court would suspend the criminal procedure in order to 
enable an accused to efficiently prepare a defence before national proceedings. 
Nevertheless, if the Prosecutor defers an investigation, he or she may request 
that the relevant State make available to him or her information on the 
46 proceedings 1. If the Prosecutor then decides to proceed with an investigation, 
he/she will notify the State in which deferral of the proceedings has taken 
147 
place 
Within the scope of the ICC Statute, a compulsory monitoring system would 
be inconsistent with the purposive interpretation of the Statute once the Court 
exercises its ultimate competence in determining the unwillingness and/or 
inability of a State to conduct investigations and prosecutions; once the Court 
confirms a case to be within the jurisdictional reach of a particular State, 
respect for the judicial sovereignty of that State and its judgments is implied. 
In verifying 'unwillingness and inability', the Office of the Prosecutor should 
143 See e. g. ICTY Appeals Chamber refusal to refer a case to national authorities in Prosecutor 
v Radovan Stankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2/-ARI I bis. 1, Decision on Rule I Ibis Referral (02 
September 2005). 
144 Prosecutor v Dragomir Milosevic, Case No. IT-98-29/1 -PT "Decision on Referral of Case 
Pursuant to Rule I Ibis" (08 July 2005). 
145 Supra, note145, p. 3- 
146 CC Statute Article 19 (11). 
147 Ibid. See also ICC RPE, Rule 5 3: " When a State requests a deferral pursuant to article 18 
(2) that State shall make this requestfor deferral in writing andprovide information 
concerning its investigation, taking into account Article 18 (2). The Prosecutor may request 
additional informationfrom that State". 
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develop a clear criterion in determining unwillingness, avoiding any 
distinction between objective and subjective criteria to that end, outside the 
Statute. Types of unwillingness/inability may include immunities of heads of 
states or ministers, statutes of limitation, an international treaty providing for 
non-prosecution of was criminals (such as Article 98 (2) agreements) and there 
should also be institutional preparedness to review the admissibility of a case 
at the time of surrender and even later, in cases where much time has passed 
since the finding of admissibility. 'Unwillingness' is to be assessed on 
procedural and institutional factors rather than the substantive outcome 148 and 
the inability includes firstly the 'collapse' or 'unavailability' 149 of the national 
judicial system and secondly, the situation wherein a state is unable to obtain 
the accused. evidence or testimony' 50 . In addition, the 
Prosecutor's authority to 
conduct activities relating to the presentation of a case in the territory of a 
State depends largely on whether or not that State has a functioning judicial 
system. Yet, determining what constitutes a functioning judicial structure is far 
from straightforward. Instrumental in illustrating difficulties incumbent in such 
assessment is the experience of Rwanda's courts with regard to which it was 
estimated that: "Even if the judicial system in place before the war had been 
left intact, it would have been difficult if not impossible for it to cope with the 
unprecedented number of victims and accused persons as with the magnitude 
of human destruction ... 
Even when the competent judicial police inspectors 
were trained to take over ftom the military and public prosecution officers 
were set to prepare case files for the eventual resumption of court activiýy, 
progress was SIOW, ý 15 1. 
In this context it is important to remember that, notwithstanding a State's duty 
to cooperate with the ICC, problems inherent within the principle of 
complementarity such as the need to rely on national laws will remain. 
148 ICC-OTP, Informal Experts Paper "The Principle of Complementarity in Practice"(2003). 
p. 14, para. 46. 
149 Ibid p. 15. Term 'unwillingness' is to be given a broad interpretation so as to cover various 
'inability' scenarios in the latter part of ICC Statute Art. 17 (3) as well as to cover typical cases 
of inability. 150 Id, para. 49. 
15 ' Ferstman C. J., "Domestic Trials of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity The Example 
of Rwanda", African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 1997, Vol. 
9, p. 867. 
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Constitutional barriers to compellability of witnesses, as well as to privileges 
exempting individuals from the obligation to testify are demonstrative of 
ý2 this' In fact) in many countries, it is not constitutionally possible to force a 
citizen to leave the country to attend judicial proceedings in another country"' , 
It is worth noting that some implementing cooperation agreements between 
states and the ICTY provide that the Tribunal may forward directly to 
individuals summons and other documents by mail. For example, Article 23 of 
the Swiss Federal Order on Cooperation 154 provides that "procedural decisions 
of the International Tribunal may be served by mail directly to the addressee 
in Si, iltzerland'. The Finnish Law on cooperation with the ICTY provides too 
that a witness "who in Finland has been summoned by the Tribunal to appear 
before the Tribunals is under a duty to comply with the summons" 155 . 
Similarly, the German law on cooperation reads: "Should the Tribunal request 
the personal appearance of a person ... their appearance may be enforced with 
the same judicial means as may be ordered in the case of a summons by a 
156 German court or a German Prosecutor's Office" .A 
further example is the 
Austrian Federal Law on Cooperation pursuant to which a witness is under a 
legal duty to execute a summons directly addressed to him/her' 57 . It is 
concluded that "this formula indicates that the Tribunal may directly summon 
individuals" 1 -ý8 . Many implementing ICC laws stipulate that national laws 
should govern the compellability of witnesses under the ICC Statute. For 
instance, the Trinidad and Tobago International Criminal Court Bill 2004 
instructs that the applicable law with respect to compelling a person to give 
152 Alongside those discussed in Chapter I on the methods and effects of implementation of 
the ICC Statute. 
153 See for example Joint Committee on Human Rights, "Memorandum from the Committee on 
the Administration ofJustice" (2003) available at 
http: //www. publications. parliameiit. uk/pa/bt2OO3O4/itselect/itri, ghts/12/]2wel2. lltni 
154 1995 Federal order on cooperation with the International Tribunals for the Prosecution of 
Serious violations of International Humanitarian Law (21 December 1995). 
155 Section 8 of the Finnish Act on the Jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Crimes Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia and on Legal Assistance to the International Tribunal, 05 January 1994/12. 
156 Section 4 (2) of German Law on Cooperation with the International Tribunal in respect of 
the Former Yugoslavia (Law on the International Yugoslavia Tribunal), 10 April 1995. 
157 Section 11 (2) of the Austrian Federal Law on Cooperation with the International Tribunals, 
Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt) No-37/1995. 
158 Frowein J. A. et al submission of amicus curiae ("Frowein Brief") on behalf of the Max 
Planck Institute for Comparative and International Law in Prosecutor v Blaskic, Case No. IT- 
95-14-PT, p. 45- 
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evidence or answer questions, or to produce documents or other materials is 
the national law of Trinidad and Tobago albeit, in order to facilitate 
cooperation with the ICC, that law applies with any necessary 
modifications 1 
59 
. 
Any interference by the ICC in the national proceedings will come with the 
consent of the State in question. National authorities do not require under the 
ICC Statute an approval to investigate or apprehend suspects or accused 
persons and the Court is required to respect foreign judgements 160 . 
Notwithstanding this obligation, the ICC may nevertheless request 
governments to provide information, which is not qualified in the Statute, on 
the progress of any investigations or trials' 61 . This is important as it gives an 
opportunity to the Court to monitor the degree to which ICC law is understood 
and applied correctly. Here is an example. In the Vuckovic Case 162 ,a Serb was 
originally convicted of genocide committed during the Kosovo conflict. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court quashed the verdict and sent it back to the first 
instance court. The appeal judgement stated that no genocide took place in 
Kosovo in 1999. This decision was criticised by OSCE as a "wasted 
opportunity to thoroughly interpret the genocide statute of the Criminal Code 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 163 and to state jurisprudence ftom other 
courts and tribunals in support of its conclusion that the evidence at trial did 
not establish the crime of genocide. A well-reasoned opinion on this issue, 
159 2004 Trinidad and Tobago International Criminal Court Bill, Art. 85(l). 
""' See for example, with regard to life imprisonment constitutional incompatibilities, Duffy H. 
"The ICC will defer to the State's investigation or prosecution of an egregious crime, 
irrespective of whether or not the State imposes a life sentence, The underlying objectives of 
constitutional prohibition on life imprisonment are human rights orientated They seek to 
recognise theJact that life imprisonment is considered a violation of human rights in certain 
national systems, although it is questionable this is so on the international level. The 
prohibition should not therefore apply to international prosecutions that enshrine 
internationally (as opposed to nationally) recognised human rights standards. The Statute 
(ICQ enshrines those human rights relating to the rights of suspects and accusedpersons that 
form part of international human rights law" in "National Constitutional Compatibility and 
International Criminal Court", 200 1,11 Duke Journal of International and Comparative 
International Law 1, p. 38. 
161 ICC Statute, Article 18 (5). 
162 Vuckovic M. and Bisevac B., indicted 29 November 1999 by the international i sed panel of 
Kosovo's Supreme Court. 
163 In particular Art. 14 1. 
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disseminated throughout the legal community, would have been useful as a 
means of increasing widcrstanding of a complex and controversial subject 15164 
However, a screening procedure with a wider scope from the one already 
envisaged by the Statute, should be encouraged within States in order to 
narrow the circumstances under which the jurisdiction of the Court may be 
triggered. 
3.5 Equality of arms in pre-trial proceedings with respect to access and 
disclosure of evidence 
The principle of equality of arms represents one of the most important features 
of the wider concept of a fair trial whereby each party must be afforded 
reasonable opportunity to present its case in conditions that do not place one at 
a disadvantage vis-a-vis one's adversary 165 . The ICTY and ICTR have ruled 
that equality of arms between the parties does not amount to equality of means 
and resources. In the Kayishema case, the ICTR concluded in fact that the 
rights of the accused should not be interpreted to mean that the defence is 
entitled to the same means and resources as the prosecution 166 . As 
far as the 
ICC is concerned, the Assembly of States has full control over all of the 
Prosecutor's resources. Notwithstanding the fact that the use of the powers of 
the Assembly of States Parties may interfere with the preliminary inquiries, 
investigations and prosecutions undertaken by the ICC Prosecutor167 , no 
remedy against such violation is provided in the Statute. 
The ICC Prosecutor, as an institutional organ of the Court, enjoys unique 
freedom and ability to identify and access relevant evidence; such imbalanced, 
164 OSCE "Kosovo's War Crimes Trials: A Review", 23 September 2002, p. 50- 
165 See e. g. Foucher v France, 18 March 1997, Reports 1997-11, at 34; Bulut v Austria, 22 
February 1996, Reports 1996-11, at 47. Some international instruments on cooperation 
specifically provide for 'judicial equality' during proceedings, e. g. 1962 Nordic States 
Scheme. 
166 Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95- I -T, Trial Chamber (21 May 
1999) para. 20. 
167 CC Statute Art. 42 (2). 
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procedural advantage (relating to the equality of arms of the parties in 
presenting their case) is inadequately restored through defence rights and the 
disclosure regime imposed on the Prosecution 168 . It is therefore fundamental to 
establish that the Prosecutor's duty, notwithstanding practical restrictions, is 
proactive rather than dependent on the defence or the Court requesting 
disclosure' 69 . The experiences of the ICTY/ICTR and the judgements rendered 
by the European Court of Human Rights concerning the gathering of evidence 
and equality of arms of the parties in criminal proceedings are instrumental in 
predicting the approach the Court is expected to take on these issues, and 
therefore in upholding the principles of a fair trial. Evidence may be crucial in 
establishing a prima facie case before the ICC, thereby sequestering the 
opportunity of national authorities to present, under comPlementarity, a timely 
jurisdictional claim or challenge. In fact, as part of investigating crimes under 
duties of 'aut dedere aut judicare' States must collect and assess evidence 170 . 
The interpretation of the principle of disclosure with respect to the imposition 
or acceptance of a broad duty has often proved to be difficult and has resulted 
in miscarriages of justice 171 . There have been several regional attempts to 
harmonise the practices among countries' 72 . The reflecting need for a unified 
practice in criminal justice the ICC Statute sets out that any application and 
interpretation is to be conducted consistently with international human rights 
and without any adverse distinction 173 . The Statute contains a 
broad provision 
to protect individuals from human rights abuses. On the one hand, the basic 
168 McIntyre G., "Equality ofArms-Defining Human Rights in the Jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Tribunalfor theformer Yugoslavia" 16 Leiden Journal of International 
Law (2003), p. 276. 
169 Justice Smellie A. QC, "The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose: The Case for Global 
Standards", International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law, 18 th International 
Conference, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 8-12 August 2004. 
170 See e. g. 1991 UN Model Treaty on Extradition, Art. 4; Wilkitzki P., "Inclusion of the 
principle 'aut dedere autjudicare' in the European Convention on Extradition" in European 
Committee on Crime Problems PC-OC 9 (1987). See also 1949 Geneva Convnetions, Articles 
49,50,129 and 146. 
171 See e. g. Australian cases of Rv Fisher and Broster [2003] NSWCCA41 and Rv Ulman 
Naruniec [2003] SASC 437. 
172 See e. g. European Commission, Green Paper on "Procedural Safeguardsfor Suspects and 
Defendant's in Criminal Proceedings throughout European Union", COM/2003/0075 final/. 
FIND FINAL; Commonwealth Scheme on Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice 
(June 1991), Commonwealth Secretariat, 
173 ICC Statute Article 21. Article 21 (1) provides that "The Court shall apply in thefirst 
place, the Statute, Elements of Cries and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence". 
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scheme of procedural protection in the Statute reflects the relevant experience 
and jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR and, on the other, introduces a new 
set of procedural protection called "Rights of Persons During an 
Ini, estigation" 174 . 
The ICC Statute aims at protecting persons from violations 
both of substantial human rights and of rights to a fair procedure 
175 
. 
Arguably, the ICC regime represents a convergence and a harmonisation 
between the common and civil law legal structures 176 and the ICC Prosecutor's 
functions are characteristic to both systems: "The Prosecutor acts both as an 
(administrator ofjustice, in that he acts in the interest of international justice 
pursuing the goal of identifying, investigating and prosecuting the most 
serious international crimes and, as in common legal orders, as a party in an 
177 adversarial system" 
Given that the efficacy of the adversarial system is predicated on equality of 
arms it is difficult to escape a claim that the right to a fair trial requires an 
approximate equality of arms or some form of compensation for any 
substantial disparity. Fairness in the adjudicative context consists partly of 
equality of treatment for the parties concerned, which presupposes an 
independent and impartial tribunal and informed participation in the process of 
arriving at a decisionI78 . From this perspective, pre-trial 
disclosure is necessary 
to ensure equality of arms and should be construed as being an inquisitorial 
174 CC Statute Article 55. 
175 ICC Statute Article 21 (1). For a discussion see e. g. Zappala S., "The Rights of the 
Accused' in Cassese et a] (eds. ), "The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary", Vol. 2, (2000 )1319. 
176 See e. g. 2003 Bosnian new Criminal Procedure Act (Sluzbene Novine Federacije BiH, 
No. 35/2003,28 July 2003), Art. 45 which eliminates the role of the investigative judge and 
now authorises the public prosecutor to carry out investigations. 
177 Cassese A. in Brandts C. and Field S., "Discretion and Accountability in Prosecution: A 
Comparative Perspective" (1995) p. 163. See also Zappala S., "Human Rights in International 
Criminal Proceedings" (2005) stating that "The solution adopted in international criminal 
procedure is certainly based more on the civil law approach", p. 176; Pizzi and Marafioti L., 
"The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial 
System on a Civil Law Foundation" 17 Yale Journal of International Law 1 (1992), 1-40. 
178 Dennis 1. H., "Human rights and evidence in adversarial criminal procedure: the 
advancement of international standards" in Nijboer J. F. and Reijntjes J. M,, "Proceedings of 
the First World Conference on New Trends in Criminal Investigation and Evidence" 1997, 
523. 
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element to the proceedings179 - The predominantly inquisitorial system of the 
ICC has been criticised as a system where "guilt or innocence was determined 
by j. udges alone and the rights of confrontation and counsel were highly 
restricted"' 80. 
In upholding the principle of equality of arms as part of a fair trial the 
European Court of Human Rights opined in Brogers v Belgium' 81 that "having 
regard to the requirements of the rights of the Defence and the principle of 
equality of arms and the role of appearances in determining whether they have 
been complied with, the Court finds that a violation of Article 6 (1) (the 
concept of afair trial) ... 
has undergone a considerable evolution in the Court's 
182 case law" 
The ICTY decided that it would only find that the principle of equality of arms 
has been breached where actual procedural inequality had been established. 
Importantly, a UN S ecretary- General's Report on the ICTY concluded that it is 
4'axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect internationally 
recognised standards regarding the rights of the accused at all stages of the 
proceedings" 183 . 
The most recent case law from the international tribunals 
shows a different trend. The ICTY has in fact, and on occasions, rejected 
adherence to the interpretation of human rights as understood by national laws 
as the application of the Tribunal's Statute is independent from domestic 
184 proceedings and institutions 
In the interest of punishing the violators of core crimes, broad inquisitorial 
functions and rights assist international prosecutors in gathering evidence by 
search and seizure warrants which authorise investigators to request 
179 See Prof. Schwikkard P. J., "Does the merging of inquisitorial and adversarial procedures 
impact onjair trial rights? " 2003 Conference Paper for the International Society for the 
Reform of Criminal Law, 17 th International Conference, The Hague, Netherlands, August 24- 
28,2003. 
180 Lee A. Casey before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 105th Congress, 2 nd Sess. (23 July 1998), p. 71. 
181 Borgers v Belgium, A214-A (19 91) 15 EHRR 92, para 22. 182 Jbid, para. 24. 
183 Report of Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 
888 (1993), (S/25704,03 May 1993), at para. 106. 
184 Op Cit, Wible, note 50, p. 270. 
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information from various government departments and/or military offices. The 
defence on the other hand is not entitled to similar investigative powers; the 
defence cannot like the Prosecutor, investigate in a general sense 185 . For 
example, governments have offered assistance to the ICTY in gathering 
documentary and other physical evidence in a number of ways. The United 
States had provided intelligence information, including overhead photos of 
186 suspected gravesites to the Tribunal , 
information that is unlikely to be 
shared with other states. If such sensitive material is subject to confidentiality, 
the Prosecutor may agree not to make any disclosures at any stage of the 
proceedings 187 without adequate prior disclosure consent of the accused 
188 
. All 
relevant material, such as intelligence information, may only be used with the 
aim of producing new evidence. The ICC Statute allows the Pre-Trial Chamber 
to authorise the Prosecutor to take specific measures within the territory of the 
requested state when there is an urgent need to access evidence. These 
measures may include the Prosecutor entering into cooperation agreements 
with the UN and/or other relevant regional organisations. Cooperation with the 
Court has been interpreted as being of a sui generis form; cooperation should 
not be seen in its 'classic' form, such as that between states, and it should be 
given wider scope 189. When the Pre-Trial Chamber determines that a State is 
unable to execute a request for assistance, it will authorise the Prosecutor to 
90 
take specific investigative measures within the territory of the relevant State' . 
The experience of the ICTY delineates that whereas the Prosecutor has the 
opportunity to secure original materials, either through orders or warrants, the 
accused is regularly denied the same access. In an ICTY case it was explained 
that: 
"The power of seizure granted to the prosecution is a very powerful weapon 
in 
its hands. By seizing material, the prosecution denies such accused persons 
185 Ibid, p. 280. 
186 Op cit, note 2 1, p. 8. Also, States have provided forensic experts or helped non- 
governmental organisations conducting forensic examinations, including excavations of 
gravesites. 187 CC Statute Art. 54 (3) (e). 
188 ICC RPE, Rule 82 (1). 
189 Op cit, note 10. 
190 ]CC Article 57 (3) (d). ICC RPE Rule 115 (1) requires the Pre-Trial Chamber to make 
every effort to inform and invite views from the State Party in question. 
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access to that material. Experience has demonstrated that the results can be 
seriously deleterious to the rights of the accused In one case, in which the 
accused became aware of the seizure by the prosecution, the prosecution 
waited over six months before providing the accused with a copy of the 
documents. In another case, in which the accused was unaware of the seizure 
by the prosecution, the accused had obtained an order requiring the relevant 
Bosnian authorities to produce the documents which was not complied with. 
Only after the trial had ended was it discovered that the documents had been 
in the possession of the prosecution throughout trial". 191 
The prosecution, because of its institutional character and the scope of its 
investigations, will be accorded much greater access to material than an 
accused and will rarely have to establish a legitimate forensic purpose to gain 
access. 
In the ICTY Tadic Case 192 ý 
it was argued for the Defence that the accused had 
been denied fair trial because of the lack of cooperation and the obstruction of 
some external entities which prevented it from properly presenting its case at 
trial. The accused argued that the prosecution did not work under the same 
difficulties in securing its evidence and thus he faced an inequality of arms in 
the presentation of his defence' 93 . The ICTY Appeals Chamber was asked 
in 
this case to construe the principle of "equality of arms" as providing 
194 195 
substantial and not only procedural equality in the interest of a fair trial 
In relying on the Trial Chamber's judgment regarding the difficulties faced by 
the parties in gaining access to evidence in the former Yugoslavia, Tadic also 
argued that the authorities in the territory where the evidence was located 
(Republika Srpska) were uncooperative, which culminated in the defence not 
having adequate time to prepare for trial. The defence proposed to the Appeals 
191 Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, Case No. IT-02-54,26 February 2002, paras3-4. 
192 Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Judgment (15 July 1999) paras. 48-52. 
193 Ibid 
194 See ICTY Statute, Article 21 (4) (b). 
195 Supra, note 196. 
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Chamber a two-step test to be applied in determining whether there had been a 
violation of the principle of equality of arms: ' 96 
Had the defence established on the balance of probabilities that the 
failure of identified authorities to cooperate with the Tribunal resulted 
in relevant and admissible evidence not being presented to the Trial 
Chamber; 
2- If so, was this the result of procedural imbalance produced between the 
parties, in which case it must be assessed whether the imbalance was 
significant enough to undermine the appellant's right to a fair trial. 
Whereas international missions such as of IFOR and SFOR have assisted the 
ICTY and ICTR in collecting evidence and arresting suspects, which are 
themselves mandated by the Security Council 197 , therefore transmit 
its powers, 
the ICC cannot enjoy the same 'benefit', unless the Council refers a situation 
to it. For instance, IFOR has provided logistical assistance to the Tribunal 
investigators excavating gravesites in Bosnia and Herzegovina' 98 ; the mission 
had extensive intelligence gathering capabilities, including monitoring of radio 
communications and access to satellite and aerial inspection. It operated at will 
throughout the country. Under the peace agreement it had "complete and 
unimpededfteedom of movement by ground, air and water throughout Bosnia 
and Herzegovina "199. In order to effectively carry out its responsibilities, it 
was also authorised to use military force 200 . The work of the 
ICTY would have 
probably been impossible without such assistance. The ICC Office of the 
Prosecutor on the other hand has so far only signed an agreement with 
Interpol, which establishes a framework for cooperation between the two 
196 Ibid., para. 33. 
197 NATO issued a Decision Sheet on 16 December 1995 stating that, on the basis of Security 
Council Resolution 103 3: "Agreeing that, having regard to UNSCR 82 7, UNSCR 1033, and 
Annex ]-A of the General Framework Agreement of Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, IFOR 
should detain any person indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal who came into 
contact with ]FOR in its execution of assigned tasks in order to assure the transfer of these 
persons to the International Tribunal". 
198 See Letter from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation addressed 
to the Secretary-General of 22 May 1996, UN Doc. S/1996/375, at para. 9. 
'99 General Framework Agreement, Annex I -A, Art. VI (9) (a). 
200 See Article V1.5 of Annex I -A of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. 
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entities in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice. The agreement 
enables the ICC and Interpol to exchange police information and criminal 
analysis, and to cooperate in the search for fugitives and suspects. The 
agreement affords the ICC Office of the Prosecutor access to Interpol 
telecommunications networks and databases. A similar agreement between 
Interpol and the Special Court for Sierra Leone 201 provides that cooperation 
shall also include the publication and circulation of Interpol notices. Under the 
Agreement, the Special Court has the right to request the Interpol General 
Secretariat to publish and circulate Interpol notices of all types, including red 
notices 202 . The Special Court has primacy over the national courts of Sierra 
Leone and it may therefore request a national court to defer to the competence 
of the Special CoUrt203' which may imply that if Interpol received competing 
requests for information, priority will be given to the Special Court. 
Access to crucial information provided by other international organisations has 
also proved to be largely inaccessibly by the accused. In another case 204 , the 
ICTY maintained that the International Committee of the Red Cross had a 
right under the Four Geneva Conventions, the two Additional Protocols and 
customary international law to insist on non-disclosure of certain information 
relating to the work of the ICRC in the possession of one of its employees 205 . 
Subsequently, however, the Tribunal changed its position following an 
application by the Defence to re-open its decision by which it granted leave to 
the ICRC to appear in matter as amicus curie, holding that "not only equality 
of arms but also common fairness demanded that Todorovic (the Accused) 
should have access for the purpose of arguing that the ICRC Decision was 
wrong"206 . 
On this issue, the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence stipulate 
nevertheless that if the Prosecutor introduces similar evidence protected under 
201 Co-operation Agreement between The International Criminal Police Organ i sation-Interpo I 
and The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Resolution No. AG-2003-RES-08, October 2003. 202 Ibid Art. 3 (1). 
203 Special Court for Sierra Leone Statute Art. 8 (2) and Rule 10 of its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. 
204 Prosecutor v B. Simic, Todorovic et al., Case No. IT-95-9-PT. 
205 Ibid., "Decision Denying Requestfor Assistance in Securing Documents and Witnesses 
ftom the International Committee of the Red Cross" (07 June 2000). 
206 Ibid., "Decision on (1) Application by Stevan Todorovic to re-o en the Decision of 27 July p 
1999, (2) Motion by ICRC to re-open scheduling order of 18 November 1999 and (3) 
conditionsfor access to material" (28 February 2000), para. 22, 
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grounds of confidentiality, the Chamber may not summon the provider of such 
evidence, nor may the Chamber, for the purpose of obtaining additional 
evidence, summon the provider or a representative of the provider as a witness 
or their attendance 207 , nor ask any questions relating to that evidence 208 . 
importantly, the right of the accused to challenge such evidence presented by 
the Prosecution is, too, subject to limitations that govern the disclosure of 
209 confidential evidence and testimony . Although the permission of the source 
of confidential material is required prior to disclosure, the ICTY has taken into 
consideration the fact that such a procedure may significantly delay 
proceedings. In BlaskiC2 10, the ICTY rejected the prosecution's argument that 
if consent for disclosure had been given it fell to the provider of the 
confidential information to determine when the disclosure would occur. In 
another ICTY motion 211 , the 
Defence rejected the position that the ICRC had 
full immunity from national courts or other tribunals and that "it is illogical to 
hold a position that while states (sovereign and independent), even warring 
states, may be compelled to furnish evidence to this Tribunal, the ICRC may 
not be so compelled 212 . 
The Tribunal rejected this argument and denied the 
motion. Whilst maintaining that the ICRC had a right under the Four Geneva 
Conventions and the Additional Protocols to insist upon non-disclosure in 
judicial proceedings of information relating to the work of the ICRC in the 
possession of one of its employees and that the ICRC had a right under 
customary international law not to disclose particular information, the ICTY 
also held that the matter may be reopened in the future if the Defence 
213 
persuades' the Tribunal that the decision was wrong 
207 ICC RPE Rule 82 (2). 
208 Ibid. Rule 82 (3). 
209 Id. Rule 82 (4). 
210 Prosecutor v Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, "Decision on Prosecutor's Requestfor 
Authorisation to Delay Disclosure of Rule 70 Jnformation"(06 May 1998) para. 2. 
211 Prosecutor v B. Sirnic, Todorovic et al, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, "Defence Further Submission 
on Motionfor Order to the ICRC'(03 May 2000) p. 5. 212 Ibid 
213 Op cit., note 208. 
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While the legal arguments behind the Accused's appeal seern clear, those of 
the Prosecution appear to be twofold 214 . Firstly, the Prosecutor attempted to 
prevent the accused gaining access to documents in possession of international 
organisations (ICRC and SFOR) in order to assure the continued cooperation 
of those organisations 215 . 
Secondly, it intended to establish a precedent by 
which other accused persons captured in similar circumstances would be 
216 unable to escape justice 
Under the ICC Statute, this possibility of 'persuading' the Court to order 
disclosure of certain types of evidence appears to be available. According to 
the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence any information, documents or any 
other evidence may be held to be privileged, confidential and therefore not 
subject to disclosure. Rule 73 (4) provides that: 
"The Court shall regard as privileged, and consequently not subject to 
disclosure, including by way of testimony of any present or past official or 
employee of the ICRC, any information, documents or other evidence which it 
came into the possession of in the course, or as a consequence, ofperformance 
by the ICRC of its functions under the Statutes of the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement unless: (a) After consultations undertaken 
pursuant to sub-rule 6, the ICRC does not object in writing to such disclosure, 
or otherwise has waived this privilege; or (b) Such information, documents or 
other evidence is contained in public statements and documents of the ICRC' 
But Sub-rule 6 provides that: 
"If the Court determines that the ICRC information, documents or other 
evidence are of great importance for a particular case, consultations shall be 
held between the Court and the ICRC in order to seek to resolve the matter by 
cooperative means, bearing in mind the circumstances of the case, the 
214 Sloan J., "Prosecution v Todorovic. - Illegal Capture as an Obstacle to the Exercise of 
International Criminal Jurisdiction" (2003) Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, 
No. 1, p. 119. 
215 ibid 
216 Todorovic however renounced his right to access SFOR information and in return 26 
charges out of 27 against him were dismissed. 
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relevance of the evidence sought, whether the evidence could be obtainedfrom 
a source other than ICRC, the interest of justice and of victims, and the 
performance of the Court's and ICRCfUnctions". 
With regard to the protection of the confidentiality of third parties that provide 
information or evidence, the ICC Statute provides that: 
"If a State Party is requested by the Court to provide a document or 
information in its custody, possession or control, which was disclosed to it in 
con dence by a State, intergovernmental organisation or international 
organisation, it shall seek the consent of the originator to disclose that 
document or information. If the originator is a State Party, it shall either 
consent to disclosure of the information or document or undertake to resolve 
the issue of disclosure with the CouW 17 . 
If the originator is a non State Party 
and refuses to consent to disclosure, the requested State shall inform the Court 
that it is unable to provide the document or information because of a pre- 
existing obligation of confidentialiiy to the originator , 218 . 
Importantly, the ICC Statute requires the Prosecutor to disclose to the defence, 
in addition to any other type of disclosure provided for in the Statute, 'any 
evidence in the Prosecutor's possession or control which helshe believes 
shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of 
the accused, or which may affect the credibility ofprosecution evidence' 219 . 
The issue of disclosure is also significant to national security concerns. The 
ICC Statute addresses the pertinent issue of the protection of State information 
220 
that may prejudice its national security interests if disclosed . In particular, 
the Statute provides that the Court and the State in question must resolve any 
217 Subject to the provisions of ICC Article 72. 218 ICC Article 73. 
219 CC Statute Article 67 (2). Also, Article 61 (3) (b) and Article 64 (3) (c) and 64 (6) (d) 
together provide that both the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Trial Chamber may order any 
relevant evidence to be disclosed prior to the relevant hearing, either the confirmation or 
preliminary hearing or the trial itself Rules 76-84 express principles and procedures that all 
the relevant parties must follow at the pre-trial stage in order to ensure that all relevant 
evidence is brought before the Court. See also Rule 12 1. 220 See ICC Articles 72,93 (4) and 99 (5). 
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221 such concerns through cooperative measures . Importantly, the States may 
now under the complementarity principle 222 request the Court to provide 
different types of evidence to them in order to assist with national 
investigations or trials of persons suspected of committing a crime within ICC 
jurisdiction, or which constitute a serious crime under the national law of the 
requesting State. There is in fact a procedure for requesting and executing such 
cooperation as well as principles guiding the Court when determining whether 
or not to meet such requeStS223. 
In the Simic Case 224 , the ICTY had to introduce a purposive interpretation of 
its Statute, namely Article 29, which was to be read as conferring on the 
Tribunal a power to require an international organisation or its competent 
organ to cooperate with it. Here the Defence requested the Tribunal to issue an 
order asking SFOR and other military and security forces to assist the Defence 
in obtaining certain documents and calling certain witnesses. It held that once 
consent had been given, the defence had an immediate right to discovery of 
that material225. It had been contended that the Trial Chamber was asserting its 
authority to control proceedings in circumstances where the disclosure of 
information was subject to the consent of the provider: "Once that consent is 
given, the limits placed on the control of that information, including disclosure 
to the accused, is a determination that falls to the trial chamber within the 
ambit of the Rules and is not one to be dictated by the provider outside the 
ambit of the Rules"226 . More recently, in the Milosevic Case, the 
Tribunal held 
that not only the identity of the information provider should remain 
confidential but also the subject and substance of that information 227 so the 
consent of the provider was needed prior to the disclosure of information 228 . At 
the same time, it was also held that equality of arms requires the Tribunal to 
221 ICC Article 72 (5). 
222 See ICC Articles I and 93. 
223 1CC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 194. 
224 Prosecutor v B. Simic, Todorovic et al, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, "Decision on Motionfor 
Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and Others" (18 October 2000). 
225 Ibid. para. 3. 226 Ibid. para. 4. 
227 Prosecutor v S. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-ARbis and AR73-3, "Public Version of the 
Confidential Decision on the Interpretation and Application of Rule 70" (Appeals Chamber) 
23 October 2003, para-20. 
228 Ibid para. 23. 
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encourage third parties to provide confidential information to the defence in 
the same way they are encouraged by the ICTY Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence to do for the Prosecution 229 . The balance achieved in the ICC Statute 
between the rights of the accused and the protection of victims is comprised in 
Article 68 (1) providing that these measures "shall not be prejudicial to, or 
I. nconsistent with the rights of the accused and [of] a fair and impartial 
trial". 230 
In yet another ICTY case 231 , where the prosecution admitted that it had been in 
possession of the archive sought during the trial but did not reveal this to the 
defence or the Trial Chamber, the defendants had sought prior to their trial and 
during the proceedings to gain access to information which they believed were 
in the hands of identified authorities of the former Yugoslavia which 
themselves claimed otherwise. During appeal it transpired that those particular 
documents were in fact in the possession of the prosecution. This case 
illustrated the disadvantages the accused faces by the fact that he does not 
know the scope of materials held by the prosecution and no obligation is 
232 
imposed on the prosecutor to provide the accused with this information 
Where such an obligation has been found to exist and has been violated by the 
Prosecution, the ICTY failed to impose sanctions 233 . 
Commenting on this case, 
an author suggested: 
"To avoid this type of situation occurring in the future, one judge of the 
Tribunal has taken a more stringent approach to the issue of search and 
seizure warrants requested by the Office of the Prosecutor. He has attached 
229 Ibid See ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rules 70 (B) and (F). Rule 70 (F) states 
that a Trial Chamber "may order upon an application by the accused or defence council that, 
in the interest ofjustice, the provisions of this Rule shall apply mutatis mutandis to specific 
information in the possession of the accused'. 
230 See Amnesty International Public Report "The International Criminal Court: Drafting 
Effective Rules of Procedure and Evidence Concerning Trial, Appeal and Review", 01 June 
1999, available at www. amnesty. oriz/1ibrary/inde. x/ENGIOR-400091999 
231 Prosecutor v Krdic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, "Decision on Second Motion to 
Extend Timefor Filing Appellant's Brief ", paras. 9-10,02 July 200 1. 
232 0 Cit, p McIntyre, note 172, p. 294. 
233 See Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, in relation to disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence, "Decision on Motionfor Relieffrom Rule 68 Violations by the 
Prosecutor andfor Sanctions to be Imposed Pursuant to Rule 68bis and Motionfor 
Adjournment while Matters Affecting Justice and a Fair Trial can be Resolved', 30 October 
2002. 
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conditions to the prosecution's seizure of documents requiring the prosecution 
to submit to ajudge of the Tribunal a list of all documents seized and to notify 
all prosecution teams of the sel--ure of the documents. However, this practice is 
jbr. /rom uniform and until it so becomes, and a register of all documents in the 
hands of the prosecution has been established so that all parties are aware of 
it, hat documents are held by the prosecution, problems similar to those 
, 234 outlined TO/I continue to occur' 
The Tribunal's rulings further reveal that there could be new facts, which, 
although not known to the Chamber at the time of a decision, may be known to 
the prosecution-, disclosure of such evidence will only be considered in 
exceptional circumstances, if the accused can prove that there is a possibility 
of miscarriage of justice. Moreover, the defence must also prove that such 
evidence could have been a decisive factor in reaching the original decision 235 . 
A further problem surrounding equality of arms in the disclosure of evidence is 
the gathering and admissibility of illegally obtained evidence. 
One of the major issues arising out of mutual legal assistance agreements is the 
gathering of evidence in a foreign country 236 and the admissibility of such 
evidence obtained in breach of foreign law 237 . For example, statements 
deemed 
to have been obtained as a result of torture should not be invoked as evidence 
in any proceedings. The ICC Statute provides in fact that "any evidence 
obtained by means of violation of the Statute or internationally recognised 
238 human rights shall not be admissible" . In extradition proceedings, 
however, 
234 Supra, note 235, p. 294- 
235 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (15 July 1999) 
para 55. 236 See for example Ex parte Bennett [ 1994] AC 42 and Rv Mullen [ 1999] 2Cr App R 143. 
237 Supra note 88, p. 233. 
238 ICC Article 69 (7). Also, Article 15 of the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment is on the one hand designed to deprive the practice of 
torture of any value when inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third party information or confession; so statements obtained as a result of torture must be 
declared absolutely null. On the other hand, Article 15 imposes an absolute obligation on the 
courts and the authorities of the state in question to examine in an objective and fair manner all 
the elements needed to establish that the statement was obtained unlawfully. 
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it is traditionally necessary to establish whether torture is practiced in the 
requesting state 
239 
and to look at the circumstances in which the statement 
issued has been obtained and whether statements obtained as a result of torture 
240 
are customarily accepted by the courts of the requesting state 
Intercepts have often presented admissibility difficulties. The issue has been 
addressed recently by the ICTY in the Milosevic case where it was said: "The 
Tribunal has liberal rides regarding the admissibility of such material ... 
In the 
pure common law system the question would be raised about the way in which 
the information was gathered, whether the wire tapes were done on court 
orders or not. This is done in order to protect the human rights of the accused 
, 241 as well as the juryfrom the possible manipulations of the prosecution' 
In another case 242 , the relevant national provisions 
had been taken into 
consideration,, but the ICTY held that although the national law rendered 
illegally obtained evidence inadmissible, this did not preclude admissibility in 
the Tribunal under the Statute. 243 Furthermore, the Tribunal held, relying on 
ECHR rulings 244 that even if the evidence in question had been obtained 
illegally, its admission during criminal proceedings may not have necessarily 
interfered with the accused's right to a fair trial. 
239 See for example P. E. v France [2001 J, UN Doc. CAT- I 5/CAT-RP- 108-9, Communication 
193/2001. 
240 No extradition to another State where there are substantial ground to believe that an act of 
torture has been committed. See for example UNHCHR Complaint No. 219/2002, G. K. v 
Switzerland and No. 110/1998 Celia Nunez Chipana v Venezuela. 
24 1 The Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T. See Trial Chamber III "Final 
Decision on the Admissibility of Intercepted Communications", 14 June 2004. 
242 Prosecutor v Kordic and Cerkez, Case No., 02 February 2000, Transcript 13670. 
243 See ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rules 89 and 95. 
244 Khan v United Kingdom (2001) 31 EHRR 45, para. 40 where it was said that absence of a 
legal basis for interception of a conversation by means of a listening device installed on 
private property was a violation of ECHR Art. 8 but the use of that evidence 
did not constitute 
a violation. Also, in Allan v United Kingdom, Judgment (05 November 2002) the 
ECHR 
considered Home Office Guidelines 1984on the use of equipment in police surveillance 
operations which provide that: in each case, the authorising officer should satisfy 
himself that 
the following criteria are met: (1) the investigation concerns serious crime-normal methods of 
investigation must have been tried and failed, or from the nature of things, be unlikely to 
succeed if tried; (2) there must be good reason to think that the use of equipment would 
be 
likely to lead to an arrest and a conviction, or where appropriate, to the prevention of acts of 
terrorism; (3) use of equipment must be operationally feasible; (4) in judging how 
far the 
seriousness of the crime under investigation justifies the use of particular surveillance 
techniques, authorising officers should satisfy themselves that the degree of intrusion 
into the 
privacy of those affected is commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. 
See also P. J. 
and J. H. v United Kingdom (1998) N. 44787/98. 
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In assessing whether intercepted evidence is admissible, the ICTY held that the 
correct balance should be maintained between the fundamental rights of the 
accused and the essential interests of the international community in the 
prosecution of persons charged with serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. In the Brdjanin case 245 , the ICTY turned to the 
jurisprudence of national courts and found three approaches adopted in 
determining the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence : 246 (1) the law 
itself may specifically provide for the automatic exclusion of any evidence 
which has been illegally obtained or otherwise inappropriately obtained; (2) 
the issue of exclusion or admission of such evidence may be left to the 
discretion of the judge who has the judicial duty of ensuring fairness to the 
accused. In Canada for instance "the evidence will not be excluded because the 
initial violation is not serious because... the police relied in goodfaith on a 
statute that had not yet been found unconstitutional"247; (3) the courts might 
concern themselves only with the quality of the evidence and not consider its 
248 
provenance at all. The last approach is mostly a common law approach 
The ICTY also reasoned, with regard to admissibility of illegally obtained 
evidence, that the drafters of the ICTY Rules chose not to set out a rule 
providing for automatic exclusion of evidence illegally or unlawfully obtained 
and opted instead to leave the matter of admissibility irrespective of its 
provenance to be dealt in accordance with ICTY Rules which provide in 
essence that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the national rules of 
evidence, 249 that the Tribunal shall apply rules of evidence which best favour a 
fair determination of a case and are consistent with the purpose of the 
245 Prosecutor v Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36, "Decision on the Defence Objection to Intercept 
Evidence ", 03 October 2003. 
246 Ibid para28. 
247 See Rv Grant (1993) 84 C. C. C. (3d) 173 (S. C. C); for a similar decision see e. g. United 
States v Leon et al. [1984] 468 US 897 (1984), where the U. S. Supreme Court established that 
the only significant exception to the exclusionary rule may be relied upon if the police obtain a 
search warrant and the warrant is later found to be defective, in which case the evidence will 
not be excluded as long as the police relied on it in "reasonable goodfaith". Generally, the 
exclusionary rule in the U. S. is mandatory and not subject to the discretion of the trial judge, 
248 Loc cit, note 250. 
249 ICTY RPE, Rule 89 (A). 
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Statute 250 
, that the Tribunal may exclude evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial251 and not admit 
evidence if obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability 
or if its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity 
of the proceedingS252. 
In implementing this provision, the Norwegian ICC Act sets out that the king 
may grant leave for the Court to receive testimony about a matter that is being 
kept secret in the interests of national security or relations with a foreign 
253 state . Moreover, duty to secrecy or other legislation or instruments shall not 
preclude a person from testifying before the Court is so far as the Court so 
254 255 orders . According to a survey conducted by the European Commission in 
2003, national rules of criminal procedure are more protective of the rights of 
the accused than is required by Article 6(l) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights 256 
. Only in seven States (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France 
257 
' 
Germany 258 
, Sweden and the United Kingdom) is evidence obtained in 
violation of the right to respect for private life in principle admissible in 
criminal proceedings. In ten other countries surveyed (Belgium, Cyprus, 
Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands and 
Portugal259) such evidence will not usually be admissible 260. 
250 Ibid Rule 89 (B). 
251 Ibid. Rule 89 (D). 
252 Ibid Rule 95. 
253 Sec. 7 of Act. No. 65 (July 12 200 1) relating to the implementation into Norwegian law of 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998. 
254 Ibid. This Section goes on to state that these provisions apply to the surrender of a 
document, other objects or information even when subject to secrecy. 
255 European Commission, "Opinion on the status of illegally obtained evidence in criminal 
procedures in the Member States of the European Union" 30 November 2003, prepared by the 
European Union Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, p. 6 available at 
http: //europa. eu. int/comi-n/justice horne/cfr cdf/doc/avis/200') 3 en. r)d 
256 For an early case concluding that certain illegally obtained evidence did not breach Art. 6 
(1) see e. g. Shenk v Switzerland, 13 EHRR 242 (12/07/1988), No. 17 1. 
257 See French Penal Code (CCP) Art. 171 providing that the exclusionary rule will be triggered 
only when the violations are considered to have breached significant portions of the Code or 
other laws related to criminal procedure. For a full discussion see Frase R. S., "France" in 
Bradley C. M. (ed. ) "Criminal Procedure-A Worldwide Study" 1999,143-155. 
258 in German criminal procedure law there is no exclusionary rule which renders illegally 
obtained evidence inadmissible. Under Sec. 136 (3) of the 2002 Criminal Code only 
statements obtained by violence, hypnosis or illegal threats will be inadmissible. 
259 See also e. g. The Canada Act 1982 (Part 1), Sec. 24 (2) provides that evidence obtained as a 
result of an illegal police search or seizure of a suspect must be barred from that suspect's 
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3.6 Conclusion 
National judicial organs through which requests of the Court are put into effect 
play a crucial role in guaranteeing the fundamental rights of individuals; in 
many States, pre-trial safeguards are part of constitutional requirements and 
sometimes these national safeguards might be greater than those existing in 
international law. From this perspective the appropriateness of the direct 
application of standards established by the ICC Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence such as those relating for instance to the 
determination of equality of arms and appropriateness of illegally obtained 
evidence in pre-trial proceedings are questionable. Application of the equality 
of arms principle in criminal proceedings should, at all stages, be inclined in 
favour of the Defence acquiring parity with the Prosecution to minimise the 
risks of carrying out miscarriages of justice. In requesting the Court to defer 
proceedings, the interested State should take into consideration the overall 
purposes of the Court, the principle of complementarity and most importantly 
the objective of producing the most appropriate jurisdiction for trying the 
accused. Consideration of the fact that the investigation process and the 
gathering of evidence might well take place before an alleged criminal is 
identified is fundamental to the timely assertion of jurisdiction and the 
observance of the equality of arms doctrine. 
When making a decision on whether or not to initiate criminal proceedings, the 
ICC Prosecutor is not guided merely by legal criteria. Under the Statute, the 
Prosecutor must assess the political convenience of doing so with a view to 
satisfying the 'interests of justice' 261 . The 
jurisdictional dilemma stems from 
conflicting needs of the ICC to ensure international justice by punishing 
violations of international crimes and the interests of the States in retaining 
criminal trial and also that the suspect has various remedies available to him such as stay of 
proceedings, sentence reduction and damage awards from civil courts. 
260 Loc cit, note 259. 
261 See ICC Statute Art. 53 (2) (c). 
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discretion regarding methods of accountability, in particular when the 
lawfulness of their official acts is in dispute. Ultimately, the Prosecutor enjoys 
a degree of political discretion which must be reconciled with the legal 
objectives of justice. By claiming jurisdiction or requesting the Court to refer 
proceedings to a State, national bodies may protect the interests of individuals 
against arbitrary political considerations of the Court262. In fact, absent a clear 
definition in the Statute or the Rules of what specifically these interests of 
justice are, the Prosecutor possess a far-reaching political discretion in 
deciding whether or not to proceed with an investigation or prosecution 263 . 
The principle of abuse of rights emanating from a failure to exercise one's 
duties in good faith 264 and in observing the rights of the accused persons is 
applicable to both States and the International Criminal Court. From 
comparisons made between legislations and practices of numerous states it is 
evident that rules of criminal justice procedure diverge in one or more aspects. 
Whether a domestic trial meets international standards of what constitutes a 
fair trial will depend in many cases on how closely the national codes of 
criminal procedure are followed. On the other hand, international rules of 
criminal procedure both under the ICC Statute and human rights fail to 
comprehensively establish rules that guarantee universal fundamental rights of 
suspects and accused persons in pre-trial proceedings. 
262 Diez Picazo, L. M., "Elpoder de acusar" Ministerio Fiscaly Cons titu cion alism o" 15 
(2000), Ariel, Barcelona. 
263 Op cit, note 184, Schefer D. J., "The Prosecutor undoubtedly is going to have to become 
not only the receiver of an enormous amount of information in this capacity, he will have to 
decide and he will have to makejudgments as to what he pursues and what does not pursuefor 
investigative purposes. In the end, those kind ofjudgments by the prosecutor will inevitably be 
politicaljudgments because he is going to have to say no to a lot of complaints, a lot of 
individuals, a lot of organisations that believe very strongly that crimes have been committed, 
but he is going to have to say no to them. When he says no to them andyes to others and he is 
deluged with these, he mayfind that he is making some political decisions", p. 3. 
264 See e. g. Lockerbie Case (Case Concerning Questions of Interpretations and Application of 
the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie - Libya v United 
States; Libya v United Kingdom, Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures) ICJ 
Rep. 1992, p. 114. 
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Chapter 4 
International Criminal Court and Article 98 Immunity Agreements 
217 
4.1 Introduction 
The debate on non-surrender agreements (or Bilateral Immunity Agreements- 
BlAs) and their effects on the International Criminal Court will be approached 
from both legal and political perspectives. The legal analysis leads to 
questioning and understanding of whether these agreements lie within the 
parameters of ICC Article 98 (2) on cooperation with respect to waiver of 
immunity and consent to surrender. The political conceptualisation of 
immunity agreements on the other hand allows appreciation of the policies 
which determine how and to what extent these agreements will affect the 
proper functioning of the ICC, affecting therefore the rights of the accused, 
and to appreciate the still uncertain and dubious relationship between the ICC 
and the Security Council which is unavoidably political rather than legal in 
nature. 
On one hand the U. S. administration moved towards persuading States to enter 
into impunity agreements, which seek to prevent States from surrendering US 
nationals accused of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes to the 
International Criminal Court. Simultaneously, it achieved a Security Council 
resolution in July 2002 seeking to invoke Article 16 of the Rome Statute 
deferring any investigation or prosecution by the International Criminal Court 
of nationals of States Non-Parties for acts or omissions in connection with a 
UN established or authorized operation. In order to evaluate the relationship 
between the International Criminal Court and the Security Council, as well as 
the Council's role in interpreting, applying and even amending the terms of the 
Rome Treaty, I will be looking at the Security Council's recent resolutions on 
peacekeeping missions; as it will be shown, in its resolutions, the Council has 
incorporated the wording of U. S. immunity agreements and therefore 
advanced through Chapter VII of the U. N. Charter U. S. interests and policies 
which defeat the object and purpose as well as the credibility and authority of 
the ICC. 
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The United States had initially encountered widespread opposition and of 
those States who signed the agreements many have indicated that their 
governments will further study the implications and then ratify them. Romania, 
for example, party to the ICC Statute, has confirmed that the signed 
agreements will go to the national parliament for review and that Romania will 
amend the agreement so that it conforms to the EU "guiding principles"' on 
immunity agreements 2. Some of the States Non-Parties have revealed that it 
would be premature to sign such agreements with the United States. Japan and 
the Republic of Korea have responded to Washington's pressures by 
concluding that, for the time being, they would not consider such agreements 
until after they have ratified the ICC Statute. Israel, which like the U. S. 
unsigned the Rome Statute, concluded a reciprocal immunity agreement 
(unlike the Romanian one) with the US. This is not surprising as Israel is 
considering enacting a law that would criminalize cooperation with the ICC, 
including the prohibition on testimony against the state of Israel by Israeli 
witnesses. 
As of 20 May 2005 the U. S. State Department reported 100 ICC immunity 
agreements. At the same time, with the ratification of the ICC Statute by the 
Dominican Republic, ICC ratifications reached 99. Governments, as well as 
international law experts and NGOs reason that the United States is 
misapplying ICC Article 98 on which these agreements are founded. Of these 
100 agreements, less than a third have been ratified by parliament. Those that 
have not been properly ratified but constitute executive agreements have been 
contested, as it will be shown with the case of the Republic of the Philippines, 
as being unconstitutional and requiring parliamentary approval. 
Recently, the parallel or hierarchical relationship of domestic and international 
jurisdictions has been questioned and redefined through the jurisprudence of 
the international ad hoc tribunals (mainly the ICTY and the ICTR) and is yet to 
1 Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions and EU Guiding Principles 
Concerning Arrangements between a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court and the United States Regarding the Conditions to Surrender of Persons to the 
Court" 30 September 2002,12488/1/02 REV ILIMITE. 
2 The justification for signing was as expressed by the Romanian ambassador 
in Washington, 
46a natural extension of SOFA" signed last year. 
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be seen how the ICC will deal in practice with competing jurisdictional 
requests. The discussion on non-surrender agreements will, in this context, be 
illustrative of the problematic nature of multiple legal regimes. It follows that 
the theoretical perspective from which I will conduct this discussion is that 
there are multiple legal regimes as opposed to the proposition that one legal 
system is superior to or subordinate to another one. Three main questions arise 
in this regard: a) whether immunity agreements as proposed by the United 
States are compatible with the existing obligations of ICC States Parties and 
States signatories; b) how will the ICC deal with the terms of such agreements 
and c) what law, under the complementarity principle, is likely to decide which 
of the conflicting obligations under the ICC Statute and an immunity 
agreement should prevail. The analysis of the latter will elucidate that there is 
no conclusive answer, which in turn will lead to a conclusion that ICC law will 
be applied inconsistently and that a significant number of States Parties' 
national constitutional considerations outweigh the object and purpose of the 
ICC Statute. 
I will also consider the reasoning behind the United States immunity 
agreements 'movement', through its legislation and policies. This will help 
understand how the United States as well as States that are parties to the 
immunity agreements justify such contracts as to their necessity and most 
importantly it will illustrate how their existence has created diverse degrees of 
compliance with the Rome Treaty. 
4.2 US objections to the ICC Treaty 
The U. S. position towards the ICC reflects largely the stance of the majority of 
ICC Non-Party States. The U. S. opposition to the ICC Treaty is premised 
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mainly on the following 3: (a) jurisdiction over nationals of Non-Parties; (b) 
ambiguities as to the roles of the Security Council; (c) the 'unaccountable 
Prosecutor' and (d) lack of due process guarantees. 
a) One of the major defects attributed to the ICC by the United States is that it 
may be exploited by some countries to bring trumped-up charges against 
American citizens who, due to the prominent role played by the U. S. in world 
affairs, may have greater exposure to such charges than citizens of other 
countries. Although complementarity ensures, in principle at least, that the 
Court does not assume jurisdiction over a case involving an American citizen, 
unless the U. S. is unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate the case itself, 
numerous U. S. vociferous opponents of the ICC express concern that the Court 
will be empowered to second-guess a valid determination by U. S. prosecutors 
to terminate an investigation or decline the prosecution of a person 4. 
Whilst the right of the United States not to ratify the ICC Treaty must be 
recognised and accepted, their fears have been perceived as misguided. Canada 
for example, recognized that the U. S. had strong concerns about the ICC, but 
concluded the ICC Statute provides, in their view, extensive concessions and 
safeguards to preclude frivolous prosecutions5. On the last day of the Rome 
Conference, the United States sought to exclude from ICC jurisdiction acts by 
nationals of a State Non-Party committed on the territory of a State Party 
unless the Non-Party State accepted the Court's jurisdiction 6. It is a general 
principle of treaty law that only nations that ratify treaties are bound to observe 
3 Elsea J., "US Policy Regarding the International Criminal Court" American Law Division 
Update (03 September 2002). 
4 See e. g The International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, 
"International Criminal Court: Manualfor the Ratification and Implementation of the Rome 
Statute", p. 13, March 2003. 
5 Statement by H. E. Mr. Heinbecker P., Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada 
to the United Nations at the I Oth session of the Preparatory Commission for the International 
Criminal Court, 03 July 2002. Liechtenstein also stated that the concerns regarding frivolous 
and politically motivated investigations are addressed in a thorough and 
fully satisfactory 
manner and that there are no substantive, only political and 
ideological reasons to amend any 
of the ICC Statute provisions, Statement by Mr. Wenaweser 
C., Deputy Permanent 
Representative of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the United 
Nations, 03 July 2002. 
6 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, U. N. Doc. A/ CONF. 183/C. I /L. 90,17 July 1998. 
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them, some purposive interpretations of the ICC Statute advance the claim that 
the Court may indeed subject to its jurisdiction and therefore bind citizens of 
Non-Party nations. The ICC's most ardent supporters maintain in fact that the 
Court, through delegated jurisdiction (see previous chapter) may extend its 
competence over persons of Non-Party States 7. This contention is premature 
and dubious if it is considered that individuals of the highest rank may be 
charged for conduct relating to the execution of official policy; here the 
difference between asserting jurisdiction over individuals and over nations 
becomes less clear. It would be hasty to suggest that the ICC is empowered to 
scrutinise laws and policies of States Non-Parties under which individuals act 
upon 8. Even if these policies were in breach of jus cogens norms, it would be 
for the Security Council and not the ICC to look into a particular situation and 
launch any necessary investigations into any possible breaches of peace and 
security. 
As seen in Chapter 1, the present study asserts that universal jurisdiction 
cannot be derived from the ICC Statute. However, whether universal 
jurisdiction, in its absolute form, in truth exists in practice, and outside the 
Statute, remains a valid, highly debatable subject. Actual state practice does 
not provide as much support for the concept as many ICC supporters may 
claim9. There are countries that have introduced universal jurisdiction 
legislations, albeit limited ones that take into account the rules of international 
and customary law governing immunity and require personal or territorial 
connection to the country in question. Belgium for example, had to abolish in 
2003 its 'Genocide Act' 10, and particularly its section on 'absolute' universal 
jurisdiction, after the International Court of Justice ruled in 2002 that Belgium 
violated international law by allowing a Belgian judge to issue and circulate an 
arrest warrant in absentia against the then Foreign Minister of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. The ICJ held in fact that Belgium failed to respect 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability that the Minister 
7 Wedgwood R., "The United States and the International Criminal Court: The Irresolution of 
Rome", 64 Law & Contemporary Problems 193,199 (200 1). 
8 Ibid 
9 See e. g. China, A/CONF. 183/13, p. 75, paras35 and 37. 
'0 Law relating to the repression of the serious violations of humanitarian 
international law, 
No. 1999-03 -2 3. 
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enjoyed under customary international law 11 . 
In the United States the War 
Crimes Act of 1996 covers specified war crimes and the legislation is limited 
to U. S. nationals or to situations where either the perpetrator or the victim of 
the act is a member of U. S. armed forces. The Act does not therefore provide 
the U. S. with the kind of universal jurisdiction over grave breaches required by 
2 the Geneva Conventions' 
As Wedgwood R. points out, "there is no ordinary precedent for delegating 
national criminal jurisdiction to another tribunal, international or national, 
without the consent of the affected states, except in the aftermath of 
international belligerency" 13 . 
As previously explained, during the Rome 
Conference universal jurisdiction had been expressly rejected by a majority of 
States and the principle therefore does not form part of the ICC Statute (see 
Chapter 1). An example of this lack of support is the Swedish law on 
Cooperation with the ICC providing that: 
"The Government may permit a person who has been surrendered to the 
International Criminal Court to be transferredftom the Court to another State 
for prosecution... If consent is not given ... the 
Government shall request that 
the person surrendered to the International Criminal Court shall be returned 
14 to Sweden" 
The question as to how the emergence of ICC jurisdiction is determined and 
how the investigations are triggered has not so far been eradicated. Three 
options have been put forward 15: (a) the ICC will exercise jurisdiction only 
with the consent of the States competent to investigate; (b) the ICC will 
11 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of II April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, p. 26, para. 70. 
12 In adopting the Act, the House Committee of the Judiciary decided that 
"Expansion of [the 
draft legislation] to include universaIjurisdiction would be unwise [sic] at present. Domestic 
prosecution based on un ivers al jurisdiction could draw the United 
States into conflicts in 
which this country has no place and where our national interests are slight... 
There are ample 
alternative venues available which are more appropriate. 
Prosecutions can be handled by the 
nations involved or by international tribunals", H. R. Rep. 
No. 104-698, at 8 (1996). 
13 Op cit, Wedgwood, note 6, p. 199. 
14 Sec. 10 Cooperation with International Criminal Court Act (2002: 329). 
15 Solera 0., "Complementaty Jurisdiction and International Criminal Justice", International 
Review of the Red Cross, 2003, N. 845, pp. 145-171. 
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determine its own jurisdiction according to a series of criteria expressly laid 
down in the Statute; and (c) the ICC would be free to establish its own 
jurisdiction within flexible parameters. 
India, for example, justified its non-ratification of the Rome Treaty by 
expressing concerns that the Statute gives the UN Security Council a role that 
violates international law and by observing that the Security Council has the 
power to refer a case to the ICC, the power to block ICC proceedings and the 
power to bind Non-Party States 16 , while some Security Council members may 
17 have no intention to become States Parties to the Statute . India was also 
concerned that the Statute may be interpreted as implicitly providing for 
delegated universal jurisdiction 18 , making no distinction between States Parties 
and States non-Parties' 9. States that have already ratified the Statute accept the 
criminal prohibition vis-a-vis the acts that constitute crimes within the ICC 
Statute. For Non-Parties intending to ratify the ICC Treaty in the future, 
complementarity jurisdiction will come into force two months after deposit of 
the instrument of ratification or accession. Therefore, criminal and procedural 
laws should be enacted and entered into force within two months of ratification 
or accession. 
(b) In an interview, the US undersecretary Grossman said: 20 
16 During Treaty negotiations proposed that Draft Statute Art. 86 (7), which read in part "or 
where the Security Council referred the matter to the Security Council referred the matter to 
the Court, to the Security Council", UN Doc. A/Conf. 183/C. I/L. 80,15 July 1998, p. 335. 
Another example is China that could not accept the universal jurisdiction of the ICC without 
State consent. In its view, the power of the Prosecutor should be based on State consent and 
the ICC Statute should also be adopted by consensus, A/CNF. 183/13 (11), p. 188, para. 37. 
17 K. Kittichaisaree, "International Criminal Law" (2002) p. 36. 
18 For example, Art. 2 of the 2004 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia specifically states 
that "sovereignty is untransferable". 
19 ICC Statute also failed to incorporate India's proposal to Articles 5 and 8 (5) to proscribe as 
a war crime the use of weapons of mass destruction, such as 'nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons", see India: proposal reading the Bureau proposal in document 
A/CONF. 183/C. I/L. 59, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/C. I/L. 72,15 July 1998, p. 248 and 
A/CONF. I 83/C. I/L. 94,17 July 1998, p. 250. 
20 Interview by M. Molinari of Marc Grossman, U. S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs, La 
Stampa, August 29,2002; In 1998 Ambassador D. J. Scheffer cited a situation of Chorrillo, 
Panama (December 1989 invasion, "Operation Restore Hope" in an effort to capture Manuel 
Noriega) as an example of potential abuse of the U. S. in the ICC- see "Challenges Confronting 
International Justice Issues", 4 New England international and Comparative Law Annual 
1998. 
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" We believe that the ICC lacks any kind of control, which is much different 
firom the judicial systems in our country. This Court risks politization, it risks 
raising unjustified cases, it risks putting the US. on the defendant's bench. We 
are great supporters of international tribunals to punish crimes against 
humanity, as those established in Rwanda and ex Yugoslavia but a tribunal 
,, 21 must be created by the Security Council, so that it can be held accountable 
Interference by the Security Council with the work of the ICC was specifically 
what the majority of states objected to during the drafting of the Statute. In 
complete contrast to the U. S. proposition on the proper role of the Security 
Council in the work of the ICC, Mexico even suggested that the use of words 
*Security Council' in any of the Statute's articles should be replaced with "the 
relevant principal organs of the United Nations"22 , suggesting delegation 
rather than centralisation of power within the U. N. system. 
In March 2005, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security 
Council passed a resolution in which it referred the situation in Darfur 
23 to the 
ICC24 
. 
To the disappointment of many ICC States Parties, this SC Resolution 
recalls Article 16 of the ICC Statute, taking note of the existence of Article 98 
25 (2) agreements . 
The Resolution in fact reads: "the Government of Sudan and 
all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and 
provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor ... while 
recognizing that States non party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under 
the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other international 
21 See e. g. Cassese A., "L'orgoglio americano cheftena il tribunale mondiale", La 
Repubblica, 17 July 2003, p. 17. 
22 Doc. A/CONF. I 83/C. I/L. 81,15July 1998 in United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Official Rec., Vol. 
111, p. 249. 23 As of 01 July 2002. 
24 UN Security Council Res. 1593 (2005), 5158 th meeting, 31 March 2005, S/RES/1593 
(2005). 
25 Ibid. At the adoption of the Resolution Denmark stressed that reference to such agreements 
is purely factual. However, Denmark did not comment on the operative paragraph 
6, Ms Loj, 
S/PV. 5158, p. 6 
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Ull . )26 organizations to cooperate ,fY 
1. By incorporating the exact wording of the 
U. S. immunity agreements, the Security Council regrettably decided that 
"nationals, current or former officials or personnelfirom contributing State 
outside Sudan which is not party to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that 
contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions... unless such exclusive 
jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the contributing State"27 . 
The United 
States abstained from the vote as it fundamentally objected to the Council's 
decision to refer the situation to the Court, but at the same it did not oppose the 
Resolution as it was satisfied with the protection from investigation and 
prosecution it achieved 28. It also emphasised that this protection is precedent- 
setting, as the Resolution clearly acknowledges the concerns of States Non- 
Parties to the Rome Treaty and recognizes that persons from those States 
should not be vulnerable to investigation or prosecution by the ICC, without 
express consent of those States or the Security Council29 . 
The United States 
actually expressed the expectation that by referring a situation to the ICC, the 
Security Council will perform its 'appropriate function' and exercise '! firm 
political oversight of the process"30 . 
The Philippines, although party to an 
immunity agreement with the United States, expressed the belief that the ICC 
may be a casualty of Resolution 1593. The country's U. N representative stated 
that "operative paragraph 6 of the resolution is killing its credibility -softly, 
perhaps, but killing it nevertheless"31 . 
Notwithstanding Security Council 
powers to exclude a group of persons from criminal investigations, one of the 
important advantages of Security Council referral is that the Court's 
jurisdiction over persons and evidence will not then depend upon the 
32 
ratification by any given state 
26 UN Security Council Res. 1593 (2005), 5158 th meeting, 31 March 2005, S/RES/1593 
(2005), para. 2. 
27 Id, para. 6. th 
28 Mrs Patterson (United States of America), Security Council 5158 meeting, 31 March 
2005, 
S/PV. 5158. 
29 Ibid 
30 id, 
31 Statement by Mr. Baja (Philippines), UN Security Council Res. 1593 
(2005), 5158 th 
meeting, 31 March 2005, S/RES/1593 
(2005) 
32 Goldstone R. J. and Simpson J., "Evaluating the Role of the 
International Court as a Legal 
Response to Terrorism", Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 
16,2003, p. 22; see also Wasek- 
Wiaderek M., "The Principle of Equality ofArms in Criminal 
Procedure Under Article 6 of 
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For the majority of States, the Security Council's potential control of ICC 
criminal proceedings was seen as a crucial element in the establishment of the 
ICC. Because of the permanent status at the Council which endows it with a 
veto, the United States 33 , 
Russia, France to a lesser extent, and China took a 
position originally that cases should only be referred to the ICC by the 
Security Council, thereby limiting the powers of the Court. This approach 
would have required prior approval by the Council before the ICC Prosecutor 
could proceed with an investigation and prosecution. In fact, the first draft ICC 
Statute provided that "No prosecution may be commenced... arising from a 
situation which is being dealt with by the Security Council as a threat to or 
breach of the peace or an act of aggression under Chapter V11 of the Charter, 
, 34 unless the Security Council otherwise decides' . In effect, this is what the 
United States has achieved through the Darfur Resolution, as ICC decisions to 
initiate prosecution may be vetoed by just one permanent member. Moreover, 
the present text of ICC Statute Art. 5 (2) provides that the definition on the 
crime of aggression shall be adopted and conditions be set out "under which 
the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to that crime ... 
[The] 
provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations". Such wording may be construed as a direct concession to the 
Security Council's responsibility and right to act and make determinations in 
cases involving aggression 35 . 
The ICC Statute empowers the Court to define 
and punish the crime of "aggression" which is solely the prerogative of the 
Security Council under the T-TN Chapter. States Parties will have the 
opportunity to vote on definitions of aggression after the Treaty has been in 
effect for seven years, and such definitions will have to be in accordance with 
the UN Charter which again, is in line with the approach of preserving the role 
the European Convention on Human Rights and its Functions in Criminal Justice ofSelected 
European Countries: A Comparative View" (2001). 
33 Ambassador D. J. Scheffer said that the ICC "has to be a court that recognises political 
realities. It has to be a court that does not contradict, contravene or override the authority of 
the Security Council to deal with conflict situations", I 9th Annual United Nations 
Parliamentary Forum, Parliamentarians for Global Action, "Crafting Lasting Peace", 09 
October 1997. 
34 1994 ILC Draft Statute, Art. 23(3). 
35 See e. g. Sadat L. N, and Carden S. R., "The New International Criminal 
Court: An Uneasy 
Revolution" March 2000, Georgetown Law Journal, pp. 381-459. 
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of the Security Counci 136. It would follow that the 1CC is merely providing a 
forum for trying individuals accused of committing 'aggression' under 
international law 37 
. 
Nonetheless, the Court and the Security Council are likely 
to act together, not one to the detriment of the other as "peacekeeping 
operations and the International Criminal Court are two important pillars for 
the realization of United Nations goals, and we have to make sure that both 
instruments work in a coherent and mutually reinforcing manner. Maintenance 
of international peace and security and the repression of serious crimes 
cannot be viewed as conflicting objectives"38 . 
(c) A further major U. S. objection to the Rome Treaty also relates to the 
proprio motu, self-initiating Prosecutor, who, as already described, on his or 
her authority and with the consent of two judges, can initiate investigations 
and prosecutions without referral to the Court of a situation either by a 
government that is a party to the Treaty, or by the Security Counci139. 
The majority of States at the Rome Conference were in favour of a proprio 
motu Prosecutor. Norway for example, perceived that the 'supervisory' role of 
the Pre-Trial Chamber was a sufficient safeguard against politically motivated, 
or otherwise inappropriate investigations, and that such a role is a particularly 
significant step forward, compared to the Statutes of the existing ad hoc 
TribunaIS40. According to the U. S. stance, this is not sufficient: "Even if he (the 
Prosecutor) has to go to the Pre-Trial Chamber and get the approval of at 
least two of three judges in the Pre-Trial Chamber, in the end you have three 
36 For a discussion on crime of aggression under the ICC Statute see Kress C., "The German 
Federal Prosecutor's Decision Not to Investigate the Alleged Crime of Preparing Aggression 
against Iraq", 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1,2004,245-264. 
37 Similarly, the General Assembly adopted a Resolution in 1974 (3314 (XXIX), 2319 plenary 
meeting) which enumerated the acts that constitute aggression but it left the determination to 
the Security Council (Art. 4). Also, opponents of the ICC may argue that the lack of agreement 
among nations as to the definition of aggression suggests that any definition adopted only by a 
majority of member states of the ICC may be sufficiently grounded in international law to 
be 
binding asjus cogens. 
nd 's Statement by Ms Viotti M L. (Brazil), SC 4772 Meeting, 12 June 2003, Press Release 
SC/7789, 
39 ICC Art. 53 (Initiation of an Investigation); Art. 57 (Functions and powers of the Pre-Trial 
Prosecutor). 
40 See Statement by Ms Johnson (Norway), A/CONF. 183/13, p. 66, para. 22; see also Mr. 
Axworthy (Canada), p. 68, para. 65; Egypt, p. 69, para. 77. 
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individuals making that decision"41 . Moreover, maintaining that the 
fundamental principle of accountability should be at the core of referrals to the 
Court: "The valite of having a government refer it (situation) to it or the 
Security Council refer it is the are accountable to somebody. They are y 
accountable either to their people ... for doing so, or the Security Council is 
, 42 accountable to the United Nations system' . In contrast, the Republic of 
Korea stated that the Prosecutor must enjoy an ex officio authority to initiate 
investigations; otherwise the effectiveness of the Court would be seriously 
eroded and the Security Council might not be able to raise cases owing to the 
exercise of the veto 43 . Similarly, Brazil was in favour of the ex officio 
Prosecutor but it emphasised the need for adequate safeguards against the 
44 Prosecutor's discretion 
. 
Some implementing States have extended, rather 
than limited, the means of cooperation with the ICC Prosecutor. The South 
African International Criminal Court Bill (2001) for example, also provides 
that "The President, as head of the national executive, may, on such conditions 
as he or she sees fit, enter into any agreement with the Court, including any 
agreement relating to the provision of assistance to the Court, and he or she 
05 
may agree to any amendment or revocation of such agreement' 
The U. S. strongly objected to such a role of the Prosecutor, because of a 
concern that this would encourage overwhelming the Court with complaints 
and risk diversion of its resources, as well as embroiling the Court in 
'controversy, political decision making, and confusion' 46 . Part of the concern 
is that conferring jurisdiction to the Court in this way may seriously undermine 
essential national and transnational efforts in the fight against the crimes under 
the Statute. From the American stance, the problem is not prosecution 
47 
, but 
41 Scheffer D. J. at the Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, "Is a UN. International Criminal Court in the US. National 
Interest", 105 th Congress, Second Session, 23 July 1998, S. Hrg. 105-674, p-21. 
42 bid 
43 Mr. Chung Tae-ik (Republic of Korea), A. CONF. 183/13, p. 69, para. 83. 
44 Brazil, A/CONF. 183/13, p. 75, para45. 
45 South African International Criminal Court Act (2001), Sec. 32 (1). 
46 Supra note 4 1, p- 13. 
47 The U. S. funded and supported 2003 Iraqi Special Tribunal Statute provides for an ex 
officio Investigative Judge (Art. 18 (2)). 
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rather investigation 48 . Crimes under the ICC Statute require an ongoing law 
enforcement effort against criminal organizations and patterns of crime with 
police and intelligence resources; the Court will not be equipped effectively to 
investigate and prosecute these crimeS49 . Also, launching massive criminal 
investigations can, according to the U. S. position, have an enormous political 
impact as a "zealous independent prosecutor can have a dramatic impact 
simply by calling witnesses and gathering documents, without ever bringing 
proper charges" 50 . Some States have addressed this issue in their ICC 
implementing legislations. For example, the Swedish law on Cooperation with 
the ICC provides that in a matter concerning surrender to the ICC, compulsory 
measures may be used without a special investigation, but there must be 
evidence supporting the fact that the person subject to the application has 
committed the alleged crime 51 . 
The Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals reveal some issues posed by the 
'unaccountable' prosecutorial discretion. Over the years, these Tribunals have 
been confronted with credibility issues by failing to adopt public regulations, 
specifying the parameters of prosecutorial discretion, especially with 
discretion regarding decisions to initiate investigations 52 . Prosecutorial 
discretion may be limited through customary international law as illustrated in 
the ICTY Simic case 53 where the Trial Chamber refused to exercise its 
discretionary power to subpoena a witness of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross 54 . However, the 
ICTY case of the NATO bombing campaign 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia demonstrates serious lacunae in 
48 bid p. 14. 49 Id 
50 Id., Statement by Bolton J. R., p. 61; see e. g. The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal 2003 
which provides that it is the investigative judge and not the prosecutor who can act ex officio 
and obtain or receive information from any source, particularly from the police and 
governmental organisations (Art. 18 (a)) whereas the Prosecutor shall act independently and 
shall not seek or receive instructions from any Governmental Department or from any other 
source (Art. 8 (b)). 
51 Sec. 5 of the 2002 Cooperation with the International Criminal Court Act (2002: 329). 
52 See Regulation No. 1/ 1994, as amended on 17 May 1995, "Prosecutor's Policy on Nolle 
Prosequi ofAccomplices", in ICTY Annual Reports. 
53 Simic et al., IT-95-9-PT, Trial Chamber, 27 July 1999, para. 42. 
54 Discussed in Chapter 3. 
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prosecutorial independence and transparency55. In 2002, the ICTY Prosecutor 
confirmed to the Security Council that there was no basis for opening an 
investigation into allegations that NATO personnel and leaders had committed 
war crimes during the alliance's air campaign against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia 56 
. 
This conclusion raised serious concerns about the Prosecutor's 
political impartiality57 and the "use of double standards in the exercise of 
discretion when applied to friendly'powers"58 . 
In determining whether there 
was a basis to proceed with an investigation, the ICTY Prosecutor adopted the 
ICC mode159 and disclosed the factors she had considered in her decision 60 . 
Reasons for not investigating were based on the fact that either the law is not 
sufficiently clear 61 or investigations are unlikely to result in the acquisition of 
sufficient evidence to substantiate charges against high level accused or 
62 against less ranking persons for particularly heinous offences . These two 
reasons raise serious questions of credibility for the ICTY, and yet this is the 
kind of international court that the U. S. supports and the type of legal 
reasoning and legal justice it promotes and ultimately, and most importantly, 
enforces through the Security Council. After the adoption of Resolution 1422 
(2002). UN Secretary General, Kofi. Annan even issued assurances to the U. S. 
that its nationals would not be subject to ICC jurisdiction. He suggested that 
the "United States at the present juncture, relies on the fact that the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, as a matter of law, is overtaken by the jurisdiction of 
the International Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia. In reality, the situation 
with respect to international criminal jurisdiction in the territory of theformer 
55 "Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", 13 June 2000,3 91 LM 
(2000). 
56 Supra note 40, p. 91. 
57 0 Cit, p Kress, note 3 5, p. 25 1. 
58 Cote L., "Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal 
Law", 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 2005, p. 180. 
59Namely ICC Art. 18 which provides that the Prosecutor shall initiate investigations, assess 
the information received and decide whether there is sufficient basis to proceed. 
60 ICTY Statute does not provide for any judicial control at this stage. 
61 See Ronzitti N., "Is the non liquet of the Final Report by the Committee Established to 
Review the NA TO Bombing Campaign Against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia acceptable? 
82 Revue Internationale de la Crux-Rouge, 2000. 
62 Op cit, note 54, para. 90. 
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Socialist Federal Republic, of Yugoslavia is the same after 01 July 2002, as 
before that date' 63 . 
In relation to the ad hoc tribunals,, even though the relevant Statutes (e. g. 
Article 29 ICTY) suggest States should cooperate with the Tribunal without 
undue delay, the implementation of this provision is not uncontested. For 
example, Article II of the Italian Decree-Law No. 544 on Cooperation with 
the ICTY provides that the final decision on surrender rests with the Minister 
of Justice 64 . Surrender to the Tribunal may be refused on any of the following 
grounds (1) the Tribunal has not issued a warrant of arrest; (2) the identity of 
the accused has not been established; (3) the fact for which the surrender is 
requested does not fall within the temporal and territorial jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal-I (4) a final judgement was entered against the person for the same 
facts. 
The third ground raises the question of the competence of a national court to 
pass judgment or otherwise the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the last 
condition is inconsistent with the principle of the primacy of the Tribunal. On 
the other hand, the Spanish Organization Law on Cooperation with the 
International Tribunal65 represents and foresees a simplified procedure for 
complying with requests from the Tribunal for the surrender of accused 
persons without the need for formal extradition proceedings. 
The ICC Statute,, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, has specific provisions regarding 
the apprehension of accused persons; the ICC has the power to issue 
"requests" for cooperation on arrest and surrender with which States must 
comply. However, as Knoops outlines: 66 
63 Letter from UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, to US Secretary of State Colin Powell, 03 
July 2002, available at http: //www. global po I icy. org/intl i ustice/icc/cris is/070' ) annan. htm 
64 For example, Art. 13 of Slovenian Law on Cooperation with the ICC (0 Sodelovanju med 
Republiko Slovenijo in Mednarodnim Kazenskim Sodiscem/700-01/02-69/1) 2002 provides 
that it is the Supreme Court, composed of five judges, that decides on surrender of persons. 
65 Act N. 15/1994, Art. 6. 
66 Knoops G-J., "Surrendering to International Criminal Courts: Contemporary Practice and 
Procedure" (2002) p. 350. 
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"This structure, far beyond international judicial barriers, contradicts the 
naturalness of the legal authority of the ICC orders, It must be recalled that 
neither the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes nor the Rome Statute include an 
operative article dealing with the important issue of auctoritas rei indicatae, 
i. e., the power and executability of an irrevocable judicial decision in public 
law generally. Yet this issue is a prerequisite for the assessment of State 
responsibility with regard to surrender requests of the international Court ". 
As already mentioned, the very Statute of the ICC, in its Article 17, defers 
jurisdiction to domestic courts, stipulating inadmissibility of a case when the 
latter is being investigated or prosecuted by a State with jurisdiction over it, or 
when the accused has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of 
complaint. On the other hand, however, the effect of Articles 25 and 103 of the 
LTN Charter allocate respectively binding force to decisions of the Security 
Council, notwithstanding the existence of municipal law to the contrary and 
superior force of obligations under the Charter over conflicting treaties. As 
discussed in previous chapters, the extent to which municipal courts can apply 
international law depends, especially in dualist countries, on how the law is 
incorporated into domestic legal systems. However, if the relationship between 
national and international courts is viewed from a moderate monist 
perspective, if a conflict is resolved at the level of international law, the 
validity of domestic law contrary to international law will always be of a 
provisional nature only, and the conflict will be resolved in favour of the 
international norm; this would also suggest that an unchallenged operation of 
domestic law will be possible only within the limits set up by international 
law 67 
. 
Unlike the Rome Treaty, the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR have not 
addressed the issue of state responsibility in cases of State failure or refusal to 
execute arrest and surrender orders of the ICTY and ICTR. Their respective 
Statutes did not require this, because these Tribunals are, unlike the ICC, U. N. 
organs and their decisions should have a direct effect into domestic legal 
structures. The distinct nature of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals raises a 
simple state responsibility mechanism 
68 
, which ultimately results 
in 
67 See Chapter 1. 
68 For instance, ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 61. 
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notification of the Security Council of a failure or refusal by a state to 
cooperate with the Tribunals 69 . The Security Council that created them has 
precisely defined the personal, material, territorial and temporal jurisdictions 
of the ICTY and the ICTR. The ICC Statute lacks any comparable 
jurisdictional precision; this marks a significant difference between the ICTY 
and ICTR on one hand and the ICC on the other. The general jurisdictional 
limits under the ICC Statute depend, in part, on which legal or natural person 
communicates the notitia criminis to the Prosecutor. Both the referral of a 
situation by the Security Council or a State Party (and the communication by 
any other legal or natural person of information regarding the alleged 
commission of a crime within the ICC jurisdiction), constitute a mere 
transmission of the notitia criminis. However, the Rome Statute, unlike some 
national legal systems, does not allow the Security Council, a State Party or 
whichever other legal or natural person to file a criminal complaint and 
become a party to the criminal proceedings before the ICC. Some argue 
nevertheless that ICC States Parties are automatically bound to recognise that 
ICC judgments and sentences are de facto verdicts rendered by their own 
domestic judiciary 70 : their supremacy is established from the mere acceptance 
of ICC jurisdiction through complementaritY7 1. Some States have however 
determined that implementing legislation will not affect their right to 
jurisdiction. An example is Australia where the International Criminal Court 
(Consequential Amendments) Act 2002 stipulates: 
"It is the Parliament's intention that the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court is to be complementary to the jurisdiction of Australia with 
respect to offences in this Division that are also crimes within thejurisdiction 
of that Court. [ ... ] the International 
Criminal Court Act 2002 does not affect 
the primacy of Australia's right to exercise its jurisdiction with respect to 
offences created by this Division that are also crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court"72 . 
69 ICTY Statute Art. 29; ICTR Statute Art. 28. 
" Op cit, Knoops, note 66, p. 349. 7J Ibid 
72 Cf Divisions 268.1 (2) and (3). 
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As opposed to the political organs established by ICC Article 112, the Office 
of the Prosecutor has been designed as a separate organ of the Court under 
Article 42(l) and has been entrusted with investigative and prosecutorial 
functionS73 
. Even though the ICC Statute provides for a limited judicial control 
by the Pre-Trial and Appeals Chambers against the Prosecution's decision 
whether or not to proceed with an investigation 74 , or request authorisation to 
do so, the Prosecutor is the primary organ at this stage of the proceedings 
because he/she is entrusted with the reception and assessment of the notitia 
criminis, the development of the preliminary inquiry and the determination of 
75 whether or not there is a "reasonable basis to proceed" with an investigation . 
The Office of the Prosecutor is not controlled by any separate political 
authority, but is endowed nevertheless, according to the U. S. view, with 
unchecked discretion to initiate cases that may lead to politicised prosecutions. 
The Prosecutor however, is not free to conduct investigations and prosecutions 
as he alone sees fit. There are a number of investigatory actions, such as the 
issuing of a warrant of arrest which has to be authorised either by the three 
judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber, or at least by a single judge 76 . The Pre-Trial 
Chamber also confirms the charges brought by the Prosecutor before the trial 
may begin 77 , 
but many decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber are subject to 
appeal before the Appeals Chamber of five judges 78 . 
In sum, whatever operative provisions a bilateral agreement might include to 
ensure effective investigation and prosecution, it still has to be noted that it is 
for the ICC to conclude whether a national court is genuinely able and willing 
to prosecute and try a given individual. This is central to the principle of 
complementarity. 
73 ICC Rome Statute Arts. 15,53,54,58,61. 
74 ICC Statute Articles 15 (3) and (4), 53 (3) (a) and (b), 82 (1) (a). 
75 Olasolo H., "The Prosecutor o the ICC before initiation of investigations: A quasi-judicial )f 
or apolitical body? " International Criminal Law Review, No. 3,2003, p. 91. 
76 CC Statute Arts. 57 and 58. 
77 ICC Statute Art. 61. 
78 
ICC Statute Art. 82. 
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As previously observed, the ICC Statute does not impose an obligation on 
States to create a domestic legal regime for prosecution of the crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. A State may need to take into consideration that 
domestic prosecution of the 'core crimes' could be costly and more 
importantly that there is a likelihood of the accused never being faced with a 
prosecution. The Darfur Resolution elucidates this point. Whilst SC Res. 1593 
was an important step in ending the conflict in Sudan, the Resolution provided 
varying exceptions for different ICC States Non-Parties. On the one hand it 
exempted large groups of people from ICC jurisdiction and on the other it 
imposed obligations on Sudan who signed but not ratified the ICC Treaty; the 
question therefore arises as to why a citizen of Sudan should be subject to the 
Court's jurisdiction when the core of the American argument is that U. S. 
citizens should not be subject to its jurisdiction because the United States is 
not a State Party. What the Resolution omits to consider here is whether Sudan 
has at any point expressed its unwillingness to be bound by the ICC Treaty as 
a consequence of its signature. In this regard Sudan expressed its concern that 
"the Council did not settle the question of accountability in Darfur', 79 and that 
"the resolution was adopted at a time when the Sudanese judiciary has gone a 
long way in holding trials". Inconsistently with the U. S. policy not to be bound 
by a treaty to which they are not a party, the U. S. Administration 
acknowledges that this sets a precedent, in that any country (and according to 
this argument this could apply to the U. S. in the future), that is not a party to 
the ICC may at some point be referred by the Security Council to the ICC80. In 
yet another contradiction, the U. S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated: 
"We do believe that as a matter of principle it is important to uphold the 
principle that non-parties to a treaty are indeed non-parties to a treaty. Sudan 
81 is an extraordinary circumstance" 
79 Statement by Mr Erwa (Sudan), Statement by Mr. Baja (Philippines), UN Security Council 
Res. 1593 (2005), 5158 th meeting, 31 March 2005, S/RES/1593 (2005). 
80 Mr McClellan, White House Press Briefing, 01 April 2005. 
81 US State Department Press Briefing, 01 April 2005. 
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When the notitia criminis is communicated by the Security Council, Article 
12(2) of the ICC Statute provides for no limitation on the personal and 
territorial jurisdiction and, therefore, the ICC could potentially exercise its 
jurisdiction over any situation or crisis referred by the Security Council as long 
as the crimes allegedly committed have taken place after the entry into force of 
the Rome Statute. Sudan is the case in point. It is not necessary that the 
Security Council, when referring a situation of crisis to the Prosecutor, 
expressly empower the ICC to investigate and prosecute such situation because 
it falls outside the general limits of its jurisdiction. 
However, when the notitia criminis is communicated to the Prosecutor by a 
State Party or by any legal or natural person other than a State Party or the 
Security Council, Article 12(2) ICC Statute limits the personal and territorial 
jurisdiction of the Court to either the nationals or the territory of the States 
Parties 82 
. In order to prevent the 
initiation of politically motivated 
investigations, Articles 13,15 and 53 differentiate between the subject of ICC 
investigations, such as crises objectively defined by personal, territorial and 
temporal considerations and the subject of the ICC prosecutions such as cases 
consisting of specific facts that amount to one or several crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court 83 . Importantly, however, the question remains open as 
to whether or not the Rome Statute grants jurisdiction to the ICC to undertake 
thorough investigations of situations of crises that take place on the territory of 
one or more States non-Parties, but in which nationals of State Parties are 
involved. 
A further U. S. objection relates to the ICC's supervisory role 84 . The 
Rome 
Statute not only allows the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction when national courts 
are unable or unwilling to prosecute but it also empowers the ICC to decide 
82 0 Cit, 
83 
P Olasolo, note 75, p. 93. 
Note Sec. 2 (1) of Standards of professional responsibility and statement of the essential 
duties and rights of prosecutors, adopted by the International Association of Prosecutors, 23 
April 1999 which provides "The use ofprosecutorial discretion, when permitted in a 
particular jurisdiction, should be exercised independently and befteeftom political 
interference". 
84 Op cit, note 45, Statement of Casey L. A, p. 72: "Upon this pretext (complementarity) the 
ICC would be in a position to examine each and every use ofAmerican military power to 
determine whether, in its view, offences within its authority have been committed'. 
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whether national courts are conducting their affairs properly. It is one of the 
functions of the Prosecutor to screen the investigations conducted at the 
national level-, one of the main objectives of the preliminary enquiry is to 
gather information that is needed to determine the competence of national 
courts 85 . Therefore, when the Prosecutor determines that a national court is 
ineffective in dealing with the crisis described in the notitia criminis, an 
investigation may begin. The key role of the Prosecutor in the exercise of the 
ICC supervisory function over national courts is in this way reinforced, by the 
fact of the Prosecutors' implicit or explicit approval, of national investigations 
and prosecutions whose decisions are only subject to a non-binding review by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber 86 . 
There are however at least two cumulative safeguards against politically 
motivated investigations. The first one consists in the definition of the subject 
of an investigation as a situation of crisis objectively defined by personal, 
territorial and temporal considerations as opposed to a case composed by 
specific facts allegedly committed by identified suspects 87 . Article 54 (1) also 
emphasises the duty imposed on the ICC Prosecutor that "in order to establish 
the truth" he should "extend the investigation to cover allfacts and evidence 
relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility under the 
Statute, and, in doing so, investigate incriminating and exonerating 
circumstances equally". This implies that the Prosecutor has to investigate and 
prosecute the crimes committed by the different parties involved within the 
situation of crisis. Moreover, in order to avoid politically motivated 
recommendations to the ICC Prosecutor, the notitia criminis transmitted by a 
State Party or the Security Council cannot refer to specific facts allegedly 
committed but it must refer to objectively defined situations. 
85 See ICC Statute Articles 15 (2) and (3), 53 (1) and ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
Rules 48 and 104. 86 ICC Statute Art. 53 (3) (a). 
87 ICC Statute Articles 13 (a) and (b); 14 (1); 15 (5) and (6); 18 (1) and 19 (3). 
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Articles 13 (b), 53 (1) and (3) and Article 18 (1) establish the fast track 
procedure to open an investigation when the notitia criminis has been 
communicated by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, this type of procedure presupposes that the Security Council has 
undertaken a previous investigation of the situation in question. The need for a 
preliminary inquiry by the Prosecutor is not expressly provided for, whereas a 
duty to open an investigation is imposed on the Prosecutor unless he/she 
determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed under the Statute 88 . The 
Prosecutor's decision not to open an investigation may be reviewed by the Pre- 
Trial Chamber at the request of the Security CounciI89 or proprio motu9o if 
such a decision is exclusively based on the political discretion conferred upon 
the Prosecutor in Article 53 (1) (c) ICC Statute9l. However, only in the last 
scenario will a decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber be binding on the 
Prosecutor. As an ICTY judge explains: "The Prosecutor should not take any 
account of political considerations in issuing charges. Apart ftom being 
professionally inappropriate, neither the Prosecutor nor their advisors have 
92 the political expertise on which to base such decisions" 
When a State Party delivers the notitia criminis to the Prosecutor, there is an 
assumption that the State has previously conducted, as far as possible, an 
investigation of the situation of crisis 93 . The significant 
difference between this 
type of procedure and the previously described one is that in these 
circumstances the decision of the Prosecutor to open an investigation is 
subject, in accordance with Articles 18 (1), (2) and (4), to a preliminary ruling 
on admissibility of the Pre-Trial and Appeals Chambers. There are two 
88 ICC Statute Art. 53 (1). 
89 CC Statute Art. 53 (3) (a). 
9' ICC Statute Art. 53 (3) (b). 
91 The Article provides: "The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made 
available to him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there is no 
reasonable basis to proceed ... In deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the 
Prosecutor 
shall consider whether, taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of 
victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not 
serve the interests ofjustice". 
92 See Goldstone R., "The Tribunal's Progress" in Johannesburg, 7-12 May 200 1, Institute for 
War and Peace Reporting, Tribunal Update, no. 220, available at 
http: //www. iwpr. net/index. pl? archive/tri/tri/220. etiý,,. txt 
93 These provisions do not presuppose that the individual or legal entity has previously 
conducted an investigation due to a lack of resources. 
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problems with the complex system of judicial review. Firstly, no judicial 
review is provided with respect to the fast-track procedure to open an 
investigation when the Security Council communicates the notitia criminis; 
when the Security Council is the informant, an investigation is automatically 
opened if the Prosecutor determines that there is a reasonable basis to proceed. 
This lack of judicial review can potentially strengthen the cooperative 
relationship between the Security Council and the Prosecutor. The demarcation 
of functions between the Security Council and the International Court of 
Justice for example is very clear; the U. N. Charter clearly states that the 
Security Council has functions of a political nature assigned to it, whereas the 
ICJ exercises purely judicial functions. Both organs can therefore perform 
separate but complementary functions with respect to the same matter 94 . 
Concerns are inevitable with regard to potential abuse of political discretion by 
the Prosecutor since, arguably, the ICC depends on the support of the Security 
Council in order to operate. Secondly, the Prosecutor may disregard previous 
decisions of the Pre-Trial and Appeals Chamber on jurisdiction and 
admissibility; the granting of such power to the Prosecutor exceeds the 
preservation of the adversarial nature of ICC proceedings and the principle of 
prosecutorial autonomy. As M. R. Brubacher explains 95 : 
"The interrelationship of law and politics is complex and requires the 
Prosecutor to make decisions that are both compliant with objective legal 
criteria but capable of being implemented in a manner that adapts to the 
prevailing political and social context. In other words, although the decisions 
of the Prosecutor must be on the legal criteria of the ICC Statute, these 
decisions are not made within a vacuum and must be executed in a manner 
94 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1984, pp. 434-435, para. 95. 
95 Brubacher M. R., "Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court" 2 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2004, p. 74; see also D. D. Ntanda Nsereko, 
"Prosecutorial Discretion Before National Courts and International Tribunals", 3 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 2005,124-144; Danner A. M., "Enhancing the Legitimacy and 
Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court", 97 American 
Journal of International Law, 2003,5 10. 
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thatfibsters the support of states so crucial for the long-term success of the 
Court". 
It is important to distinguish between the political dimensions of a decision 
from the political pressure exercised on the Prosecutor who is taking a 
decision 96 : "The former political component, which characterizes the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion, may be acceptable while the latter is highly 
objectionable as it challenges the independence not only of the Prosecutor but 
of the whole judicial institution', 97 . This system for judicial review is not 
uniform for all of the Prosecutor's decisions; its scope depends on the natural 
or legal person who communicated the notitia criminis to the Prosecutor. 
Because of the fast track procedure available for opening an investigation 
under the ICC Statute, Article 18 (1) (Preliminary rulings regarding 
admissibility) 98 is not applicable when the Security Council communicates the 
notitia criminis, so the ICC Statute does not explicitly state that whenever the 
Security Council is the informant a situation of crisis must be investigated. 
However, considering that Article 13 (b) of the ICC Statute requires the 
Security Council to refer to the ICC Prosecutor situations of crisis as opposed 
to specific cases, and considering also that whenever the Security Council is 
not the informant the standard of 'reasonable basis to proceed'99 with an 
investigation is applied to a situation of crisis and not to specific facts, it may 
be deduced that when the informant is the Security Council the investigation 
must also be opened in relation to a situation of crisis. This interpretation is 
also supported by the intent of the drafters of the Rome Statute to reduce the 
risk of politically motivated investigations by making sure that the ICC 
" Op cit, Cote, note 5 8, p. 17 1. 
97 Ibid 
98 The Article provides: "When a situation has been referred to the Court pursuant to article 
13 (a) and the Prosecutor has determined that there would be reasonable basis to commence 
an investigation, or the Prosecutor initiates an investigation pursuant to article 13 (c) and 15, 
the Prosecutor shall notify all States Parties and those States which, taking into account the 
information available, would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned The 
Prosecutor may notify such States on a confidential basis and, where the Prosecutor believes 
it necessary to protect persons, prevent destruction of evidence or prevent the absconding of 
persons, may limit the scope of the information provided to States". 
99 ICC Statute Articles 53(l) and 15(3) and (4); Rule 48 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence makes it clear that the standard 'reasonable basis to proceed' in these Articles is the 
same. 
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Prosecutor could not target a specific political and military authority during his 
preliminary inquiry and subsequent proceedings to open an investigation' 00. 
A situation where the Prosecutor may feel under political pressure can arise in 
cases of competing situations of crises. The drafters of the Rome Statute, in an 
attempt to shield the Prosecutor from external political pressure, introduced 
basic guarantees intended to defend his independence. At the Rome 
Conference it was suggested that if several States have jurisdiction over a case, 
and one of those States has already challenged the jurisdiction of the Court, the 
remaining State(s) should not bring additional challenges except on different 
grounds'01. The Swedish law on Cooperation with the ICC shows that it is for 
governments to prioritise applications for legal assistance. It states that "If, 
when processing an application for legal assistance in a criminal matter from 
the International Criminal Court, it transpires that the application con icts Ifl 
with such an applicationfor legal assistance in criminal mattersfrom another 
State that is being dealt with in accordance with the International Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (2000: 562), the issue shall be deferred to 
the Government, which will decide which of the applications shall have 
102 precedence" 
Under Article 42 (1) ICC Statute the Prosecutor "shall act independently as a 
separate organ of the Court and a member of the Office shall not seek or act 
on instructions from any external source". Article 42 (2) furthermore specifies 
that the Prosecutor who will have authority over the management and 
administration of that Office shall head the Office of the Prosecutor. Articles 
42 (3) and (4) establish that the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors shall 
possess high moral character and extensive practical experience in the 
100 See e. g. Ms Poptodorova (Observer for Parliamentarians for Global Action) who said that 
although all the statements made during the Rome Conference had reaffirmed the view that the 
ICC must not be a political instrument or politically motivated, the issues involved were 
undoubtedly highly political, A. CONF. 183/13 (11), p. 104-05, para. 124. 
101 ICC Draft Statute Art. 17 (Challenges to the Jurisdiction of the Court or the Admissibility of 
a Case), A/CON F. 18 3 /13 (Vo 1.111), p. 29 
102 Sec. 15 Cooperation with the International Criminal Court Act (2002: 329). 
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prosecution or trial of criminal cases and that they should not be eligible for re- 
election once their mandate expiresJ03. 
The Assembly of States should have full control over the resources of the 
Prosecutor. Even though the use of these powers by the Assembly of States to 
interfere with preliminary inquires, investigations and prosecutions could 
constitute a violation of Article 42 (2), no remedy against such a violation has 
been provided for in the Rome Statute. The weak legal position of the 
Prosecutor vis-A-vis both the Assembly of States and States Parties themselves 
renders him/her vulnerable to political pressure, especially from influential 
States Parties. This vulnerability to political pressure is increased by the fact 
that the Office of the Prosecutor is organised in accordance with the principles 
of hierarchy and unity under ICC Article 42 (2) so that the political discretion 
conceded to that Office has been placed exclusively upon the Prosecutor 
himself. It can be said therefore that ICC Article 42, whilst representing an 
important step in isolating the Prosecutor from external pressure, does not 
suffice to guarantee his independence. 
As seen in previous chapters, some ICC States Parties have addressed the issue 
of the 'unaccountable prosecutor' in their ICC ratification legislations. 
Australian law, for example, provides that no prosecution is to be commenced, 
or proceedings conducted, without the consent of and in the name of the 
Attorney General. The Attorney General's powers to consent to arrest, 
surrender or prosecution provide on the other hand for a wide discretion, 
04 limiting the grounds for judicial review of the exercise of those powers' . 
Australian legislation also includes a clause limiting judicial review of any 
decision of the Commonwealth Attorney General to give or refuse consent to 
103 Unlike the judges who are elected and removed by a two thirds majority of the members of 
the Assembly of State Parties, the Prosecutor is elected and removed by only an absolute 
majority of the members of the Assembly of State Parties (Articles 39 (5), 42 (2), 46 (2) (a) 
and (b) ICC Statute); while an ICC judge can only be removed from the Office after the 
majority of the judges have so recommended, a mere complaint filed with the Presidency by 
any natural or legal person could be enough to bring the issue of the removal of the ICC 
Prosecutor to the Assembly of States Parties (Article 46 (2) (a) and (b) and ICC Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence 16,29 and 81 (1)). 
104 2002 International Criminal Court Act, Art. 22. 
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an arrest on a warrant issued by the ICC, the surrender of a person to the 
Court; or conduct a prosecution under Australian law in relation to the 
offences contained in this implementing legislation' 05 . 
(d) The U. S. views the ICC as a close meld of prosecutorial and judicial 
functions, which reflects the European constitutional model. The U. S. 
Constitution provides that the exercise of executive power is to be rendered 
through the law-enforcement power of the President 106 . The Congress, all of 
whose members are popularly elected, both through its statute-making 
authority and through the appropriations process can exercise significant 
influence and oversight. European legal structures are therefore criticised for 
not providing sufficient accountability to warrant vesting the ICC Prosecutor 
with enormous power of law enforcement that the ICC supporters have 
obtained. 
Moreover, it is argued that the ICC will not offer the accused Americans due 
process rights (such as the right to a jury trial) guaranteed under the U. S. 
Constitution. Right to trial by jury is regarded as one of the most critical rights 
enjoyed by Americans. Such a right "is not merely a means of determining 
facts in ajudicial proceeding, but is afundamental check on the use and abuse 
vis-a-vis the individual" 107 . This procedural safeguard 
is not however absolute 
under the U. S. Constitution. For example, cases arising in the armed services 
are tried by court-martial, which are exempt from the requirement for the jury 
trial 108 . The current U. S. policy about the use of military tribunals 
in the war 
against terrorism could lead to suggestions of a double standard on the part of 
the U. S. with respect to procedural safeguards in war crimes trials. In the U. S. 
defendants in a military trial have a right to plea-bargaining'09. The United 
States understood the role of the ICC Prosecutor as not having, strictly 
105 Ibid 
106 1787 U. S. Constitution, Article 11, Sec. 3. 
107 Op cit, note 45, Bolton D. J., p. 69- 
108 Current US policy about the use of military tribunals in the war against terrorism could lead 
to suggestions of a double standard on the part of the US with respect to procedural safeguards 
in war crimes trials. On a limited right to a small jury of three members of the military chosen 
by senior commanders see United States v Witham, 47 MJ 297,301 (1997). 
109 See Chapter 1, p. 19. 
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speaking, an adversarial position. It was through U. S. efforts that the 
Prosecutor now has a responsibility to look also into exculpatory evidence 
In conclusion, the Rome Statute offers the United States grater substantial 
safeguards than the ad hoc Tribunal Statutes, although the latter have never 
elicited the least of concern by the U. S. Administration because of Security 
Council oversight over the Tribunals' proceedings. Firstly, the ICTY Statute 
permits the Tribunal to compel national courts to drop a case and cede it to the 
ICTY (principle of primacy), whereas the ICC Statute provides that the Court 
can prosecute only if competent national courts do not investigate and 
prosecute (principle of complementarity). Secondly, a single judge confirms 
indictments prepared by the ICTY Prosecutor' 10, whereas the ICC Prosecutor 
can undertake a prosecution only with the authorisation of a Pre-Trial 
Chamber composed of three judges. Thirdly, as provided by SC Resolution 
1593 on Darfur, ICC Article 98 enables any State requested to cooperate with 
the Court to invoke a non-surrender agreement. The exclusion of the custodial 
state as a basis for jurisdiction presents another obstacle to ICC powers to 
initiate investigations and prosecute. The exclusion of the custodial state 
through which the ICC can obtain jurisdiction has been criticised widely 
primarily because it is argued that this will allow criminals to travel freely. The 
argument put forward to justify this lacuna is that any state can prosecute war 
criminals under universal jurisdiction but universal jurisdiction has been 
specifically excluded from the ICC Statute"'. For instance, the Security 
Council action on Liberia, which through a resolution, and acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, provided for exclusive, status-offorces type of 
12 jurisdiction for U-NMIL military personnel deployed to Sierra Leone' . 
110 For a discussion see Morris V. and Sharf M., "The International Criminal Tribunalfor 
Rwanda", (1998), p. 381: "The successful outcome of the work of the Yugoslavia Tribunal is in 
many respects dependent upon thejudgment and the experience of a single individual-the 
Prosecutor". 
111 See e. g. Explanatory Memorandum of the Irish International Criminal Court Bi 11 (2003) 
which reads: "Un ivers aljuris diction ... was previously adopted 
in respect of grave braches in 
international armed conflict of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and First Protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1977. Since many of the grave breaches under the Geneva Convention 
are comparable with ICC offences, universal jurisdiction is also adoptedfor those ICC 
offences which are also offences under the Geneva Conventions Acts 1962 and 1998". 112 S/Res/1626 (2005), para. 9. 
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4.3 ICC Statute Article 98 (2) 
The U. S. has repeatedly expressed in principle its support for an international 
criminal court 113 ; Congress also declared its support, provided the rights of US 
citizens were recognised' 14 . 
However, the Foreign Operations Appropriation 
Act 2000 expressly provides that any US contribution' 15 to a just resolution of 
charges regarding genocide or other violations of international humanitarian 
law should not be construed as an endorsement or precedent for the 
establishment of any standing or permanent international criminal tribunal or 
court 116 . 
It is interesting to note however that U. S. national courts have cited in 
17 their decisions some provisions of the ICC Statute' . 
A major achievement of the U. S. delegation to the U. N. Preparatory 
Commission for the ICC (PrepCom)l 18 was its successful negotiation of ICC 
Statute Article 98 on "Cooperation with Respect to Waiver of Immunity and 
Consent to Surrender". ICC Article 98 (2), which provides that the ICC may 
not proceed with a request for surrender that would require the requested state 
113 Republicans had few reservations - Statements made by members of Congress: "As it 
currently operates, the UN does not deserve continued American support. Its bureaucracy is 
proliferating, its costs are spiralling, and its mission is constantly expanding beyond its 
mandate-and beyond its capabilities. Worse, with the steady growth in the size and scope of its 
activities, the UN is being transformedftom an institution of sovereign nations into a quasi- 
sovereign entity in itseýf That transformation represents an obvious threat to US national 
interests. Worst of all, it is a transformation that is beingfunded principally by American 
taxpayers. The US, contributes more than $3.5 billion every year to the UN system as a 
whole, making it the most generous benefactor of this power-hungry and dysfunctional 
organisation ". How U. S. Lawmakers View the United Nations, USIA, U. S. Foreign Pol icy 
Agenda, May 1997. 
114 Leigh M., "The United States and the Statute of Rome", 95 American Journal of 
International Law 1,124-131, (200 1) 
115 Such as financial aid provided for in the Foreign Assistance Act 196 1. 
116 Foreign Operations Appropriation Act 2000, Public lawl 06-429, Sec. 552, p. 114. 
117 On crimes against humanity see for example WIWA v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. et al. 
226 F. 3d 88,532 U. S. 941 (2001). 
118 For a discussion of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court see Scheffer D. J., "Staying the Course with 
the International Criminal Court" 35 Cornell International Law Journal 47,68 (2002). 
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to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements, was 
included in the Rome Statute to provide a methodical process for the handling 
of suspects among states cooperating with the Court and not to allow a state 
that has refused to cooperate with the Court to enter into an agreement that 
119 would secure exemption for its nationals 
On the other hand, it can also be concluded that the final wording of ICC 
Article 98 was a deliberate attempt to increase multilateral support for the 
Court. In fact, Article 98 only tentatively resolves the conflict between a 
State's international obligations to other States and its duty to comply with 
requests and orders from the Court for surrender of suspects. It leaves room for 
States to create and enter into international agreements that compete or conflict 
with such requests and orders from the Court. As an author correctly points out 
"Article 98 supports current treaties and allows for the negotiation offuture 
treaties or international agreements that would secure a state's jurisdiction 
over its citizens to supersede ICC jurisdiction. Thus, it protects the power of 
states to independently negotiate treaties concerning jurisdiction over certain 
120 121 
criminal suspects" . It 
is also argued that such 'subordination' of ICC 
jurisdiction to national courts and international treaties is in line with the 
central ICC Statute principle of complementarity. According to this 
interpretation of Article 98, the Court will have to give priority to national 
claims of jurisdiction as well as defer to conflicting international agreements 
that prevent the surrender of suspects 122 . Such conclusion 
follows also from 
the fact that there is nothing in the Statute to say that States are under an 
obligation not to enter into agreements that would contradict obligations 
undertaken by signing and ratifying the Rome Treaty, or that obligations under 
the Statute should prevail in the case of conflict' 23 . 
Such explicit requirement 
is present in the UN Charter, Art. 103 which reads: "In the event of conflict 
between the obligations of Members of the United Nations under the present 
119See e. g. Human Rights Watch, "United States Effort to Undermine the International 
Criminal Court: Impunity Agreements", 04 September 2002. 
120 Rosenfeld E., "Application of U. S. Status of Forces Agreements to Article 98 of the Rome 
Statute", Washington University Global Studies Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 1,2003, p. 277. 
121 jbid p. 278. 
122 Supra note 119, p. 278. 
123 See e. g. Sadat-Akhavi S. A., "Methods of Resolving Conflicts between Treaties" (2003). 
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Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their 
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail". 
ICC Article 98 tracks the terminology used in Status of Forces Agreements 
(SOFA) which regulate foreign forces present in another's territory with the 
consent of the receiving state. These provide for priority to American 
Tribunals where foreign forces are present with the consent of a receiving 
state, and do not contain immunities in the strict sense, but establish a 
concurrent jurisdiction which gives the sending or the receiving state a primary 
right to exercise jurisdiction over certain crimes. When a State Party is obliged 
to surrender a U. S. national to the Court, the latter will be transferred on the 
basis of these agreements to U. S. jurisdiction. SOFAs only apply to military 
personnel and other closely aligned civilian personnel serving on a state's 
territory on an official mission. It is also firmly grounded in the ICC's ability 
to assume jurisdiction over a case should it find that an investigation or 
124 prosecution was not conducted in good faith 
ICC Article 98 (2) refers to the consent of the 'sending State' as a prerequisite 
of surrender; it also acknowledges the so-called Status of Forces Agreements 
concluded between the sending and the requested states. The provision does 
not affect the Court's initial jurisdiction since it only plays a role at the stage 
of request of surrender and does not affect the possibility that other States 
Parties, not under an international obligation to refrain from surrender, may be 
able to surrender when they obtain jurisdiction over the individual concerned. 
The European Commission concluded that these words require for a situation 
to be present in which a certain individual is 'sent' 125 by one State of which he 
may not necessarily be a national, to another State for a particular reason. To 
construe the words 'sending State' as simply meaning "the state with which 
124 See however the exclusive jurisdiction afforded to the contributing state in SC Res. 1626 
(2005), para. 9. 
125 Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions and EU Guiding Principles 
Concerning Arrangements between a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court and the United States Regarding the Conditions to Surrender of Persons to the 
Court" (scope of 'person') 30 September 2002,12488/1/02 REV I LIMITE. 
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they have some connection" would be to depart from the ordinary meaning of 
the words, which is the basic criterion for their interpretation under 
international law. The word "send" does not have the same meaning as the 
words "to be connected to or with". Surrender under Article 98 cannot be 
deemed to include transit as referred to in Article 89, paragraph 3 of the ICC 
Statute. Article 98 (2) provides for a limitation of the Court's powers only with 
regard to surrender; no such limitation is allowed with regard to States Parties' 
obligation to comply with the Court's request for transfer. 
A number of bilateral as well as multilateral treaties already exist between 
states and the U. S., as well as treaties with third states that are ready to engage 
with the U. S. in review of these arrangements (mainly SOFAs and extradition 
126 
treaties) , which may 
fall into the category of agreements defined in Article 
98 (2) of Statute. For example, recent U. S. extradition treaties with ICC States 
Parties (many of these have publicly refused to sign a BIA and lost each under 
ASPA up to $2.300.000 in aid 127) specifically prohibit (by way of a 
reservation or 'understanding' on the part of the U. S. ) extradition to the 
International Criminal Court. For instance,, the extradition treaty with Paraguay 
provides that this understanding is based on the Rule of Specialty 128 and that 
the United States shall not consent to the transfer of any person extradited to 
the Republic of Paraguay to the ICC unless the ICC Statute enters into force in 
the U. S. by and with the advice and consent of the Senate' 29 . Another example 
is the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 130 to 
which the United States attached a condition 131,, which again prohibits 
extradition to the ICC. Many treaties on mutual legal assistance have similar 
126 German Government, "Supportive Interpretation of the Commentary on the EU General 
Affairs Council Conclusions on the International Criminal Court of 30 September 2002" 
October 24,2002. 
127 See The American Non -Governmental Organisations Coalition for the International 
Criminal Court (AMICC), "Bilateral Immunity Agreements: Country Position", 06 October 
2004, at http: //www. amicc. orR/docs/CGStableofl3IAsbylCCstatusý/ý2010-04. p 
128Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Paraguay 1998, Treaty No. 106-4, Art. XV. See also 
Extradition Treaty with Peru, understanding of 14 November 2002 (also publicly refused to 
sign a BIA and lost under the ASPA $1.300.000). 
129 IbidTreaty No. 106-4, Understanding (a), 13 July 1999. 
130 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 15,1997, 
131 Sec. 4 (2), Treaty No. 106-6, September 8,1999. 
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reservations and conditions on the part of the U. S, For example, the Treaty 
with Ireland on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 2001 provides 
for an express prohibition on assistance to the International Criminal Court. 
The 'understanding' furthermore reads: "The United States shall exercise its 
right to limit the use of assistance provided under the Treaty so that any 
assistance provided by the Government ... shall not be transferred to or 
otherwise used to assist the International Criminal Court" 132 . Late formulation 
of a reservation is to be deemed as accepted by a contracting party if it has 
made no objections to such formulation after the expiry of the 12-month period 
following the date on which notification was received 133 and to date none of 
the above States expressed objections to U. S. reservations, conditions and 
understandings. 
It has been said that under ICC Art. 98 (2) immunity agreements are 
134 
permissible as they may be treated as a mere extension of existing SOFAs 
The NATO SOFA assigns jurisdiction in criminal matters and in cases of 
concurrent jurisdiction, allocates primary rights of jurisdiction for offences 
arising out of an act or omission done in performance of official duty by a 
military person' 35 to the law and courts of the sending State 136 . 
When instances 
of exclusive jurisdiction do arise, there is no possibility of waiver requests 
from one State to the other. The United States has traditionally been the 
sending State, and sought therefore, to limit the jurisdiction of the receiving 
137 States 
132 Understanding under Sec. 2, Congressional Record, 14 November 2002,107 1h Congress, 2`d 
Session, 148 Cong Rec S 11059. Identical conditions are included in the US-France Treaty on 
Mutual Legal Assistance 1998, Treaty No. 106-17; U. S. -Liechtenstein on Mutual Legal 
Assistance; U. S. -Greece 1999, Treaty No. 106-18; U. S. -Egypt 1998, Treaty No. 106-19; U. S. - 
Ukraine 1998, Treaty No. 106-16; U. S. -Poland 1995, Treaty No. 105-12. 133 See Pellet A., "Eighth report on the reservations of treaties", GA 55th session, 23 May 
2003, A/CNA/5 3 5, p. 10. 
134 See e. g. Senator Biden, Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 105 th Congress, Second Session, 23 
July 1998, p. 18-20. 
135 See also Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 1950 which also governs U. S. troops 
abroad (e. g. Art. 13 4). 
136 NATO SOFA, Art. VII (3). See e. g., Yoon-HO Alex Lee, "Criminal Jurisdiction under the 
US. -Korea Statues of Forces Agreement: Problems to Proposals", 13 Journal of Transnational 
Law and Policy 1,2003, pp. 213-248. 137 Ibid., Yoon-HO Alex Lee, p. 215, 
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Another important provision of the SOFA is its Article VII (8) that prohibits a 
second State from prosecuting after an acquittal, or a conviction followed by 
service of sentence, or pardon based upon the same offence within the territory 
of the receiving State. Presumably therefore, the receiving State's lack of 
jurisdiction would appear to preclude it also from arresting that person and 
surrendering him to the ICC. However, according to this provision, military 
procedure over violations of disciplinary rules of the sending State's is not 
prohibited 138 . The validity of this concept is questionable in the view of ECHR 
case law. The Engel case [1978] is instructive; here the Court underlined that 
unlike its domestic classification as disciplinary court proceedings, these 
proceedings may be equivalent to a criminal charge, according to Article 6 (1) 
ECHR 139 
. 
Here, in concluding that the charges related to disciplinary 
misbehaviour of Dutch service personnel, the Court found an important 
criterion for application of Article 6 (1), the nature and severity of the sanction 
to be imposed by the domestic court martial or military disciplinary 
proceedings. In case of imprisonment of considerable length (the ECHR held 
that two days incarceration were insufficient but that few months fell within 
the scope of Article 6 (1)), Article 6 (1) ECHR may be applicable in military 
disciplinary and court martial procedures. It follows that the surrender defence 
of ne bis in idern pursuant to Articles 20 (3) and 89 (2) ICC cannot be set aside 
merely on the formal characterisation of a domestic trial as being of a 
primarily disciplinary nature 140 . 
Generally, bilateral extradition provisions between the U. S. and E. U. States 
provide the former with a right to demand the extradition of a U. S. citizen if 
certain conditions are met; this right may have precedence by the requested 
State over a request for surrender of the same person issued by the ICC, under 
Article 90 (6) of the ICC Statute. This right to primacy may occur in SOFA 
and SOMA (Status of Mission Agreements) agreements. It may also be that 
extradition treaties between E. U. Members and third party States do not allow 
138 Op cit, Knoops, note 66, p. 332. 
139 Engel and Others v the Netherlands (5100/71), Judgment 08 June 1976, ECHR 3, Ser. A, 
No. 22, at 82-83. 
140 Supra note 136, p. 333. 
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in every case for a prohibition on the further surrender to the ICC to be 
included. If that is the case, these treaties could collide with new bilateral 
treaties with the result that one or the other would have to be terminated. 
U. S. immunity agreements are contrary to the intentions of the Rome Statute. 
Delegates involved in the negotiation of Article 98 of the Statute indicate that 
this Article was not intended to allow the conclusion of new agreements based 
on Article 98, but rather to prevent legal conflicts that may arise because of 
existing agreements, or new agreements based on existing precedent, such as 
new SOFAs. Article 98 was not intended to allow agreements that would 
preclude the possibility of a trial by the ICC where the sending State did not 
exercise jurisdiction over its own nationals. Indeed, Article 27 of the ICC 
Statute provides that no one is immune from the crimes under its jurisdiction. 
On closer scrutiny however, such interpretation cannot be final because of the 
failure to state explicitly that Article 98 (2) was intended to apply only to 
existing SOFAs. The European Council Conclusions 141 provide an ambiguous 
meaning to what type of agreements are permissible under ICC Article 98 (2). 
It claims that: "a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties between 
individual Member States and the United States already exist, as well as 
treaties with third states, which are of relevance in this context" 142 and note 
that a number of "Member States are ready to engage with the United States in 
a review of these agreements which may fall into the category of agreements 
defined in Article 98, paragraph 2 of the Rome Statute" 143 . Amnesty 
International concluded that the failure of the Council to make clear that Art. 
98 (2) is intended to cover only existing SOFAs was a 'Jundam e ntal flaw in the 
decision in the face of the USA demands' 144 . 
With regard to other agreements, 
such as extradition treaties, ICC Article 90 (6) makes it clear that a State Party 
may give priority to a competing extradition request from a court of a Non- 
141 Op cit, note 123. 142 ibid, p. 2 143 ibid 
144 Amnesty International, "International Criminal Court: The needfor the European Union to 
take more effective steps to prevent membersfrom signing US impunity agreements", October 
2002, Al Index: IOR 40/03 0/2002, p. 12-13. 
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State Party only if it considers that compliance with that extradition request 
will not lead to impunity. 
Furthermore, these non-surrender agreements are contrary to the wording of 
Article 98 itself. These agreements seem to amend the terms of the treaty by 
effectively denying the concept of the sending State from Article 98 (2); this 
term indicates that the language of Article 98 (2) is intended to cover only 
SOFAs, SOMAs and other similar agreements. SOFAs and SOMAs reflect a 
division of responsibility for a limited class of persons deliberately sent from 
one country to another and carefully address how the crimes they commit 
should be dealt with 145 . By contrast, the U. S. immunity agreements seek 
exemption for a wide-ranging class of persons, without any reference to the 
traditional sending state-receiving state relationship of SOFA and SOMA 
agreements. This wide class of persons includes anyone found on the territory 
of the State concluding the agreement with the U. S. who works or has worked 
for the U. S. Government. Presumably, this includes non-Americans and could 
include citizens of the State in which they are found, effectively preventing 
that State from taking responsibility for its own citizens 146 . So 
far, it appears 
that Bosnia and Herzegovina, in signing and ratifying the Article 98 immunity 
agreement 147 , is the only State to 
have specified that this agreement should not 
apply to non-Americans employed with the U. S. diplomatic missions or other 
organisations in Bosnia. 
In order to provide some direction as to how non-surrender agreements should 
be interpreted and dealt with, the EU General Affairs Council developed a set 
of principles to serve as guidelines for Member States when considering the 
necessity and scope of possible agreements or arrangements in responding to 
the U. S. proposals. Moreover, the view of the E. U. is that Article 98 (2) ICC 
needs further clarification: 148 
145 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, "US. Bilateral Immunity or So-Called 
"Article 98 " Agreements", Questions and Answers, 30 September 2003, p. 3. 
146 ibid. 
147 07 June 2003. 
148 The following is an extract from the "ICC-Supportive Interpretation of the Commentary on 
the EU General Affairs Council Conclusions on the International Criminal Court of 
September 2002". 
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"It (Article 98, Paragraph 2) refers to two aspects under which possible 
agreements must be scrutinized. - their scope and necessity. The latter criterion 
is ofparticular importance in view of existing treaties. It is also important to 
notc that this paragraph only states that certain aspects have to be taken into 
account if such an agreement is possible, but does not declare that 
"agreements or arrangements" are "possible", i. e. not in contradiction to the 
Rome Statute. The paragraph is silent on the question of admissibility of new 
bilateral non-surrender agreements under the Rome Statute: "It leaves room 
for an interpretation of Article 98 (2) of the Statute that was already advanced 
by many before the Common Affairs Council of 30 September 2002. This view 
takes Article 98 (2) to allow onlyfor the continued application of "old" (i. e. 
already existing) SOFA-type agreements, but not for the conclusion of new 
agreements of this kind The key argument is that otherwise any State Party to 
the Statute could, by the simple device of concluding treaties of this kind, 
redefine, limit or even opt out unilaterally of its obligations under the Rome 
Statute-something which it could not even have achieved by way of reservation 
at the time of signature or ratification, as the Rome Statute specifically 
149 prohibits reservations (Article 120)" 
The uniform implementation of SOFAs and the recognition of concurrent 
jurisdiction as the international norm for the regulation of peacetime 
jurisdiction over visiting forces is an indication that States tend to maintain 
their territorial sovereignty whilst allowing sending States to assert jurisdiction 
over actions of their forces. In particular, when the laws of both the sending 
and the receiving States are violated, SOFAs provide that the sending State 
retains exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that 
State 150 . 
The receiving State has exclusive jurisdiction over civilian persons 
149 Mexico for example, abstained from adopting the ICC Statute as no reservations are 
permitted; additional reasons for its abstention were the lack of a clearer definition of 
complementarity and a lack of requirement for the consent of the State having custody over a 
person sought by the ICC. Turkey also abstained mainly because terrorism was not included as 
a crime against humanity, as proposed by it and because there was a lack of a satisfactory 
formulation allowing the opting out of ICC jurisdiction. 
150 Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their 
Forces, 19 June 1951,4 U. S. T. 1792, Art. VII 2 (a). 
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accompanying a military force with respect to offences of the receiving state 
151 
and the law of the sending state . The U. S. Supreme Court upheld this 
provision by eliminating U. S. military jurisdiction over American civilians and 
152 dependants in peacetime . 
Under ICC Article 98 (2), a SOFA is an 
international agreement that requires a host State to obtain the cooperation of 
the sending State in order to surrender a suspect to the Court. If a U. S. service 
member committed a crime that could be prosecuted under the ICC Statute and 
was covered by SOFA, the United States would maintain jurisdiction over the 
crime. Therefore, Article 98 (2) would preclude a national court from 
complying with a request or order from the ICC, preventing effectively 
prosecution and investigation. U. S. non-surrender agreements (whether 
unilateral or bilateral) consistently provide that 'persons', subject to these 
agreements, are current and former Government officials, employees 
(including contractors), or military personnel or other nationals of the Parties 
in question 153 . 
Some of these agreements, such as the one with India' 54 9 
provide that a person of one or both parties may not be sent to 'any' 155 
international tribunal, whereas others, such as the one concluded with the 
Republic of the Philippines, do not exclude the possibility of a person being 
surrendered to a tribunal established by the UN Security Council. Agreements 
with States Non-Parties to the ICC Treaty also acknowledge that an existing 
international obligation may preclude compliance with a non-surrender 
agreement, providing however that both parties must be part to such an 
existing international agreement 156 . 
Non-surrender agreements between the 
151 Ibid., Art. VII 2 (b). 
152 See e. g. Grisham v Hagan, 361 U. S. 278 (1960); McElroy v Guagliardo, 361 U. S. 281 
(1960). 
153 See e. g. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Albania and the 
Government of the United States of America Regarding the Surrender of Persons to the 
International Criminal Court (02 May 2003); Art. I of the Agreement between the Government 
of the United States of America and the Government of Romania regarding the surrender of 
persons to the International Criminal Court (0 1 August 2002). 
154 See para. 3 of the bilateral Agreement between the Government of India and the 
Government of the United States of America regarding the Surrender of Persons to 
International Tribunals, 26 December 2002. 
155 See para. 2 (a) and para. 3 of the bilateral Agreement between the United States of America 
and the Republic of the Philippines, Note No. BFO-028-03,13 May 2003. 
156 For instance, para. 2 (b) of the US-India Non-surrender Agreement provides: "Persons Qf 
one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent express consent of thefirst 
Party, be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country or 
expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international 
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United States and States Non-Parties 157 also stipulate: "Each party agrees, 
subject to its international legal obligations, not to knowingly facilitate, 
consent to, or cooperate with efforts by any thirdparty or country to effect the 
extradition, surrender, or transfer of a person of the other Party to the 
International Criminal Court" 158 
. 
NATO SOFA allows for diplomatic intervention to obtain custody in case of 
unclear primary jurisdiction 159 . This Agreement provides that "the authorities 
of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a 
request from the authorities of the other State for a waiver of its right in cases 
where the other State considers such waiver to be ofparticular importance" 160 . 
This provision illustrates a trend whereby most countries agree on an ad hoc 
basis to U. S. requests for jurisdiction in cases where it retains no legal 
claim 161 . On the other hand, there are SOFAs which contain blanket waivers. 
For instance, SOFAs with Tonga and Philippines, as well as the annex to the 
NATO SOFA with the Netherlands, provide that, at the request of the United 
States these countries will waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction. If 
a case is of particular importance, such as a situation that would warrant 
transfer of an accused to the ICC, States may revoke the waiver 162 . 
tribunal, unless otherwise obliged to do so by an international agreement to which both India 
and the United States are parties". 
157 Art. 5 of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Uganda regarding the surrender of persons to the International Criminal Court, 
12 June 2003 provides "this paragraph isfor use only in agreements with countries that are 
not parties or signatories to the Rome Statute". 
158 See e. g. Art. 5 of the bilateral Agreement between His Majesty's Government of Nepal and 
the Government of the United States of America regarding the surrender of person's to the 
International Criminal Court, 3 Is' December 2002; Art. 5 of the bilateral Agreement between 
the Government of India and the Government of the United States of America regarding the 
Surrender of Persons to the International Criminal Court, 26 th December 2002. 
159Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their 
Forces, June 19,1951,4 U. S. T. 1792. 
160 Art. VII, 3 (c), Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the 
Status of their Forces, June 19,1951,4 U. S. T. 1792. See for instance Art. 19 of the 
Agreement of 03 August 1959, as Amended by the Agreement of 21 October 1971,18 May 
1981 and 18 March 1993, to Supplement the Agreement between the Parties to the North 
Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces with respect to Foreign Forces stationed 
in the Federal Republic of Germany (Revised Supplementary Agreement), 29 March 1998. 
16 1 Fleck D. (Ed. ), "The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces", 200 1, p. 112. 
162 See e. g., Paust J. J,, "The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction over No-Signatories Nationals" 33 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1 (2000). 
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Whereas the U. S. SOFAs do not explicitly provide for transfer of individuals 
to other jurisdictions, they do not prohibit such transfers either. Potentially, 
this leaves open the possibility that ICC Article 98 may not apply and a 
receiving State that has obtained jurisdiction over an individual that decides 
not to try him could transfer that individual to the ICC. The U. N. SOFA, 1 63 on 
the other hand, affords States providing peacekeeping forces exclusive 
jurisdiction over any criminal offence that may be committed by their 
personnel in the host territory' 64 . The maintenance of criminal jurisdiction of 
participating States over their forces encourages U. N. members to contribute 
peacekeepers to U. N. missions. Such unconditional provision gives U. S. troops 
greater protection under ICC Article 98 than would waivers or assignments of 
jurisdiction found in other SOFAs 165 . There are also extradition treaties that 
fall within the meaning of ICC Art. 98. For example, the U. S. concluded a 
bilateral extradition treaty with the Republic of Korea in 1999,66 which 
prevents the extradition of nationals of the two parties to the ICC167 . Korea 
subsequently ratified the ICC Treaty 168 . 
Correct interpretation of ICC Article 98 (2) is crucial here since two main lines 
of argument suggest that the Article only refers to existing agreements such as 
Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) and Status of Mission Agreements 
(SOMAs), whereas the other one suggests that the wording of the Article is too 
vague and it may not have been intended to preclude the creation of new 
agreements 169 . Rome 
Treaty negotiations suggest, and this is reflected in some 
170 
provisions of the ICC Statute , that the bilateral and multilateral obligations 
among States refer only to existing agreements and treaties 171 . 
For example, 
163 Model Status of Forces Agreement for Peace-keeping Operations, Report of the Secretary 
General, U. N. Doc. A/45/594,09 October 1990. 
164 Id. Art. 6 (47) (b). 
165 Op cit, Rosenfeld, note 119, p. 290. 
166 1999 Extradition Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea (U. S. T. 168). 
167 Ibid., Art. 1. 
168 Republic of Korea ratified the Rome Statute on 13 November 2002. 
169 See Prost K. and Schlunk A., "Article 98. - Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity 
and consent to surrender" in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: Observer's Notes, p. 113 1 (Triffterer 1999). 
170 ICC Statute Art, 90 (7) (a) and (b). 
171 See Draft ICC Statute, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Vol-III, 14 April 1998. 
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ICC Draft Statute Article 87 provided that grounds for refusing surrender 
could be justified only if the request would put a State in breach of an existing 
obligation that arises from peremptory norms of general international law, or a 
treaty obligation undertaken vis-a-vis another State 172 . These existing 
obligations are also related to diplomatic or state immunity, as framed in the 
1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. On the other hand, 
reference to 'existing' international obligations was omitted in the wording of 
Article 98 (2), which only refers to 'obligations under international 
agreements'. Moreover, if the first interpretation is the correct one, then a 
question arises as to how this Article affects States who have signed the ICC 
Treaty, submitted it for ratification, and at the same time entered into a non - 
surrender agreement. On the other hand it has been argued convincingly that 
Article 98 'facilitates negotiation and ratification of future international 
agreements and limits the Court's intrusion upon international relations 1 73 . 
Such a proposition is based on the fact that a new treaty providing for ICC 
primary jurisdiction over national courts and treaty obligations would violate 
sovereignty rights, which are upheld through the complementarity principle. 
Whereas a number of ICC States Parties maintain that the conclusion of 
immunity agreements represents the preservation of their sovereignty in 
relation to the ICC, others, like the Philippines, argue the contrary. Because of 
the way these agreements are usually concluded, secretly, it is perceived that 
such agreements take away the opportunity to try and punish the crimes 
covered in the Rome Statute and therefore limit substantially a State's 
sovereign authority to govern effectively. This is of crucial importance since 
the ICC Statute creates rights and duties that directly affect individuals. 
It should be noted that the standard provisions of SOFA agreements emphasise 
the retention by the sending State of primary jurisdiction but do not deny other 
172 Similarly, Draft Article 90 (other forms of cooperation [and judicial and legal [mutual 
assistancefl), Option 2, which read: A State Party shall deny a request for assistance in whole 
or in part only if (f) compliance with the request would put it in breach of an existing 
[international law] [treaty] obligation undertaken to another [State] [non-State Party]. 
173 Op cit, Rosenfeld, p. 279. 
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legitimate sources of jurisdiction. In the case of extradition agreements and in 
the case of newer SOFA agreements, there are even provisions that allow 
receiving States to retain jurisdiction in cases of overriding national interests 
or of widespread public concerns. In this regard, SOFAs and similar 
agreements fit into the ICC complementarity principle whereby national 
jurisdictions have a primary right and duty to carry out investigations and 
prosecutions. 
4.4 Hierarchical obligations for States Parties with regard to the ICC 
Statute and immunity agreements 
The questioning of state sovereignty resurfaces in day-to-day operations of the 
international tribunals and shapes to a certain degree, their ability to fulfil their 
mandate; this handicap is also inherent in the ICC. The U. N. Charter too 
reinforces the concept of sovereignty; Article 2 (1) provides that the U. N. "is 
based on the principle of sovereign equality of all of its members". Moreover, 
Article 2 (7) proscribes intervention on part of the U. N. "in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state". Correspondingly, 
recourse to the main judicial organ of the U. N., the International Court of 
Justice, is entirely voluntary, and as with the whole of the U. N. adjudication 
system, the powers and jurisdiction of the ICJ extend only to the consent 
attributed to it by member states. The Rome Statute itself, reinforces 
sovereignty by specifying that implementation is necessary (methods of 
implementation have already been discussed in Chapter 1). The question is 
therefore, how and to what degree the ICC differs and whether it may confer 
obligations to third party states. As a general rule, State's prescriptive 
jurisdiction (the one that describes a State's ability to define its own laws in 
respect of any matters it chooses) is unlimited and a State may legislate for any 
matter irrespective of where the event occurs (even if in the territory of another 
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State) or the nationality of the persons involved 174 . Parallel to this principle, a 
State's enforcement jurisdiction within its own territory is presumptively 
absolute over all matters and persons situated therein; there are exceptions to 
this absolute territorial jurisdiction, as where persons are immune from the 
jurisdiction of local courts but this occurs only by reason of a specific rule of 
international or national law to that effect"'. 
The question is to what legal regime immunity agreements belong and whether 
such agreements fall within the ambit of such specific forms of international 
and national law considering that on the international level, they are in conflict 
with the Rome Statute because they defeat its object and purpose, and on the 
national one, they leave the problem of competing treaties unresolved for ICC 
176 States Parties 
. Competing procedures which are viewed as a threat to the 
normative "welfare" of the legal system (jurisdictional competition within a 
single legal system that might lead to inconsistent judgments) are treated with 
hostility by that system's judicial organs, while "harmless" competition, from 
a normative point of view (competition between courts and tribunals operating 
in different national systems) is generally tolerated. 
In relation to immunity bilateral agreements, two issues arise: 
1. The questionable legality of these bilateral agreements in relation to the 
ICC considering that the Rome Statute does not constrain State Parties 
to enter into new agreements and considering that, unlike the UN 
Charter which deals with competing treaties (Article 103), the ICC 
Statute does not have a provision which is intended to give it 
precedence; and 
174 Dixon M. and McCorquodale, "International Law: Cases and Materials", 2003, p. 268. 
175 See e. g. Irish International Criminal Court Bill 2003, Part 11, Art. 12 on Extra-territorial 
jurisdiction. 
176 Interestingly, the Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Laws of the United States [ 19871 
reads: "The rules given in this Restatement are said to reflect the law as given effect by Courts 
in the United States. In general, these Courts may construe US national law so as to not 
conflict with international law (but see US vA lvarez-Machain). Moreover, the so-called 
principle of "jurisdiction to prescribe "-being the applicable rules when two or more States 
are claim ingjuris diction over the same event-are not accepted by all scholars as reflecting 
customary international law ". American Law Institute (1987), p. 23 5. 
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2. How will the constitutions of States Parties deal with this coexistence 
and inconsistency that immunity agreements produce? 
As already mentioned, the U. S. State Department reported so far 100 
177 agreements although information is available on 86 immunity agreements 
Of these agreements, 20 have been ratified by parliament and 11 are 
considered executive agreements (which means they do not require 
ratification) 178 . 41 ICC States Parties have signed a BIA. Of these agreements 
13 have been ratified 179 . 57 of 99 ICC States Parties have not signed the 
agreement, of which 21 States Parties have lost aid under the ASPA. The 
major US allies 180 and European member States' 81 that have not signed the 
agreement have been exempt from U. S. aid cuts. The 2002 American 
Servicemembers Protection Act (ASPA) also prohibits military assistance to 
countries that are parties to the Rome Statute, but allows the President to waive 
this ban if the State enters into a non-surrender agreement with the U. S. or it is 
decided that it is in the national interest' 82 . The Foreign Relations 
Authorisation Act 2001 183 prohibits funds, "or any other act" from being used 
177 See Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), "Status of US Bilateral 
Immunity Agreements (BIAs) as of May 18,2005", available at. http: //www. iccnow. org 
178 In 8 ICC State Parties these agreements constitute executive agreements: Botswana, Dem. 
Republic of Congo, Malawi, Nigeria, Uganda, Antigua and Bermuda, Colombia and 
Afghanistan. 
179 Gambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Cambodia, East Timor, 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, FYR Macedonia, Tajikistan, see Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court (CICC), "Status of US Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs) as 
of May 18,2005", available at httl2: //www. iCciiow. org 
180 Australia, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, Japan, Jordan. 
181 Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Czech Republic. 
182 Section 2007. So far, countries affected are: Antigua and Bermuda, Barbados, Belize, 
Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Central African Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominica, 
Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Namibia, Niger, 
Paraguay, Peru, Samoa, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, St. Vincent 
and Grenadines, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zambia. See e. g. 
Presidential Determination No. 2004-4 1, "Memorandum on Waiving Prohibition on United 
States Military Assistance with Respect to the Republic of Congo-Brazzaville", 06 August 
2004, para. l. 
183 Public Law 106-113, SS 705-706,1999, H. R. 3427 Foreign Relations Authorisation Act 
(2000-2001). A former US Foreign Relations Act FY 2003, H. R. 1646, Sept. 30,2002 
prevented the U. S. dues under regular budget of the U. N. from being used to fund the ICC 
through 2003. See also the former Hyde Amendment 2002, H. R. 3338, Department of 
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by or for the support of the ICC, or to extradite a United States citizen to a 
foreign country obliged to cooperate with the ICC, unless the U. S. receives 
guarantees that the person will not be sent to the Court. The general 
prohibition applies to American tribunals, local and federal governments. It 
includes a prohibition to transfer to the Court any person, an American citizen 
or a foreign one for inquiry by the Court on U. S. territory. Furthermore, it 
includes a prohibition to use funds of the U. S. government in order to help the 
inquiry, the arrest, the detention, the extradition or the prosecution of an 
American citizen or of a foreigner permanently living in the U. S. by the Court 
and to process on the territory of the United States any investigatory measure 
linked to a primary demand, an inquiry, a prosecution or any other procedure 
by the Court. 
The ASPA prevents also other forms of cooperation; it prevents for example, 
the transfer of documents of national security concerns to the Court' 84 . It 
prohibits any military assistance with most States that have ratified the ICC 
Statute 1U 
. 
The general principle of this Act provides that, one year after the 
entry into force of the Court, no military assistance could be given to a State 
Party to the ICC. As already observed, most U. S. allies are exempted from the 
effect of this article on US national security grounds 186 . 
Furthermore, Section 2005 of ASPA restricts American participation to certain 
U. N. peacekeeping operations. Accordingly, U. S. military participation will be 
approved only if it takes place on the territory of a Non-Party State. The 
President should hand a report to the Congress detailing each military alliance 
which the U. S. is part of and specifying to what extent members of American 
armed forces could, in the context of a military operation supervised by this 
Defence and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from the Response to 
Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act 2002,10 January 2002 which prevented funds from 
2002 Department of Defence appropriations "to be used to provide support or other assistance 
to the International Criminal Court or to any criminal investigation or other prosecutorial 
activity of the International Criminal Court". 184 ASPA Sec. 2006. 
185 ASPA Sec. 2007. 
186 The non-assistance clause does not apply to NATO-state members, to essential allies 
although NATO members (including Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Argentina, the 
Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Taiwan). 
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alliance, be placed under the operational control of the foreign officers 
submitted to ICC jurisdiction as nationals of State Party to the Statute and 
evaluate the risk for U. S. Armed Forces. 
Whilst the U. S. was unequivocal about its intentions not to be bound,, it 
remains for other parties to a BIA, that are also ICC State Parties, not to defeat 
the object and purpose of the Rome Treaty 
187 
. 
The ICC Statute may be contrasted to those of the ICTY and ICTR, as they are 
not treaties but sui generis legal instruments that resemble treaties in certain 
respects; these tribunals refer to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
when interpreting their Statutes' 88 . The ICC will be doing the same. The 
principles deriving from the Vienna Convention are generally regarded as 
reflecting international customary law'89. The first principle in Article 31 (1) 
of the Vienna Convention is that a treaty be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of a treaty in 
their context and in light of their object and purpose. 
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention also permits alternative means of 
interpretation such as for example, the preparatory works of a treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion in order to confirm an interpretation arrived at 
via Article 3 1; reference to such preparatory work is also permitted where the 
application of Article 31 still leaves the meaning of a provision "ambiguous or 
obscure ". States are in theory at least independent of each other and possess at 
least territorial sovereignty' 90 . Importantly therefore Articles 
35 and 36 of the 
187 For a similar U. S. policy see e. g. Roberts S., "No Exceptions, No Reservations, No 
Loopholes: The Campaign on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, 
Transfer and Use of A nti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction", Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law 9,1998, pp. 371-391 and the so-called Ottawa Treaty, 18 
September 1997,3 6 ILM 36 (1997). 
188 Prosecutor v D. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, "Decision on the Prosecutor's motion requesting 
protective measuresfor victims and witnesses" (08 August 1995). 
189 See for example Qatar v Bahrain (Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions) ICJ 
Rep. 1995, p. 6, at para. 18. 
190 See e. g. the Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume in Congo v Belgium, ICJ Reports, 2002, 
para. 4; Lord Griff iths and Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3), 200,1 AC 
147,188; Donaldson LJ in Rv West Yorkshire Coroner, ex parte Smith, 1983, QB 335,358; 
Island of Palmas Arbitration (1928), 2 RJAA, p. 838. 
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Vienna Convention state that third states may derive rights and obligations 
from a treaty only if they consent to assuming obligations or exercising the 
rights laid down in the treaty. The ASPA also recalls this doctrine in its 
preamble and reiterates: "an international treaty cannot create obligations 
towards a State Non-Party" and consequently that "the United States refuses 
anyjurisdiction of the Court over their nationals". 
Massive violations of a treaty by numerous states over a prolonged period of 
time can be seen as casting that treaty into desuetude, that is reducing it to 
paper rule that is no longer binding. The violations can also be regarded as 
subsequent custom that creates new law, supplanting old treaty norms and 
permitting conduct that was once a violation. This is a risk that the ICC Treaty 
may face in the future if immunity agreements are given priority in national 
courts over obligations under the ICC Statute. Finally, contrary state practice 
can also be considered to have created a non liquet, to have thrown the law 
into a state of confusion such that legal rules are no longer clear and no 
authoritative answer is possible. In effect, it makes no practical difference 
which analytical framework is applied. The default position of international 
law has long been that when no restriction can be authoritatively established, a 
country is considered free to act'91. There is also a possibility for rules to 
develop which bind only two or a set of states 192 reflecting the need for 
'ýrespect of regional legal traditions" 
193 
. 
As seen in Chapter 1, the relationship between competing treaties, especially 
in the case of contradictory treaties, is a problematic and largely unresolved 
issue under international law. Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties 
provides some guidance. This codification represents mainly the existing rules 
of customary law whose core principle is that treaty provisions that are 
incompatible with ius cogens are void; these ius cogens rules can be derived 
191 G lennon M. J., "Why the Security Council Failed", Foreign Affairs, May/J une 2003, pp. 23 - 
24. 
192 See claim by Honduras in the El Salvador/Honduras Case, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351,579; 
97 ILR, p. 513 that a "trilateral local custom of the nature of a convention" could establish a 
condominium arrangement. 
193 See the Eritrea/Yemen (Maritime Delimitation) Case, 119 ILR, pp. 417,448. 
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both from customary international law and other treaties. General treaty law 
also reveals that in the case of bilateral treaties between the same parties, either 
the treaty later in time prevails or the more specific one (lex posterior derogat 
legi priorY, lex specialis derogat legi generali) 194 . 
Article 103 of the UN Charter does not expressly specify whether treaty 
provisions incompatible with the Charter are void, voidable, suspended or 
unenforceable' 95 . 
The Charter only states that it has a higher rank and that 
obligations derived from the Charter must prevail; there is no differentiation 
between obligations incurred among member states of the UN and obligations 
of and towards non-member states. In the latter case, the Charter should 
obviously prevail. To the extent that the Charter provides for the competence 
of UN organs to adopt binding decisions, measures taken in accordance with 
such provisions can lead to obligations of the members that prevail under 
Article 103,, notwithstanding any other commitments of the members 
concerned 1 96 . 
This is true for decisions and enforcement measures of the 
Security Council under Chapter VIL As far as Article 25 "to accept and carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Present 
Charter" binds members of the UN, they are also bound, according to Art. 103, 
to give these obligations priority over any other commitments. 
Article 103 represents a partial suspension of the basic international law 
principle of pacta sunt servanda; this suspension will only be acceptable in the 
case of a conflict between obligations, the superior or stronger of which should 
prevail. In the case of conflicts between clauses contained in bilateral treaties, 
all such treaties are equally valid and binding with the consequence that the 
state, having made incompatible promises, becomes responsible for contractual 
violations if it does not perform its commitments, even if unable to do so in 
97 
view of the conflict between treaty provisions' . 
194 SimmaB. (Ed. ), "The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary" (2002), p. 1118, 
para. 3. 195 Ibid para. 6. 
196 Ibid, para. 10. 
197 Ibid, p. 112 1, para. 13. 
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Where a multilateral treaty (ICC Treaty) prevents any special agreement 
between the parties on the same matter, such a prohibited agreement should be 
invalid or unenforceable because it is incompatible with the good faith 
principle. Importantly, however, bilateral agreements (BlAs) with third states 
that are non-parties to the multilateral treaty remain valid. The situation often 
arises in national law that a party has concluded different treaties which it 
cannot implement at the same time; this party is responsible for all its 
commitments and in international law, the resolution of such conflict depends 
98 on the rules of state responsibility' . The ICC Statute does not address state 
responsibility in this context. 
The invalidity of a treaty between a UN member state and third parties 
depends largely on whether a Charter provision represents jus cogens. This 
invalidity resting on the conflict between a treaty provision and jus cogens 
rules is based on Article 103 UN Charter as well as Articles 53 (treaties 
conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law-jus cogens) 
and 64 (emergence of a new peremptory norm of general international law-jus 
congens) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. It is the core 
principle of jus cogens that no derogations are permitted and that conflicting 
norms are invalid for both member and non-member states of the UN. 
The question therefore, in relation to the ICC, is whether the provisions of the 
Rome Statute represent ius cogens norms with respect to the surrender model 
under that Statute. It is suggested that, by contrast to the ICTY and ICTR 
Statutes, the surrender provisions in the ICC Statute do not transpose UN 
Charter Chapter VIL However, as discussed above, the functions of the ICC 
Office of the Prosecutor and its potential relationship with the Security 
Council may infer some referral of U. N. Chapter VII norms. Therefore, the 
coexistence of the ICC Statute and immunity agreements in ICC States Parties 
poses several treaty related problems. 
198 Ibid, p. I 119, para. 3. Georgia is an example as it first ratified the immunity agreement with 
the U. S. (13/05/2003) and then adopted a law on cooperation with the ICC (14/08/2003). 
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It must be recognised that a multilateral treaty structure can and often does, 
contradict existing principles of customary international law or principles of 
customary international law that have only partially developed or are in their 
conclusive phase of evolution. This is reflected in Article 123 of the ICC 
Statute which provides that seven years after its entry into force a Review 
Conference shall be convened. This time limit should ensure that there is at 
least some significant legal practice under the Statute that will provide 
guidance to further application of the Statute 
199 
. 
Furthermore. Knoops [2002]200 offers a critical analysis of the principle pacta 
sunt servanda in the context of Article 42 of the Vienna Convention. 
Presuming that a treaty in force is binding upon the parties and must therefore 
be performed by them in good faith, a treaty may become void if it conflicts 
with an unconditional norm of general international law Ous cogens) 
established after the treaty comes into force, though this does not have 
retroactive effect on the validity of a treaty. Knoops suggests that fundamental 
authoritative norms in view of the existing doctrinal basis of the surrender 
provisions in the ICC Statute (i. e., emerging norms of fair trial to be endorsed 
in surrender proceedings) could potentially affect the legality of the ICC. 
The value protected by immunity ratione personae is much more important 
than the value protected by immunity ratione materiae. This type of immunity 
protects the functionality of a state and the procedures, including arrest, 
against a head of state or other leading state officials might seriously impair 
the state's ability to discharge its functions properly. This is why immunities 
ratione personae provide complete protection against any foreign exercise of 
201 jurisdiction whereas immunity ratione materiae covers only official acts 
'99 Bassiouni M. C., "Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an ICC', (1999), 
32 Cornell International Law Journal, p. 467. 
200 Op cit, Knoops, note 66, p, 36. 
" Wirth S., "Immunities relatedproblems andArticle 98 of the Rome Statute" (2001) 12 
Criminal Law Review 4, p. 432. 
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Article 27 ICC Statute (irrelevance of official capacity) has proven to cause 
incompatibilities with regard to immunity provisions in national constitutions. 
States have, however, indicated their readiness to overcome these problems; 
although some have pointed out that constitutional immunity might form an 
obstacle to swift ratification, some states have amended their constitutions (i. e. 
Luxemburg), others have announced that constitutional amendments are 
probably necessary (i. e. Austria, Mexico, Slovenia), and others that it is not 
(i. e. Norway, Spain). Also, some states have chosen to ratify the ICC Statute 
first and deal with possible compatibility questions later (i. e. Italy, 
Belg, UM)202 . 
Furthermore, some states have declared that constitutional 
immunities are only relevant within the internal constitutional order and are 
therefore not affected by the ratification of the Statute. This argument 
debatably neglects the process of surrender to the ICC (an act covered by 
Article 27) because the surrender of a head of state to the ICC by national 
authorities is at least in breach of any inviolability the head of state may enjoy 
within the constitutional order. 
Requests for surrender or assistance under Article 98 ICC (cooperation with 
respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender) illustrate the possible 
conflict between the requested State's obligations under international law and 
national immunity provisions. Article 98 (1) provides that the Court may not 
proceed with such a request when this would put the requested state in the 
position of having to violate its obligations under international law with regard 
to immunities. It has been argued that this does not reduce the effect of Article 
27. It should follow that the widely acknowledged customary law status of 
Article 27 should lead to the conclusion that there are no immunities under 
international law. 
Immunities ratione personae constitute a rule of customary international law 
and "any exception to this rule in the case of international criminal tribunals 
202 Van Alebeeck R., "From Rome to the Hague: recent developments on immunity issues in 
the ICC Statute" 13 Leiden Journal of International Law 3 (2000) p. 487. 
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must be legalýl, justified". This is where the analysis of Article 12 ICC Statute 
(preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction) begins in so far as it overrides 
the customary rule on immunities (Article 27 precludes immunity based on 
customary or treaty law). If a State has consented to a global custom, then 
other interested States may validly estop any objection to such custom in the 
form of a subsequent treaty. The Vienna Convention does not define "object 
andpurpose", so it is unclear what these obligation entail, especially in the 
context of a treaty, like the Rome Statute, that creates and regulates a new 
international institution. Nor is it clear how long the object and purpose 
obligation lasts after a nation has signed a treaty. The U. S. Government 
expressed its opposition to the Rome Treaty by deciding to nullify its 
signature 203 and declared that "[it] does not intend to become a party to the 
treaty. Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations arisingfrom its 
signature 5,204 . Moreover, the United States objected to the fact that its 
signature related to a treaty, the final text of which was amended at the last 
minute, without any notice 205 or procedure and to the fact that there was no 
opportunity for the usual technical review by the Drafting Committee. The 
United States also maintained that insofar as substantive changes have been 
made to the original text, mainly in relation to ICC Arts. 12 and 93, should 
questions of interpretation arise, they should be resolved in conformity with 
the signed 206 rather than the final ICC document207 . The U. S. also failed to 
obtain consensus on its proposal to allow States to "opt-out" of ICC 
jurisdiction for up to ten years so that the opting-out States could assess the 
development regarding the ICC and decide whether it was functioning 
203 In a communication received by the UN on 06 May 2002, the Government of the United 
States stated that "in connection with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
adopted on July 1997,1998, that the United States does not intend to become a party to the 
treaty". Under Article II of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organisations or between International Organisations 1986, the consent of the 
State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed, among other means, by a signature. However, 
consent has to be given for a signature to have that effect (Article 12 (a)) or such intention was 
expressed during negotiations (Article 12 (c)). 
204 Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, Treaty I-XVIII, Note No. 6. 
Similar declaration has also been made by the Government of Israel (Note 3). 
205 For the original text presented for signatures see A/CONF. 183/C. I/L. 76 and Adds. 1-13. 
206 Ibid 
207 A/CONF. 183/9. 
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effectively and impartially 208 . Turkey on the other hand opposed the lack of a 
satisfactory formulation allowing opting in and out of the ICC's jurisdiction 209 . 
Some countries that have signed but not ratified the ICC Treaty and have at the 
same time entered into a non-surrender agreement, have attempted to resolve 
at the domestic level the incompatible relationship between the two. In the 
Republic of the Philippines for example it was said that the non-surrender 
agreement concluded with the United States 210 , which in domestic law would 
be equivalent to a contract adhesion 211 , legitimises immunity for the crimes 
under the ICC Statute and creates a "two-tiered system of justice"212 . In a 
petition against the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Alberto Romulo, who 
secretly 213 entered into the agreement, he was accused of abandoning and 
waiving the only national legitimate recourse through the ICC to try persons. 
The object of the petition was to declare the non-surrender agreement 
constitutionally flawed, set aside and nullified 214 . Moreover, 
it had been 
argued that the agreement is detrimental the status of national laws. In the 
Philippines, national laws do not provide for the prosecution of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes or crimes of aggression 215 . The effect of 
entering into the non-surrender agreement means that the Philippines cannot 
deliver an American national to the jurisdiction of the ICC but is obliged to 
deliver a Filipino national who has nothing to do with the United States 
national interests. It was observed that "The American armedforces are the 
primary visiting military forces in Philippine territory. More likely than not, 
they are the foreignforces prone to commit genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes against the Filipino people', 
216 
. 
The proposition that a non- 
... Op cit, note 4 1. 
209 A/CONf. 183/13 (Vol. 11), p. 106, para. 12 and p. 124, para. 42. 
2 10 RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement, through exchange Notes No. BFO-028-03,13 May 
2003. 
21 1 Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court (Manila), Bayan Muna v Alberto Romulo, p. 1, 
at 
http: //www. p, -,,, action. oriz/uploadedfiles/Philippinesý/ý20petitioný/ý20toý/ý2Onultifyý/ý20BIAý/ý20 
9-30-03(l). pdf 
212 Ibid 
213 Discerned from the marking "CONFIDENTIAL" on the original certified copy. 
214 Supra note 20 8, p. 2 1. 
215 See e. g. 1932 Penal Code of the Republic of the Philippines. 
216 0 Cit, P note 208, p. 28. 
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surrender agreement may be defined as an executive order rather than a treaty 
is questionable. A decisive factor in ascertaining the legal nature of an 
instrument is whether or not it is intended to create rights and obligations 
between the parties. Another criterion is whether the agreement involves 
fundamental political issues or changes in national policy or whether it affects 
directly and fundamentally the rights and duties of nationals of a particular 
state. In Australia, for example, it was felt that " While still of the belief that the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court is not in the best interests of 
Australia and Australians... though the majority of submissions opposed 
. Australia's ratification, Parliament will pass the Bill and Australia will 
ratify ý, 217 . Traditionally, individuals cannot question the constitutionality of 
executive orders but in the Philippines, the Supreme Court underscored the 
importance of public interest, ruling that it was the Court's duty to determine 
whether or not "other branches of the government have kept themselves within 
the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the 
discretion given to theM"21 8, deciding to "brush aside technicalities of 
procedure". The Manila Supreme Court had historically allowed ordinary 
citizens to question the constitutionality of several executive orders even when 
they involved only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the 
publi C219. 
Main issues in the petition related to whether the RP-US Non-Surrender 
Agreement constitutes an act which defeats the object and purpose of the 
Rome Statute and contravenes therefore the obligation of good faith and 
whether the Agreement is void and unenforceable for a grave abuse of 
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in connection with its 
execution. It was correctly argued by the petitioners that the execution of the 
Agreement could not be isolated from the signing of the Rome Statute 220 
Their effect is to prevent States Parties from meeting their obligations under 
217 Letter from Downey R. to Morris B., Inquiry Secretary, Joint Standing Committee on 
Treaties, Submission No. 198.1,11 September 200 1, available at 
http: //www. aph., izov. au/house/committee/isct/icc/subs/sub 198. I. pd 
218 Basco v Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation [19941197 SCRA 52,60 
219 See e. g. Kilosbayan v Guingona Jr., 232 SCRA 110 [1994]; Philippine Constitution 
Association v Gimenez, 122 Phil. 894 [1965]; Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association v 
Feliciano, 121 Phil. 258 [1965]. 
220 Supra note 213, p. 24. 
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the Rome Statute 221 . 
The Non-surrender Agreement between the U. S. and the 
Government of Romania acknowledges for example that "Romania, by 
becoming a State Paro, to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, has expressed its commitment to be bound by the rules andprinciples 
222 embodied therein" . Obligations of good faith emanate from the generally 
accepted principle pacta sunt servanda and Article 18 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. The non-surrender agreements constitute a 
conduct equivalent to interferences with contractual relations. This implies (a) 
the existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third person 
of the existence of the contract; and (c) interference by a third person is 
without legal justification or excuse. This is comparable to contractual 
estoppel and in international law it is a principle whereby states deemed to 
have consented to a state of affairs cannot afterwards alter their position 223 . For 
instance, if a country agrees to cede territory to another, it may not, in the 
period between signature and ratification, surrender the same to a third 
country 224 . The same expectation applies 
in the case of the ICC Statute 
although estoppel, originating from the jurisprudence of the Court is 
underdeveloped and as a result considered not to form a rule of substantive 
law. 
4.5 ICC Statute and peacekeeping missions 
The discussion on the relationship between the ICC Statute and Security 
Council decisions regarding peacekeeping missions serves here to target the 
unresolved inconsistencies in the Rome Treaty which indicate at close 
22 1 For instance, it can be argued that non-surrender agreements breach ICC Arts. 27,86,87, 
98 and 90. 
222 Emphasis added. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government regarding the surrender of persons to the International Criminal Court, 01 
August 2002. The Agreement which done both in English and Romanian, provided that in case 
of disputes, the English version will prevail. 
223 See e. g. Sinclair 1. "Estoppel and Acquiescence" in Lowe A. V and Fitzmaurice 
M. "Eds. ) 
"Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice" (1996) p. 104. 
224 See e. g. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 
6 and 
Cameroon v Nigeria (Preliminary Objections) Case, ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 275,303. 
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inspection that since the terms of the Statute may be effectively altered by 
decisions of the Security Council, it may be feasible to conceive the 
implementation of immunity agreements by ICC States Parties as not being, ab 
initio, incompatible with the objectives of the Statute. 
Eleven days after the ICC entered into force on 01 July 2002, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1422 (2002) as a result of United States threat to 
the United Nations that it would withdraw all its peacekeeping forces from 
Bosnia and East Timor unless it obtained immediate agreement that none of its 
nationals would be subject to any action by the International Criminal Court 225 . 
It was therefore the Security Council and not the ICC who examined, 
interpreted and accordingly applied the ICC Statute, namely Article 16. 
Importantly, having applied ICC Article 16 in a unvarying manner, what is 
now significant is whether the ICC will challenge such interpretation of 
Art. 16, and if so, to what legal consequences. 
In July 2003, the Security Council renewed Resolution 1422; this Resolution 
made in the context of the Security Council debate on the UN mission in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, exempted U. N. peacekeepers from ICC jurisdiction if 
they came from countries that were not parties to the Rome Statute. Paragraph 
I of Resolution 1422 asserted that it is consistent with Article 16 (deferral of 
investigation or prosecution) of the Rome Statute, which states: "No 
investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with this Statute 
for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the 
Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the 
same conditions". 
Paragraph I of the 1422 Resolution provides that "Requests, consistent with 
the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the ICC, if a case arises 
involving current or former officials or personnel from a contributing States 
... See e. g. Lynch C., "US. Peacekeepers May Leave E. Timor-Immunity Soughtftom War 
Crimes Court", Washington Post, 18 May 2002. 
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not a Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United 
Nations established or authorized operation, shall for a twelve-month 
period ... not commence or proceed with investigation or prosecution of any 
snch case, unless the Security Council decides otherwise". 
The contention that the Resolution was consistent with ICC Art. 16 is 
questionable. This is so because of the intent of the drafters of Article 16 for 
the provision to be invoked only in rare events where the Security Council 
makes an individualized determination in a particular case that a temporary 
deferral of an investigation or prosecution would help the Council to restore 
international peace and security. 
The wording of Article 16 makes it very clear that the requests for which it 
provides are intended to be binding on the ICC. However, the Article is less 
specific in making reference to "acting under the Chapter VIF. Article 16 
becomes anomalous at this point to the extent that 226 : 
"In assigning functions to the Council, it OCC Art. 16) specifies its legal basis 
in the Charter. This is a question that, as should be clearftom the introductory 
part of this article, only the Council can decide upon, if itftels necessary to do 
so, and will arise only if the Council does notfirst determine that it lacks the 
power to perform the functions assigned to it,, 227. 
Article 16 was the subject of intense negotiations. Some states, including the 
U. S., wanted the ICC to be under the control of the Security Council and able 
to initiate proceedings only with the Council's consent. Since any permanent 
member of the Council could then veto proceedings directed against it, many 
states objected. Article 16 arose as a compromise recognizing that suspension 
of ICC proceedings might be essential to allow the Council to maintain 
226 Lavalle R., "A vicious storm in a teacup. - the action by the United Nations Security Council 
to narrow thejurisdiction of the International Criminal Court", (2003), Criminal Law Forum 
14, p. 201. 
227 See also Cassese A., "L'orgoglio americano cheftena il tribunale mondiale", La 
Repubblica, 17 July 2003, p. 17. 
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international peace and security. An essential element of this compromise was 
the requirement that any extension of the deferral would require a new 
decision by the Security Council which any permanent member could vet0228. 
Since action by the Security Council pursuant to ICC Article 16 does not relate 
to Article 40 of the UN Charter 229 , 
it is manifest that the only Charter 
provision under which the Council could take action under ICC Article 16 is 
Article 4 1230 
. 
Article 41 of the LN Charter authorises the Council to employ 
measures falling below the use of armed force.. Since however, Article 41 UN 
Charter defines its scope by referring to "measures not involving the use of 
armed, force", for the purposes of ICC Article 16 the Council may in principle 
make the requests specified in ICC Article 16 under Art. 41 of the UN 
23 1 Charter 
It is accordingly argued that Resolution 1422 cannot be interpreted as illegal or 
inoperable and the question as to whether the Resolution is consistent with 
Article 16, becomes irrelevant. As Lavalle points out: "It would seem that if 
the resolution were constitutional, it would ... 
be mandatory whether or not it is 
consistent with article 16. The only difference this question makes is that, if the 
resolution is consistent with article 16, it does not involve interference by the 
Council in the operation o the ICC. But the resolution is not constitutional ýf 
and as such shouldproduce no effect ý, 
232 
228 Supra, note 223. 
229Article 40 of the UN Charter reads: "In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the 
Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures 
providedfor in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional 
measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without 
prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned The Security Council shall 
duly take account offailure to comply with such provisional measures". 
230 Article 41 of the Charter reads: "The Security Council may decide what measures not 
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may 
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, 
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations". 231 Op cit, Lavalle, note 223, p. 201. 
232 Jbid. 
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Opponents of Resolution 1422 furthermore maintained that Article 16 was 
intended to apply on a case-by-case basi S233 where ICC proceedings could 
interfere with efforts to restore or maintain international peace and security. 
They argued that it was not intended to apply prospectively to provide blanket 
immunity from the Court. Resolution 1422 was extended once in 2003 by 
Security Council Res. 1487 234 . In 2004, when this Resolution should have been 
extended, the U. S. found difficulties in obtaining the necessary support amidst 
growing concerns about allegations of abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. 
Critics of the Resolution also maintain that it exceeds the Security Council's 
authority by interfering with the sovereign right of states to enter into treaties 
and violates an asserted jus cogens principle of customary international law 
that perpetrators of serious violations of humanitarian law must either be 
prosecuted or extradited to a state that will prosecute. 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty should be 
interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms in light of its 
object and purpose. If the language is ambiguous, resort may be had to 
supplemental means of interpretation, including the record of the negotiations 
leading to the treaty. Arguably, Article 16 is ambiguous. There is nothing in 
its language that expressly excludes the approach taken in Resolution 1422. 
Nevertheless, the Resolution constituted an unauthorized amendment of the 
Statute; the Security Council does not have the competence to adopt and 
interpret international treaties, and by attempting to do so, it weakens the 
235 
system established by the Charter 
There is nothing in the Charter to suggest that the Security Council cannot, 
where there is an actual threat to the peace, take an action inconsistent with a 
treaty or customary international law. On the contrary, the Charter implies that 
233 See SC Press Release, "Security Council rejects draft proposing of United Nations Mission 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina", SC/743 7,3 0/06/2002, Statement by French Ambassador to the 
United Nations Jean-David Levitte. 
234 SC Resolution 1487 (2003), 4772 nd meeting (12 /06/ 2003), S/RES/1487 (2003). 
235 See e. g. Mr Wenawesser, SC 4722 nd Meeting, 12 June 2003, S/PV. 4772, p. 8. 
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such actions might be necessary. Article 2(7) prohibits the U. N. from 
intervening in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, but 
indicates that the prohibition does not apply in the case of enforcement 
measures taken under Chapter VII. The argument that the Security Council 
must act consistently with jus cogens norms finds some support in the Vienna 
Convention, which provides that treaties violating jus cogens norms are void. 
The United Nations Charter does not authorise the Security Council to amend 
treaties that are consistent with the obligation under the Charter or to require 
member states of the UN to violate their obligations under such treaties. Brazil 
for instance described that "The Security Council cannot alter international 
agreements that have been duly negotiated and fteely entered into by States 
parties. The Council is not vested with treaty-making and treaty-reviewing 
powers. It cannot create new obligations for the States parties to the Rome 
Statute, which is an international treaty that can be amended only though the 
, 236 procedures provided in Articles 121 and 122 of the Statute' . Canada 
expressed its concern by concluding that Resolution 1422 (2002) sets a 
negative precedent under which the Security Council could change the 
negotiated terms of any treaty it wished such as for example the nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty 237 
An author also explains 
238 
: 
"Resolution 1422 does not only re-interpret the ICC Statute, in particular its 
Article 16, but it in fact turns the past logic ofpeacekeeping measures in the 
UN system upside down. If the ICC could, so far, be understood-by proponents 
as well as opponents-as a peacekeeping measure, because, according to the 
Statute's preamble, it shall prevent the threat to peace and security of mankind 
236 These two articles refer respectively to amendments to the Statute and amendments to 
provisions of an institutional nature. See e. g. Condorelli L. and Villalpando S., "Referral and 
Deferral by the Security Council" in Cassese A., Gaeta P. et al (Eds. ) "The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: A Commentary" (2002), at 647. 
237 See Mr. Heinbecker (Canada), Security Council, 4546 th Meeting, 10 July 2002, S/PV. 4568, 
p. 3. 
23' Ambos K., "International Criminal Law has Lost its Innocence", 3 German Law Journal, 
No. 10, October 2002, para. 4, available at 
http: //www. L,, ei-manlawiournal. com/articIe. php? id=19 
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by grave international crimes, it now takes a whole new nature. In the light of 
the Council's resolution, the Court becomes itself a threat to peace". 
Article 103 of the UN Charter suggests that obligations to comply with 
Security Council decisions made under Chapter VII seem to prevail for States 
239 Parties to the ICC Statute over their rights and obligations under the Statute 
However, although the ICC Statute lacks the UN Charter VII power to compel 
surrender and transfer, ICC Article 86, addressing specifically the obligations 
to arrest and surrender, is practically identical to Articles 29 and 28 of the 
ICTY and ICTR Statutes, respectively. Also, the ICC Statute distinguishes 
between States Parties and States Non-Parties imposing a subsequent fine 
distinction of different legal obligations on each. Unlike the ICTY and ICTR 
cooperation framework, the conclusion must be that although requests for 
arrest and surrender may be addressed to any State, a binding obligation is 
only to be imposed on States Parties to the ICC Statute, and in cases other than 
genocide, on States Parties which have explicitly accepted the ICC jurisdiction 
with respect to the crime in question. 
Res. 1422 (2002) provides that the Security Council is acting under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of United Nations. In order to act under Chapter VII, the 
Security Council must make a determination under Article 39 of the LTN 
Charter the wording of which provides that the Security Council must 
"determine" whether a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of 
aggression exists. The ICC Draft Statute included in fact references to Article 
3 9240 Through the construction of the sentence, such determination is 
unequivocally singled out as a condition for the use of the particular 
competences provided in Chapter VII. The Security Council has ordered in the 
past temporary enforcement measures, within the framework of Chapter VIL If 
such determination is made, then obligations of UN member states to 
implement enforcement measures have priority over treaty obligations that are 
239 MacPherson B., "Authority of the Security Council to Exempt Peacekeepers ftom 
International Criminal Court Proceedings", AJIL Insight, July 2002. 
240 See ICC Draft Statute, Art. 10 (4) (Relationship between the Security Council and the 
International Criminal Court), option 2, A/CONF. 183/13 (Vol. 111), p. 24. 
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otherwise fully consistent with their obligations under the UN Charter. SC 
Res. 1422 (2002) has been criticised for lacking the required determination 
under Art. 39 of the UN Charter 241 as there was no immediate threat to or 
breach of the peace or an act of aggression. In 1992 the Security Council 
recognised that the absence of war and military conflicts amongst states does 
not per se ensure international peace and security but it recognised 
nevertheless that Chapter VII is reserved for military confliCt242 . At the same 
time it must be said that insufficient determination under Art. 39 of the UN 
Charter in SC Res. 1422 (2002) is not without precedent. In 1972 for example, 
the Security Council determined that apartheid in South Africa 'disturbed' 
243 international peace and security Such formulation clearly fell short of UN 
244 Charter Art. 39 prerequisites 
It must also be mentioned that while a determination of the Security Council is 
a prerequisite for the imposition of measures under Chapter VII, this is not to 
say that the determination must also be made with express reference to 
Art. 3 9245. It was not until Res. 598 in 1987 that Art. 39 was expressly 
mentioned. Resolutions 1422 and 1487 do not make any reference to Art. 39 
nor do they make any determination of a threat to international peace and 
security 246 . At the adoption of 
Resolution 1487, Nigeria 247 expressed the 
understanding that ICC Art. 16 was to be invoked only in a practical situation 
241 See e. g. Amnesty International, "International Criminal Court. - The unlawful attempt by the 
Security Council to give US citizens permanent impunityfrom intern ation al justice", 01 May 
2003, Al INDEX: 40/006/2003. 
242 UN Doc. S/23500,31 January 1992, p-3. 
243 SC Res. 31 1, Question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of 
apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, 04 February 1972; see also 
Report of the Sub-Committee on the Spanish Question, appointed by the Security Council on 
April 29,1946, UN Doc. S/75 (31 May 1946), paras. 16-22, where the sub-committee came to 
the conclusion that neither a breach of peace nor a threat to the peace existed. 
2440 p Cit, Simma, note 19 1, p. 609, para8; see also Conforti B., "The Law and Practice of the 
United Nations" (2000), p. 179 expressing serious doubts about the Security Council finding 
that the failure to extradite was a threat to peace and security; Graeftath B., "Leave to the 
Court What Belongs to the Court. - the Libyan Case", 4 European Journal of International Law" 
(1993) pp. 184-196. 
245 See e. g. SC Res. 567 of 20 June 1985 and SC Res. 574 of 07 October 1985 (Angola, 'armed 
attacks' and 'acts of aggression') SC Res. 502 of 03 April 1982 ('breach of peace', Falklands 
conflict); SC Res. 496 of 15 December 1981 and SC Res. 507 of May 1982 (Seychelles, 
4mercenary aggression'); SC Res. 393 of 30 July 1976 (Zambia 'armed attack'). 
246 Statement by Mr. Wenawesser (Liechtenstein), Security Council 4772 nd meeting, 12 June 
2003, S/PV. 1772, p. 7. 
247 Ibidl statement by Mr. Mbanefo (Nigeria), p. 18. 
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as demonstrated and reinforced by ICC Art. 13 (b): "A situation in which one 
or more of such crimes (crimes under Art. 5) appears to have been committed 
is i-cferred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII 
of the Charter of the United Nations". New Zealand expressed similar unease. 
It expressed serious concern that the use of the specific procedure laid down in 
ICC Art. 16 was formulated in a generic resolution and not in response to a 
particular fact/situation and with the intention to renew it on an annual basis; it 
was inconsistent with both the terms and purpose of that provision and that "as 
such, it touched directly on the obligations assumed by States Parties under 
the Rome Statute, without their consent. Such an approach ... stretched the 
legitimate limits of the role and responsibility entrusted to the Council under 
the Charter"248 . 
During the negotiation of ICC Article 16 it was stressed that any suspension by 
the Security Council of ICC proceedings must be exceptional in nature and 
apply for a limited duration and that the prior consent of the Court should be 
249 
necessary . Moreover,, it was strongly felt that consideration of a matter by 
the Security Council should not prevent the Court from acting since, whereas 
the functions of the Council are political, those of the ICC, like those of the 
ICJ, were purely judicial250 . Negotiating parties to the ICC felt that although 
the Council had exclusive competence and responsibility in determining the 
existence of an act of aggression, it is only the ICC that could decide whether 
an individual had committed the crime of aggression. Predominantly in fact, it 
was the crime of aggression that was considered the major if not the only 
exceptional circumstance, which could trigger Security Council suspension of 
ICC proceedings 251. For example, Art. 10 (4) option no. 2 of the ICC Draft 
Statute provided that: "The determination [under Art. 39 of the Charter of the 
248 Ibid, statement by Mr. McIvor (New Zealand), p. 5. 
249 Statement by Mr. Bandonin (Observer for the International Federation of Human Rights 
Leagues) at the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 6 th Plenary Meeting, 17 June 1998, 
A/CONF. 183/SR. 6, p. 105, para130. See also Verge Sabola (Brazil), 3 rd Plenary Meeting, 16 
June 1998, A. CONF. 183/SR. 3, p. 76, para. 47. 
250 Ms Blokar (Slovenia), I Vh Plenary Meeting, 22 June 1998, A/CONF. 183/C. I/SR. 11, p. 207, 
para5 5. 251 See e. g. Statement by Denmark, II 
th Plenary Meeting, 22 June 1998, 
A/CONF. 183/C. I /SR. 11, p. 209, para86; Mr Kessel (Canada) made specific reference to 
ending a war, I Oth Plenary Meeting, 22 nd June 1998, A/CONF. 183/C. I /SR. 10, p. 208, para. 66. 
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United Nations] of the Security Council that a State has committed an act of 
aggression shall be binding on the deliberation of the Court in respect of a 
complaint, the subject matter of which is the act of aggression". Even then, it 
was strongly felt that a 12-month period was unnecessary and overly long252. 
States like Venezuela, Spain and Japan for example, felt that the ICC Statute 
provided insufficient safeguards against Security Council interference and that 
it would be inappropriate to totally prohibit the Court from exercising its 
functions with respect to a case simply because the case had already been 
taken up by the Security Counci, 253 . During the adoption of Resolution 1422 
(2002) Canada asserted that in the absence of a specific threat to international 
peace and security, the Council acted ultra vires 254 : 
"Even if the Security Council has wide discretionary powers [under Article 
j255, 103 of the UN Charter these powers are not unlimited The Charter is a 
legally binding document and no organ is endowed with complete freedom to 
act or not to act... in a case of manifest ultra vires decisions of any organ, such 
decisions are not binding and cannot prevail in case of conflict with 
ý256 obligations under other agreements' 
During the adoption of SC Resolution 1487 (2003), the LTN Secretary General 
expressed his belief that ICC Art. 16 was indeed not intended to cover requests 
such as those advanced by the United States, but only a more specific request 
relating to a particular situation 257 . On an assumption that 
"no peacekeeper or 
any other mission personnel have been anywhere near committing the kind of 
252 See Mr Cuatoor (Trinidad and Tobago) at II 
th Plenary Meeting, 22 June 1998, 
A/CONF. 183/C. I /SR. 11, p. 21 1, para. 2; Mr Sadi (Jordan), p. 208, para. 65; Mr Diaz Paniagua 
(Costa Rica), p. 208, para. 68. 
253 Ibid,. pp. 209-212. 
254 See Mr. Heidbecker (Canada), Security Council 4568thMeeting, 10 July 2002, S/PV. 4568, 
p. 3. 
255 UN Charter, Art, 103: "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Member of 
the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail". 
256 Bernhardt R., "Article 103" in Simma, op cit., note 19 1, p. 1299; see also Separate Opinion, 
Judge Shahabuddeen, Question of Interpretation and Application of the Montreal Convention 
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Request for Indication of Provisional 
Measures), Libya v U. S., Order 14 April 1992, ICJ Rep. (1992), para. 142; Franck T., "The 
'Powers ofAppreciation'. - Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality? " 86 American 
Journal of International Law (1992), pp. 519-532 
257 Op cit, note 243, p. 2. 
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crimes thatfiall under Ihe jurisdiction of the ICC ýý258 he also stated that it 
should be accepted that the "Security Council is acting in goodfaith, and that 
its purpose is to make it possible for peace operations to continue, whether 
established or onl ý259 y authorized by the Council' 
Jordan expressed its reservations by stating; "We are still concerned over how 
this resolution has attempted to elevate an entire category ofpeople to a point 
above the law, - a feeling sharpened still further when thought is given to the 
revolting nature o the crimes covered by the Courts jurisdiction. The ýf 
resolution is therefore, in our assessment a misapplication ofArticle 16, and a 
contravention of the Statute"260 . 
Iran too expressed similar concerns at the renewal of Resolution 1422 as it 
concluded that it "legally disputed and considered to be questioning the 
authority of a treaty-based international body, the JCC. The resolution unduly 
interfered with the Statute of the ICCi261 . 
The Iranian delegation regretted that 
-a unilateral approach, which isfounded on a misplaced notion ofplacing one 
country above the law, has created an untenable and unsound situation in the 
Security Council and in international relations in general. Undoubtedly, such 
an approach runs counter to the spirit and letter of the UN Charter, especially 
Article 24, which maintains that the Council acts on behalf of the general 
ý262 membership' 
258 bid, statement by the Secretary General, pp. 2-3. See also statement by the President of the 
Security Council, S/PRST/2005/21,31 May 2005 alleging serious sexual misconduct by 
United Nations Peacekeeping personnel; on U. S. military war crimes (My Lai massacre, 
Vietnam) see Kelman H. C. and Hamilton V. L., "Crimes of Obedience", 1989, pp. 5-12. See 
e. g. the trial of Gary Bartlam (10 January 2005) at the military base of Bergen-Hohne, 
Germany, a British soldier charged with the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners near Basra (Darren 
Larkin, Daniel Kanyon and Mark Cooley pleaded guilty to similar charged on 18 January 2005 
before the court martial in Osnabruck, Germany). See also the trial of Charles Graner by an 
American military court (Fort Hood, Texas) sentenced to ten years imprisonment (16 January 
2005) for series of abuses against prisoners of the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. 259 Ibid., Secretary General. 
260 Supra note 243, statement by H. R. H. Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein, Ambassador, 
Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations. 
261 Statement by H. E. Dr. M. Javad Zarif, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran before the Security Council on United Nations Peacekeeping, SC 4772 nd Meeting, 12 June 
2003. 
262 Ibid 
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Furthermore, the E. U. Guiding Principles have been criticised as weak, since 
reference to the U. S. role in peacekeeping missions has been described as 
-irrele 1, t1nt-263 because, as far as Europe is concerned, there are no substantial 
peacekeeping missions on its territory 264 . The primary concern of the U. S. 
addressed through SC Resolutions did not relate to its nationals participating in 
U. N. peacekeeping missions, but to U. S. nationals, including military and 
civilian leaders involved in numerous multilateral operations concluded in 
recent years, such as in Iraq, Kosovo and Afghanistan. In fact, the United 
States employs only a relatively small number of nationals participating in U-N 
peacekeeping operations, excluding non-UN operations such as KFOR in 
Kosovo, run by NATO, and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan, as well as UN peace-building missions, such as MINUGUA in 
Guatemala, with over three-quarters of them in KoSOV0265. In fact, as of the 
end of April 2005, the United States participated in 17 UN peacekeeping 
operations. U. S. personnel serve mainly as civilian police and military 
observers in seven U. N. peacekeeping missions, with almost 80 percent of 
them posted in Kosovo 266 . 
Moreover, of the 103 nations contributing 66,547 
personnel to these UN operations, U. S. participation amounted to just one half 
267 
of one percent 
Pakistan, the largest contributor to U. N. peacekeeping operations, following 
the U. S. strategy, maintained that U. N. peacekeepers should not be exposed to 
any 'arbitrary or unilateral action by any national or international body 
268 
. 
Pakistan explained that such a possibility could reduce the incentives for 
263 Amnesty International, "International Criminal Court: The needfor the European Union to 
take more effective steps to prevent membersfrom signing US impunity agreements", October 
2002, Al Index: IOR 40/030/2002, p. 9. 
264 At the time of the adoption of SC Resolution 1422 (2002) in Bosnia and Herzegovina the 
U. S. had 2000 troops and nearly 50 civilian police, see Mr Negroponte (United States), 
Security Council 4568 th Meeting, 10 July 2002, S/PV. 4568, p. 9. 
265 Henry L. Stimson Centre, "U. S. Personnel Contributions to U. N. Peacekeeping Operations 
as of 30 April 2005, Peace Operations Factsheet Series, available at 
http: //www. stimson. orp, /fopo/? SN=F02005051883 
266 Ibid 
267 ibid 
268 Op cit, note 243, Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of 
Pakistan to the United Nations, to the Security Council, p. 2 1. 
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member States to offer UN peacekeeping forceS269 
. This is very important and 
illustrates how ICC Party States, like France, had to support the Darfur 
Resolution despite its non-immunity provisions for Non-Parties. At the 
adoption of SC Res. 1487 (2003 )270 France pointed out in fact that the 
principal reason behind their previous support for Res. 1422 (2002) was the 
risk at the time of non-renewal of U. N. missions and the wish, in response to 
the request by the U. S. to allow it a further period of time to find a lasting 
solution to its concerns regarding the ICC Statute 271 .AU. S. statement 
illustrates this: "even one instance of the ICC attempting to exercise 
jurisdiction over those involved in a UN operation would have a seriously 
damaging impact on future UN operations"272 . France abstained from 
Resolution 1487 as it believed that its previous reasoning was now unjustified 
and it -lies in the past', 273 and was in favour of Resolution 1593 274 because of 
the overriding concerns about the situation in Sudan 275 . 
Furthermore, although nearly all participants to the Rome Conference 
concurred that jurisdiction over genocide should be automatic, the United 
States, as well as other countries such as France, argued that states should be 
allowed to "consent separatelyll to jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes 
against humanity 
276 
. Because both the United States and France have a large 
269 Ibid Pakistan also reserved the right to adjudicate in cases involving Pakistani 
peacekeepers in all peacekeeping operations and duties but suggested that the annual renewal 
by the Security Council may be avoided in future through separate arrangements, Statement by 
Ambassador Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, to the 
Security Council, 12 June 2003, S/PV. 4772, p. 21. 
270 SC Resolution on United Nations peacekeeping, S/RES/1487 (2003), 12 June 2003. 
271 Op cit, note 243, Statement by Mr Duclos (France), p. 24 
272 Ibid., statement by Ambassador Cunningham J., Deputy United States Representative to the 
United Nations. 
273 Ibid., statement by Mr Duclos (France), p. 24. 
274 In favour were Argentina, Benin, Denmark, France, Greece, Japan, Philippines, Romania, 
Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania; no state was against the 
resolution and abstaining were Algeria, Brazil, China and the United States. 
275 See e. g. Security Council 5071" Meeting, 04 November 2004, S/PV. 5071 where the 
Security Council is warned that the situation in Sudan is deteriorating; see also Ms Arbour, 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights expressing that the Commission of 
Inquiry concluded that the Government of Sudan had not pursued a policy of genocide and 
that the Commission recognised that "only a competent court could determine, on case-by- 
case basis, whether individuals, including Government official, ordered or participated in 
atrocities motivated by the genocidal intent to exterminate a protected group", SC 5125 th 
Meeting, S/PV. 5125,16 February 2005. 
276 Marler M. K., "The International Criminal Court: Assessing the Jurisdictional Loopholes 
in the Rome Statute", 49 Duke Law Journal, Issue 3 (1999) p-825- 
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number of soldiers serving in peacekeeping missions throughout the world, the 
two countries expressed concerns over politically motivated prosecutions for 
war crimes before the ICC. This is why the ICC Statute as adopted allows 
States to opt out of jurisdiction over war crimes, but not crimes against 
humanity for a period of seven years. 
In March 2005 a U. S. Commander stated that while ASPA provides a positive 
effort in protecting U. S. nationals from ICC prosecutionS277: 
"It has an unintended consequence of restricting our access to and interaction 
with many important partner nations. Sanctions enclosed in the ASPA statute 
prohibit International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds ftom 
going to certain countries that are parties to the Rome Statute ... of the 
22 
nations worldwide affected by these sanctions, 11 of them are in Latin 
America, hampering the engagement and professional contact that is an 
essential element of our security cooperation strategy... We now risk losing 
contact and interoperability with a generation of military classmates in many 
ýý278 nations of the region, including several leading countries 
Notwithstanding the argument that the Security Council may not supersede 
peremptory norms of general international law Ous cogens) 279 and the 
obligation on UN Member States to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Counci1280' the ICC and the Security Council are likely to act 
together, not one to the detriment of the other. 
277 General Bantz J. Craddock, Commander of United States Army, before the Committee On 
House Armed Services, 09 March 2005,1 09th Congress, Congressional Record, 15 March 
2005, p. D241. 
278 Ibid. Craddock also stated that "In Latin America where the contact is the coin of realm, 
where engagement is really where we make the progress in reinforcing... democratic 
institutions and ensuring that militaries understand the democratic process and the 
subordination to civilian leadership, it's critical we have contact across the board'. 
279 See e. g. Dinstein Y., "War, Aggression and Se4f-Defence" (2001) p. 282. 
280 See UN Charter, Art. 25; see e. g, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence 
of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, International 
Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I. C. J. Rep. 16,54. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Much has been said about the 'illegality' of U. S. immunity agreements, even 
more about their political incorrectness. Regardless as to whether the latter 
statement is accurate or not, it is only relevant in so far as it provides a 
perspective for understanding a State's methods of ICC Statute 
implementation and subsequent interpretation at the national level. Policy 
considerations offer a tool for understanding and anticipating how both ICC 
States Parties and Non-Parties are going to apply or misapply the Rome 
Treaty. Policy considerations will determine which States are likely to give 
precedence. at the national level, to an immunity agreement. Legal 
considerations will elucidate what consequences such action is likely to incur 
but as both immunity agreements and recent Security Council actions 
illustrate. it will be political and socio-economic forces that determine possible 
treaty breaches and it will remain for the Security Council to act upon them if 
it so decides. Whereas these arguments paint a demoralising picture of the 
ICC, it must not be understated that there are serious flaws in the Statute that 
allow too much room for varying interpretations and importantly therefore 
inconsistent applications which will wary around the globe. Immunity 
agreements, which undermine the object and purpose of the Rome Treaty, do 
reveal that the ICC Statute has not dealt adequately with State responsibility in 
case of a treaty breach, and Security Council decisions demonstrate that the 
Court is not independent from the Council and is therefore, at present, an 
extension of it. 
The ICC must play a leading role in devising legal standards and procedures, 
which in turn must be understood and perceived as authoritative and as 
applying equally to all States Parties. Whereas the U. S. position towards the 
ICC is detrimental to that effect, it must be accepted that unless through action 
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by the Security Council the ICC Treaty cannot bind Non-Party States. Only the 
Security Council has such authority and power under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. It must be remembered that universal jurisdiction has been expressly 
rejected during the Rome Treaty negotiations and the ICC Statute does have a 
provision to that effect. Nor does the ICC Treaty have a provision, similar to 
Article 103 of the UN Charter, which regulates conflicts of obligations arising 
from two or more treaties. 
Perhaps the creation of the ICC had been premature and forced upon States in 
a much-needed mechanism for investigation and punishment of the most 
serious international crimes. Or perhaps, as previous chapters try to underline, 
regional redress mechanisms will prove more effective in combating and 
preventing these crimes, In such a context, the ICC should play a crucial and 
permanent disseminating role in bringing international criminal law closer to 
those directly involved, at a national level. In order to function consistently, 
the ICC Treaty would have had to be adopted through a democratic model, 
such as the referendum on the ICC in Ireland. As it stands, the Rome Treaty 
may collapse in certain parts of the world, just as the recent European 
Constitution had done. Again, the increasing number of immunity agreements 
are a very valid case in point, just as Security Council resolution 1593 on 
Sudan is, and they must not be ignored or marginally treated as at present there 
are more parties to immunity agreements than there are parties to the ICC 
Statute and the Security Council has, for a third time, since the entry into force 
of the ICC, significantly interfered with the Court's proceedings. The fact that 
Security Council decisions had been criticised as ultra vires or as representing 
jus cogens breaches, remains valid and interesting, but nonetheless 
impertinent, until the Court itself makes such a determination and acts on it, by 
proceeding with investigations and prosecutions, notwithstanding Security 
Council actions. 
The Court will undoubtedly conduct important investigations and it will bring 
to justice some of those responsible for genocide, war crimes or crimes against 
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humanity. It seems however such actions will be sporadic and symbolic, rather 
than global and uniform. 
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Conclusion 
Evaluating a pragmatic approach to the scope and effectiveness of the ICC 
legal order leads to the conclusion that the system of international criminal 
justice should be further elaborated, in particular by unifying material and 
procedural law and by developing instruments of mutual assistance in the 
suppression of crimes. This would greatly help the process of eliminating 
obstacles to the effective implementation of international criminal law. 
Importantly, even if the ICC creates a system of binding precedents that is 
politically feasible, such a system remains unenforceable in the absence of an 
independent adjudicative body with appellate criminal jurisdiction. 
Although the jurisdiction of the ICC should remain limited to the core crimes 
while leaving open the possibility of broadening the scope of its jurisdiction 
through periodic amendments of the Statute, the Statute should have provided 
for compulsory jurisdiction since any conditioning or requests for additional 
consent by the States before a case may be referred to the Court is a retrograde 
step in respect of existing law. It appears that despite the efforts to provide 
mechanisms that redress the needs of accountability for the commission of the 
ýmost serious crimes of concern to the international community' only the 
corpus of general and treaty law proscribing torture has evolved to a relative 
level of universality. From this perspective the achievements of the ICC 
Statute remain in a fundamentally embryonic state. 
Chapter I examines the overall scope and effectiveness of the ICC Statute in 
advancing a precise and uniform international justice accountability 
mechanism. It pinpoints to lacunae of the ICC as well as to factors outside 
its 
regime which affect or otherwise condition the correct and most efficient 
application of its norms. In particular, under scrutiny are the effects of national 
and regional amnesties which survived the ICC Statute. Although no clear 
rules can be enunciated to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate 
amnesties under international law, their recognition and acceptance as an 
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important instrument in peace processes underscores the validity of national 
and regional accountability mechanisms whose principles rest on legal values 
and doctrines that are often in opposition with those of the ICC and of 
standardized international justice goals, Non-inclusion of universal jurisdiction 
in the Statute and the right to enter reservations regarding the Court's 
jurisdiction over war crimes further underline the discrepancy between the text 
of the Statute,, its goals and objectives as well as the consequent fragmented 
approach to its understanding and applicability. The relationship between 
domestic and ICC rules on sentencing and plea-bargaining aim at illustrating 
the difficulties inherent in a hybrid criminal justice system which encompasses 
diverging legal traditions whereby nations enjoy great, often constitutional 
discretion,, in harmonising through implementation the norms of the ICC with 
those of national legal orders. The overall result of numerous varying 
implementation methods and aims is an inconsistent international criminal 
justice order. Accordingly, Chapter I examines through complementarity, 
jurisdictional links between the Court, States Parties and in part, States Non- 
Parties. Far from revealing characteristics of universality and consistency of 
the ICC criminal justice model, this examination identifies the sui generis 
nature of the ICC. From this perspective Chapter I outlines the need for 
decentralisation. of the ICC and importantly, its involvement at a local level 
with the aim of promoting and advancing international justice doctrines by 
gradually stimulating local legal, ultimately institutional, change. 
Chapter 2 examines the varying and often contradictory applications of the 
ICC rules by evaluating its surrender/extradition model. Traditionally, in the 
event of conflict between an extradition treaty and a constitutional order 
provision, the latter prevails. In contrast, in surrender proceedings, such as 
those enforced by international tribunals operating by transcribing UN Chapter 
VII authority, a person is in effect prevented from obtaining full adjudication 
on the merits of domestic laws prior to surrender. However, when travaux 
preparatoire of the Rome Treaty are closely analysed, it becomes apparent that 
the ICC Statute takes a retrograde step with respect to existing ICTY/ICTR 
surrender laws as well as judicial and political necessities behind them. 
Although the ICC Statute does not refer to 'extradition', domestic restrictions 
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to extradition are, in principle, in contravention with the cooperation and 
surrender framework of the ICC. From this perspective surrender is examined 
in particular through the survival of extradition laws in ICC surrender 
proceedings, especially with regard to defences to extradition such as ne bis in 
idem, nulla poena sine lege and specialty. That the ICC Statute establishes 
only "minimum ... rules of conduct"I and does not prevent States to employ 
conventional extradition rules may also be evidenced through Article 10 of the 
Statute, which intends to preserve the existing or developing customary law 
outside the ICC regime. Moreover, the relationship between extradition and 
surrender is analysed in the context of the rights of the accused, in particular 
that of habeas corpus in pre-trial proceedings and against prima facie cases 
before the ICC since traditional prohibitions against extradition involve the 
guaranteeing of due process rights. The examination also unveils that the usage 
of the term 'extradition' in ICC implementing legislations favours national 
proceedings. This in turn is an indicator of the preservation of judicial 
autonomy. therefore sovereignty. Notwithstanding the underlying 
acknowledgment of doctrinal differences between 'extradition' and 
'surrender', Chapter 2 demonstrates that in practice, extradition and its 
conventional defences will apply to ICC proceedings. 
Moreover, in order to determine jurisdictional hierarchy during the surrender 
process, the principle 'aut dedere aut judicare' is examined through 
complementarity norms. This pinpoints to the indistinctness between the 
obligation to investigate, prosecute or surrender on the part of former and 
present governments. In this regard the ICC Statute lacks specificity and 
consequently the rights of suspects and accused persons may be hampered 
due 
to the resulting leeway afforded to national authorities. From this perspective 
the equivalence of pre-trial procedural rights as well as their observance and 
progression between the ICC vis-a-vis States is analysed. By examining 
both 
international and national jurisprudence with regard to mala captus 
bene 
detentus principle, the reach of the right to challenge the legality of one's 
arrest is evaluated with a conclusion that there 
is no uniform state or 
1 Sadat L. N., "Custom Codification and some Thoughts about the Relationship between the 
Two: Article 10 of the ICC Statute", 49 De Paul Rev. 2000, p. 923. 
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international practice and that the ICC Statute does not resolve the status of the 
doctrine nor does it regulate the effects of abuse of process against accused 
persons in consideration also of the fact that, under the Statute, States are not 
able to question and scrutinize the basis and content of ICC arrest warrants. 
In Chapter 2 amnesties once more illustrate that States retain important powers 
in controlling pre-trial proceedings especially with regard to reconciling the 
needs for accountability with national socio-political emergencies and 
objectives. Moreover, the trend in customary law to prosecute all war crimes 
must not presume the invalidation of amnesties but rather with annihilation of 
impunity, particularly in light of the fact that the Statute permits the State 
Parties to 'opt out' of the Court's jurisdiction over war crimes for seven years. 
The furtherance of extradition norms as well as amnesties in ICC surrender 
proceedings clearly evidence the binary nature of the ICC Statute 
interpretation as well as the consequential inequality in the nature and 
accessibility to human rights protections against procedural abuse across the 
globe. 
The language adopted in procedural law of the ICC Statute does not 
encompass the pure terms of the adversarial or inquisitorial models of criminal 
procedure nor does it reflect any of the existing hybrid structures. By 
examining ICC travaux. preparatoire it becomes apparent that the drafters of 
the Statute deliberately applied a degree of vagueness: Court's criminal 
procedure is unique in that the Statute leaves to the judges to strike the 
appropriate balance between adversarial and inquisitorial elements. This power 
or discretion, characteristic of common law systems, is unqualified in the 
Statute. From this perspective the interplay between pre-trial procedural 
regime of the ICC and external components such as domestic rules are 
indispensable in getting an accurate picture of the ICC reach during 
investigations and initial proceedings. Chapter 3 examines the jurisdictional 
reach of the ICC by outlining pre-trial issues relating to the transfer of criminal 
proceedings and in particular those relating to the equality of arms, 
presumption of innocence and right to habeas corpus against a prima facie 
cases. The research verifies that procedural rights of suspects and accused 
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persons before national and international courts and tribunals for serious 
international crimes are sporadically afforded but frequently neglected and 
denied. In fact, there is no uniform national or international habeas corpus 
practice and Chapter 3 emphasises the pivotal need for the ICC as well as 
national authorities to establish and unconditionally protect these rights. Only 
a synchronised approach to the application of judicial review may validate and 
ensure authority of international criminal law. Such synchronisation 
necessitates the evolution of municipal international criminal law. In order to 
minimise abuse of process, therefore miscarriages of justice, all investigations 
and prosecutions should be inclined in favour of the defence. In this context 
parameters of complementarity are also questioned by considering situations 
that are not envisaged by the ICC Statute or its Rules of Procedure of 
Evidence. In particular, the research reveals that when assessing whether 
proceedings are being conducted in good faith by local authorities, variables 
'inability' and 'unwillingness' are not adequately qualified. Consequently, no 
satisfactory redress against abuse of process is available to accused persons. 
By looking into numerous domestic legislations the study furthermore 
concludes that constitutional orders determine the extent to which the ICC 
regime may interfere with national judicial sovereignty. Such conclusion is 
supported by the fact that there is nothing in the wording of the Statute to 
prevent a State Party to enter into subsequent treaties which regulate 
obligations between States and the ICC Treaty, therefore modify in practice its 
scope and reach. 
The wording of the Statute lacks specificity, which coupled with the exclusion 
of forceful enforcement measures generates varying degrees of applicability, 
cooperation, therefore justice. In international criminal law that is concerned 
with the most serious international crimes, mutual legal assistance is not 
necessarily the most adequate method of securing cooperation. The present 
study locates complexities involved in affirming jurisdiction under 
complementarity, in identifying sources of procedural safeguards as well as 
assessing their effectiveness in ICC proceedings. Uncooperative States may 
be 
referred to the Security Council, if a situation has been referred by 
it to the 
Court. This leads to the conclusion that normative regime of the ICC is 
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significantly dependant, therefore associated with the Security Council as 
illustrated most recently with the case of Sudan. In fact, clear lines of authority 
must be drawn between the Court and the Security Council. The Council must 
be prevented, through an amendment of the ICC Statute, from halting judicial 
proceedings whereby the Prosecutor shall have the right to initiate or continue 
investigations in the absence of any decision of the Council. Most importantly, 
whatever penal obligation is imposed on a State, it must form part of a duty to 
achieve highest standards of justice for the defendant. With the objective of 
addressing State responsibility in investigating and prosecuting the violations 
of international criminal law, the Security Council and the Court should work 
concurrently but independently from one another, and not one to the detriment 
of the other. The type of legal cooperation, depending on whether the ICC is 
acting on its inherent investigative or prosecutorial powers or in pursuance of a 
Security Council referral, is not, per se, more relevant than the existence of 
some form of review process of abuses of individual's procedural and human 
rights on the part of the ICC as well as national courts and law enforcement 
agencies in general. Since arrests entail depravation of liberty, this should be 
of Paramount importance when effecting surrender. Local courts must, through 
habeas corpus writs, observe fundamental procedural human rights, and the 
thesis observes namely the protection from the risk of deliberate violation of a 
fair trial and the protection from a prima facie case against indictee. The 
enforcement of ICC requests and the observance of human rights must occur in 
concurrence and not in isolation to the detriment of inconsistency and 
inequality. In this respect Chapter 3 also assesses the roles of the ICC 
Prosecutor and national and international safeguards against potential arbitrary 
exercise of his /her powers and discretion. Beyond the doctrinal evaluation of 
the 'unaccountable' Prosecutor, his functions are examined against the right of 
accused persons to appeal against prima facie cases in particular where 
principles of equality between the parties in collecting, accessing and 
presenting evidence are brought into question. Any derogation from procedural 
requirements and human rights must not be to the detriment of individuals who 
are now recognised as subjects of ICL. Treaties like the ICCPR, ECHR AND 
ACHR allow an individual to plead their rights before both domestic and 
international courts and most importantly to have the international courts 
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uphold those rights. ICC Art. 21 (1) (b) and (3) explicitly impose the obligation 
on the ICC to synchronise its law making "with internationally recognised 
human rights". The ramifications of waiving due process and fairness 
guarantees in pre-trial proceedings on part of the ICC, such as for example 
accepting illegally obtained accused persons and admitting illegally obtained 
evidence in order to establish a case will have a significant effect in validating 
the international criminal process. The Court's stand that it does not have 
jurisdiction to question the legality of one's arrest, not providing habeas corpus 
redress in such situations and its rules on admissibility of illegally obtained 
evidence clearly undermine the protection of fundamental human rights. 
Departure from pre-trial due process guarantees will significantly weaken the 
credibility and effectiveness of the Court and it will consequently reinforce 
national political and adjudicative powers and discretion. 
The preservation of local judicial autonomy, which furthers inconsistencies in 
the application of the Statute, is evidenced through Article 98 (2) immunity 
agreements revealing non-hierarchical obligations for States Parties under the 
ICC Treaty. Chapter 4 indicates to the strong political dimension within which 
immunity agreements are concluded and within which the terms of the ICC 
Statute are commonly altered or reinterpreted. Demonstrative is the evaluation 
of the role of the Security Council which through its resolutions effectively 
modified the terms of ICC Article 16 (SC Res. 1422 (2002)) and irrefutably 
reiterated that the Statute cannot bind third parties (SC Res. 1593 (2005)), 
therefore rejected any claims of universality of the same. Immunity 
agreements, which damage the object and purpose of the Rome Treaty, as well 
as their recognition in recent Security Council decisions, underline furthermore 
that the Court is not independent from the Council but is rather an extension of 
it. These agreements as well as their increasing number must not be 
undermined or marginally treated as 'exceptions' to the correct 
implementation and application of the Statute. Chapter 4 illustrates that in ICC 
States Parties, also parties to these agreements, political and economical 
emergencies are likely to prevail in surrender requests. Identifying and 
examining U. S. ICC-related national legislation, such as ASPA, 
illustrate this 
point. 
295 
Immunity agreements do not fall under the provisions of Article 98 (2) as their 
scope of application ratione personae is too broad if the object and purpose of 
the ICC Treaty is considered. Importantly, however, when their validity is 
examined against the backdrop of the law of competing treaties, it is revealed 
that non-surrender agreements are valid regardless of their conflict with the 
Statute. Consequently, States Parties to these agreements have obligations, on 
one hand towards the United States and on the other towards the Court and 
other ICC States Parties. Even when these agreements purport that each party 
shall investigate and prosecute the 'core crimes' the Court will not be able to 
assess domestic proceedings by evaluating the 'inability' or 'unwillingness' of 
a particular judicial system. It remains for ICC States Parties to amend the 
terms of Art. 98 (2) agreements in order to comply with requests under the 
Statute. 
International law and international criminal justice cannot operate and survive 
in vacuity as a discipline that exists outside the 'State'. Although ICC law as 
well as human rights should form part of an independent, supranational entity, 
binding unconditionally and indiscriminately all States, these normative rules 
are far from having emancipated to a, perhaps utopian, level of totality and 
uniformity. The creation of the ICC and its enforcement mechanisms represent 
the proper progress in that direction, but only a tentative one. In fact, the 
Statute is the end result of numerous conflicting interests and viewpoints. The 
compromise it represents reflects the need to overcome legal, political and 
cultural divergences by expressing rules at a level of generality as 
demonstrated through the survival of doctrines such as those of extradition 
defences, amnesties, immunity agreements and others. Being a sui generis, 
treaty based organ, it must operate in harmony with all States Parties. 
The ICC plays a timely role in promoting awareness of the nature, extent and 
consequences of crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide as well as in raising levels of international participation in the 
process of punishment of such crimes. As the thesis purports, much will 
depend on whether a particular State adheres to a monist or dualist, 
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parliamentary or constitutional model of appreciation of the relationship 
between domestic and international law. Unfortunately, international 
prosecution of the core crimes has typically been reserved for small, poor or 
third world countries. 
A sophisticated strategy to durable international and national accountability 
mechanisms must aim towards restoration rather than retribution. Both 
prosecutorial and sentencing policies should have restoration as their primary 
goal. The aims of accountability under the ICC Statute cannot exist in a 
vacuum, outside the wider context of societies affected by the crimes 
committed. Judgments cannot be properly made nor sentences pronounced 
when questions of how nations should overcome and then deter violence are 
overlooked. Advancing deterrence demands that these questions do not remain 
neglected. The centralised Court cannot properly deal with the scale and 
complexities of such assignments, nor can the U. N. alone 2. Because of the 
multiplicity of international criminality, legitimacy and consistency of long- 
term accountability mechanisms demand a multilateral approach to the 
enforcement of criminal justice. Monopoly over international criminal justice, 
as advanced through the powers of the Security Council under the ICC Stature, 
is contrary to the interests of an international community whose common 
objectives are, by virtue of being parties to the U. N. Charter, peace and 
security. Adjudication of a domestic situation, which is distant from its 
original context, is in most situations inappropriate; the ICC should not 
sequester the opportunity for a country to expose and then account for serious 
international crimes. Contrary to the belief that since such crimes are "of 
concern to the international community as a whole", as reiterated by the ICC 
Statute, they may only be competently adjudicated internationally, the present 
thesis concludes that in order to prevent the risks of conflicts and the 
committing of crimes of humanity, war crimes and genocide, local population 
and local institutions must be exposed to all the evidence of the execution of 
such crimes. This in turn will serve to diminish the culture of denial. 
2 See Annan K., "We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First 
Century", Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Millennium Assembly, 
2000, A/54/2000. 
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Significant in this view is the appreciation of the proximity factor; proximity to 
the crimes, perpetrators, victims, evidence as well as the proximity to the legal 
process which will restore justice and as a consequence, social as well as 
political balance. Whereas prosecutions of crimes by the Court may be more 
immediate and adhere to the higher standards of criminal justice, they do not, 
per se, affect considerable legal, cultural and/or institutional change. Bridging 
gaps between warring nations and between perpetrators of crimes and victims 
may only be effected through negotiation, which begins with accountability 
and collective acceptance of responsibility. Nonetheless, local judges should 
be trained to represent the interests of the international community. Bearing in 
mind that the "ICC in not an international court of appeal, nor is it a human 
rights body designed to monitor all imperfections of legal systeMS,, 3 the ICC 
could play a crucial role by disseminating international law by monitoring 
national accountability process. Although the ICC does not have the authority 
to directly supervise or interfere with local proceeding, by training local 
investigators, prosecutors and judges and by monitoring criminal proceedings 
the Court could gradually 'internationalise' national courts, whereby judges 
from the ICC could sit provisionally in domestic trials; this would create a 
symbiosis between the jurisprudence of the Court and that of national courts. It 
should be observed here that by virtue of correctly incorporating the ICC 
Statute into national legal system, international crimes retain their international 
character in a nationalized, international jurisprudence. By employing judges 
from the Court, the chances of inadequate or arbitrary interpretations of the 
ICC law would be moderated and a more consistent and uniform application of 
international criminal law would be increased. In this way greater certainty, 
therefore predictability of the ICC law would be enhanced and res judicata 
developed. Moreover, this balanced solution would preserve both national 
interests of a particular country and the common interests of the international 
community as a whole. By promoting national and accordingly regional 
stability, national courts will, in the future, move from answering primarily 
national concerns to addressing simultaneously also issues of other interested 
parties, and ultimately, and by implication, those of peace and security which 
3 ICC-OTP, Informal Expert Paper: "The principle of complementarity in practice" (2003), 
p. 16. 
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are in the interest of the whole of the international community. This conclusion 
does not attempt to undermine difficulties inherent in the process of 
penetrating primarily national political institutions and persuading 
authoritarian governments to adhere to the above model (in fact, independent 
from the strategies and aims of the Court, resort to political, economic or 
military measures must remain open), or if competent, to alone fulfil duties 
under aut dedere aut judicare, which exists also outside the ICC Statute. The 
integration of ICC law within national legal culture and legal environment 
remains at present fragmented. Ultimately, this fragmentation reflects 
regionalism, which entails different perspectives from which the ICC Statute 
will be appreciated and the degree to which it will interfere with other relevant 
national and regional rules and conditions. This is largely evidenced through 
distinct approaches to human rights across the globe. It suffice to mention here 
the Asian position which infers that human rights, as set out by the West, are 
founded on individualism and accordingly have no substantial relevance in 
Asia where the political and legal doctrines are based on principles of 
collectivism. This communitarian argument is pivotal for a widespread claim 
against the universality of human rights. In order to reflect and, to a moderate 
level, accommodate legal and cultural diversities, regional rather than 
universal human treaties have been introduced, such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights (1950), the American Convention on Human 
Rights (1978) and the African Charter of Human and People's Rights (1981). 
Alleging that the number of ICC States Parties represents the grounds for a 
consensus and harmonised international society based on peace and security, is 
an argument dismantled if it is taken into consideration how many of ICC 
States Parties are parties to Article 98 (2) agreements and how many 
permanent members of the Security Council are engaged in extensive arming. 
Whilst in principle human rights are universal and norms of jus cogens non- 
derogable, the application of these rights within each society and culture will 
vary. Contrary to the proposition in the ICC Preamble that all States share 
common bonds, the Vienna Declaration acknowledges the importance of 
appreciating different cultural backgrounds and advises that these 
factors must 
be 'bourn in mind'. 
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The extent and scope within which the protection of individual rights is 
paramount will depend largely upon and therefore reflect the prosecutorial 
functions, which may be instrumental in either preserving the general 
constitutional interests or be considered as the apparatus through which 
governmental policies are implemented. Highest standards of objective justice 
and legality as visualized by the ICC Statute demand progressive suppressing 
of all levels of political discretion in order to avoid differential or 
discriminatory treatment of persons in similar circumstances/cases. Extending 
this argument further leads also to a conclusion that advancing and enhancing 
the uniformity of application of the ICC Statute must too result in founding a 
clear corpus of res judicata or estoppel in international criminal law that is still 
largely underdeveloped, as evidenced through the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals. Only then may the ICC Statute begin its emancipation into 
customary international law. 
In summary, the ICC can play a crucial role on three levels. The first, most 
important one is developing and promoting conditions for further clarification 
of law by employing consistent legal standards and reasoning; secondly, this 
consistency should result in strengthening of local law-related institutions that 
would, as a consequence, enhance conditions for development by promoting 
the rule of law and thirdly deeper the goal of increasing government's 
compliance with the law through imposing equal measures against all 
uncooperative nations. The latter aim is unquestionably the most difficult to 
achieve as it requires a substantial degree of interventionalism on a national 
level and within a national socio-economic context as well as political 
attention as long lasting, effective reforms or developments, cannot be reached 
without a society wide consensus. Promoting the protection of rights of 
suspects and defendants is strongly linked to 'development', which enhances 
the conditions for the building the rule of law. Efforts to promote aspects of 
the rule of law that strengthen the pivotal protection of fundamental rights are 
both an end in themselves and are a route to the promotion of regional, 
ultimately international peace and stability through political and economic 
growth. Education and dissemination of international criminal law as well as 
humanitarian law at all levels, military and in particular civilian, must form 
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part of a long-term policy towards greater, global accountability and 
deterrence. 
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